State v. Provost

Minnesota, Respondent, STATE PROVOST, Jr., Appellant.

Robert

No. C6-90-2479.

Supreme Court Minnesota. 2, 1992.

Oct. Defender, Stuart, Public M.

John Cromett, De- State Public F. Asst. Michael Paul, fender, appellant. St. for Gen., III, Atty. Humphrey, H. Hubert Gen., Atty. St. Kempainen, Asst. Paul R. Reuter, Chisago County Paul, T. James City, respondent. for Atty., Center OPINION SIMONETT, Justice. was convict-

Defendant-appellant Provost following a bifur- degree murder ed guilty and pleaded he cated trial where insanity. ap- guilty by reason of On violation, a Miranda peal, defendant claims counsel, error ineffective assistance presenting him from prohibiting (or during the first guilt) phase of the trial. We affirm. Jr., Provost, and Bar- Defendant Robert August married in bara Larson were high they graduated from soon after During the fall of their rela- school. worsened; one, happy de- tionship, never a violent, increasingly as- fendant became Barbara, destroying posses- her saulting In De- sions, threatening to kill her. her, to burn 1989 he threatened cember Burning Bed.” in the movie “The p.m. At 12:30 on December City into the Blaine defendant walked patiently waiting After Police Station. else, receptionist to on someone he wait up locked he had asked to be because police Defendant told the burned his wife. to him that he had officers who talked wife, get help his that he wanted to burned fast, they for her and that should call spoke, As he defendant be- ambulance. agitated, pacing very upset came back re- lobby and forth in the and sometimes point fusing questions. At one answer talked, said, they “Help he her!” As gasoline the smell of officers detected face made an proof noticed that the hair defendant’s counsel offer of as to what singed. expert’s testimony neck his would have been. footnote See infra. get to tell The officers tried was; where his wife and he During phase them eventual- the first told the officers that she in the ly was coroner that testified Barbara Provost had Avery Refuge. Wildlife Defendant inhalation, Carlos died of her body smoke that was having mentioned tele- also made a 911 extensively burned with a 3- 4-inch hole checking, police call. phone Upon the chest, in severity the and that the of the telephone that there been a call found had burns indicated use of an accelerant. Also reporting in the a need- day earlier woman during phase trial, the first of the defen- ing help Avery area, in the and that Carlos taking dant gas testified a can from his through officer had driven that an then garage parents’ putting car, it in his anyone needing to find area but was unable forcing and then his wife into the car. He help. taking related his Avery wife to the Carlos Refuge, pouring gasoline her, Wildlife on appeared Because the unable defendant fire, lighting dousing gaso- her her with give wife’s to coherent directions to his leaving line again, and then her in the location, and because the officers believed snow. At close of his direct testimony, the might help, and in injured she be need of denying wife, after he intended to kill his they if asked he show defendant could added, “I defendant still that believe she is where them his wife was. He indicated alive.” he that could. Defendant was then hand- in placed police

cuffed and the As car. In second stage, the trial the defense they along, drove defen- the officers asked Turnquist called Dr. Kevin and Dr. Jeffrey directions, point for and at asked dant one Boyd. Turnquist, Dr. psychiatrist, diag- a the wife’s name. Defendant shouted at suffering nosed defendant as from chronic faster, hurry go the officers to and to schizophre- and subchronic undifferentiated saying that his wife was hurt. nia, gave an that defendant did Following directions, of- not know the nature of acts on defendant’s the his Decem- badly Boyd’s psychological ficers found Barbara ber 1989. Dr. Provost’s body gas dented testing diagnosis burned and a can in the confirmed the of chronic in Avery middle of a dirt the schizophrenia. road Carlos undifferentiated He testi- Refuge. Defendant then schizophrenia impair per- Wildlife was fied that can a Chisago authorities, County transferred to son’s volition and the to control only at was the given that time he one’s called behavior. State three ex- warning. Miranda Farnsworth, pert Dr. witnesses: Michael a Fox, psychiatrist; Douglas psycholo- Dr. trial, Prior to defense counsel notified Schwartz, gist; Dr. Carl a forensic State of to Turn- the his intention call Dr. psychiatrist. expert Each of the State’s psychiatrist, during quist, the first or testified witnesses that defendant under- phase “guilt” testify that burning stood he was his wife and that Provost did not to kill In intend his wife. it wrong. he knew was response, prosecution or- moved for an in limine from prevent der defendant I. calling Turnquist. Dr. The trial is- court restricting psychiatrist’s sued order Defendant claims that admission police “to factual observations relevant of certain his statements direct- premeditation, intent and ing police body and a discus- Provost’s Barbara processes in- psychological argues sion normal error. Defendant was reversible in premedita- any police volved intent to the formation statements he made limitations, put tion.” Faced these de- he handcuffed and after police counsel not to fense elected call his car and he read his Mi- before stage. preserve rights, first trial To his should ruled inad- randa have been Further, defendant, appeal, says claim error for later defense missible. it fol- focus of safety exception, the true any public other body and victim’s that the lows safety exception seems more to public at the scene of found physical public protecting general due to directed to inadmissible also be crime should rather than to from the defendant violation. the Miranda of the defen- particular victim plight of dur Generally, statements made actions. But United States dant’s cf. interrogation custodial ing a —the (10th Cir.1987). Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 in the while handcuffed concedes California, custody be admit doctrine” police car was the “rescue —cannot suspect giv is unless the emergency into evidence situations where applicable ted warning intelligently compli the Miranda excuse “exigent en circumstances self-incrimination. right against in instances waives the Miranda rules ance with 444-45, Arizona, 384 U.S. overriding Miranda need to human life or to save 1612-13, 1602, L.Ed.2d 694 danger.” 86 S.Ct. persons whose lives are rescue warning not itself (1966). 563, 574, The Miranda Riddle, Cal.App.3d People v. cert, right, rather it is a denied, a constitutional (1978), Cal.Rptr. right protect the devised to measure 937, 99 S.Ct. 59 L.Ed.2d 496 440 U.S. compulsory self-incrimination. against (1979). court identified three The Riddle 433, 444, Tucker, 417 U.S. Michigan v. met to claim the limit factors that must be 2357, 2364, (1974). 41 L.Ed.2d 182 S.Ct. (1) exception: urgency of need in that no ed (2) relief; promises action other course of Supreme Court United States The possibility saving human life res the the exceptions limited Mi does allow danger; and cuing person a whose life is Thus, an police faced with rule. randa (3) primary purpose and mo rescue as the public safety may ask immediate threat interrogators. the Id. at tive of safety necessary the questions to secure Cal.Rptr. police In the in at 177. Riddle prior to a Mi public or themselves the suspected kidnapper the terviewed a Quarles, warning. York v. New randa giving the of the victim without location 655-57, 104 S.Ct. 2631- 467 U.S. warning, and his suspect the Miranda Quarles po L.Ed.2d 550 found admissible. statements were rapist suspected chased a who lice officers hours, missing for 11 victim had been gun through grocery was armed with suspect the arrested the had victim’s when apprehended the officers the store. When wallet, 567-69,148 at keys, watch. Id. gun. An officer suspect he did not have Cal.Rptr. at 171-73. suspect, empty the found an shoul frisked holster, suspect the and asked where der Perhaps the facts in this case more suspect’s the of the gun the was. On basis exception. easily fall within the “rescue” answer, police gun the retrieved the from a police that he had burned Defendant told suspect nearby, then arrested the carton that she was somewhere the his wife and warning. him the at and read Miranda Id. refuge. only Defendant was wildlife Quarles 651-52, 104 S.Ct. at 2628-29. The might person who knew where she be. requiring police reasoned that court injuries possible her and the cold Given warning gun read the Miranda before weather, imperative for it was December might discovered have deterred police to find the victim as soon as suspect responding put public from possible. urged police Defendant 656,104 at at 2631. safety at risk. Id. S.Ct. help his wife and to send an ambulance her; case, police justified in be the trial court determined hence were In this application lieving might the wife still be alive justified the facts Moreover, scope Quarles injured. the limited public safety exception; asking questions supports of the officers’ a deter to direct them to where his wife defendant primary purpose that the of the found, police acting were to mination could be safety questioning possible was to find a burn protect the health and of the wife. The facts of victim before it was too late. agree we with the trial court that While Quarles require- amply satisfy case the three satisfy spirit here facts exception of the “rescue” to Mi- agree ments Nor do we with defendant randa, adopt apply now which we “contemporaneous” that there must be a Consequently, here. defendant’s custodial record made of the defendant’s consent to directing police statements to his wife’s strategy his counsel’s of admitting guilt to body are under the rescue doc- admissible charge. a lesser previously We have not trine. held, so and we decline to do so here. The speaks record for itself in showing the

II. acquiesced in his counsel’s strat Defendant contends he did not receive egy-

effective assistance counsel. Defense strategy counsel’s trial was to concede de- ill. fendant had caused the death of his wife but that defendant never intended to kill pleaded Defendant her, only says hurt her. Defendant he now guilty by reason of mental illness to the strategy never consented to this trial and charge degree of first murder. These that it contradicted his own pleas mandated a pursuant bifurcated trial he believed his wife still There alive. to Minn.R.Crim.P. 20.02. Defense counsel argument. is no merit to this notified the state of his intent to call an expert psychiatric during witness the first Admitting guilt a client’s without “guilt” trial, phase of the contending acquiescence the client’s consent or is Bouwman, that State v. 328 N.W.2d 703 deemed ineffective assistance of counsel (Minn.1982), prohibit testimony did not on grounds and is for a new trial. State v. defendant’s mental condition and how this (Minn. Wiplinger, condition have affected 1984); defendant’s Moore, v. 458 N.W.2d State 95- mental state at the time of the crime. (Minn.1990). case, In this Wip- unlike response, prosecutor moved for an linger and or Moore where the defendants prevent der in limine strongly objected to defendant from to their counsel’s admis (Wiplinger calling expert. sions claimed misidentification accident), and Moore claimed an The trial court’s order in limine limited objected. opening Provost never From his expert testifying to on factual observa- through closing argument, statement his premeditation, tions relevant to intent and consistently defense counsel posi took the psychologi- and a discussion of the normal tion that defendant had caused the victim’s processes forming cal involved intent death. At no time does the record disclose premeditation. Confronted with these any objection that defendant had to or dis restrictions, defense counsel elected not to strategy. satisfaction with this trial De call expert during phase his the first fendant seizes on his statement at trial that Instead, preserve trial. to his claim of “I still believe she is alive” as somehow appeal, error on counsel made an offer of indicating disagreement with his counsel’s proof expert as to what his would have strategy. trial We see no such inconsisten said.1 however, cy, especially since the defendant appeal, admitted he On defendant also go had forced his wife to asserts that with him spot denying right present to a secluded in a a defendant the to refuge, wildlife her, poured gasoline fire, psychiatric opinion on started her relevant on poured gasoline on more element because she of intent is a violation of his feder- hurt,” “didn’t look like she was right process and then al to due a fair off, leaving drove arguing her to burn on the frozen Winship, under In re 397 U.S. road. (1970), 90 S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 368 proof consequences Defense counsel's offer of was as fol- tion of cause and effect and thus Turnquist say: lows: “Dr. would the defendant impaired, can be and that should be considered schizophrenic, typically is and that a schizo- by as to whether or not he intended the disorder, phrenic person thought has a that it death of Barbara Provost.” associations, can loosen that their determina- determining psychiatry in Arkansas, The role of 483 U.S. S.Ct. Rock generated culpability has no end (1987), per se criminal 97 L.Ed.2d 37 writing, no evidence, and there is wish irrespec- judicial type exclusion of many has been said help- repeat here to what competency, of its relevance tive respond argu- To to fulness, with his times elsewhere.2 impermissibly interferes by the ments raised the dissent and present to a defense. right however, defendant, necessary, it is to ex- here, then, holding is our Implicated position plain in detail our and how some Bouwman, (Minn. it. we arrive at expert psychiat- 1982). There we held not admissible opinion testimony was ric A. stage of a trial show guilt bifurcated might begin well how crimi- It be mentally ill defendant lacked that a typically proven: intent nal is killing or to form premeditate capacity to kill. specific intent to always easy prove is at a later It not of a mind at that date the state man’s defendant contends that In this case particular earlier moment when he was preclude does not or should Bouwman causing engaged in conduct or threaten- on whether expert ing harm to the interests of others. He premedi- mentally subjectively ill defendant contemporaneously speak does not often and intended the death of victim. tated thoughts his or write out for others Presumably generally hear or read. He will not ad- being offered to diminished show having mit later to the intention which responsibility, or diminished requires. the court So of course his defendant, fact,' show whether thoughts gathered must from his an element formed the mind which is (if any) light and actions in the words charged. approach of crime This is Nat- surrounding all the circumstances. rea called the “strict mens mod- sometimes urally, he and what does what foresee- pro- el.” Two law articles which review ably from a results his deeds have bear- Arenella, pose this model are The Dimin- ing may he had in mind. what have Responsi- Capacity and Diminished ished Scott, LaFave & Substantive Criminal bility Two Children Defenses: of 1986). 3.5, (2d pp. 317-18 ed. Law § Marriage, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 827 Doomed (1977); Morse, impairs when mental illness a de- and Undiminished Even Confu- forming criminal in- Capacity, in 75 J.Crim.L. fendant’s sion Diminished (hereinafter tent, (1984) from Criminology 1 re- such intent is still determined & respectively says as or a defendant and does. Take this ferred Arenella what Morse). Notwithstanding Relying part on two arti- defendant’s obvi- in these case. behavior, cles, good case makes a mental illness and bizarre the dissent this ous testimony although psychiatric rea no argument for a strict mens use of and during the first psychiatric testimony, even so we are admitted into evidence but of persuaded appropriate. stage of the the evidence both approach is 642, 587, 42 Our research has some states 69 N.Y.2d 511 N.Y.S.2d 503 N.E.2d indicated Weinstein, (1986); admissibility psy- and v. of 1018 Commonwealth which have discussed 1344, 106, (1982). 499 Pa. 451 A.2d 1347 bears on mens evidence it states, Twenty-four of one fashion rea. these psychiatric testimony use on the issue another, have {see or allowed such recognized by the mens rea is also Model 3, infra), have footnote while 18 states taken Code, (1962) 4.0 the American § Penal contrary psychiatric view. Cases which admit Mental Health Bar Association Criminal Justice 1103, Saille, People v. Cal.3d Standards, evidence include 54 (1989). Standard 7-6.2 588, 364, 369, (1991) Cal.Rptr.2d 593 2 820 P.2d Among jurisdictions rejecting psychiatric 28(b)); State, § also Cal.Penal Code State v. {see evidence are Chestnut v. (Fla. 1989), 538 So.2d 820 314, Hines, 199, (1982); State, 72, 187 Conn. 445 A.2d 317 and Steele v. 97 Wis.2d 294 State, 473, 622, 632, 2, (1980). Hoey yet v. 311 Md. 536 A.2d have 14 Some courts Simmons, (1988); People Westergard, up E.g., n. 5 v. v. made their minds. 89, 65, 590, 640, (1985), (1983). aff'd, A.D.2d 69-71 172 W.Va. S.E.2d 497 N.Y.S.2d Indeed, if mony kill over- to homicide.3 one were to intent to premeditation and it, whelming. perfectly logical psychiatric be opinion testimony subjec- on how the mind Nevertheless, argues that the dissent tively forms intent should be admissible opinion testimony is somehow psychiatric perfectly of a even the case sane defen- determining defendant real helpful in what suffering is from no dant who mental ab- admitted. been ly intended and should have simply normality. a matter Perhaps relevancy if were agree, it is not. logic, might we suggested It is sometimes adopts a minimal While Minn.R.Evid. dispel is needed to the old notion is counterbalanced relevancy approach, this really that mental illness is not an illness at 403, provides that by Minn.R.Evid. is, simply failing. all but a moral There excluded if its relevant evidence be however, hardly family in these modern substantially outweighed probative value is experience times that has not had some considerations, including prejudice by other Brom, with mental illness. See State Relevancy, confusion of the issues. (Minn.1990)(Wahl, Advisory Committee comment says the J., dissenting) (citing sources that one in logic is “a test of Rule both ” reported three adults in the United States probative (emphasis value assessment of they family sought help or a member added). “A assortment of relevant wide psychiatrist psychologist from a at some deliberately excluded crimi [in cert, lives), denied, in their time Brom v. counterbalancing by reason of nal cases] — Minnesota, U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. greater factors that are believed be (1991). jurors The fact is 113 L.Ed.2d 453 unfettered admission of moment than the accept understand and that mental illness testimony.” relevant Wahrlich State of They real illness. also understand that is a (9th

Arizona, 479 F.2d Cir. can, do, people illness with mental denied, 1973), cert. U.S. S.Ct. society committing function our without Consequently, 38 L.Ed.2d 249 See, 253B.23(2) psychiatric testimony may e.g., crimes. Minn.Stat. to conclude that § (1990) (mentally persons relevance to a mind is ill have some committed or end, any beginning, not the chapter treated under this not to be de- testimony. inquiry admissibility into of that legal right, including prived any right dispose property, sue and jurisdictions Even that allow sued, contracts, purchases and make appear to testimony on mens rea acknowl- license). in question The hold a driver’s limits; edge logic has its most of these is not the defendant is these cases whether jurisdictions “illogically” restrict admissi- defendant, ill, mentally but rather what the bility involving “specific intent” to crimes not, subjectively “had in mentally ill or something distinguished as from called intent,” limit mind.” “general and a few this testi- Weinstein, (1986); Logically, v. 499 illness should be treated like 1018 Commonwealth mental 1344, involuntary apply general 106, (1982); and to as intoxication Pa. A.2d 1350 State v. 451 cf. specific intent crimes. See State v. 232, 532, well as Burge, A.2d 539-40 195 Conn. 487 532, 232, Burge, Conn. 487 A.2d 539-40 195 (1985). expert Some states also limit the testi- illness, (1985) (Mental involuntary like intoxi- See, mony e.g., cases. Common- to homicide cation, culpability "involves no on the defen- Robinson, 591, Mass.App. 441 v. 14 wealth part, by processes but is caused outside dant’s 553, (1982); Commonwealth v. N.E.2d 558 However, control.”). of the 24 states that his 1344, 1347, Weinstein, 106, Pa. 451 A.2d 499 illness, expert 17 allow some evidence of mental of diminish- 1350 Iowa allows evidence testimony expressly limit that to intent "specific responsibility ed as a “defense” in in- See, 28(b) e.g., crimes. Cal.Penal Code and § 316, crimes, Barney, v. 244 N.W.2d tent” 1103, Saille, Cal.Rptr.2d People 2 v. 54 Cal.3d Plowman, 1976), (Iowa yet and in State v. 318 369, 364, 588, (1991); Hoey v. 820 P.2d 593 546, (Iowa App.1986), sec- 622, State, 473, Md. 632 & n. 5 311 536 A.2d murder, degree required malice ond 8, (1988); People Lynch, Mich.App. 208 general aforethought, was held to be a intent 656, (1973); Westergard, People responsibility de- (1985), so that the diminished aff’d, crime 113 A.D.2d 497 N.Y.S.2d was unavailable. N.Y.2d N.E.2d fense N.Y.S.2d by limiting psychi- responsibility testimony, any minished

Psychiatric opinion rea, event, opinion testimony dimin- to strict not be allowed to show atric mens should responsibility. capacity ished or diminished i.e., only in fact the to whether defendant jury is to deter- The the court role of But if guilty psychiatric formed mind. particular case the facts of mine whether opinion testimony is admitted on the issue by legislature. fit the crime as defined the defendant did or didn’t whether “fit,” it is as- assessing generally In mind, guilty jury will requisite have the same all those who commit the sumed that inevitably as an invita- take guilty mens rea are acts the same with defendant tion consider offense, regardless of differences the same could or couldn n have a mind. In- condition, or environ- upbringing, mental deed, (so jurors quite prop- would why else long they under- background, so as mental wonder) psychiatrist tes- erly would the that it of their act and stand the nature tifying? Cautioning not to consid- words, defendants wrong. In other all capacity responsibility er diminished certain are held to a who are not insane confusion. The law can- would cause conduct. The criminal minimal standard giveth the one psychiatric legal responsibility match law seeks to away hand it with the other. and taketh in a consistent and fair culpability moral manner, providing at the same time while capacity to the diminished addition adequate controls so that members societal effect, severely spill-over another factor peace live public relative probative limits value of security. opinion testimony. expert testimony If negate mens it is also admissible to of diminished doctrines run mens rea. leads responsibility counter admissible to affirm This diminished assumptions. The di- unprofitable disagreements these societal basic between the capacity approach “opens the minished See, experts by e.g., sides. hired both virtually psy- unlimited courtroom doors Morse, (“Trial appellate supra, at Arenella, at testimony,” supra, literally courts irrele- bombarded not lend itself to a consistent and does vant, confusing, prejudicial testimony administration of criminal principled professionals from health ei- mental who justice. responsibility ap- The diminished ther do not understand what the law re- punishment make the fit proach seeks to quires of them or who have not-so-hidden effect, by, in crime changing the crime agendas.”). (or by transferring sentencing at least 704(b) Significantly, Fed.R.Evid. judge jury). Di- function from the any preclude wit- amended to responsibility, points minished Arenella ness on mental condition a defendant out, offenders sub- separates sane into two opinion in a case giving from criminal groups, namely: group fully of “normal” that the “did or did culpable group of not have criminal offenders and a constituting sane mentally offenders with mental or condition abnormal state * * Arenella, culpability. supra, at charged reduced crime *.”4 element of the legislature 860. has our rec- Not 704 to Congress Rule “eliminate amended ognized subgroups, but question- such it is of ex- confusing spectacle competing is psychiatry able able tell into testifying directly contra- pert witnesses particular subgroup a offender be- dictory legal to the conclusions as ultimate longs. issue to the trier of fact.” be found Alexander, F.2d dissenting opinion The the United States would avoid (11th Cir.1986) (citing di- 1463 1984 U.S.Code pitfalls capacity twin of diminished sought Judiciary proven. The Committee has fash- 4. The Committee’s Note con- to be Senate precluded provision ioned to reach all such rationale ultimate its Rule cludes: "[T]he issues, testimony beyond insanity e.g., premeditation opinion 'ultimate' in a homi- extends case, entrap- predisposition any mental de- cide lack of ultimate state of the defense legal ment.” is relevant to conclusion fendant that Gong. 3182, 3412-13).5 premise & Admin.News guilt stage of the bifurcated trial, namely, that the defendant capable is The confusion that would result from forming simply mens rea but has not inviting experts mental health into the le- done so. This is what Bouwman holds. gal help culpa- arena to establish criminal psychiatric Nor is underestimated; opinion bility is not to be it is “an ad- question missible on the ultimate jousting, invitation to semantic wheth- metaphysi- er in fact the requisite defendant had the speculation cal judg- intuitive moral mens rea when he committed the crime. ments masked as factual determinations.” legal construct, Because mens rea is a Cong. See 1984 U.S.Code & Admin.News opinion medical being is improperly elicited (legislative history amending question on a mixed of law and fact. We 704(b),quoting of Ped.R.Evid. approv- with not, do for example, expert opinion allow Robinson). al Professor David The resul- testimony on the question ultimate tant confusion is not to be considered an rape whether a rape victim had trauma adverse psychia- reflection on either law or syndrome, Saldana, State v. 324 N.W.2d rather, try; simply it is a reflection that the (Minn.1982), nor on whether a battered disciplines speak two per- from different woman in fact suffered from the battered spectives.6 syndrome, woman Hennum, State v. (Minn.1989). Equally B. important, any probative value of such Apparently there is some confusion opinion testimony is substantially out- about what is admissible under State v. weighed by the confusion and prejudice Bouwman, (Minn.1982). 328 N.W.2d 703 engendered by jousting” the “semantic sense, In a evidence of defendant’s state- experts. Again, this is what Bouw- ments, actions, “psychiat- and demeanor is man holds. ric evidence” because it is the kind of clini- view, our opinion testimo- psychiatrists cal detail rely diagnosis on for ny helpful is not person capa- whether a and treatment. But it is also the kind of of forming ble intent did in fact “lay every evidence” admitted in criminal formulate that Though subjective intent. Bouwman, course, case. admits this state of mind at times be difficult to evidence, kind of referring to (perhaps it determine, mystery there is no to mens inaptly) “physical evidence.” at Id. 705. the latinism notwithstanding. Jurors in What “expert psy- Bouwman disallows is everyday their constantly judg- lives make testimony.” ments on whether the conduct of others all, psychiatric First of opinion testimony accidental, premeditated intentional or whether, fact, not admissible on Thus, or not. something to do intentionally defendant had the capacity to form the purpose is to do it with accomplish- requisite subjective state of mind. This ing 609.02, that something. Minn.Stat. § testimony impermissibly introduces dimin- person subd. 9 To set a on fire with ished jury’s into the deliberations. purpose ending person’s life is is also inconsistent to torch psyehia- with intent to kill. The Minnesota, system, unlike the questions, federal allows to be moral not medical ones. The whether, fact, expert testimony on the defen- judges community’s rep- and the are the * * * Hoffman, dant was insane. State v. Society resentatives in this area. de- (Minn.1982). When, however, insanity through them—what crime is and what cides— (as stage is the issue in the second of a bifurcat- proof requires any particular it instance trial), worry ed any there is no need to penalty applies. and what confusing spill-over capacity. of diminished Menninger, K. The Crime Punishment 139 of (1968). Menninger psychiatric Dr. believes that Menninger gone 6. Dr. Karl has so far as to helpful judge sentencing information is to the at suggest psychiatrists not be witnesses at offender, deciding in what to do with the trials, criminal insanity. not even on the issue of helpful deciding but is not to the factfinder in He writes: guilt. oppose appearances I courtroom because I guilt, competence, responsibility consider history the rela- evidence on the of said heard may what the defendant look at

trist his opinion the tionship whether the between give did to opin- kill or torching expert to to done with intent The is whether wife. concern too; hurt, do this but the factfinder can to add a ions should be allowed it, indeed, do job it is the factfinder’s gloss. juror.7 expert’s as a thirteenth the evi- frequently argued that because It is opinion testimony Arguably, psychiatric on mens of is admissible dence intoxication generally explaining might still be useful of illness be so should evidence mental origins of the characteristics See, v. e.g., States admissible. United disorders; but these mental illness and Brawner, (D.C.Cir.1972). F.2d stage initial of a bifurcated opinions, in the argument, at least plausibility of this The a jury usefulness to are of minimal state, not withstand close anal- in this does conduct already that the defendant’s aware and, indeed, misstates the situation. ysis conflicting mentally To add is abnormal. 609.075, says statute, Minn.Stat. Our § descriptions by defendant’s condition may be taken “evidence of intoxication” very help adds little to disagreeing experts specific in- on whether into consideration subjec- the defendant’s the determine enough. Fair tent has been formed. Morse, at supra, tive state of mind. See however, expert psy- question, is whether from (“knowing the defendant suffers opinion testimony on is admissible schizophrenia add no addi- paranoid would has ren- defendant’s intoxication information.”). tional, legally relevant forming incapable dered the defendant of suffers from “undiffer- Whether defendant In such requisite mens rea. Minnesota “person- or schizophrenia” entiated from testimony is not Our opinion admissible. (as experts ality disagreeing disorder” testi- expert psychiatric law on of case use during case the second testified this illness is mony for intoxication and mental stage), fact remains that the defendant quite consistent. intent, capacity has the form still question the intent that is what was person’s on a blood Opinion terms, legal psychiat- this was formed. and on the fact of intoxi- alcohol content best, testimony has, opinion at minimal ric admissible, opinion tes- expert cation is relevance, of which probative value timony on dimin- how intoxication substantially outweighed by counterconsid- is not ish to form intent erations.8 day The same admissible. Bouwman decided, v. this court decided State say This is not to that factual evidence Fratzke, (Minn.1984). In bearing mentally abnormal on defendant’s psychiatrist testified without Fratzke the kind condition is not admitted. This of course, as, objection, large part on the defen- based in as a matter of evidence comes case, alcoholism, history that in his jurors past dant’s of example, for in this where Amos, Poisoning: ago, years legal Andrew The Great Over Over commentator ex- 7. (1846). plained opinions as the role of about well The Trial the Earl Somerset 326 put: it can be might be not, Another counterconsideration according opinion is Evidence of admissible, Courts, problem of accommodat practice except mentioned here is modern profes- regard ing proving to matters of science or mens rea be the State's burden drawing of sional skill. In such cases the yond doubt bur a reasonable with defendant’s does conclusion from ascertained facts insanity proving his a fair den defense sense, depend wholly on but re- common Allowing preponderance ex of the evidence. knowledge experience. quires peculiar pert psychiatric on mens rea would life, ordinary But in matters of if evidence of procedure now undermine bifurcated trial allowed, would be inter- were trials place proof problem. this burden of handle minable; juries constantly whilst would be Brown, (Minn. See State 345 N.W.2d 233 mistaking opinions proofs, and would 20.02, 1984); See also Minn.R.Crim.P. subd. 6. adopt suggestions partial interested Brom, (Minn.1990), witnesses, escape mental in order lab- — U.S.-, denied, Minnesota, cert. Brom v. making our of their own reflections 111 S.Ct. 113 L.Ed.2d 453 testimony of facts. opinion testimony the defendant was intoxicated the the if defense counsel could re- fully night intent, of the murder and not able to late it to but defense counsel was good judgment or exercise self-control. to satisfy unable the court that the testimo- expert counsel then asked his if Defense he intent,” ny would relate to id. at add- opinion an on whether had the defendant ing that we did not imply mean to such planned planning” any- “could have or was generally evidence was inadmissible. thing evening. that at 408. The trial Id. Again, Frank, State v. judge relevancy objection. sustained a On (Minn.1985), a sexual assault post- case appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s Bouwman, dating we held that the trial ruling, holding disposi- that Bouwman was court did not its discretion in abuse exclud- tive; words, sylla- in other in the stated ing testimony by expert an offered to show opinion, “Testimony bus to the court’s possible complainant’s effects of the .14 expert psychiatric is not admis- witness blood alcohol level “on ability one’s to re- prove that sible defendant was unable to call, inhibitions, one’s and so on.” We said: act with intent because of intoxication.” follow, however, It does not that a crimi- Later, Brown, Id. at 404. in State v. nal always right defendant has a to have (Minn.1984), defendant ar- expert testimony admitted on subject gued in refusing psy- the trial court erred consumption by of alcohol the victim as it opinion testimony that defendant’s ability relates to her to withhold consent. intoxication from marijuana alcohol and jurors experience Most have some precluded forming requisite him from the effects of consump- excessive alcohol degree intent for first murder. We therefore, tion and ordinary case, in an said defendant’s claim “without mer- will not expert need assistance. it,” citing ap- Bouwman. Our court of words, In other expert we treat testimo- peals, correctly Bouwman, applying has ny on intoxication and mental illness cases also psychiatrist’s ruled inadmissible a Expert much testimony the same. is not opinion “highly unlikely” that it was that issues, i.e., admissible on the “ultimate” paranoid the defendant in a intoxicated capable ability state had the form rea, forming requisite mens or whether attempted degree mind for murder. defendant, fact, actually possess did (Minn. Cyr, State v. St. 354 N.W.2d 479 Moreover, that expert opinion mens rea. App.1984). general effects of cases, however, Our intoxication have ordinarily mental illness or intoxication is open possibility expert left testi- jurors inadmissible because most have mony on the might, effects of intoxication experience some with these conditions. particular case, in a be admissible if it If, exceptions. There be a few directly on mentally bears whether the ill example, there was a mental disorder char- defendant, fact, requisite formed the particular acterized the formation of a Hardimon, mens rea. subjective state of mind inconsistent with (Minn.1981), pre-Bouwman N.W.2d 564 pertinent opinion criminal mens case, the defense wanted to call an alcohol testimony about such a mental condition expert to estimate the blood alcohol level of might situations, be admissible. These shooting, defendant at the time of the however, very rare.9 hypothetical question, on a based and then A expert likely to ask the more physiological about the instance where tes- timony may effects of alcohol. affirmed We the trial be admissible is where the rejection past history court’s of the offered defendant has a of mental for lack of foundation. If past history We observed that illness. includes a clini- “implied the trial court psychiatric opinions that it would allow cal record ap- wherein mind, judges requisite 9. "If trial understand how rare these tertain the state of most cases are a strict [for variant of the mens rea testimony will be excluded from trial." Arenel- reject psychiatric testimony all la, model] evaluates a defendant’s supra, at 863. general capacity to en- function, typically schizophrenics that how (such diagnosis), it as a pear nothing to what really added which be admissible. would such evidence Cf. mind,” is the issue “had in defendant Fratzke, (expert supra phase. In- in the first consideration under history alcohol abuse defendant’s testimony in case deed, the defendant’s nature of received). in the This evidence is to form a that he had was “the explain whole background to factual in fact formed a intent and that he specific of the the events he was before man” as intent; his in- only that he claims specific after-the- miasma of crime and before hurt, not an intent an intent to tent was rationalizations. crime defendant had Expert testimony that kill. following rules hold the up, we To sum probative “thought disorder” has no val- admissibility psychiatric govern shall actually the defendant which intent ue on stage of the testimony in the first opinion torched his wife. in mind when he had trial: bifurcated give expert did not proof the offer testimony on the 1) opinion Psychiatric issue of mens on the ultimate opinion in fact the question of whether ultimate had, have rea; opinion such an would if he subjective requisite had the judge here The trial inadmissible. been rea is inadmissible. mens “a discussion of nor- have allowed would testimony on in in- 2) Psychiatric opinion psychological processes involved mal fact, defendant, premeditation” (empha- had the tent formation requisite subjective added). testimony lies within the form the This capacity to sis jurors and knowledge experience of rea is inadmissible. mens expert opinion. proper subject not a testimony is 3) Other however, moot, ruling is The trial court’s except in a few generally inadmissible out, because, defense counsel as it turned particular men- cases, explain as to such ruling. accept the did not in- characterized tal disorder psy mens requisite from the add that exclusion different We need tent past opinion testimony defendant’s on mens rea aspects of a or where The trial is history guilt phase are relevant. of a bifurcated mental illness from the proof process. require an offer of due judge should not a denial constitutional trial Brom, hearing on the ad- have so held. State v. outside We (Minn.1990), testimo- cert. de missibility proffered of the — -, thereof, Minnesota, carefully weighing nied, U.S. parts ny or Brom (1991) prof- relevancy probative value 113 L.Ed.2d 453 111 S.Ct. evidence, against the likeli- any, if cited and discussed. fered cases therein prejudice or confusion. hood of Affirmed. GARDEBRING, (dissenting in Justice C. part). good illustra

This case affords a majority from the respectfully I dissent foregoing evidentiary rules how the tion of admissibility of the issue of the opinion on According to the defendant’s applied. issue of intent. psychiatric testimony on the psychiatrist proof, the defense offer of First, I reasons. believe I do so for two “the defendant have testified would on the allow its admission typically a schizo our decisions and that schizophrenic, Second, disorder, not to admit facts of this case. thought phrenic person has a create confusion association, would be to then determi such evidence it can loosen evidence, inconsistency in our rules of conse effect and nation of cause and in a vari- such evidence is admitted impaired.” This offer because quences thus can be other contexts. rejected. ety of properly proof limit use of the In its determination to sufficient offered lacked court relied psychiatric testimony, the trial diagno- of a It consisted probative value. ruling understanding upon of our opinion on its condition and an sis of a mental (Minn. Bouwman, case, ing v. 328 N.W.2d 703 the Brom we State concluded that there Bouwman, 1982). In we were asked to meaningful was no distinction between in- following question: answer the certified premeditation tent purposes of as- certaining expert admit, psychiatric whether May the court at the trial of a testi- mony on these charged may prohibited with murder in the elements expert psychiatric opinion in degree, phase first the first of a bifurcated trial. Id. (not Thus, testimony Brom, offered to establish a de- in we affirmed the trial 611.026) fense under Minn.Stat. that court’s refusal to allow § defendant to offer defendant, alleged at the time of expert psychiatric testimony regard crime, capacity lacked the mental premeditation intent or during the first premeditate killings or to form the phase of a grounds bifurcated trial on the specific kill? intent to Brom, that it is not relevant. Id. at 762- Bouwman, v. 328 N.W.2d at 704-05 State added). (emphasis We answered no. We However, my reading general of our af- in based our decision Bouwman on our firmance of the Bouwman doctrine in only conclusion that the relevant evidence open Brom is that it left possibility regarding disputing intent is evidence facts, expert that a different set of

physical prosecution facts which the has psychiatric testimony on the elements of introduced to allow the factfinder to infer premeditation intent and might be relevant holding I in intent. Id. believe our Bouw- Brom, and thus admissible. 463 N.W.2d at one, expert a narrow psychi- man was legal 763 n. 9. We identified relevance as testimony atric is inadmissible as it relates key admissibility to the expert to the requi- mental to form the Therefore, testimony. expert witness intent; site it but has been read more Brom, in “difficulty psychia- who had as a broadly preclude any relating getting questions trist into the premedi- premeditation phase to intent or in the first simply tation” was able to offer testi- See, of a bifurcated trial. e.g., State v. mony relevant, thus, which was admis- Jackman, 24, (Minn. 396 N.W.2d 28-29 contrast, appellant’s expert sible. was 1986); Fratzke, 354 N.W.2d State willing testify appellant’s as to how men- (Minn.1984); Brown, 408-09 State v. 345 tal disease have affected or (Minn.1984); N.W.2d not he intended to kill his wife. The trial (Minn. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d willing court testimony to allow some 1982). The result has been that defendants by expert, ordered that but routinely prevented introducing from be limited to “factual” rele- observations competent evidence of their state of mind premeditation, vant to intent and and a alleged at the time of the offense. A case- psychological process- discussion normal by-case legal analysis prof- of whether the premeditation. es involved intent and probative fered evidence is and material Thus, appellant’s expert was not allowed to generally rejected has in favor been of a speak to the existence of mental or disease application blanket Bouwman a re- bearing presence defect and its on the jection of the evidence. I believe that such absence of intent. justice. a result is not in the interests of In order to determine whether the trial prior

After Provost’s his curtailing scope court’s action in of the appeal, again we examined this issue correct, proffered testimony I would Brom, (Minn. State v. N.W.2d 758 — 1990), have us look at whether the denied, U.S.-, cert. 111 S.Ct. would have been relevant to the existence (1991). 113 L.Ed.2d 453 The Brom issue, appellant of intent. To convict of murder presented case slightly different degree, prove must present the first the state whether a defendant could wife, appellant pre- caused the death of his evidence on the issue of (rather intent) premeditation and during meditation than and that he did it with phase Brom, of a bifurcated trial. intent to effect her death. Minn.Stat. However, (1990). 609.185(1) recog- at 762. consider- This statute § every mem- general experience common to is committed when that a crime nizes community, has aided in an evil act also an ber of the would be does someone who mind, way, it put another “a the of- or to the consideration issues evil prohib- in the concurrence of testimony.” Equip. consists Rental crime fered Clark v. culpable mental state.” Inc., Co., ited conduct and Minn. (14th ed. Law Criminal Wharton’s § culpable 1978). mental state required This expert testimony, As with other the all rea.” “mens is called the admissibility particular expert’s a testi- of 401 defines relevant evi- Minn.R.Evid. mony and on the mens rea elements tendency “having any as that dence phase a trial will the first of bifurcated * * * any of more fact make the existence requirements governed by be the of the probable than it would be or less probable Expert Minnesota Rules of Evidence. tes- added.) (Emphasis evidence.” without the timony concerning the defendant’s mental comment, the noted in the committee As bearing and its on disease or defect the pro- of logic and assessment test is one of existence of rea should be a mens value, represents ap- liberal bative if it tests only admissible meets the of relevancy, admissibility. and thus proach applied of normally evidence to offers ex- 401, comment, para. 1. Minn.R.Evid. pert testimony. that, although by any I not am convinced Additionally, reading a careful of Bouw- questions on of intent dispositive means that our real concern about man indicates expert psychiatric testi- premeditation, admissibility the of evidence on bearing, have a ten- mony can can have the mens rea elements its proba- “more dency to make their existence There, reliability. relevance also its we probable.” or This evidence is ble less of justified testimony the exclusion on men- weighed by appropriately and considered the allowing tal illness while at same time the facts jury, along physical of the “intoxication, testimony admission of incident, determining the the whether medication, epilepsy, infancy senili- [and] necessary the elements proved state has Bouwman, ty.” 328 706. N.W.2d at We crime. the suscep- noted “[t]hese [conditions] analysis This is also consistent with our quantification lay tible understand- expert opin- question cases on the when ing.” supported by Id. We our conclusion testimony is relevant and thus admissi- ion describing psychiatry” the “esoteries of Expert testimony generally is allowed ble. ordinary (quot- “not within the ken.” Id. scientific, subject matter is of a where State, 1137, ing Wahrlich v. 479 F.2d 1138 specialized or nature and the tes- technical (9th Cir.1973)). However, Indeed! timony the trier fact to under- will assist analysis supports a conclusion that the tes- a fact in stand the or determine timony at here is issue admissible. Once Where, on the issue. Minn.R.Evid. having bridge as to basic rele- crossed hand, testimony other is one within the illness or vance mental mental defect on lay knowledge experience jury, of a so intent, the issue of a conclusion that the of the will subject requiring specialized is one matter depth to precision jury’s ability add or knowledge admissibility mandates conclusion, expert testimony reach a expert testimony. ordinarily Dyson is not v. allowed. Schmidt, Further, question 260 Minn. I whether the common (1961); Helterbridle, person understanding a better really has (Minn.1980). senility “A epilepsy N.W.2d reason- or than she has of mental applied presence test is the mem- illness? If evidence on able to be having knowledge intoxication,1 medication, senility jury, bers of the or requiring culpable at mental See State 1. Evidence of a defendant's intoxication state. Neumann, (Minn.1978). time the be crime committed consid- N.W.2d may negate ered an element will); Schneider, 1, 4, it relates to mens it must admissible as Timm v. 203 Minn. equally (1938) surely (capacity so as to mental illness. 279 N.W. to enter contract); into Lindsey v. Lindsey, 369 I am also concerned that exclusion of 26, 28, (Minn.App.1985) (expert expert testimony particular as to a state of psychiatric testimony admitted on phase mind in of a trial bifurcated contract). cases, enter into a In these anomaly is a in the real law of evidence. admissibility the test as to of evidence is “Mental condition” or “state of mind” is relevance, and the standard should be the put frequently variety at issue in a of law- same here. suits, and triers of fact are to hear allowed Therefore, testimony on their existence or non-exis- I would conclude that evi- dence, provides including expert opinion tence. This kind of criminal case testimony, perhaps example. Expert psychi- concerning the best the defendant’s mental disease is, previous atric offense, under our or defect at the time alleged cases, clearly negate admissible in the second is admissible to the existence of a trial, phase determining necessary specific directed at mens rea. major- As the laboring ity two, whether the defendant “was un- concedes in its posi- footnote * * * reason, der such a defect of as not to tion is consistent with the conclusion act, know the nature of the or that it was reached by majority jurisdictions of (1990). wrong.” Psy- issue, Minn.Stat. 611.026 which have considered this and is in § difficult, conformity related to this with the Model Penal Code and standard, metaphysical ap- almost does not American Bar Association Criminal Justice pear inherently helpful to be more or reli- Mental Health Standards. psychiatric testimony

able or relevant than This determination is consistent with our presence on the If of intent. one is allowed approach admissibility traditional to of evi- admitted, logic compels to be the other’s dence based on our faith in jury’s abili- admissibility, as well. ty meaningfully weight assess the as- signed Outside the of a particular pieces testimony. bifurcated trial of context guilty by 496, mandated a defendant’s not Chapel, See Lehmann v. 70 Minn. 497-99, 402, (1897). reason of mental or illness mental deficien- 73 N.W. Our cy plea, expert testimony policy admitting on “mental condi- freely of evidence has also tion” and “state of mind” is also previously admissible extended to the admission of proceedings. other criminal insanity See State v. evidence trials. unbifurcated Linder, 734, (Minn.1978) Rawland, 17, 46, 268 N.W.2d 736 See State v. 294 Minn. (expert psychiatric 774, (1972); testimony admitted on 199 N.W.2d 790 and Anderson capable 538, 555, of Grasberg, issue whether defendant was of v. 247 Minn. 78 N.W.2d waiver); 450, (1956). knowing, intelligent voluntary stated, 461 In Rawland we Holm, 353, 354 freely “evidence should be received so the * * * (Minn.1982) (expert psychiatric testimony factfinder can ‘take account of the ” competent admitted on whether defendant entire man and his mind as a whole.’ Minn, trial). Rawland, 46, to stand 294 at 199 N.W.2d at (quoting Pope Mr. Justice Blackmun in Similar issues arise non-criminal con- States, (8th 372 F.2d United example, as well.2 For the determi- texts Cir.1967)). effort, That to know the whole capacity competency nation of is critical man, appropriate today is as as it was in evaluating validity in the context of of wills, gifts, validity contracts or and the variety things, including for a consent While I would conclude that some testimony may medical treatment. Parrish v. Peo- See be relevant to issues of ples, 214 Minn. premeditation part 229 intent and in the first (1943) (mental capacity to make deeds or a bifurcated the content of that testi- Problem, catalog legal involving cho-legal Am.J.Psychiatry 2. For a areas mental capacity (1962). see Robert R. Mezer & Paul D. Rhein- gold, Capacity Incompetency: Psy- Mental A criminally responsible. hence narrowly tailored to address mony must be negate type evidence is offered actual mens defendant’s issues of the crime indispensable element of premeditation particular intent (i.e., guilt or culpability the time of the possessed at defendant bears any general innocence). type not address is offered It The second offense. By premeditate.3 insanity impacts to intend or to establish way, I would limiting ap- in this upon the evidence culpability but rather upon mens called the “strict adopt has been punish- what of criminal propriateness vel non admissibility of evidence model of the rea” ment. charged of a crime.4 negate the elements State, Md. 536 A.2d Hoey v. Further, I am not I to stress what types want of evidence Both advocate the advocating today. I do not admissible, for its differ- each relevant and defense. adoption of a new affirmative purpose. ent this rule evidence under The admissible reasons, I allow For these would go negating an element simply would on the psychiatric evidence admission of prima case. required facie purpose of for the limited issue of intent capaci- adopt the “diminished I would not presence. negating its merely No ty” doctrine. may merely less ca- shows a WAHL, (dissenting part). Justice required mens entertaining the

pable Gardebring join I of Justice rea is admissible. admissibility dissenting on the issue of re- adopt the “diminished I would not of testimony on the issue No evidence which sponsibility” doctrine. intent. a defendant to show that is offered or her responsible less for his somehow ad- mental disease is because of a

actions must take full Each defendant

missible. he or com- for the crime she

responsibility

mitted. WARTNICK, Petitioner,

However, charged with Norman if a defendant Appellant, possess degree did not murder in the of intent required mens rea elements proved lack is and that premeditation, BARNETT, al., Respondents. et & MOSS evidence, including psychiatric by relevant No. C6-91-564. evidence, guilty is not then he or she crime, possibly guilty still although that Supreme Court of Minnesota. requiring proof crime not a lesser Our de- specific mens rea elements. 1992. those Oct. today emphasizes that

cision Rehearing Denied Dec. 1992. demonstrating a lack of mens evidence purpose from evi- serves a different rea demonstrating the defendant that

dence the crime and at the time of

was insane mens rea purpose which such 4. For an excellent review of the strict spite the narrow admitted, argues Morse, majority Stephen J. Con- evidence could model see Undiminished "inevitably juries take the will Capacity, in Diminished J. of Crim.L. fusion consider whether the defendant Arenella, (1984); an invitation Criminology & and Peter mind,” and fur- have a or couldn’t could ther that a Capacity The Diminished and Diminished Re- cautionary to the instruction sponsibility Two Children Defenses: This discounts cause confusion." "would 827, 828-29, Marriage, 77 Doomed Colum.L.Rev. jurors respond to their care with the instructions, 836-39, they fully capable I believe they understanding must consider this only. purpose for a limited

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Provost

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Oct 2, 1992

Citation: 490 N.W.2d 93

Docket Number: C6-90-2479

Court Abbreviation: Minn.