State v. PhippsState v. Phipps
OPINION
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio, appeals the decision of the Auglaize County Municipal Court holding that the Senate Bill No. 163 amendment to
{¶ 2} On June 21, 2003, Robert Phipps (hereinafter “Phipps“) was cited for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of
{¶ 3} Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court concluded that the action of the legislature in amending
{¶ 4} It is from this decision that the state appeals, asserting one assignment of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I
The trial court erred when it declared Ohio Revised Code 4511.19(D)(4)(b) amended and enacted on April 9, 2003 to be unconstitutional as a matter of law.
{¶ 5} On review of statutory acts, a court is bound to give a constitutional rather than an unconstitutional construction if one is reasonably available. United Air Lines v. Porterfield (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 97. This is due to the general presumption in favor of the validity of legislation.
{¶ 6} In State v. Homan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 421, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the results of field sobriety tests are not admissible unless the tests are performed in strict compliance with the procedures promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The Homan court found that “[w]hen field sobriety testing is conducted in a manner that departs from established methods and procedures, the results are inherently unreliable.” 89 Ohio St.3d at 424. Therefore, the Homan court announced a rule that strict compliance with testing standards was necessary for the results of field sobriety tests to serve as evidence of probable cause to arrest.2
{¶ 7} Prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Homan, Ohio statutory law did not contain a provision regarding the admissibility of field sobriety test results. After the Homan decision, however, the Ohio General Assembly deliberated on the issue of field sobriety tests, and enacted Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 163 (S.B. 163) in 2002. S.B. 163 amended
In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, * * * if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that were set by the national highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply:
(i) The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so administered.
(ii) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding.
(iii) If testimony is presented or evidence is introduced under division (D)(4)(b)(i) or (ii) of this section and if the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.
The legislature, therefore, determined that testimony or other evidence of field sobriety tests done in substantial compliance with NHTSA standards should be admitted as evidence, if otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence, and accorded “whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.”
{¶ 8} In the case sub judice, the trial court found that, based on the precedent of Homan, strict compliance with NHTSA standards must be demonstrated before field sobriety tests can be admissible as evidence.3 The trial court found that the ruling in Homan was “not a new evidentiary rule, but an application of an existing rule to determine the admissibility of evidence.” Based on that, the trial court found that the legislature violated
{¶ 9} The state claims that the amendment of
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} The Rules of Evidence contain provisions regarding the admissibility of certain types of specific evidence.
{¶ 12} Although we are very cognizant of the judicial branch‘s exclusive authority under the Ohio Constitution to promulgate rules of procedure in its courts, the legislature‘s amendment of
{¶ 13} We conclude that S.B. 163 simply replaced the common law standard of admissibility announced in Homan. As such, the legislative enactment did not create a constitutionally impermissible conflict with a formally prescribed rule of practice and procedure. Thus, we find that the substantial compliance standard adopted by legislative amendment to
{¶ 14} Accordingly, the state‘s assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 15} Having found error prejudicial to appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Shaw, P.J., and Bryant, J., concur.