91 P.2d 447 | Utah | 1939
Defendant was tried in the District Court of Wasatch County for the larceny of a sheep. From a judgment of conviction he appeals. Two points are involved in this appeal: (1) Was there sufficient evidence of the larceny to *160 submit the case to the jury and to support the verdict? (2) Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial supported by the affidavits of the eight jurors who tried the case to the effect that the verdict of guilty with a recommendation of leniency was a compromise verdict?
(1) Defendant's guilt of larceny of the sheep was under the evidence properly submitted for the determination of the jury.Barnes v. Commonwealth,
By statute the stealing of sheep is grand larceny. There is sufficient evidence of the various elements of the crime to support the verdict of guilty. Appellant claims that there is insufficient evidence of the asportation of the property. The law is settled that even a slight asportation of the property of another will supply this element of the offense. In Marshall v.State, 108 Tex.Crim. R.,
"Evidently the jury did not believe defendant's explanations, nor accord to the evidence introduced in his behalf much weight. With this exercise of the jury's discretion we cannot interfere.
"On the cold record the evidence against the defendant does not appear very strong, but upon a careful analysis of it we cannot say it was not sufficient to justify the jury in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged."
The jury had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing them testify. It was in a position to determine the credibility of the various witnesses and weigh the evidence. Since there was substantial evidence of appellant's commission of the crime alleged to support the jury's verdict of guilty, the trial court did not err in submitting the case to the jury nor in denying appellant's motion for a new trial on that ground. *162
(2) The court properly denied the motion for a new trial based on the claim that the verdict was "a 5-7 compromise verdict." The verdict reads as follows:
"We the jury duly empanelled and sworn in the above entitled cause do find the defendant guilty of Grand Larceny, as charged in the Information.
"We the jury ask for leniency of the Court."
An affidavit was filed by each of the eight jurors to the effect:
That the said jury did not agree upon a verdict of guilty until it was finally agreed that they should recommend leniency. And that he [affiant] believing that when leniency was recommended by all the jurors in the said action in their verdict, that only a fine would be imposed by the Court and that no prison sentence would be given the defendant to serve. Believing that leniency would be shown by the Court to that extent influenced me in my decision in the case.
"That he would not have voted for a verdict of Guilty in the said case if he had believed that a state prison sentence would have been required to have been served by the said defendant."
It is the settled law in this jurisdiction that jurors cannot impeach their verdict except in the instances expressly made exceptions by legislative enactment. People v. Flynn,
Judgment affirmed.
MOFFAT, C.J., and WOLFE, McDONOUGH, and PRATT, JJ., concur.