State v. PrinkeyState v. Prinkey
Edward M. Hеindel, 450 Standard Building, 1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant).
O P I N I O N
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Richard A. Prinkey, Sr., appeals the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to four years in prison on one count of Illegal Assembly or Possession of Chemicals for the Manufаcture of Drugs, in violation of
{¶2} Appellant pled guilty, by way of North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, to the aforementioned charge. At a May 20, 2010 sentencing hearing, appellant informed the trial court that he wished to withdraw his plea. A hearing was held, and the
{¶3} “The trial court erred when it denied Prinkey’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his Alford guilty plea.”
{¶4}
{¶5} Here, appellant moved the court to withdraw the guilty plea prior to sentencing. Motions to withdraw guilty pleas before sentencing are to be freely given and treated with liberality. State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, paragraph one of the syllabus. This court has recognized that although such motiоns are to be treated liberally, “the right to withdraw a plea is not absolute.” State v. Ziefle, 11th Dist. No. 2007-A-0019, 2007-Ohio-5621, at ¶9, citing State v. Xie, supra.
{¶6} “In rendering a judgment, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea. *** After considering the basis of the motion, the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Ziefle, supra.
{¶7} An appellate court is limited in its review of a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to determine whether the triаl court abused its discretion. State v. Gibbs (June 9, 2000), 11th Dist. No. 98-T-0190, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2526, at *6-*7. An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise
{¶8} In Alford, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that a plea of guilty may be accepted by the trial court despite the fact thаt the defendant maintains actual innocence of the charges. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, at ¶13. “An individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the сrime.” Alford, supra, at 37.
{¶9} In State v. Piacella (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 92, syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio applied Alford, supra, and held:
{¶10} “Where the record affirmatively discloses that: (1) defendant’s guilty plea was not the result of coercion, deception or intimidation; (2) counsel was present at the time of the plea; (3) counsel’s advice was competent in light of the circumstances surrounding the indictment; (4) the plea was made with the understanding of the nature of the charges; and, (5) defendant was motivated either by a desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or both, the guilty plea has been voluntarily and intelligently made.”
{¶11} On appeal, appellant concedes that the trial court explained his
{¶13} “This plea of guilty signed form says it’s by way of Alford, which is -- it just makes reference to a Supreme Court decision *** in which the Supreme Court said that a person could plead guilty to a charge even though they felt they were not guilty of it if they were receiving some benefit that made it worthwhile to take the plea rather than take the risk of going to trial. And, in this case, the mandatory portion of the sentence is being reduced from five down to two. *** [Y]ou could go ahead and plead guilty and I could accept your plea, even though you’re not actually admitting that you’ve had [sic] committed this offense. Do you have any questions about that?”
{¶14} “THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir.”
{¶15} At the hearing on May 20, 2010, appellant further acknowledged that he understood the negotiated plea agreement and the fact that the mandatory sentence time was to be reduced from a five-year mandatory sentence to a two-year mandatory sentence.
{¶16} Therefore, appellant’s motivation in entering into the Alford plea is evident from the record. That is, appellant was aware that the state of Ohio was willing to withdraw the language relating to appellant’s previous conviction as specified in the indictment, to wit: that appellant had been “previously convicted of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs in violation of section 2925.04(A) in case number 2001-CR-172, in violation of section 2925.04 оf the Ohio Revised Code,” if he entered into the plea agreement.
{¶17} Appellant next argues that the trial court was required to make an inquiry into the state’s evidence. Appellant was charged with illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, a violation of
{¶18} “(A) No person shall knowingly assemble or possess one or more chemicals that may be used to manufacture a controlled substance in schedule I or II with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance in schedule I or II in violation of section 2925.04 of the Revised Code.
{¶19} “***
{¶20} “(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs. Except as otherwise рrovided in this division, illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs is a felony of the third degree, and, except as otherwise provided in division (C)(1) or (2) of this section, division (C) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code applies in determining whether to impose a prison term on the offender. *** If the chemical or chemicals assembled or possessed in violation of division (A) of this section may be used to manufacture methamphetamine, the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender as follows:
{¶21} “(1) If thе violation of division (A) of this section is a felony of the third degree under division (C) of this section and the chemical or chemicals assembled or possessed in committing the violation may be used to manufacture methamphetamine, except as otherwise provided in this division, the court shall impose as a mandatory
{¶22} As this court has previously noted, “[f]ootnote tеn of the Alford decision requires a factual basis when a defendant pleads guilty at the same time as he is protesting his innocence, so that the trial court can assure itself that the defendant is entering his guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently:
{¶23} “‘Because of the importance оf protecting the innocent and of insuring that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea ***; and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence.’” State v. Al-Jumailee, 11th Dist. No. 2006-P-0037, 2007-Ohio-2061, at ¶24-25, citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, fn. 10.
{¶24} Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the state set forth the following factual basis for the plea at the hearing:
{¶25} “A search warrant was executed at the property of Mr. Prinkey and as a result of that search warrant, there were at least 25 items that are consistent with the
{¶26} A review of the record reveals thе trial court complied with the requirements of Piacella, and, thus, appellant’s guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently made.
{¶27} Appellant also maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea made prior to sentencing, when the record indicates that the trial court did not engage in the proper inquiry before accepting his Alford plea. As stated, we have held that based on the record, appellant’s Alford plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing.
{¶28} In evaluating presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas, this court has generally applied the four-prong test set forth in State v. Peterseim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 213-214. In Peterseim, the Eighth Appellate District held:
{¶29} “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw: (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to
{¶31} Second, the record demonstrates and appellant acquiesces that he was afforded a proper hearing pursuant to
{¶32} As to the third and fourth Peterseim factors, after appellant’s counsel informed the trial court that appellant wished to withdraw his plea, the trial court afforded appellant a hearing on said motion. Appellant’s attorney informed the trial court that appellant had indicated he did not have enough time with counsel to seriously consider the offer or the merits of his case. Appellant was then questioned by his counsel and stated that he did not “want to plead to something that [he] didn’t do.” However, he acknowledged that by entеring into the plea agreement, his mandatory sentence was to
{¶33} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s assigned error is without merit. The judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.