State v. QuinnState v. Quinn
Defendant-appellant, Christopher Quinn, appeals his conviction in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for burglary and grand theft of a vehicle.
In the early morning hours of August 21, 1998, Quinn, George M. Thomas III, Chad Taylor, and Rickey Harbrecht 1 broke into Daniel Frick’s house at 3853 West Elkton Road, Hamilton, Butler County, Ohio. Harbrecht had discovered that the Frick family was on vacation, and, believing that there was a large safe *461 in the house, the defendants broke into the house through a first-floor window. After failing to discover the safe, the defendants ransacked the house for valuables and began loading the Fricks’ 1990 Ford Escort, which was parked in the front drive, with stolen belongings. The defendants vandalized the house, urinating throughout the residence.
As a next-door neighbor was retrieving his morning newspaper, he noticed the defendants loading up the Escort. The neighbor promptly notified the police. Upon being discovered, Thomas and Taylor fled the scene on foot, going to Harbrecht’s mother’s house. Quinn and Harbrecht drove off in the Escort. They later unloaded the stolen belongings and set the car on fire.
On October 5,1998, the grand jury returned a five-count indictment against the defendants. As relevant to Quinn, Count One charged burglary, a violation of
On November 10,1998, Quinn entered a guilty plea to burglary and grand theft of a motor vehicle. After informing Quinn of his rights, and being assured that he was knowingly waiving those rights, the trial court heard the state’s statements of the facts. The trial court then accepted the guilty plea.
On January 6, 1999, Quinn appeared for sentencing. After Quinn told the trial court that he was sorry for committing the crimes, the trial court heard from the victims. The trial court proceeded to sentence Quinn, finding that the crime was shocking to the conscience, “the worst possible form of the offense,” and “unforgivable.” The trial court ordered that Quinn serve a five-year term of imprisonment and pay a $10,000 fine on the burglary charge and serve an eighteen-month term of imprisonment on the charge of grand theft of a vehicle, the sentences to be served concurrently. Quinn appeals, raising a single assignment of error:
“The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant in sentencing him to the maximum stated prison terms without properly considering the seriousness and recidivism factors as required by Ohio Revised Code, Section 2929.12.”
In his assignment of error, Quinn contests the trial court’s determination that he serve the maximum prison terms for his offenses. Quinn asserts that the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing factors. He argues that he should have been sentenced to less than the maximum allowable terms of imprisonment.
*462
An appellate court may not disturb a sentence imposed under Am.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence is not supported by the record or is contrary to law.
The sentencing court is given wide discretion in determining the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of Senate Bill 2. “[A] reviewing court will not interfere with a sentence unless the trial court abused its discretion.”
State v. Yontz
(1986),
The trial court sentenced Quinn to the maximum allowable terms of imprisonment for his offenses, which he contends was excessive. Pursuant to
If the offender has not served a previous prison term, the trial court must impose the minimum sentence, unless the trial court finds on the record that to do so would “demean the seriousness of the offender’s conduct” or “not adequately protect the public from future crime by the offender or others.”
When reviewing the seriousness of an offender’s conduct, the trial court is guided by
Although the trial court is not required to use the magic words of the statute, substantial compliance is required.
State v. Estrada
(Sept. 18, 1998),
*463
Sandusky App. No. S-98-006, unreported,
The trial court’s comments at the sentencing hearing and its judgment entry of sentencing make it clear that the trial court felt that any sentence less than the maximum allowable terms of imprisonment would demean the seriousness of Quinn’s conduct. The trial court specifically stated that his crimes were the “worst form of the offense,” involving not only breaking into the victims’ home, but also extensive vandalism of their property. The defendants also urinated throughout the house and set the Fricks’ automobile on fire. The trial court also found, regarding Quinn, that the theft of the vehicle and subsequent arson made his offenses that much more unconscionable. The victims stated and the trial court found that severe emotional harm had been inflicted as a result of Quinn’s conduct.
Upon a thorough review of the record, it is clear that the trial court found that Quinn committed “the worst forms of the offense” as required by
Quinn asserts that the trial court failed to make findings regarding recidivism, asserting that they are required by
The sentences imposed were supported by the record and sufficient findings by the trial court. Accordingly, Quinn’s assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. When referred to collectively, Quinn, Thomas, Taylor, and Harbrecht will be referred to as "the defendants.” Otherwise, the defendants will be referred to individually.