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State v. PriceState v. Price

Louisiana Court of Appeal
Oct 8, 1986
No. CR85-1169
Versions:495 So. 2d 389
1986 La. App. LEXIS 7826
YELVERTON, Judge.

Thе defendant, Hillie Price, Jr., pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1), and was sentenced to two years in the Department of Corrections. He reserved his right to appeal two rulings оf the trial court, the first denying his motion to suppress evidence, and the second his plea of unconstitutionality of the marijuana law. This is that appeal. We affirm the trial court’s rulings.

On July 26, 1984, officers from the Zwolle city police were called to a mill where defendant worked in Sabine Parish, where they were shown some marijuana that had been found on mill property, that was believed to have been in the possession of the defеndant. They questioned the defendant, he admitted it was his, and then he gave them verbal consent and the keys to search his vehicle. Several small bags and one larger bag of marijuana were found in the trunk.

The Motion to Suppress

The defendant complains that the marijuana recovered from the trunk of his car should have been suppressed. He сontends that since no search warrant was procured and no exception to the search warrant requirement was affirmatively shown by the state, the search and seizure was unconstitutional. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703 requires that the state carry the burden of proving the admissibility of any evidence seized without a warrant. State v. Banks, 363 So.2d 491 (La.1978).

A search cоnducted with the consent of a defendant is an exception ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍to both the warrant and probable cause requirements of the law. State v. Tennant, 352 So.2d 629 (La.1977). Voluntariness of the consent is a question of fact to be determined by the triаl judge under the facts and circumstances of the case. Because the ruling of the trial judge is based on thе credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, it should not be overturned in *391the absence of palpable abuse of discretion. State v. Tennant, supra.

The record supports a finding by the trial judge that the officer who conducted the search had permission to do so. The officer clеarly testified that the defendant had verbally consented to have his car searched.

There is no merit to this assignment of error.

The Constitutionality of the Marijuana Classification

By this second assignmеnt of error, the defendant argues that the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug is unconstitutionаl.

Defendant gives two reasons to support his contention. He argues that the classification of marijuаna does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Secondly, he cоntends that the classification of marijuana is unreasonable because it is in direct conflict with and diametrically opposed to the criteria established for classifying a substance as a Schedule I drug enumеrated in La.R.S. 40:963(A).

There is no merit to the defendant’s second argument as there ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍is no conflict between the legislаture’s classification and La.R.S. 40:963(A). That statute provides as follows:

“There are established five schedules of controlled substances, to be knоwn as Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V. Such schedules shall initially consist of the substances listed in R.S. j0:96j. In determining that a substance is to be аdded to these schedules, the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Resources shall find the following:
“A. As to Schedule I:
(1) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(2) The drug or other substance has no currеntly accepted ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍medical use in treatment in the United States, and
(3) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.”

(Emphasis added)

Marijuana was not added to thе list of Schedule I substances pursuant to this statute. The statute provides guidelines for the Secretary of the Department of Health arid Human Resources for determining that a substance is to be added to the schedulеs. The secretary is so authorized under La.R.S. 40:962.

In this case marijuana was added to the list of Schedule I controllеd dangerous substances by the legislature in 1981 by Act 800. See State v. Kibodeaux, 435 So.2d 1128 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). For this reason it is not in conflict with the statute as the defendant suggests.

The defendant further suggests that the classification is constitutionally infirm because it is simply unreasоnable. Since marijuana use or distribution is not a “fundamental right”, ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍any criminal statute classifying and proscribing the use оf the substance need only be rationally related to the need to protect the public health, safety and welfare. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Therefore, considering the basic presumption that legislative enactmеnts are constitutional, State v. Skinner, 358 So.2d 280 (La.1978), and considering the extent of conflicts in the scientific community as to the effects of marijuana use and its potential for abuse, it cannot be said that the legislature had no rational or reasonable basis for classifying marijuana as a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance. Sеe also State v. Chrisman, 364 So.2d 906 (La.1978), wherein the proscription of the use of marijuana in the privacy of one’s home was held to be constitutional.

Furthermore, the defendant fails to recognize that even though marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, it is not classified as a narcotic as are most Schedule I substances including opiates and opium derivatives. The legislature did recognize, contrary to defendant’s argument in briеf, that marijuana does not possess the same characteristics as the remaining narcotic drugs in Schedule I. Possession and distribution of Schedule I substances *392which are classified as narcotic drugs ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‍carry considerably greater penalties.

The assignment is without merit.

For the above reasons, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Price
Court Name: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Date Published: Oct 8, 1986
Citations: 495 So. 2d 389; 1986 La. App. LEXIS 7826; No. CR85-1169
Docket Number: No. CR85-1169
Court Abbreviation: La. Ct. App.
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