STATE OF OHIO v. JAMES QUINN
Appellate Case No. 2014-CA-95
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
January 15, 2016
2016-Ohio-140
Trial Court Case No. 13-CR-869 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Rendered on the 15th day of January, 2016.
RYAN A. SAUNDERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0091678, Clark County Prosecutor‘s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
LUCAS W. WILDER, Atty. Reg. No. 0074057, 120 West Second Street, Suite 400, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
FAIN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant James Quinn appeals from an order of the Clark
I. The Assault on Quinn‘s Mother
{¶ 2} The victim, Beverly Quinn, is a 79-year-old woman, the mother of two daughters and two sons, including the defendant, James Quinn. In December 2013, Quinn‘s girlfriend, Samantha Ferrell, was living with Quinn‘s mother, Beverly, in her two-bedroom house. At that time, Quinn was under indictment for a domestic violence incident involving his mother; as a condition of bond he was subject to a no-contact order with his mother. Late in the evening, Beverly was awakened by noise, and found Quinn and Ferrell in her home, drinking vodka and watching television. Beverly told Quinn he was not allowed to be there and asked Quinn to leave, to turn off the television, and for Samantha to go to her room. Quinn became very angry with his mother, pushed her into a chair, and hit her. When Quinn suggested to Samantha that they take his mother to “mental health,” Samantha suggested that they take Beverly out into the country and dump her. Beverly then ran to her own bedroom, locked the door, and left the house by crawling out of the bedroom window. Beverly went to a neighbor‘s house and called the
{¶ 3} According to Beverly‘s testimony at trial, several hours later Quinn returned to his mother‘s home, without Samantha, forced entrance into his mother‘s bedroom, and forced his mother to leave the house with him, threatening to take her to the country and make her jump off a bridge. Beverly described her son as very angry and intoxicated on alcohol and drugs. Beverly left with her son because she felt she had no choice. He drove out into the country, stopped at a bridge and said, “if you don‘t jump, I‘ll push you.” According to Beverly, Quinn decided he could not do it, and told her that he wouldn‘t do anything to her as long as she did not testify against him. Beverly testified at trial that Quinn then drove to Walmart, hitting her in the head numerous times as he was driving. After he left the car, Beverly got out of the car and approached a Walmart employee for help. She told the employee that her son had hurt her and was trying to kill her. The Walmart employee verified this course of events and testified that Beverly was scared, but she knew who she was, where she was, and was not disoriented or confused. The Walmart employee testified that as Beverly was talking to him, a man came up to both of them, grabbed Beverly‘s arm and complained that she was trying to hurt him. The employee insisted that he let go and leave her alone. A surveillance video of the Walmart
{¶ 4} The detective who interviewed Beverly at Walmart testified that Beverly identified her son, James Quinn, as the person who attacked her in her home, who forced her into a car, threatened to harm her, and hit her face, causing visible injuries. The detective also testified that during his interview on the scene, Beverly was very emotional, but lucid and articulate about the events of the evening. Based on this interview, the detective obtained a search warrant. A search of Beverly‘s home revealed evidence that her bedroom door had been damaged as the result of being forced open.
{¶ 5} Beverly was transported to the hospital by ambulance and treated in the Emergency Room at Springfield Regional Medical Center. The paramedic who transported Beverly testified that she was alert and oriented. The ER Nurse testified that Beverly was oriented, and did not appear to suffer from dementia or any other mental defect. The ER Nurse testified that Beverly identified her son as the person who had hit and injured her.
{¶ 6} At trial, evidence of Quinn‘s two prior convictions for Domestic Violence was admitted through court records. Beverly acknowledged that she was the victim of one of the prior Domestic Violence convictions.
{¶ 7} In November 2013, Quinn was indicted on one count of Domestic Violence, a felony of the third degree, in violation of
{¶ 8} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two Kidnapping charges and the Abduction charge for purposes of sentencing. The State elected to proceed on count three, a charge of Kidnapping. The court denied the defense request to merge Kidnapping with the Intimidation conviction, rejecting the argument that both were committed by the same conduct. The defendant made a statement to express his remorse, and the victim‘s granddaughter made a statement to explain the impact on the family. The State described Quinn‘s criminal history, although neither a pre-sentence investigation report, nor any other documentation, was presented to support the statements. The State urged the court to order consecutive sentences because the
{¶ 9} Quinn was sentenced to serve a total of twenty years in prison; three years for each of the two Domestic Violence convictions, three years for the Intimidation conviction, and eleven years for the Kidnapping conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, after finding that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the defendant, are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant‘s conduct and to the danger the defendant poses to the public, are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the defendant given the defendant‘s history of criminal conduct, that at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as a course of conduct, that the harm caused by the offenses so committed is so great or unusual that no single prison term adequately reflects the seriousness of the defendant‘s conduct, and that the defendant committed one or more offenses while he was under indictment awaiting trial.
{¶ 10} Four months after the trial and conviction, Quinn filed a motion for a new trial and attached three affidavits; his own affidavit and two affidavits from his mother, Beverly, who recanted her trial testimony. The motion also requested a hearing. In the affidavits filed in support of the motion for a new trial, Beverly avers that her testimony was based on what she was told by her family and by the prosecutor. She avers that at the time of the incident, she was not wearing her glasses or hearing aid, and she was on medication that caused her confusion. She avers that she does not believe that Quinn committed the crimes against her, because she knows he had consumed two fifths of
The defendant offered no new evidence that would create a strong possibility that a different result would occur. The victim‘s testimony was clearly supported by the surveillance video from Walmart, where it is clear that the victim ran from defendant‘s car. The Defendant is depicted on the video leaving very quickly when he sees his mother has the attention of the store clerk. The victim is the defendant‘s mother and it is only natural that she might change her testimony as she has done in past hearings, but the Walmart video clearly supports the victim‘s testimony at trial. Therefore, defendant has offered no new evidence that shows any probability that any different result would apply to the facts of this case.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Overruling the Motion for a New Trial Without Conducting a Hearing
{¶ 11} Quinn‘s First and Second Assignments of Error will be considered together, which assert as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION DENYNG THE DEFENDANT‘S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE BELIEF THAT THE TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY THE SURVEILLANCE VIDEO AND WOULD NOT CREATE A STRONG PROBABILITY OF A DIFFERENT RESULT AT TRIAL
{¶ 12} A ruling on a motion for a new trial is within the trial court‘s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990); State v. Williams, 43 Ohio St.2d 88, 330 N.E.2d 891 (1975). “[I]t is within the trial court‘s discretion to determine whether or not it is necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing on a new trial motion.” State v. Moore, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 9, 2014-Ohio-358, ¶ 19, citing State v. Green, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05 MA 116, 2006-Ohio-3097, ¶ 11. An abuse of discretion “implies that the court‘s attitude [was] unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.” AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Redevelopment, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
{¶ 13} In State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505, 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[t]o warrant the granting of a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, based on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that the new evidence (1) discloses a strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been discovered since the trial, (3) is such as could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered before the trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is
{¶ 14} In Dayton v. Martin, 43 Ohio App.3d 87, 90, 539 N.E.2d 646 (2d Dist. 1987), we concluded that “[w]hile Petro stands for the proposition that newly discovered evidence that merely impeaches or contradicts other evidence is not enough for a new trial, we do not read Petro as establishing a per se rule excluding newly discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial simply because that evidence is in the nature of impeaching or contradicting evidence. The test is whether the newly discovered evidence would create a strong probability of a different result at trial, or whether it is merely impeaching or contradicting evidence that is insufficient to create a strong probability of a different result.” Accord State v. Smith, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23945, 2011-Ohio-2189, ¶¶ 24-25; State v. McConnell, 170 Ohio App.3d 800, 2007-Ohio-1181, 869 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 15} When the motion for a new trial is based upon newly discovered evidence which is primarily the recantation of the prosecution‘s primary witness, we have held that the trial court “must make two findings: (1) which of the contradictory testimonies of the recanting witness is credible and true, and if the recantation is believable; (2) would the recanted testimony have materially affected the outcome of the trial?” State v. Arnold, 189 Ohio App.3d 507, 2010-Ohio-5379, 939 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.), citing Toledo v. Easterling, 26 Ohio App.3d 59, 498 N.E.2d 198 (6th Dist. 1985). Accord State v. Williams, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19854, 2004-Ohio-3135.
{¶ 16} In the case before us, the trial court, without holding a hearing, determined that the trial testimony of the victim was more credible than the statements she made in
{¶ 17} To determine which of the contradictory testimonies of a recanting witness is credible and true, a trial court must be able to point to evidentiary support in the record for its conclusion. In most cases where a motion for a new trial is based on recanted testimony of the State‘s primary witness, it will be necessary for the trial court to conduct a hearing to weigh the credibility of the testimony. See, e.g., State v. McConnell, 170 Ohio App.3d 800, 2007-Ohio-1181, 869 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.); State v. Wright, 67 Ohio App.3d 827, 588 N.E.2d 930 (2d Dist. 1990); State v. Fuson, 5th Dist. Knox No. 02CA23, 2002-Ohio-6601, ¶ 10 (evidentiary hearing on motion for new trial necessary to more accurately access the credibility of the witnesses because it is difficult to compare written and live testimony). “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co. v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). In other cases, a trial court can rule on the motion for a new trial, without a hearing, when the affidavit appears
{¶ 18} In the case before us, the trial court determined that the recanted testimony would not affect the outcome of the trial because evidence of Quinn‘s guilt was independently established by the admission of the surveillance video. We disagree. The record establishes that no testimony was given from anyone to identify Quinn as the person in the video who made contact with Beverly and the Walmart employee. On both direct and cross-examination, the Walmart employee who talked with Beverly in the parking lot, could not identify Quinn as the person who approached him and Beverly and whom he asked to leave, as depicted in the video. Also contrary to the trial court‘s finding, the record contains no testimony from anyone who positively identified the car in the video as the defendant‘s car. Actually, the only testimony at trial regarding what car Quinn was driving was from Beverly, who said he was driving her tan sedan, not a white station wagon as depicted in the video. We have viewed the video, which does not reveal a clear or close enough view of the person‘s face to match it with Quinn. The video does not independently provide sufficient evidence to convict Quinn of any of the charged offenses.
{¶ 19} However, the record does contain sufficient support for finding that Beverly‘s testimony at trial was more credible than her post-trial affidavits. At trial,
{¶ 20} In reviewing motions for a new trial, we have applied case law established for reviewing the credibility of affidavits supporting petitions for post-conviction relief. State v. Beavers, 166 Ohio App.3d 605, 2006-Ohio-1128, 852 N.E.2d 754, ¶¶ 20-21 (2d Dist.). “In assessing the credibility of affidavits, the trial court should consider all relevant factors, including: ‘(1) whether the judge reviewing the post-conviction relief petition also presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical language, or
{¶ 21} In the case before us, all of the Calhoun factors justify a conclusion that the affidavits filed in support of the motion for a new trial lacked credibility. The trial judge who presided over the trial is the same judge who reviewed the affidavit and determined its lack of credibility. In their post-trial affidavits, both Quinn and his mother describe his level of intoxication on the night of the offenses as “too drunk to stand.” Beverly‘s statements regarding how much Quinn had to drink and his ability to drive on the night of the incident, if believed, had to be based on hearsay statements Quinn made to her. She also claims that her original story was derived from fear based on hearsay statements made to her by family and the prosecutor. However, the trial testimony of the officers, the Walmart employee, and the ER Nurse confirmed that the story Beverly told at trial was consistent with the statements she made to them on the night of the incident, before she talked to her other family members or the prosecutor. The affidavits were signed by Quinn‘s mother, who may naturally want to protect her son from long-term incarceration.
{¶ 22} Based on the circumstances of the case before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err by not conducting a hearing on the motion for a new trial, or by overruling the motion for a new trial. Therefore, Quinn‘s First and Second Assignment of Errors are overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 23} Both assignments of error having been overruled, the order of the trial court overruling Quinn‘s motion for a new trial is Affirmed.
DONOVAN, J., and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Ryan A. Saunders
Lucas W. Wilder
Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter