State v. PetersenState v. Petersen
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Petrie
In this consolidated appeal, the State of Washington seeks reversal of the trial court’s dismissal, on the basis of the defective suspension of the defendants’ driver’s licenses, i.e., without notice and opportunity for hearing on the question of their liability for accidents in which they were involved, of habitual traffic offender proceedings against James Alan Petersen, Gary Lynn Malliot, and Arthur Frank Bamer. We agree with the State that the court should not have considered whether the licenses had been improperly suspended when it heard the habitual traffic offender proceedings, and we vacate the orders of dismissal.
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The facts are undisputed. James Petersen’s driver’s license was suspended on February 15, 1973, for failure to deposit security to satisfy any potential judgments for damages resulting from an auto accident, as required by
In 1974 the State filed habitual traffic offender complaints against all three defendants pursuant to
As used in this chapter, unless a different meaning is plainly required by the context, an habitual offender shall mean any person, resident or nonresident, who has accumulated convictions or, if a minor, shall have violations recorded with the department of motor vehicles, or forfeited bail for separate and distinct offenses as described in either subsection (1) or (2) below committed within a five year period, as evidenced by the records maintained in the department of motor vehicles: . . .
(1) Three or more convictions, singularly or in combination, of the following offenses:
(b) Driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants or drugs; or
(c) Driving a motor vehicle while his license, permit, or privilege to drive has been suspended or revoked;
Pursuant to
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• However, in the cases at bench, the trial court dismissed the habitual offender complaints in view of
Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90, 91 S. Ct. 1586 (1971), which held unconstitutional a Georgia statutory scheme directing the summary suspension, without hearing, of the driver’s license of one who is involved in an accident and who fails to post security to cover potential damages. It is now settled that the Department of Motor Vehicles may not constitutionally suspend a driver’s license under
The State’s essential argument on appeal is that a defendant in a habitual traffic offender proceeding is not entitled to collaterally attack the validity of the convictions supporting the action by alleging the impropriety of the prior license suspension. We agree.
In urging the invalidity of their license suspensions as grounds for reversal of the traffic convictions underlying the habitual offender charges, the defendants are attempting a collateral attack upon those convictions, Batey v. Batey, 35 Wn.2d 791, 215 P.2d 694 (1950), unlike the successful direct attack on the suspension in Bell v. Burson, supra. A collateral attack may be maintained only against a final order or judgment which is absolutely void, not merely erroneous or voidable, Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 543 P.2d 325 (1975), Peyton v. Peyton, 28 Wash. 278, 68 P. 757 (1902), and then only on the basis of fraud going to the very jurisdiction of the court. Anderson v. Anderson, 52 Wn.2d 757, 328 P.2d 888 (1958). A judgment is void only where the court lacks jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter or lacks the inherent power to enter the order involved. Bresolin v. Morris, supra; Anderson v. Anderson, supra; see National Bank v. McCrillis, 15 Wn.2d 345,130 P.2d 901,144 A.L.R. 1197 (1942).
The initial orders of suspension of the Department
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of Motor Vehicles are appealable to superior court.
license revocation . . . proceedings, even if termed a collateral consequence of accumulated driving convictions, must be viewed as a consequence that is indirect and removed, both in time and in purpose, from the original driving convictions of the offender.
State v. Francis, 85 Wn.2d 894, 896, 540 P.2d 421 (1975).
The dismissals of the habitual traffic offender complaints are vacated, and the actions are remanded to superior court for further proceedings thereunder.
Pearson and Reed, JJ., concur.