81 Conn. App. 84 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2004
Opinion
The defendant, Florencio P. Punsalan, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after he entered a plea of guilty, convicting him of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, sexual assault in a spousal relationship in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70b
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. On October 10, 2001, the defendant pleaded guilty to a four count substitute information. On March 22, 2002, the court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years imprisonment with ten years of special parole. The court also entered a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40e, precluding the defendant from having any contact with his minor children. Additional facts and procedural history relevant to the defendant’s claims will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the imposition of a twelve year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Connecticut constitutions. Specifically, the defendant claims that because of his medical condition, he should have been sentenced to home confinement. We do not agree.
The following additional facts are relevant to the defendant’s claim. In March, 1999, while released on bond, the defendant suffered paraplegia as a result of an automobile accident. On October 9, 2001, following his guilty plea, the defendant was taken into custody. At his sentencing on March 22, 2002, the defendant, who submitted testimony from his physician, argued for a sentence of home confinement because of his medical condition and related needs. The court, how
“It is well established that an unconditional plea of guilty, made intelligently and voluntarily, operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings. ... In general, the only allowable challenges after a plea are those relating either to the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea or the exercise of the trial court’s jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nelson, 76 Conn. App. 472, 474, 819 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 913, 826 A.2d 1156 (2003).
In the present case, the defendant pleaded guilty to all counts of the information and does not challenge, on appeal, the court’s jurisdiction, the plea agreement, the pleas or whether his sentence is within the statutory limits. Consequently, his claim of cruel and unusual punishment is not properly brought as a direct appeal from the sentencing court. See id.
The defendant bases his claim on what he alleges was a worsening of his condition while he was in presen-
In Williams, the defendant claimed cruel and unusual punishment because while he “was confined in jail awaiting trial and unable to furnish bail, the jail physician denied him proper medication for his claimed ailments . . . .” Id., 120-21. Our Supreme Court stated that “[w]hile courts have entertained claims of mistreatment of various sorts, usually made by prisoners in proceedings such as habeas corpus or for an injunction, we have found no instance in which mistreatment of the sort claimed here prior to trial has been entertained as a ground for attacking, on appeal, a judgment rendered within the limits of the statute punishing the offense.” Id., 121-22. Here, as in Williams, the defendant is asking this court to change, based purely on speculation, a sentence imposed within the statutory limits and the plea agreement. We cannot engage in such speculation.
In further support of this court’s refusal to entertain such a claim by speculating as to how the defendant might be treated while in sentenced confinement, it is relevant that the sentencing court specifically ordered that the mittimus reflect the defendant’s medical requirements, including his need for physical therapy, Botox injections and maintenance of his stomach pump.
This appeal is not an appropriate means by which the defendant can claim cruel and unusual punishment.
II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly entered a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to § 53a-40e precluding him from having any contact with his minor children. Specifically, the defendant argues that § 53a-40e does not allow the court to enter such a restraining order for the benefit of anyone except the victim.
The defendant’s claim requires this court to interpret § 53a-40e. “Statutory construction . . . presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . According to our long-standing principles of statutory construction, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. ... In construing a statute, common sense must be used, and courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Regency Savings Bank v. Westmark Partners, 70 Conn. App.
Section 53a-40e (a) provides in relevant part that if a person is convicted of a violation of one of the enumerated offenses
Although research of the scant legislative history provides little insight into the issue presented, it can be ascertained from the language itself that such an order precluding the defendant from having contact with his
Consequently, although we will not go as far as to say that a court has unlimited options in making a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to § 53a-40e, we conclude that the situation presented here, where those protected by the order are the minor children of the victim and the defendant, is clearly a situation within the scope of the statute. Children living in the home of a victim of sexual assault and attempted murder should be afforded the same protection of a standing criminal restraining order as their victim mother. For all of those reasons, we conclude that the court’s standing criminal restraining order precluding the defendant from contacting his minor children is within the scope of § 53a-40e.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The defendant’s claim more properly is brought, for example, in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of his confinement.
The defendant does not challenge the court’s authority to impose such a restraining order insofar as it applies to the victim.
The defendant was convicted of two of the enumerated offenses required by § 53a-40e: Attempt to commit murder in violation of § 53a-54a, and sexual assault in a spousal relationship in violation of § 53a-70b (b).