*1 “Refusing or neglecting obey the commands of... the fire department” fire, at the scene “a emergency, call” service is a violation. RSA 154:9. The legislature defines “other emergency” to include other real emergency directly which does not extinguishment involvethe of an actual 1(c) added). fire.” RSA (emphasis only exception involves propelled vehicle accidents. Id.
The plain phrase meaning “other emergency” includes floods. emergency An “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state action,” that calls immediate “a pressing need” or “a usu[ally] distressing event or condition that can often be anticipated or prepared for but exactly seldom foreseen.” WEBSTER’SThird New Dictionary 2002). International ed. (unabridged floodmeets this definition. that, points 644:2, IV, V(a)(3) out (2007),a
peace
officer
lawfully
order person
to leave his or her own home
during a flood. The defendant asks us to read the same language into RSA
(2002
2008).
chapter 154
Supp.
However,
154:7, 11(b)
specifically
grants authority
ato
fire officer
order
persons
“[t]o
to leave any
added.)
limit,
building.” (Emphasis
Had the legislature
intended
of fire
authority
departments as it
peace
did with
officers in RSA
Instead,
could have done so.
the legislature chose to use broad language,
and we will not
an exception
read
into a statute that
did not
see fit to include.
Langill,
See
Reversed and remanded. Galway Broderick, C.J., Duggan, Hicks, JJ., concurred. Rockingham No. 2007-923 Hampshire
The State of New Dennis Pratte Argued: October
Opinion Issued: November *2 (Francesca Stabile, on the Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney, attorney general for the State. orally), brief and Jr., Soldati, N. (Harry
Jeffco, Starbranch of Portsmouth Starbranch orally), on the for the defendant. brief Pratte, of his the denial appeals The Dennis J. GALWAY, (JNOV) Superior notwithstanding by the verdict judgment motion for (Nadeau, J.), a felon in being possession his conviction for following Court 159:3,1 weapon. See We reverse. trial, the evidence dispute. The not in At State introduced facts are bow, arrows, rack on a wall hanging on a defendant had a with several residence, had located additional arrows a recreational room his evidence that presented The State also within the residence. property to shoot and kill a on his bow and arrow
had used the jury The defendant was convicted past. at point some felon in of a deadly weapon. Subsequently, the defendant moved for JNOV The trial court denied the motion. appeal,
On dispute defendant does not that he possessed the bow and arrows, nor that he precluded from possessing deadly weapon because he is a felon. See I. primary whether, issue before us case, under the circumstances of this trier rational of fact could have found that the bow and arrow weapon. constitutes JNOV, considering motion for the trial court weigh cannot witnesses, evidence or inquire credibility into the of the and if the evidence at adduced trial is or if conflicting, several reasonable inferences drawn, the motion should be denied. State v. jury’s upheld verdict should be “unless no rational trier of fact guilt doubt,
could find beyond a reasonable all the considering evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in most favorable to the *3 omitted). State.” (quotation Id. question The of whether is required JNOV because of the insufficiency of question the evidence is a of law. v. State (1991). O’Neill, 182, 134 N.H. 184 On appeal, objectively “we review the record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential of elements the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 156 N.H. at 464 (quotations
Resolution of this issue requires that we in engage statutory interpre- tation. of statutory matters interpretation, we the are final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed the of words a statute considered (2008). as a whole. v. 421, State Gallagher, 157 N.H. 422 firstWe examine statute, and, the language possible, where we apply plain and ordinary to meanings the words at used. Id. 422-23.We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written will not consider what the might have said or add language that the legislature did fit to not see 77, (2008). include. State v. Langill, 157 N.H. We construe parts together statute to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust (2004). result. Franklin v. Newport, Town 151 N.H. Moreover, we do not isolation, consider words and phrases but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Grand China v. United Nat’l Co., Ins. 156 N.H. I, 159:3, provides
RSA that person is B guilty a class if he felony or has in control, “[o]wns his or revolver, under his pistol, or firearm, knuckles, other or slungshot, billies, stiletto, metallic switchblade knife, cane, cane, pistol sword blackjack, dirk-knife, dagger, or other 625:11, weapon as defined in V” and has been convicted of proscribed A felony. bow and arrow is not one of the enumerated weapons
159:3,1(a); therefore, to be “deadly considered a for weapon” purposes statute, that a bow and arrow must fall within the definition a 625:11,V defines 625:11, V weapon under RSA it which, in the manner firearm, knife or other substance is known to be threatened to be to used, intended Thus, was the State injury.” producing arrow, the bow and possessed defendant only not that the prove required or threatened intended in manner the defendant but that arrow, producing was to use the bow bodily injury. that the proving element that it satisfied this asserts State death, past and arrow the to cause actually used the bow Thus, of an that the death the State contends porcupine.
death of the bow and the defendant used prove sufficient to past animal in the bodily injury producing death or serious a manner arrow in defendant, however, argues that RSA of RSA V. purposes only include death or serious should be construed to human, with the defendant. agree not that of an animal. We to a phrase “death or serious specify not that the V does However, to hold otherwise being. a human pertains to injury” interpreta as such an vague expansive impermissibly renders statute of those ordinary adequate with notice provide person not tion would statute things which constitute substances are set out terms unconstitutionally vague prohibitions “as as its long sufficiently sense can ordinary exercising ordinary common person that the (2008) Lamarche, with.” comply understand *4 omitted). that no underlying vagueness of is principle “The (quotations which he or she criminally responsible conduct person should be held (brackets Id. at 340-41 to reasonably proscribed.” could understand be omitted). quotation conclusion, any logical its Taking interpretation the to State’s a any living thing the of is thing” used to produce “substance or 625:11, to using poison For a example, person V. deadly weapon a clearly has used substance pest of or some other rid his residence rodents interpretation, the he or she would be to a death. Under State’s produce and, requisite underlying convic with possession of weapon tion, possession deadly of a felon in of may be convicted 625:11, 159:3,1. ordinary an level of Reading to RSA V with pursuant RSA sense, under ordinary person that an we cannot conclude common such an item would constitute to mean that the use of stand this statute the terms interpretation, the State’s Under adequately to bodily injury” simply vague are too and “serious “death” statute, thus what included under the notify ordinary person of be
49 ultimately rendering the statute will unconstitutional. statute not be “[A] unconstitutional, to construed be where it susceptible is to a construction Pierce, (2005) it rendering constitutional.” (brackets quotation Here, logical the more of the reading statute, constitutionally one, and the permissible to interpret is RSA 625:11,V as to causing limited If injury to a human. did not intend this interpretation, it is free to amend the language Bedard, the statute as it sees fit. the Matter of LaRue (2007) N.H. To the extent argues the State that a bow and arrow is inherently deadly weapon, State, we disagree. relying solely upon unpublished an Delaware, decision from argues that because a bow arrow is a weapon “designed kill target,” its it is deadly weapon. interpretation This ignores plain 159:3,1, language 625:11, both RSA and RSA V. RSA 159:3,1, requires any item not specifically enumerated the statute as arrow, like weapon, 625:11, a bow and satisfy also RSA V. That statute deadly weapon, part, defines any substance or which “in the manner is intended to
known to be capable of producing death serious bodily injury.” RSA 625:11, However, V. the State’s interpretation requires ignore that we whether, “used, in the manner this defendant use, intended to or threat arrow, ened to use” this bow and it was known to death or seriously bodily injury, and instead end our inquiry with whether arrow, the bow and independent action essence, doing so. In the State would have us add to the enumerated list 159:3, deadly weapons specified I, any object that is causing death serious bodily injury to any thing. plain language of 159:3, I, and RSA prohibits this result. As we have stated, it previously is the manner in which the “other substance or thing” used, and the surrounding circumstances its that makes it a Hull, under V. See State v. N.H. Thus, this requires determination more than the limited examination suggested itself by the State. Id. at 714-15. V,
With this interpretation of RSA we now examine whether fact, a rational trier of all of viewing evidence and reasonable inferences from it in most favorable to the could have found *5 this defendant was in possession of a deadly beyond a weapon reasonable doubt. See 156 N.H. at 464. We conclude that the evidence was insufficient. in Viewed most favorable to only demonstrating evidence this case actual use involved the use of the bow and arrow to kill porcupine. a There no presented was evidence that the manner have concluded trier of fact could which rational
from to use the bow used, intended to or threatened the defendant which of, or serious capable causing death to be arrow was known standing to, porcupine, death of the human. Because the bodily injury 159:3,1, trial alone, the defendant under to convict was insufficient for JNOV. denying request his court erred as a was insufficient that the indictment argues also The defendant that the defendant did However, we conclude because of law. matter v. Gill not address this issue. See we need weapon, possess (2007). Gerrato, 156 N.H.
Reversed. Duggan J., Hicks, JJ., concurred; Dalianis, Broderick, C.J., dissented. J., conviction of dissenting. I would affirm the
Dalianis, that he used I that the bow and arrow because, majority, unlike the believe 159:3,1 (2002); is a See RSA to kill a has mind, has an animal been To and arrow that killed my V a bow or capable producing death in which it is “known to be in a manner used being human V. Had a injury” being. to a human serious have suffered the human would at least porcupine’s place, been in the therefore, the bow and arrow used bodily injury. a serious seriously injuring killing or capable to be in a manner that is known being. human firearm, knife or deadly weapon defined RSA used, which, intended to be in the manner it or
other substance used, death used, producing known to be or threatened an [in is ‘the manner which phrase “The critical injury.” used, is known or to be [it] intended to be threatened object] is ” Hull, v. bodily injury.’ producing serious to be object can become a An innocuous 149 N.H. Kiluk, Id.; see State
when it is used to assault someone.
eye).
(1980)(dinner
someone in
To
used to stab
fork is
when
causing
“intrinsically capable
need not be
deadly weapon,
actually cause
Hull,
it have to
Given interpretation I that a believe rational trier fact, viewing of the evidence in most to the favorable could found beyond have a reasonable doubt that the possessed weapon. A rational trier of fact could have concluded that the — manner in which the defendant used the bow and arrow to kill a — is known to of, causing the death to, injury reasons, therefore, human. For these I would affirm the defendant’s conviction.
Franklin District Court No. 2008-033 Hampshire
The State of New Gladys Durgin Argued: October
Opinion Issued: November