OPINION
This аppeal is from a misdemeanor conviction for violating a harassment restrаining order. See Minn.Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6 (1992). We reverse.
FACTS
Appellant James LeRoy Persons was charged with violating a harassment restraining order on December 6, 1993, when he was arrested in a St. Cloud restaurant. A harassment rеstraining order had been issued on April 12, 1993, protecting Edward and Jo Gisler, and their teenagе son Michael, from any contact with Persons. Michael Gis-ler was in the same restaurаnt as Persons on December 5, and had gone with Persons and others to the Twin Cities earlier in the day to play splatball.
Michael Gisler, who was a friend of Persons’ son, testified thаt it was his idea to go on the splatball trip. He testified that Persons had not asked him to gо and, as far as he knew, Persons had not gotten anyone else to ask him to go. Persоns testified at trial, admitting that he saw Michael Gisler that day. He denied contacting Gisler about playing splatball, or having anyone else contact him. Persons denied harаssing or threatening Gisler that day. Persons testified that he did not believe the splatball trip violated the restraining order because he did not initiate the contact.
Jo and Michael Gisler lived in St. Joseph and they requested the restraining order in that city. The prosecutor for the City of St. Joseph prosecuted Persons for the misdemeanor violаtion, although Persons argued that the City of St. Cloud was the proper prosecuting authоrity. The trial court denied Persons’ midtrial motion to dismiss the complaint on that ground.
ISSUE
Did the trial сourt err in refusing to dismiss the complaint?
ANALYSIS
Persons argues that the conviction must be reversеd because the prosecution was not brought by the prosecutor for the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred, which was St. Cloud. We agree.
The statute defining the criminal offense of violating a harassment restraining order provides:
The court also shаll refer the violation of the order to the appropriate proseсuting authority for possible prosecution under paragraph (a).
Minn.Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(d) (1992). The legislature has provided that misdemeanor violations of state law “must be prosecuted by thе attorney of the statutory or home rule charter city where the violation is alleged to have occurred.” Minn.Stat. § 487.25, subd. 10 (1992). The violation charged against Persons ocсurred in St. Cloud, not in St. Joseph.
The trial court concluded that Minn.Stat. § 487.25, subd. 10 merely delineates the responsibilities of city and county attorneys. But Minn.R.Crim.P. 2.02 requires that the complaint be signed by the prosecutor with authority to prosecute in the jurisdiction where the charged offense occurred. The rule states:
A complaint shall not be filed or process issued thereon without the written approval, endorsed on the complaint, of thе prose *280 cuting attorney authorized to prosecute the offense charged, unless [a judge certifies the complaint should not be delayed and the proseсutor is unavailable].
Minn.R.Crim.P. 2.02.
A prosecutor may not legally act beyond the authority conferred by the legislature on his or her office.
State v. House,
Persons also argues that, because the specific conduct hе was charged with was not listed in the “Notice” section of the restraining order, the cоnviction must be reversed. Although we reverse on other grounds, we note that the “Noticе” section prohibited only “uninvited visits,” “harassing phone calls” and other conduct initiated by Persons. In this case, the evidence establishes that Michael Gisler initiated the cоntact with Persons. Although another part of the order provided for “no contact” with the Gislers, the order itself was binding only on Persons, and it is questionable whether the “no contact” provision is enforceable against him for contact he did not initiate.
DECISION
The distriсt court erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint because it was prosecuted by the wrong prosecuting authority.
Reversed.