State v. Peterson, 07 Ma 59 (12-10-2008)State v. Peterson, 07 Ma 59 (12-10-2008)
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Vukovich, Waite
OPINION
{¶ 1} This timely appeal comes for consideration upon the record in the trial court
{¶ 2} Peterson‘s assignment of error is meritless. Ohio‘s version of the Adam Walsh Act requires original and retroactive classification into a sexual predator tier based upon the crime committed thereby eliminating the need for a hearing. And because sexual predator classification is civil in nature, the consequences of the classification cannot be a mandatory part of a
Facts
{¶ 3} On April 14, 2005, Peterson was indicted by the Mahoning County Grand Jury. The indictment contained one count of kidnapping in violation of
{¶ 4} The State agreed to dismiss one count of aggravated burglary and one count of violation of a protective order and recommend a thirteen year prison term. In exchange, Peterson agreed to plead guilty to the remaining counts and stipulated to a sexual predator classification. On February 15, 2007, the trial court reviewed the agreement with Peterson and accepted his guilty plea. The court conducted a sentencing hearing on February 20, 2007, and Peterson requested that the court impose the thirteen year sentence. Peterson signed his acknowledgement of the court‘s Judgment Entry and
{¶ 5} Peterson‘s appellate counsel initially filed a no merit brief with this court and moved to withdraw. The State did not submit a reply brief. On April 29, 2008, this court denied the motion to withdraw because there was a non-frivolous argument regarding whether Peterson had been properly informed of the consequences of stipulating to a sexual predator classification.
Sexual Predator Classification Procedure
{¶ 6} In the first part of his sole assignment of error, Peterson argues:
{¶ 7} “The trial court erred in classifying Appellant a sexual predator without clear and convincing evidence of specific findings under Ohio Revised Code
{¶ 8} Before this court can address the merits of Peterson‘s argument, we must first address the State‘s argument that the issues raised in Peterson‘s brief are moot. The State now argues that the issues raised in the brief are moot because they all deal with the correctness of the trial court‘s labeling Peterson as a sexual predator. The State argues that a retroactive change in the law would negate Peterson‘s classification as a sexual predator and label him instead under a different scheme.
{¶ 9} In 2006, the Federal government enacted a law popularly known as the Adam Walsh Act. That Act organized sex offender classifications into three tiers and gave states a strong incentive to come into compliance with its dictates. In 2007, Ohio passed Senate Bills 10 and 97 in order to comply with the Adam Walsh Act. Under this new statutory scheme, an offender‘s sexual offender status falls into one of three tiers, which is based solely on the crime committed. Therefore, a trial court no longer holds a hearing before classifying an offender as a particular type of sexual offender. The newly amended
{¶ 10} A moot case is one that seeks a judgment which cannot have any practical legal effect on the controversy. In re L.W., 168 Ohio App.3d 613, 2006-Ohio-644, 861 N.E.2d 546, at ¶ 11. Moot cases should be dismissed because they no longer present a justiciable controversy. Id. Because
Validity of Plea
{¶ 11} Peterson argues, in the second part of his sole assignment of error:
{¶ 12} “The trial court erred in failing to ensure Appellant‘s stipulation to a sexual predator classification, agreed to as part of the plea agreement, was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made rendering the plea void.”
{¶ 13} Peterson contends that the trial court erred when classifying him a sexual predator because his stipulation to that classification was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The passage of Ohio Senate Bills 10 and 97 moots Peterson‘s stipulation argument as stipulations are no longer possible due to the automatic nature of the sex offender classification scheme. Regardless of the mechanism of classification, being classified as a particular type of sex offender continues to be a consequence for pleading guilty to such offenses. We must determine if an understanding of this consequence has an effect on whether a defendant‘s guilty plea is knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} This court has not specifically held that a trial court‘s explanation of the consequences of being classified as a sexual predator is mandated as part of accepting a guilty plea. However, in previous cases we have considered the trial court‘s explanation of these consequences to the defendant in our
{¶ 16} A growing number of districts have held that courts have no obligation whatsoever to explain the ramifications of a sex offender classification as part of accepting a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Dotson, 12th Dist. No. CA2007-11-025, 2008-Ohio-4965, at ¶ 28; State v. Bowens, 9th Dist. No. 22896, 2006-Ohio-4721, at ¶ 16; State v. Wheeler, 10th Dist. Nos. 03AP-832, 03AP833, 2004-Ohio-4891, at ¶ 16; State v. McGee, 8th Dist. No. 77463, 2001-Ohio-4238, at *3; State v. Drennen (Mar. 16, 2001), 6th Dist. No. H-00-007, at *1.
{¶ 17} It would seem that the placement of so many requirements on a defendant as part of being classified as a sex offender would impel a trial court to discuss those requirements at a plea hearing. Nonetheless, we agree with the above districts that we cannot impose criminal plea requirements on the sex offender classification system. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the sex offender classification system is civil in nature. State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 1998-Ohio-291, 700 N.E.2d 570. Subsequent to the passage of Ohio Senate Bills 10 and 97, the Ohio Supreme Court made it clear that the new rules continue to be civil in nature. State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110. Therefore, a discussion of the consequences of being classified as a sexual predator cannot be a mandatory part of the
{¶ 18} Accordingly Peterson‘s sole assignment of error is meritless and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vukovich, J., concurs.
Waite, J., concurs.