State v. Quinn

Minnesota, STATE

Petitioner, Appellant, QUINN, al.,

Mara Therese et

Respondents.

No. C7-88-14.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan.

Rehearing Denied March Johnson, Berg-

Thomas L. Vernon E. strom, Beitz, County Toni A. Hennepin Atty., Minneapolis, appellant. for McGlennen, Michael A. Demetruis Clem- ons, Cascarano, Craig Singer, M.G. Minne- apolis, respondents. for KELLEY, Justice.

As authorizing the result of a order wiretap, police intercepted conversations and later implicat- seized certain evidence ing respondents types in various of crimi- activity. respondents nal moved to suppress contending evidence authorizing its face fatally defective for failure to include statutory phrase that the warrant “must terminate attainment of the autho- objective.” rized Minn.Stat. § 4(h). By split decision, a court appeals panel affirmed a trial court order suppressing the evidence failure comply literally with the statute. State v. Quinn, (Minn.App.1988). N.W.2d granted petition We the state’s for further review. We conclude that the constitution- safeguard privacy al to the citizens’ rights protected fully substantial compli- ance with the statute’s mandate. There- fore, we reverse. Minneapolis Department Police spring of 1985commenced an investiga- suspected ring and was believed authorities to have been shoplifting

tion of a Dayton’s. stolen from pro- operation. An informant had fencing that a wide- police information vided A well planned burglary and successful fencing opera- spread and return” “boost store, Cedrics, retail of an Edina occurred Quinn being operated by Mara tion was Fifty-four fur on October coats During the course and Jerald Saliterman. $354,770 Eye valued were stolen. wit- Quinn made of a residence search from juvenile ness evidence a at the scene warrant, pursuant duly to a issued search implicated Saliterman as well as three oth- empty clothes racks and persons, pen register officers observed er whom the had to paraphernalia useful of recipients phone other items and identified as calls Quinn type placed in of a crimi- from the residence. employed and often that questioned Police enterprise. nal likewise police suspected of investigation purchased having to persons who admitted Quinn-Saliterman enterprise continued Quinn less at the residence for merchandise of months. Some over number Neighbors price. retail than the normal police by information furnished informants in complained heavy and out traffic had been confirmed to the extent that the During Quinn the course residence. police probable had cause to that believe continuing operations later and, surveillance Saliterman, others, Quinn perhaps and fall, that officers observed a number sophisticated, in a were involved somewhat Quinn coming extensive, high from the residence people and dollar volume criminal bags However, operation. tips those and carrying appeared what to be full follow- to up investigative pro- efforts had failed They also noted that al- merchandise. sufficient either ap- duce evidence convict Quinn though neither nor Saliterman person, any crime person, or other employed, they frequently peared to be be commensurate with the which would into resi- bags of merchandise brought in a scheme of extent their involvement during Intermittently the surveil- dence. magnitude. provided had period lance several sources indicating information officers with from, to, initially Separate unrelated suspected activity was criminal police investiga- on-going Minneapolis apprised ongoing. Those informants also tion, County deputy Hennepin sheriff Walt Quinn police had Saliterman from an infor- independently learned Power stores, working especially associates selling mant that Norman Mastrian was stealing. Dayton’s, them who assisted arranged through fur coats. Power stolen “placed” or- Police learned that customers Mastrian to be introduced to the informant Quinn ders with and Saliterman stolen Pretending to capacity. in an undercover by telephone. As the result merchandise purchasing coats Pow- interested fur register telephone on the at the pen negotiations during engaged purchase er Quinn residence, large police learned that he the coats was Mastrian admitted which telephone calls were made numbers Cedrics selling those stolen and from the residence. Saliterman had led burglary. Eventually negotiations A of the calls purchase by criminal record. number Power of two of the placed January During from the residence were to other those ne- 1986.1 coats A initiated under- had Power gotiations, convicted felons. Mastrian informed coats, 30 other while operation proved cover to be unsuccessful he had access to insisting acting targets recognized always he was the undercov- when the nonetheless register penA officer, only middleman. police informant was able as a er but a phone resi- Quinn on the at Mastrian’s purchase property placed from Quinn prosecute purchase, both connection sufficient state concedes that after the Saliterman, charges ring support up shoplifting evidence to sufficient break However, for the Mastrian sales. fencing operation, the coats and recover investigation real focus of its state asserts the the merchandise stolen stolen from Cedrics and many months was to secure evidence over persons. other from Saliterman, Quinn, establishing the Mastrian dence, pen register ther of as well an intentional act nor secretarial error in Quinn county attorney’s telephone, office. confirmed connection Quinn-Saliterman between Mastrian and conducting Officers had been telephone a number of communications in, followed, procedures trained to min- passing back and forth between the two imize of conversations over- residences. actually heard. The conversations moni- persons appeared tored were between who The failure of normal traditional investi- purchasers goods, to be of stolen those gative techniques produce sufficient evi- opera- involved in the “boost and return” gang dence to convict the members tion, personnel seemingly store involved crimes, police by which the now were scheme, with the and with individuals who being by persons certain were committed appeared to be shoplifting. involved with operation run involved an from the monitored, 231, Of telephone calls or 41 South, house at 1012 Avenue Min- Thomas percent activity related to criminal connect- neapolis, customary residence of sus- ed with the scheme. pects Saliterman, Quinn, Mara Gerald Ed- Simultaneously wiretap, with the Deputy Quinn Scholl, Greg prompted ward and Sheriff negotiations Power’s undercover police, by necessity, to authority seek with Norman Mastrian continued. Those place wiretap telephone. a on the house's negotiations ultimately resulted An Hennepin County attorney, assistant agreement by exchange Mastrian to 14 ad- aid, with their the application, sup- drafted ditional stolen coats cocaine. Wiretap affidavits, porting proposed and a warrant interceptions Quinn-Saliterman on the tele- signed by magistrate to be authorizing phone person also revealed that the form- wiretap. Those documents were then ing connecting link between them and by county attorney’s reviewed the assistant Terry Mastrian was February Martin. On superior, cpunty immediate and later 18, 1986, when Mastrian and Martin at- attorney they present- himself before were Power, tempted to deliver fur coats to Judge Fitzgerald ed to District Patrick on they immediately were arrested.2 10,1986. February Judge Fitzgerald, after Though neither mandated nor law documents, reviewing signed the war- itself, county warrant the assistant attor- authorizing rant surveillance. ney prepared and a report, furnished based provided authority its upon logs of monitored conversations ema- automatically terminate either ten nating Quinn-Saliterman to and from the days suspect charged. or when a As By residence. statute and warrant’s provided by 626A.06, subd. terms, specific wiretap authority ended 4(e) (1986), provided the warrant further at 11:42 on February Approxi- a.m. that the authorization should not “automat- mately 20 complaint minutes later a charg- ically terminate when the ing described com- Mastrian and possession Martin with munication has been first obtained.” The stolen fur coats filed.3 warrant did contain the minimization clause investigation into the activities of required by subd. ring beyond continued 4(h). The warrant did not state that the wiretap. As a intercep- result wiretap authorization would terminate tions, recovered, stolen property was identi- objec- attainment of the authorized fied and inventoried and were able to tive. See subds. locate and including interview witnesses 4(h), 5. This omission was the nei- result owners of some of stolen property.4 day representative 4.02, following 2. The provided 5(1) from Ce- as Rule and being drics identified of the 14 coats as coats Minn.R. of Crim.Pro. burglary. stolen in the The 13 coats had a retail 4.Property recovered and identified included $166,000. value of rings stolen in a burglary, Donald Anderson appear- 3. Mastrian and Martin made Dayton’s, their first furs stolen from glary furs stolen a bur- court, Gucci’s, ance charges before the and clothing were stolen from retail Phoenix, Arizona, filed Minneapolis, them within the 36 hour deadline stores alleging adopted that complaints recommendation. May On Because prop- receiving substantially complied stolen of counts number statutes, against Quinn, Judge federal Devitt held erty filed Saliterman statutory provision omission of others. from five body of the warrant did not render activities Because the discovered facially defective. Quinn may Saliterman have likewise Saliterman, 6-87-101, op. slip. CR statutes, criminal Minne- violated federal 7, 1987). (D.Minn., Dec. apolis Hennepin County law enforce- un- The identical agencies relayed the information issues were la- ment during investigation presented Hennepin County to local ter District covered August Judge adopted In May and Charles Porter. He federal authorities. hearing jury transcript as grand indictments were federal federal case, and, well, charging Quinn, record of the facts of the returned and filed Saliter- adopted Magistrate Symchych’s crimi- man, others with various federal recommen- and Judge one exception. dation with nal offenses. Porter Statutes, that under held Minnesota and suppress the evi- Pre-trial motions them, interpreting cases the failure in- wiretap in made both dence from were provision mandating clude hear- the state court.5 The federal and tap attainment of upon cessation in ing pending motion objective in the warrant itself authorized the out- pending court was deferred state facially wiretap rendered the warrant inval- hearing on identical motion come of the id, and, consequently, that the conversa- Magistrate court. United federal States intercepted tions and derivative evidence initially the motion. Symchych Janice heard wiretap result must seized as the be Dis- States She recommended United by a suppressed. ruling, split His affirmed challenges to the that all four trict Court appeals panel, resulted from a court of Specifically recom- denied. she warrant be and literal strict statu- challenge denial of the wire- mended language.6 tory notwithstanding that it omit- warrant by raised statutorily phrase that To resolve the issue this ted mandated “ * * * interpret portions must upon appeal, we must terminate warrant 626A, Statute, chapter the Pri objective Minnesota attainment of the authorized * * * 4(h) 626A.06, Specifically, Act. vacy of Communications MinmStat. subd. § provi so, doing “The must focus on four (1986).” In she stated: we 626A.06, (1) 5, subd. objectives lan- absence of the authorized sions: circumscribing wiretap of a order duration guage not fatal here. Because the is (2) intercept; subd. within clearly called for termination 1(d) applicant, upon earlier, authorizes an days, parties if one of named which showing, to making appropriate inter narrowly confined an charged, it is more conversations; (3)-(4) multiple particular cept in each the warrants than 4(e) (h) cases.” United upheld foregoing Saliterman, 6-87-101, slip, specify information to be included in States CR 23, 1987). statutory provi (D.Minn., Those four op. the warrant. at 19-20 Nov. attempts representative of initial- Judge Devitt sions are United States District challenged Winona, wiretap in both In the value of Motions courts Minnesota. addition to (1) grounds: probable Cedrics, on four Lack of retail value of stolen from the furs cause, (2) procedures, minimization insufficient $60,000. May property On recovered (4) (3) particularity, lack termi- lack 1987, 15, charges receiving and con- criminal provision. nation conspiracy cealing property stolen Quinn, only against Jerry Saliter- Mara filed primarily courts State 6. Both state relied man, Opitz, Dawn Pink- but also Freida Frink, (1973): Minn. 206 N.W.2d 664 erton, Thurman, and Orville whom acknowledged or cited our later neither case, scheme. revealed to be involved in the had (Minn. Monsrud, 337 N.W.2d 1983). ly Congress public interest, (3) made and later to pro- failed legislatures codify several the hold- state vide for automatic termination once the ings Supreme three United States Court sought conversation seized. In holding which, cer- cases that under while States, Katz v. United U.S. police wiretap intercep- tain circumstances (1967) S.Ct. 19 L.Ed.2d 576 the court tions not violate the United held of a conversation proscrip- Constitution’s Fourth Amendment type of eavesdropping violated the Fourth barring tion sei- unreasonable searches and prohibition Amendment on unreasonable zures, established nevertheless standards searches, an impartial judicial unless offi- designed to minimize intrusions cer has first determined the need for the rights. privacy citizens’ proce- and then structured employed dure to States, to insure a narrow Osborn v. United privacy intrusion into S.Ct. broader than nec- L.Ed.2d essary Supreme for the legit- Court denied a chal- to attain their lenge grounds imate objective. on Fourth Amendment to a authorizing tape re- a concealed Congress reacted to this triad of cording a conversation ac- between the when, part cases of the Crime noting cused and an informant. After Control and Safe Street 18 U.S.C. prepared the officers had and submitted a 2510-20 holdings codified the §§ report judges approved to two federal who provision of those cases. One of the act the procedure, the court stated: “There *“ * * requires that wiretap must termi- hardly example could be a clearer the of upon nate attainment of the authorized ob- procedure justification of antecedent before * * * ” jective 2518(5) 18 (Supp. U.S.C.A. § magistrate a that is the central to Fourth 1988).7 precondition Amendment as a of lawful Thereafter, several states followed suit 330, electronic surveillance.” Id. at 87 by enacting legislation patterned after court, the S.Ct. 433. The same in the subse- passed federal act. quent Minnesota act York, au- Berger case of v. New 388 thorizing wiretaps which has U.S. 87 been codified S.Ct. 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 part and now forms of Privacy invalidated on Fourth the of Amendment Com- grounds (1) munication York per- New statute which 626A.01-.23 §§ (1986). tap any prior mitted a showing without of Minnesota act contains a ter- probable mination any provision cause that appear- offense had been identical to that being conducted; (2) ing or was in authorized the the federal statute.8 As does the long wording statute, continue as as two months of the federal the literal upon simple showing probable cause, of wording of the Minnesota statute if, with an additional two months extension that the itself provide for automat- Specifically the statute reads: grounds The warrant shall the contain for its findings may No issuance with order entered under this au- as to section the existence of approve any interception thorize or of the matters contained in 1 subdivision * * * wire, oral or electronic communication for specify: shall also longer any period necessary than is to achieve (e) period during time which such inter- of authorization, * * * any nor in authorized, ception * * * longer * * * thirty days. Every event than (h) and must terminate attain- order and extension thereof shall contain a objective, any ment or in authorized provision that the authorization * * * days event in ten practicable, shall be as as executed soon shall Subd. 5. Duration of warrant. No warrant way be conducted in such a as to minimize may entered under this section authorize or interception of communications not other- approve wire, interception any elec- subject chap- wise ter, under this tronic, any or oral period communication for and must terminate attainment of longer necessary than is objec- to achieve the objective, any or in event in authorized authorization, tive nor in event thirty days. longer days. than ten 2518(5) (Supp.1988) 18 (Emphasis U.S.C.A. (1988). (Em- subds. 5 supplied). phasis supplied). provisions 8. Material of the act are:

763 and order to the is critical const- upon attainment ic termination Notwithstanding surveillance”, itutuionality of a id. at objective. achieved wording, urges state us to follow literal analyzed Scott, court v. United States courts, as employed federal lead (D.D.C.1971) F.Supp. 331 233 and United in jurisdictions, number state well as a Mainello, (E.D. F.Supp. v. wiretap warrants determining whether N.Y.1972). holdings It concluded the in the Fourth requirements meet of those cases as both well those general Federal courts have Amendment. Escandar, F.Supp. v. United States intercep ly upheld validity of a (S.D.Fla.1970), Leta, United States (1) provided: has tion (M.D.Pa.1971), F.Supp. Unit complied if with substantially, literally, not (S.D. King, F.Supp. 523 ed States v. statute, (2) statute’s applicable that the Cal.1971) federal demonstrated that courts extent purpose to minimize the underlying pragmatic approach have taken re not governmental intrusion has requirement. spect particularity to the omission, (3) by the frustrated Tortorello, Finally, 480 F.2d at 780. even a noncrucial omission involved though acknowledged Tortorello requirement, and accused was applications were before it “some approach appears to prejudiced. not That broad,” it they held nonetheless de what approach merely an extension of the suspected scribed the offenses with de traditionally used federal courts have gree particularity sufficient to meet the tradition testing application affidavits and Amendment and the Fourth standards stat they to see if measure al search warrants So, too, requirement. utory Id. at 781. re up to Fourth Amendment constitutional F.Supp. Baynes, United States is, quirements; that to test such documents (E.D.Pa.1975) where the minimization and fashion” a “common sense realistic possible phrases as soon as execute See, hyper-technical in a manner. omitted, court applied similar reasoni Ventresca, e.g. point issue in ng.9 More on 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 S.Ct. are cases present case federal Thus, Tortorello, 480 in United States v. have sustained orders and warrants courts (2nd Cir.) denied, F.2d cert. 764 challenges Fourth Amendment 866, 63, (1973) the 94 38 L.Ed.2d 86 S.Ct. here, provision, as the termination when validity issue the of New involved both courts, though omitted. Those has been wiretap statute as well as whether York’s noting generally “termination at intercept the warrant was itself constitu objective” provision is of an man tainment holding After New tionally defective. missing statutory read datory, have which, law, as does the Minnesota York’s See, provision into order and warrant. statute, language of virtually tracks the 489, 473 F.2d Cafero, States e.g., United v. Crime, Title III of the omnibus Control Cir.1973), (3rd denied, 417 cert. U.S. 496 1968, Safe Act of constitution Streets 2622, (1974); 918, 41 223 94 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d al, the court addressed the defendant’s Cohen, 43, v. 530 F.2d 46 for, and the challenge that the 855, (5th Cir.) denied, 429 U.S. 97 cert. itself sufficient wiretap warrant lacked 149, (1976); 50 130 L.Ed.2d United S.Ct. particularity as to enumerate the offenses Cambia, 1099, F.Supp. 1107 observing v. being charged. After that States (E.D.N.Y.1974).10 wiretap “[particularity eavesdrop in an substantially complied there with and was no court stated: The defendants, only prejudice to the and where sum, that, we believe under the circum- requirements of the “less crucial" statute case, stances of this common sense actually breached. us that an inadvertent omission of to hold Id. at 310. language from order does not relevant pro- a fatal defect the statute constitute where or- 10. The Cohen sustained it, impact calipers though for the order in the vides measurement der even as did case, statutory prejudice present reason the exact to the defendants did not contain omission, was, fact, language: where the statute sey, from the federal The we draw generally conclusion Illinois have likewise cases is that federal courts read the applied analysis. the federal See v. “ * * * phrase statutory termination neces- 480, Brown, (App.1987) 113 Idaho 745 P.2d 1101 sary objective of authori- to achieve the denied; rt. rev. State v. ce * * ” * zation into the order and then ex- 48, Christy, 112 N.J.Super. 270 A.2d 306 amine officers to the actions 1970); Wrestler, (Cty.Ct People v. 121 Ill. fact, if, wiretap see ended when the 147, App.3d 548, 76 Ill.Dec. 458 N.E.2d objective was achieved. (1984). states, The courts of several hand, On other Maloof, State v. 1968, patterned after enacted statutes after 380, (1975), 114 R.I. 333 A.2d 676 Crime, the federal and Safe Streets Control court, relying Rhode Island its own have likewise occasion address constitution, state than rather the Fourth specific issue before us. A number of Amendment, literally construed the statute jurisdictions, passing upon challenges and struck down a warrant which had omit- permitting wiretap interceptions, warrants provision.11 ted the termination analysis have used similar to that em In several other cases where the court ployed by the federal courts. In State v. seemingly applied compli a strict or literal 169, Moccia, 119 N.H. 400 A.2d analysis, challenged ance order failed though even authorization had required provisions. See, include other specify the interception failed to must e.g. State, 760, Cross v. 225 Ga. 171 S.E.2d objective obtained, terminate when the was (1969); State, Johnson v. 226 Ga. upheld warrant was because the omis (1970); Siegel, S.E.2d State v. sion prejudice did not the defendants and (1972); Md. 292 A.2d 86 State v. Pot beyond was harmless a reasonable doubt. tle, 296 Or. 677 P.2d 1 Likewise, York, in New omission Cross, orders in Siegel Johnson and failed provision was deemed a de to include a statement whether the inter justifying minimis error scrivener’s cept would terminate when the described prejudice when no shown received, communication was first the mini properly the warrant was otherwise requirements, mization pro People Scarnati, executed. Misc.2d visions, and failed to name the individuals (Cty.Ct.1986). 508 N.Y.S.2d 365 Ne whose intercepted. conversations could be adopted reasoning braska United Oregon court in (3rd State v. Pottle indi Cafero, 473 F.2d Cir. might 1973) cated it view the matter differently read accordingly into the warrant if its the order requirement “omits essential intercep element tion shortcoming must end in the when order had no Brennen, consequence achieved. State 218 Neb. actual execution (1984). Idaho, 861 N.W.2d New Jer- order.” 677 P.2d 10. at Third, provision intercept interception the upon order did not terminate attain- automatically that said shall not objective. ment of the authorized That the lat- * * *, shall terminate but continue until com- weighed heavily ter inclusion in the court's con- intercepted munications are which reveal the perhaps clusion is demonstrated when the court details of the which scheme have been used to express said the order "flies in the face of the (state laws), participants violate the and the language clearly in that statute states therein, conspiracy and nature of the or involved intercept upon need not terminate the ac- period days for of from the date complishment purpose." of the order’s Id. 333 order, earlier, this whichever is fulfills the A.2d, Maryland, at 680. In the state’s statute statutory requirement that an be order limited expressly requires compliance "strict with this period necessary objec- to the to achieve the statute, construing In Mary- subtitle.” that long- tive authorization but in event land court held that the omission of the termi- days. er than nation directive in the order rendered Cohen, 530 F.2d at 46. initio, and, therefore, the instrument void ah and, Conceivably, perhaps, signifi- even more tap sup- evidence obtained from cant to the result achieved was the fact that in pressed. Bailey, State 289 Md. 422 A.2d omitting provision, to addition expressly provided the warrant in that case that urges respondent that we In this court not before court has this While appeals court and the court specific join issue the trial address called by holding the warrant fa- case, previous panel majority occa- on two raised compli- provi- cially for lack of literal two other defective addressed we have sions provision Privacy of Communications ance with the sions enacted, 4(h) so- Minn.Stat. originally Act. As § —the The county compliance approach. attor- required that strict called 626A.05 § hand, argues state, for make the on the other ney Frink, employment 296 Minn. of a State approach is the preferable warrant. county assistant approach “pragmatic 206 N.W.2d and common sense” wiretap. for a We applied attorney States District Court employed by United subsequently issued to be warrant, held the warrant examination of this same in its attorney him- county appeals, defective because and our the court dissent and further application, made in Monsrud. Appellant had not finds analysis self prior by the wire- the evidence obtained Monsrud: held that re- support position for its Id. N.W.2d Frink. tap efficacy inadmissible. emphasizes spondent legislative in- acknowledged the implies 665. We the case relied party Each in the statute underlying the inclusion erroneously employed an tent other may apply limiting those who provision statutory of a construction standard. improper attorneys re- Monsrud, county in- Frink reading, warrants first On such an intru- public policy that deed, contra- may appear flected to announce to a restricted authority However, analysis should be rulings. dictory sive further subject who is responsible official “publicly holdings are recon- that their demonstrates process.” Id. N.W.2d political to the construed Minn.Stat. We cilable. 674.12 strictly in Frink because 626A.05(1) we provide one legislative policy to perceived a Monsrud, later in years Ten by an scrutiny and consideration additional (Minn.1983) applied a we N.W.2d directly the elector- responsible official approach” commonsense “pragmatic and wiretap procedure the intrusive ate before utilizing requirement particularity statutory mandate authorized. analysis Amendment traditional Fourth interpreta- required no clear and there was denial of a defen- upholding a trial court statutory underlying the purpose tion. Id. at 658—59. suppression motion. dant’s by extend- could not be served requirement additionally In Monsrud defendant subor- authority to a non-elected ing that sufficiency of the warrant’s challenged Monsrud, contrary, To the dinate. agreed procedure. we minimization While certain. Mons- was less directive min- inadequate contained that the warrant 626A.06, subd. rud involved only con- held that provisions, imization we set 4(c) improperly in- which had been versations description type particular “a forth subject suppression. tercepted would be intercepted, sought to be of communication Id. at 660-61.13 provi- legis- authorities in violation from welfare Notwithstanding perception of the our They underlying used the information of the act. intention sions lative note, Frink, we subd. 1 in State v. We refused to applying warrant. for a search holding in that apparently in reaction suppress as a result received evidence pragmatic upon the effect as its case as well doing applied the same tradi- so we search. offices, prosecutors’ operation of modern analysis that had Fourth Amendment tional eligible applicants, persons now to be class of course, Smith, is used in Monsrud. been limited, by though expanded ch. was still under distinguishable it did not arise because 1976 Minn. Laws § Act, it is Privacy but Communications priva- that the it demonstrates relevant because Substantially policy the same concerns fail- whether the cy is focused on consideration Privacy of Communi enactment of the underlie technically affected the follow the statute ure to Act, Minnesota also are mirrored in the cations purported to afford. protection the statute basic ch. Data Governmental Practices (Minn. respect, with Monsrud. Smith, it is consistent In that N.W.2d 497 13. In State v. 1985), address police learned of the defendant’s offense particular and a statement of the whichever occurs first. No issued warrant Obviously, by (1) court to which it relates.” determi- Minnesota can authorize a complied wiretap intercept days than 10 nation warrant more whether issuance; (2) particularity requirement calls for from allow the surveillance to rule judgmental analysis beyond necessary some whether continue the time to (3) language employed objective; per- in the warrant achieve the authorized or judgment monitoring meets When that mit continuation of after a the standard. holds, analysis necessary, party charged. Monsrud named has been The au- is practical thority apply “a and com- conversation ends when should reading by mon of the documents in first of those three events occurs sense” Monsrud, resolving regardless issue. 337 N.W.2d statute what not at 659. we construed the statute in does or does contain. The warrant in Had not, not, permit Frink to an unauthorized assistant case did and could extend the attorney applicant, beyond county statutory to be the it authorization termi- judi- nation would have amounted to unwarranted limits. whereas, legislation, cial in Monsrud the magistrate Before signed this war- legislative evidenced primary concern magnitude rant he was aware of the requirement particularity was to en- operation scope investigation, of the under sure warrant would be so type persons the numbers and known to general limited avoid the evils as to degree it, have some involvement Thus, held that a court warrant. Monsrud operative that it had been for an extended justified focusing on substance rath- was period past ongoing. of time statutory compli- er than literal verbatim He also had been informed that because of underlying ance to determine whether high probability these facts a existed that However, in

policy was effectuated. both 10-day statutory period the entire would be inquiry cases the court’s concentrated necessary obtain objec- the authorized determining particular ap- on whether the Moreover, tive. he knew the nature and warrant, plication, complied and execution scope investigation warranted inclu- with, met, the concerns addressed in provision, permitted by sion of a as Minn. Osborn, Berger Katz, as codified in 626A.06, 4(e), authorizing Stat. subd. con- § the statute. beyond tinuation the time first commu- legislative alleged concern that the duration nication conspiracy relative only peri- be limited to time been obtained. Under those circum- absolutely accomplish stances, necessary language, ods inclusion omitted advancing legislative sought any result is evidenced Minn.Stat. insofar as con- 4(h) cern, 626.06, pro- essentially and subd. which would have been redun- subd. vide upon for termination attainment of the dant. To hold this to be constitu- objective, tionally light authorized in no event after a in the but defective these cir- Notwithstanding cumstances, 10-day duration. because omitted redundant 4(h) clause, literally appears subd. elevate literal formalism statute, appear termination clause over realistic substance. warrant, 626A.06, specifically subd. itself af- necessary automatically protection per- directs that the authorization fords the expires upon has priva- when the nicious intrusion constitutional upon expiration days, cy rights.14 reached of ten Ap

14. The United States Third Circuit Court of whether a statement to this has been effect (3d Thus, peals Cafero, authorizing judge. 473 F.2d United included denied, Cir.1973), 2622, thirty-day period provided cert. 94 S.Ct. in the statute does testing L.Ed.2d223 consti represent of all life authori- tutionality compliance of warrant and with a containing requiring zations not termination Instead, a statement substantially identical statute stated: federal objective. attainment of interpret 2518(5) requiring thirty-day period merely [W]e section a stat- utory tion, automatic attainment of the limitation the life of authoriza- authorization, objective irrespective every which terminates authorization

767 technically judges whether that initial decision was every omission to Not statutory re wiretap Secondly, literal correct. neither the statute nor comply with “unlawful” quirements' prose- renders police rule of law or meaning of Minn.Stat. within progress reports cutors to submit 626A.12(1), technical every nor does magistrate during the course of the suspression of disclosure justify omission by unless directed to do so the warrant. intercepted communica of contents of the case, though required Finally, by in this See, e.g., evidence. tions or derivative itself, prosecutor law or the warrant 562, 579, Chavez, 416 U.S. v. issuing magistrate did furnish the with a (1974). 1849, 1858, 380 40 L.Ed.2d 94 S.Ct. progress report day tap. 8th on the is reserved to suppression The deterrent challenged complies with defect in the warrant instances where requirements respects statutory all ex that upon statutory requirements impedes cept the omission herein discussed. That substantially” implement the “directly and technical omission did not result frustra legislative employment wire intent that purpose underlying tion of the statute’s to clearly situations taps be limited those governmental minimize intrusion into the calling employment of rare and for the lives of its citizens. The omission itself procedures. See United States intrusive considered the context of the circum 505, 527, 1820, Giordano, 416 U.S. S.Ct. surrounding the of this stances issuance (1974). 1832, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 critical warrant was not because au judge granted who thority may beyond of no extend facially motions concluded warrant Finally, limitations. there because, opinion, in his the omis- defective showing prejudice no to these has been sion from the warrant of showing has accuseds—there been phrase objective on attainment of “leaves not have occurred ex intercept to the decision to terminate the actly as it did even had it contained the intercepting prosecut- officers and reasons, language. we omitted For those authorities, ing not to the sound and the United States District concur with magistrate.” impartial discretion of the facially this warrant was not Court that reject conclusion we find We because requiring sup extent of defective to the First, faulty respects. in at least three pression intercepted conversations rela that even had the omitted lan- we observe criminal conduct or evidence tive warrant, deci- guage the initial derived therefrom. United States Sali tap sion as to whether or when the 6-87-101) (1987).15 (U.S.D.M. terman —CR objective always attained achieved hearing sup- the trial court Because prosecutors rests with —it impartial magistrate pression motions ruled only later that an activity engaged thirty days regardless in criminal has of whether ment those the end of employment by governmental has been of the authorization necessitated the eavesdropping achieved. occasional tech- authorities of added). (emphasis See also United ongoing struggle prosecut- Id. at 496 niques in their 43, Cir.), Cohen, (5th cert. States v. 530 F.2d ing activity, prosecutors and courts criminal 855, 149, denied, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 429 U.S. always foremost consideration to must afford 795, Scarnati, (1976); People 133 Misc.2d restricting privacy into the that intrusion (Cty.Ct.1986); United States v. 508 N.Y.S.2d 365 Saliterman, because, practicable, almost citizens as much as (United et al. CR 6-87-101 degree governmen- exception, to some without Minnesota); State v. District Court—District of likely a conversation is tal 861, Brennan, N.W.2d 218 Neb. upon private unrelated conversations intrude (1984). activity. Scrupulous adherence to stat- criminal certainly utory requirements will almost Although setting uphold the validi- in this we legislative keeping scheme de- with a more in warrant, holding ty be neither of this our should rights signed protect privacy of citizens. by prosecutors or read nor understood Chavez, See, e.g. States v. United of inattention courts as court’s condonation 1849, 1858, (1974); L.Ed.2d 380 S.Ct. statutory require- precise or indifference to the Hinton, 226 Neb. 415 N.W.2d Although State v. development modern ments. employ- technology communication defective, facially (1988), was Minn.Stat. 645.17 that the unnecessary entire § findings specific on the issue for it presumed make statute is to be effective and objective wiretap had of whether the of certain. any expi- been time before the achieved county attorney, The assistant who draft- ten-day period authorized ration of the issue, ed in the warrant failed to include (subd. 5). Therefore, 296A.06 Minn.Stat. § language expressly man- trial

we reverse and remand to the court to 626A.06, 4(h). dated Minn.Stat. subd. § specific findings make on whether ob- The majority determines that this violation jective prior expi- had attained been of requirement is a “techni- ten-day ration of limit Minn.Stat. cal require sup- omission” which does not 626A.06, 5.16 subd. § pression gathered. of evidence The Privacy provides of Communications Act WAHL, (dissenting). Justice (1988): otherwise in 626A.04 Minn.Stat. § respectfully I dissent. The trial court any Whenever wire or oral communica- appeals of correctly and the court deter- part tions has intercepted, of the authorizing mined that the warrant fatally wire case this defective contents of such communication and no requiring on its face of the may evidence derived therefrom be re- tap. evidence obtained the wire trial, ceived in evidence in any hearing, proceeding or other in or any before Privacy language of the of Commu- grand jury court or if the disclosure of explicit unequivocal. nications Act1 that information would be violation of meeting probable In addition to cause re- sections 626A.01 to 626A.23. 626A.06, quirements, Minn.Stat. subd. § 4(h) requires wiretap that warrants That disclosure of the evidence issue * * * fSjhall specify also would be in violation of the as de- 626A.04, scribed in section is made clear in statement shall be 1(c) (1988), practicable,

executed soon as as shall be subd. way prohibits such which of executed in as to minimize disclosure the contents interception any wiretap except specifically communications not autho- subject Reinforcing otherwise under rized under the Act. this con- section 626A.01 to 626A.23 and must clusion is Minn.Stat. 626A.12 terminate attainment the au- permits aggrieved party to make objective, thorized or in event in ten suppress a motion to evidence. Grounds days. for such a motion include facial insufficien- cy authorization. Id. added). (emphasis undisputed isIt l(ii). insufficiency Facial warrant at issue did not contain the separate is listed language explicitly required in and distinct from subdivision a mo- 4(h). tion It is not this court to based determine constitutional violation. Clearly Privacy clear otherwise subdivisions the act of Communications Act are suppress “redundant” and need not be enforced. itself envisions motions to evi- legislature provided, through gathered pursuant has dence to warrants which to, part ruling, As an alleged aside but not a establish the existence of this wide- judge hearing opine theft, the trial court omnibus did spread burglary, shoplifting web which, hypothetical certain circumstances fencing involving persons number other fact, they might triggered existed in have application identified and warrant. Addi- cessation. Since the and for the warrant tionally, on remand should the trial court find clearly particularized the warrant itself that the authorized had been achieved of, subject in, persons matter and the involved eighth day, intercepts on the of conversation communications, scope as well as prior as well thereto as evidence obtained there- investigation underway, we note arrest See, suppressible. e.g., from would not charging Crowley, of Mastrian or as isolated Monsrud, 337 N.W.2d 660-61. more, legally events without would not amount objective” "attainment of the authorized §§ 626A.01-626A.23 uncovering evidence and leads evidence to terms comply on their face fail (Schroeder) KRAUSS, Relator, Act. Linda D. its privacy Out of concern for

citizens, legislature in Minn.Stat. ITT CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPA- exacting created an 626A.06 has NY and Insurance INA/CIGNA scheme somewhat inflexible Company, Respondents. controls the issuance of war applied This court that scheme liter rants. No. C3-88-2276. Frink, ally in 296 Minn. State v. Supreme Court of Minnesota. and held a in N.W.2d county attorney because the himself valid Feb. applied had not for the warrant as law explicitly rejected In required. Frink we argument “mere technical violation” by the State in this case. Id.

now advanced 72-73, 206 N.W.2d at 672-73. Subse Frink,

quent to we decided v. Mons (Minn.1983).

rud, 337 N.W.2d 652 “pragmatic and com

Monsrud we took a approach particularity re

monsense majority cor

quirement.” Id. at 658.

rectly ap this commonsense notes that

proach justified judgment is re is because

quired to determine if the words as written satisfy particularity re Majority op.

quirement of the statute. required in this judgment such No majority the State nor the

case. Neither actually complies

contend that the warrant Nothing reading a literal of the Act.

with proposition

in Monsrud stands for the

warrants, compliance not in actual with the

Act, ought nevertheless to be excused Nothing previ noncompliance. our suggests mere

ous case law technical

violations of Minn.Stat. 626A.06 should

be overlooked. As the State’s warrant comply the Act’s ter

its face fails to requirement,

mination suppression of the re 626A.04

sulting evidence.

I would affirm the decisions trial appeals.

court and court of

POPOVICH, (dissenting). Justice join

I in the dissent of Justice WAHL. Museus, P.A., Bass, Louis D.

Bass and Minneapolis, for relator.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Quinn

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Jan 31, 1989

Citation: 436 N.W.2d 758

Docket Number: C7-88-14

Court Abbreviation: Minn.