State v. PugaState v. Puga
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Walters
Angеl Puga was convicted of vehicular manslaughter. He received a seven-year fixed sentence. On appeal, Puga argues that a fixed period of confinemеnt without treatment for his chronic alcoholism violates his statutory and constitutional rights. He contends that probation with treatment should have been ordered; or that an indetеrminate period of confinement with provision for treatment and rehabilitation was appropriate. We hold that Puga’s rights were not violated and that the trial judge did not abuse his sentencing discretion. We affirm the judgment and sentence.
Puga was charged with two counts of vehicular manslaughter (
The state recommended the maximum sentences for each count. Relying upon
*876 manslaughter. 1 At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found that incarceration was necessary for the protection of the public, and that the maximum period of confinement was appropriate due to the “seriousness of the crime” and to punish and deter Puga. The trial judge also expressed frustration with his inability to ensure treatment for Puga’s chronic alcoholism prior to Puga’s release from confinement.
The presentence evaluation indicates that Puga is a chronic alcoholic with problems dating from his military service in the Vietnam War and from his subsequent divorce. He suffers from intermittent drinking bouts and had sought professional help on three occasions prior to this incident. Just two days before the accident he had been released from jail on two pending chаrges of driving under the influence of alcohol. When not under the influence of alcohol Puga appears to be a trustworthy and responsible employee. He was dеcorated for his military service. The trial judge acknowledged these attributes, stating, “You [Puga] are not what I would call a common criminal in the sense that we have them____” However, despite Puga’s request for probation, the trial judge still found it necessary to impose a seven-year fixed term of incarceration.
In reviewing a sentence, we conduct an independent examination of the record, focusing upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
State v. Beltran,
109 Idaho 196, 706 P.2d 85 (Ct.App.1985). Puga committed аn act resulting in multiple deaths and severe injuries. His actions are not excused by intoxication.
The trial court properly applied the criteria of
Puga also argues that confinеment without a guarantee of treatment for alcoholism is in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. The trial court acknowledged that without treatment Puga’s illness was likely to rеmain and could result in alcohol abuse following his release. However, having concluded that confinement was appropriate, the trial judge found himself powerless to ensure treatment during incarceration.
The eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not require treatment for alcoholism, even where the disease creates а continuing danger to the public. Cf. People v. White, 656 P.2d 690 (Colo.1983) (treatment of sex offender not guaranteed). On the other hand, imprisonment may result in cruel and unusual punishment if adequate medical facilities are not provided. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.1982). Puga has not alleged that the Idaho prison system fails to contain adequate medical facilities. Such conditions will not be presumed — the burden is on the person asserting a constitutional violation to show the sentence is actually cruel and unusual. State v. Stansbury, 108 Idaho 652, 701 P.2d 272 (Ct.App.1985).
Puga points to the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Aсt,
We now consider whether the length of the sentence is excessive. Seven years is the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by statute for vehicular manslaughter.
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As set forth in Toohill, the term of confinement must appear reasonable upon the facts of the case. A term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary to accomplish the primary goal of protecting society and to achieve any of thе related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id. The trial judge expressly stated that the maximum term was being imposed to protect society for the maximum рeriod, to deter Puga and others from similar acts, and as a reflection of the seriousness of the crime.
Puga points to shorter and indeterminate sentences recently imposed in other cases involving vehicular manslaughter by intoxicated drivers to demonstrate that his fixed period of confinement is unreasonable. We are not persuaded. The trial court must sentence the individual and not merely the crime category. Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct.App.1983). Moreover, the mere existence of lesser sentences in other casеs does not mean that such sentences were more appropriate than the sentence under review. Without a fuller record we cannot, and will not, presume that the sentence here is disproportionate.
In contrast to an indeterminate sentence, a fixed sentence allows no opportunity for parole. Lengthy сonfinement without remedial programs can run counter to rehabilitation goals. It may diminish a prisoner’s ability or motivation to conform to the law upon release. 2 State v. Pettit, 104 Idaho 601, 661 P.2d 767 (Ct.App.1983). However, in this case the trial court, balancing all of the sentencing objectives, gave greater weight to retribution, deterrence and protecting society. The сhoice was a reasonable one. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a fixed seven-year sentence. We affirm the judgment and sentence.
BURNETT and SWANSTROM, JJ., concur.
Notes
. On appeal, neither party has questioned the multiple-count conviction or the trial court’s decision to impose a sentence only оn one count. Therefore we do not decide whether this approach is correct under Idaho law. Compare State v. Lee, 111 Idaho 489, 725 P.2d 194 (Ct. App.1986).
. We note that trial courts will soon have the power to specify a minimum period of confinement in combination with an indeterminate sentence.
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