75 Conn. App. 80 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2003
Opinion
The defendant, Joseph R. Pranckus III, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (l).
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On July 4, 1998, a party was held at 69 House Street in Glastonbury. The house was rented by Debra Malcomson, who lived there with her daughter, Samantha Witnauer. Malcomson was vacationing on Cape Cod and had left the defendant to look after her house and Samantha. Richard Lupacchino, Samantha Witnauer’s boyfriend at the time, and Damien McLaughlin organized the party. People first arrived at 69 House Street
Earlier that day, Karen Witnauer, Samantha Witnauer’s sister, and the defendant left 69 House Street to view fireworks. They had no knowledge that the party was taking place, nor had the defendant given permission for a party to occur. Karen Witnauer and the defendant arrived back at 69 House Street in Karen Witnauer’s car sometime after 11 p.m. Located in the trunk of the car was the defendant’s backpack, which included the defendant’s clothes. Samantha Witnauer and Lupacchino approached Karen Witnauer’s car to inform them of the party and to see if they had a problem with it continuing. The defendant indicated that he did not have a problem with the party as long as it was not loud and people were out at a reasonable time. The defendant then mingled at the party with others, smoked marijuana, drank alcohol and lit fireworks in the backyard.
By 3 a.m. on July 5, 1998, the majority of people had left the party. The remaining people included the defendant, Karen Witnauer, Samantha Witnauer, Lupacchino, McLaughlin, Gordon Anderson, Peter Doucette and the two victims, Bryan Judd and Paul Potkaj. Anderson, Doucette, Judd and Potkaj were in the kitchen where they continued to drink, arm wrestle and break dance. Shortly thereafter, the defendant entered the kitchen and began yelling and swearing at the boys to leave. Judd approached the defendant in an attempt to calm him.
The defendant then punched Judd in the face. Judd responded by punching the defendant in the face. A
Judd suffered a seven inch deep stab wound to the left side of his chest and an another wound from the knife to the left side of his back. Potkaj received a seven and one-half inch deep wound to the right side of his chest and a superficial incision wound on the left side of his back around his shoulder blade. Everyone remaining at 69 House Street ran outside, but the defendant remained inside where he called the police. Both Potkaj and Judd collapsed on the ground from their injuries. Potkaj eventually died from the seven and one-half inch stab wound to the right side of his chest, and Judd died from the seven inch stab wound to the left side of his chest. The defendant was arrested on the scene and later treated for a laceration over his left eye and a broken left orbital bone.
The defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the state failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his justifi
“[T]he standard for reviewing sufficiency claims in conjunction with a justification offered by the defense is the same standard used when examining claims of insufficiency of the evidence. ... In reviewing [a] sufficiency [of evidence] claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
“On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [trier of fact’s] verdict of guilty. . . . We are mindful as well that [t]he state has the burden of disproving the defense of justified use of force . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Whether the defense of the justified use of force, properly raised at trial, has been
The defendant claims that the state failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his justification defense. Essentially, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence (1) to disprove that he reasonably believed Judd and Potkaj were using or about to use deadly physical force against him, or were inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm on him, and that deadly physical force was necessary to repel the attack, (2) to prove that he had a duty to retreat and (3) to prove that he was the initial aggressor. We disagree.
In support of his claim, the defendant posits an alternative factual scenario of the events of July 5,1998. The defendant had to work the next morning and wanted the partygoers out of the house in the early morning hours. He asked Samantha Witnauer to ask people to leave, but they did not do so. At around 2:30 a.m., the defendant personally began asking people to leave, many of whom did, but several teenagers remained, including Judd, Potkaj, Anderson and Doucette. At about 3 a.m., the defendant entered the kitchen and politely asked the remaining people to leave. Judd then became angry and verbally confronted the defendant in a threatening manner. In response to Judd’s actions, the defendant punched him in the face. Potkaj, Anderson and Doucette all then began punching and kicking the defendant, who fought back with punches of his own. During the altercation, the defendant was hit in the head with a
Before addressing the defendant’s specific arguments, we note that twenty-four witnesses testified at trial. The written and oral statements the defendant made to the police also were admitted into evidence.
“It is the jury’s right to accept some, none or all of the evidence presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 73 Conn. App. 173, 188, 807 A.2d 500, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 923, 812 A.2d 865 (2002). “Moreover, [e]vidence is not insufficient . . . because it is conflicting or inconsistent. [The jury] is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible. ... It is the [jury’s] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . The [jury] can . . . decide what — all, none, or some — of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 71 Conn. App. 217,
“We do not sit as a [thirteenth] juror who may cast a vote against the verdict based upon our feeling that some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nicholson, 71 Conn. App. 585, 590, 803 A.2d 391, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941, 808 A.2d 1134 (2002). Although there was some evidence to support the defendant’s version of the events, the jury was free to reject that evidence. Our standard of review dictates that we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. See Statev. Johnson, supra, 71 Conn. App. 279. Applying that standard, we conclude that the verdict should be sustained.
I
The jury was free to disbelieve the defendant’s claim of self-defense and to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he could not reasonably have believed that he was faced with deadly physical force or great bodily harm at the hands of Judd and Potkaj. The jury also reasonably could have concluded that the defendant’s use of deadly physical force was unnecessary. Our Supreme Court has interpreted § 53a-19 (a) to require that “a person may justifiably use deadly physical force in self-defense only if he reasonably believes both that (1) his attacker is using or about to use deadly physical force against him, or is inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm, and (2) that deadly physical force is necessary to repel such an attack.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 285-86, 664 A.2d 743 (1995).
The cumulative force of the evidence allowed the jury reasonably to conclude, first, that the defendant did not reasonably believe that deadly physical force was being used or about to be used on him by the victims
The evidence also is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably believe that great bodily harm was inflicted or about to be inflicted on him. Although the defendant did suffer a broken orbital bone from one of Judd’s punches, the jury was free to determine that this injury did not constitute great bodily harm.
Even if we were to find that the jury determined that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly physical force or great bodily harm was or was going to be used or inflicted on him, we conclude that the jury had sufficient evidence reasonably to find that his use of force was unnecessary under the circumstances. “We repeatedly have indicated that the test a jury must apply in analyzing the second requirement, i.e., that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly force, as opposed to some lesser degree of force, was necessary to repel the victim’s alleged attack, is a subjective-objective one. The jury must view the situation from the perspective of the defendant. Section 53a-19 (a) requires, however, that the defendant’s belief ultimately must be found to be reasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 286.
The subjective-objective inquiry “requires that the jury make two separate affirmative determinations in order for the defendant’s claim of self-defense to succeed. First, the jury must determine whether, on the basis of all of the evidence presented, the defendant in fact had believed that he had needed to use deadly physical force, as opposed to some lesser degree of force, in order to repel the victim’s alleged attack. . . .
“If the jury determines that the defendant had not believed that he had needed to employ deadly physical force to repel the victim’s attack, the jury’s inquiry ends, and the defendant’s self-defense claim must fail. If, however, the jury determines that the defendant in fact had believed that the use of deadly force was necessary, the jury must make a further determination as to whether that belief was reasonable, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
Evidence that the altercation between the defendant and Judd was a mere fistfight that the defendant initiated with no signs of escalation by Judd or Potkaj allowed the juiy reasonably to conclude that the defendant did not believe deadly force was necessary to repel Judd’s defensive punches. Also, the fact that the defendant purposefully continued the fight without a weapon after it had been broken up demonstrates his belief that resorting to deadly force was unnecessary to combat Judd. Furthermore, evidence that the defendant grabbed the knife and strode six feet toward Judd reasonably can be inferred to prove that the defendant’s use of the knife was an offensive rather than defensive attack. The defendant stabbed the victims a total of four times. Two of these wounds required the defendant to use enough force to drive the knife practically to its hilt into each victim. The other two wounds were on the backs of the victims, indicating that they were fleeing from the defendant. There was, therefore, sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant did not reasonably believe deadly force was necessary to repel Judd’s defensive punches. Although we address the defendant’s remaining claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he (1) had a duty to retreat and (2) was the initial aggressor, we note that we are not required to do so because the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified in using deadly physical force under § 53a-19 (a). See State v. Ash, 33 Conn. App. 782, 789-90, 638 A.2d 633, rev’d on other grounds, 231 Conn. 484, 651 A.2d 247 (1994).
II
The evidence also supports the conclusion that the defendant was in a position to retreat with complete
The court read to the jury the definition of dwelling provided in General Statutes § 53a-100 (a) (2). That subdivision provides that a dwelling is “a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present . . . .” The court further instructed the jury that the statute “contemplates a duration element, by requiring usual habitation at night. Usual, in this context, means ordinary or customary. Thus, occupation for some period of time is required. In considering whether a house is the defendant’s dwelling, the jury can consider evidence such as where the defendant’s clothes and personal effects were kept.”
The court then instructed the jury concerning the duty to retreat.
Additionally, the jury reasonably could find that the defendant knew that avenue of retreat was available and that such retreat could be accomplished with complete safety. Evidence that no one was obstructing the defendant’s retreat into the laundry room, that Judd merely was defending himself from the defendant’s attacks, and that the defendant strode six feet toward the victims to stab Potkaj and Judd instead of retreating was sufficient to allow the jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant knew no harm would have befallen him in making that retreat.
Ill
Finally, the jury also reasonably could have concluded from the evidence presented that the defendant was not justified in using deadly force against the victims because he was the initial aggressor. General Statutes § 53a-19 (c) (a) (2) provides in relevant part that “a person is not justified in using physical force when . . . he is the initial aggressor . . . .” The court defined “initial aggressor” as “the person who acts first in such a manner that creates a reasonable belief in another person’s mind that physical force is about to be used upon that other person. The first person to use
Our standard of review dictates that we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. See State v. Johnson, supra, 71 Conn. App. 279. Applying that standard, we determine that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence disproved the defendant’s justification defense of use of force in defense of a person beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person . . . .”
General Statutes § 53a-16 provides: “In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 53a-17 to 53a-23, inclusive, shall be a defense.”
General Statutes § 53a-19 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm.
“(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating, except that the actor shall not be required to retreat if he is in his dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work and was not the initial aggressor, or if he is a peace officer or a private person assisting such peace officer at his direction, and acting pursuant to section 53a-22, or (2) by surrendering possession of property to a person asserting a claim of right thereto, or (3) by complying with a demand that he abstain from performing an act which he is not obliged to perform.
“(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force when (1) with intent to cause physical injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of physical force by such other person, or (2) he is the initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, but such other person notwithstanding continues or threatens the use of physical force, or (3) the physical force involved was the product of combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.”
The defendant does not appeal from the propriety or language of the jury instructions concerning self-defense.
The defendant did not testify at 1 rial.
General Statutes § 53a-3 (5) defines “deadly physical force” as “physical force which can be reasonably expected to cause death or serious physical injury
General Statutes § 53a-3 (4) defines “serious physical injury” as “physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ . . .
General Statutes § 53a-3 (3) defines “physical injury” as “impairment of physical condition or pain . . . .”
The defendant, was six feet, two and one-half inches tall and weighed 180 pounds whereas Judd was five feet, eleven inches tall and weighed 156 pounds.
The court defined “great bodily harm” as “bodily harm that is substantially more than minor or inconsequential harm.”
The charge referred only to the ability to retreat with complete safety and the defendant having no duty to retreat from his own dwelling.
That instruction is consistent with Connecticut case law. See State v. Bailey, 209 Conn. 322, 343, 551 A.2d 1206 (1988).
The court stated in its instructions: “[A] person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating. That means both a retreat was completely safe and available, and the defendant knew it.
“Complete safety means without any injury whatsoever to him. As I have said, self-defense requires you to focus on the person claiming self-defense, on what he reasonably believes under the circumstances, and it presents a question of fact as to whether a retreat with complete safety was available and whether the defendant knew of it.
“The law stresses that self-defense cannot be retaliatory. It must be defensive and not punitive. So, you must ask yourself: Did the defendant know that he could avoid the use of deadly force by retreating with complete safety? Is so, and yet he chose to pursue the use of deadly physical force, you shall reject the self-defense claim.”
That instruction is in accordance with Connecticut case law. See State v. Montanez, 71 Conn. App. 246, 263, 801 A.2d 868, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 935, 806 A.2d 1069 (2002).
That definition is in compliance with our case law. See State v. Ramos, 261 Conn. 156, 166-67, 801 A.2d 788 (2002).