State v. PutnamState v. Putnam
R. Paul LaPlante, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa R. Clapp, Assistant Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant-Appellant).
O P I N I O N
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Warren L. Putnam, appeals from the Judgment Entry of Sentence of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to an aggregate term of six years in prison for Attempted Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity and three counts of Receiving Stolen Property. The issue to be decided by this court is whether a trial court’s discussion of all relevant sentencing factors constitutes
{¶2} On February 16, 2012, Putnam pled guilty, by way of information, to one count of Attempted Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity, a felony of the third degree, in violation of
{¶3} A sentencing hearing in this matter was also held on February 16, 2012. During the hearing, defense counsel stated that Putnam expressed remorse and that he had cooperated with authorities. The State also gave a statement, noting Putnam’s extensive criminal record. The trial court listened to the arguments and made various findings for the record. The court noted that it considered the statements of both sides and other evidence before it, the purposes of felony sentencing pursuant to {¶4} Putnam was sentenced to a term of three years imprisonment for Attempted Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity and one year for each count of Receiving Stolen Property. Each sentence was ordered to be served consecutively, for a total term of imprisonment of six years. Putnam was also ordered to pay restitution to four separate victims. The sentence was memorialized in a Judgment Entry of Sentence, dated February 23, 2012. That Entry also stated that the court had considered “the principles and purposes of sentencing under {¶6} “The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant-appellant to maximum, consecutive terms of imprisonment.” {¶7} Subsequent to State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, appellate courts have applied a two step approach in reviewing felony sentences. First, courts “examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court’s decision in imposing the term of imprisonment is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 26. {¶8} A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. “The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” {¶9} There is no “mandate” for the sentencing court to engage in any factual finding under these statutes. Rather, “[t]he court is merely to ‘consider’ the statutory factors.” Foster at ¶ 42. This standard continues to be applicable after the recent {¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Putnam notes that he “does not assert that his sentence was contrary to law” or dispute that the trial court followed the applicable rules and statutes, as required by the first prong of the Kalish test. Rather, he argues only that the trial court failed to give “careful and substantial deliberation to the relevant statutory considerations” set forth in {¶11} Regarding the likelihood of Putnam committing future crimes under {¶12} Regarding the issue of remorse as a mitigating factor to committing future crime, defense counsel noted at the sentencing hearing that Putnam did not try to “run * * * from these charges” and that he took full responsibility. It was also explained that Putnam attempted to cooperate with police in further investigation of related crimes. The State confirmed that Putnam did provide some information in an investigation regarding other related crimes, but noted that he provided an incorrect address of potential suspect and the information given “does not seem to have [led] any place further.” The trial court listened to this argument on remorse and ultimately concluded that Putnam tried to run and that “he had to be chased.” The court found that it was not presented with “anything concrete that would show a sufficient amount of remorse or cooperation with the government” and Putnam expressed “no genuine remorse.” As this court has held, “a reviewing court must defer to the trial court as to whether a defendant’s remarks are indicative of genuine remorse because it is in the best position to make that determination.” State v. Davis, 11th Dist. No. 2010-L-148, 2011-Ohio-5435, ¶ 15, citing State v. Dudley, 11th Dist. No. 2009-L-019, 2009-Ohio-5064, ¶ 22. Based on the foregoing, the record indicates that the trial court carefully and substantially deliberated the risk of Putnam committing future crimes, pursuant to {¶13} Putnam further argues that the trial court did not give careful and substantial deliberation to the factors under {¶14} The sole assignment of error is without merit. {¶15} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing Putnam to an aggregate prison term of six years for Attempted Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity and three counts of Receiving Stolen Property, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant. TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., concur.