State v. Pittman (Slip Opinion)State v. Pittman (Slip Opinion)
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} In this case, we hold that a person is not subject to prosecution under
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} In December 1988, the Marion County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, ordered appellee, Robert Pittman, to pay child support for his two children, Sade and Sate Douglas, from January 6, 1989, until the children attained the age of 18 years and completed their high school education or were otherwise emancipated.
{¶ 3} On November 20, 2006, the Marion County Common Pleas Court, Family Division, issued two judgment entries, one relating to Sade and the other relating to Sate, stating that the children were emancipated as of August 31, 2006, because they had turned 18 years old and were no longer in high school. One entry declared that Pittman owed $34,313.45 in child-support arrearages for Sade—$33,730.14 to Alma Douglas, the children’s mother, and $583.31 to the Job and Family Services of Marion County Child Support Division for Ohio Department of Job and Family Services—and granted each a judgment against Pittman in those respective amounts. The entry stated that “all current child support shall cease effective 8/31/06,” but it ordered Pittman to pay $236.17 plus a two percent processing fee per month toward the arrearages owed. The judgment entry relating to Sate was substantially the same.
{¶ 4} On December 6, 2007, the family court found Pittman in contempt for failing to pay his arrearages and sentenced him to 30 days in jail with 25 days
{¶ 5} Next came the criminal charges that are the focus of this case. The state charged Pittman with nonsupport of his dependents in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. On July 9, 2009, an indictment was handed down against Pittman containing nine counts related to his failure to pay the child support previously ordered. Each count in the indictment addressed a specified two-year period—July 1, 2003, through June 30, 2005 (Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9), July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2007 (Counts 3 and 4), and July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2009 (Counts 5 and 6)—and alleged that during those periods, Pittman “did recklessly abandon or fail to provide support as established by a court order to, another person whom, by court order to decree, the Defendant is legally obligated to support,” pursuant to
{¶ 6} Counts 1 through 6 alleged fourth-degree felonies under
{¶ 7} The 2009 indictment was not served on Pittman until he voluntarily appeared before the court on June 11, 2013. On July 29, 2013, Pittman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the state had violated his constitutional rights to due process of law and a speedy trial in delaying nearly four years before serving the indictment. At an August 20 hearing, the motion to dismiss was orally amended to also seek dismissal because the six-year statute of limitations for felonies set forth in
{¶ 8} Further, the court held that the nearly four-year delay in serving the indictment violated Pittman’s speedy-trial rights as to all counts but Counts 5 and 6. Counts 5 and 6 alleged that Pittman had engaged in illegal activity between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2009. The court distinguished Counts 5 and 6 from the older counts because the delay was not as long, some civil enforcement action
{¶ 9} On September 24, 2013, Pittman moved to dismiss those remaining counts. He argued that because his daughters were emancipated as of August 31, 2006, he had no duty to provide support to them after that date. Thus, he was not legally obligated to pay support from July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2009, as alleged in Counts 5 and 6.
{¶ 10} On October 16, 2013, the state filed a bill of particulars clarifying the nature of the offenses in Counts 5 and 6. The state indicated that the charges were based on Pittman’s failure to provide support pursuant to the November 20, 2006 orders, which determined that the children were emancipated and calculated the amount of Pittman’s arrearage. The state also indicated that Count 5 alleged that Pittman had failed to provide support as established by a court order to Alma Douglas for Sate Douglas and Count 6 alleged that he failed to provide support as established by a court order to Alma Douglas for Sade Douglas. Finally, the state alleged that Pittman failed to provide support for 101 weeks of the 104 consecutive weeks between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2009.
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated to the relevant facts and in a November 5, 2013 hearing, submitted to the court the question whether
{¶ 12} On November 14, 2013, the trial court granted Pittman’s motion to dismiss:
With regard toR.C. 2919.21(B) , some meaning must be given to the phrase “to another person whom * * * the person is legally obligated to support.” The State’s interpretation would restrict the statute to the initial phrase, which provides: “No person shall abandon, or fail to support as established by a court order.” The additional meaning provided by the phrase, “to another person whom, by court order or decree, the person is legally obligated to support” is that at the time of the commission of the criminal offense there must be a current obligation of support.
(Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 13} The state appealed. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that
{¶ 15} Upon the state’s motion, the appellate court certified that its decision was in conflict with Dissinger. This court determined that a conflict exists and ordered briefing on this issue as stated by the court of appeals: “Is a person subject to prosecution under
LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶ 16} We address whether, pursuant to
{¶ 17} “Our first duty in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute is clear and unambiguous.” Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc.,
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} In 1988, Pittman was ordered to pay child support for Sade and Sate until their emancipation. But Pittman’s criminal liability for nonpayment of support ended on August 31, 2006, when his children were emancipated. Counts 5 and 6 of the indictment alleged that Pittman violated
{¶ 21} The decision of the court below was in conflict with the Fifth District’s decision in Dissinger. We address that decision briefly. In that case, the court based its decision on the definition of “child support order” in former
(B) “Child support order” means an order for the support of a child that provides for monetary support, whether current or in arrears * * *. “Child support order” includes:
(1) An order under which the child has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing state and amounts for current support are required to be paid, or arrearages are owed, under the order.
In Dissinger, the court concluded that “[b]ased upon the legislature’s definition of ‘child support order’ under
CONCLUSION
{¶ 22} In this eertified-conflict case, we ordered briefing on the following question: “Is a person subject to prosecution under
{¶ 23} We hold that Pittman was not subject to prosecution under
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 24} While I concur in the judgment in this case, I write separately to note that prosecution under
{¶ 25} It is undisputed that Pittman was legally obligated to pay child support for his two daughters, who were born August 31, 1988, until they turned 18 years old in 2006. And there is no argument that over $68,000 is still owed to Alma Douglas, the children’s mother, for child-support arrearages.
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28} Finally, it should be noted that Alma Douglas has her rights under R.C. Chapter 3123 to a civil remedy. What has been foreclosed here is criminal prosecution.
{¶ 29} For these reasons, I concur only in the court’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals.
O’Connor, C.J., and French, J., concur in the foregoing opinion.