State of Ohio, Appellee v. Jeremy J. Quinn, Jr., Appellant
Court of Appeals Nos. L-14-1037, L-14-1045
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Decided: November 21, 2014
2014-Ohio-5211
Trial Court No. CR200502529
Jeremy J. Quinn, Jr., pro se.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} Jeremy J. Quinn, Jr., appellant, appeals judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas filed on February 10 and 14, 2014, denying post judgment motions by Quinn in his criminal case. In the February 10, 2014 judgment, the trial court denied Quinn‘s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial. In the February 14, 2014 judgment, the trial court denied Quinn‘s “motion to vacate void sentence.”
{¶ 2} Quinn was convicted of one count of kidnapping (a violation of
{¶ 3} Appellant made a direct appeal of the judgment. In a decision and judgment filed on February 29, 2008, this court affirmed. State v. Quinn, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-06-1003, 2008-Ohio-819. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave for further appeal on August 6, 2008. State v. Quinn, 119 Ohio St.3d 1410, 2008-Ohio-3880, 891 N.E.2d 770.
{¶ 4} Appellant filed an
{¶ 5} Appellant pursued federal habeas corpus relief. In a January 18, 2012 judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered the grant of federal habeas corpus relief, requiring resentencing on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) grounds. Quinn v. Ohio Dept. Rehab. and Corr., 6th Cir. No. 10-3490 (Jan. 18, 2012). Upon federal mandate, the trial court conducted a State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470 resentencing hearing on August 8, 2012 to remedy Blakely sentencing errors. The trial court also filed a resentencing judgment on that date.
{¶ 6} Appellant appealed the resentencing judgment to this court. In a January 31, 2014 judgment, we affirmed. State v. Quinn, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1242, 2014-Ohio-340. We denied appellant‘s
{¶ 7} Appellant filed both motions concerned in this appeal while the resentencing appeal was pending in this court. The motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial was filed on January 29, 2014. The “motion to vacate void sentence” was filed on February 11, 2014. Appellant filed timely appeals of the trial court judgments denying both motions. We have consolidated the appeals for proceedings in this court and placed them on the accelerated calendar.
{¶ 8} Appellant asserts two assignments of error:
Assignment of Error No. 1. The trial court erred when denying appellant‘s motion for new trial, violating rights guaranteed within the State and Federal Constitution. (A) There was clear and convincing proof that appellant was prevented unavoidably from filing his motion for a new trial
within the timeframe. (B) The trial court erred in denying appellant‘s motion for a new trial creating a manifest miscarriage of justice. Assignment of Error No. 2. The trial court erred when denying appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment in not issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law, violating rights guaranteed within the State and Federal Constitutions.
Denial of Leave to File Motion for New Trial
{¶ 9} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant him leave to file a motion for a new trial. Appellant contends that the motion should have been granted because he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel and because of claimed prosecutorial misconduct, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), in suppressing until trial the nature and results of DNA testing conducted by the state. The grounds are interrelated. Appellant contends that counsel was deficient in failing to object on Brady grounds to the state‘s failure to disclose before trial that DNA testing conducted by the state demonstrated the existence of seminal fluid in the alleged victim‘s vaginal vault and the fact that the state did not conduct DNA testing of the semen.
{¶ 10} The state argues that the motion for leave to file was properly denied because it was time barred under
{¶ 12} Where a motion for a new trial is based upon grounds set forth in
{¶ 13} Motions for a new trial under
{¶ 14} For purposes of the rule, unavoidably prevented from filing a motion for a new trial means “the party had no knowledge of the existence of the ground supporting the motion for new trial and could not have learned of the existence of that ground within
{¶ 15} An appellate court reviews the denial of leave to file a motion for a new trial under
{¶ 16} As appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial within the time provided under
{¶ 17} We find assignment of error No. 1 not well-taken.
{¶ 18} Assignment of error No. 2 concerns the trial court‘s denial of appellant‘s “motion to vacate void sentence,” which was filed on February 11, 2014. Appellant argues that the motion constituted a petition for postconviction relief under
{¶ 20} The state argues that the petition for postconviction relief was properly denied because it was not filed within the 180 day period set forth in
{¶ 21}
{¶ 22} A trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for postconviction relief, filed after the 180 day period, unless the delay in filing is excused under
{¶ 23}
{¶ 24} A trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for postconviction relief, filed after the 180 day period, unless the delay in filing is excused under
{¶ 25} Under such circumstances a trial court is not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to its denial of postconviction relief. The requirement under
{¶ 26} The doctrine of res judicata bars claims that were raised or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal:
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus.
{¶ 27} Whether the jury verdict forms complied with statutory requirements is an issue that could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. Henson, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-13-029, 2013-Ohio-4833, ¶ 7. Accordingly, we conclude that assignment of error No. 2 is also barred by res judicata.
{¶ 28} We find assignment of error No. 2 not well-taken.
{¶ 29} As justice has been afforded the party appealing, we affirm the judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. We order appellant to pay the costs of these appeals pursuant to
Judgments affirmed.
C.A. Nos. L-14-1037
L-14-1045
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J. CONCUR. _______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.