State v. PerlsteinState v. Perlstein
This appeal follows from defendant‘s convictions in the municipal court and later in the Superior Court after a trial de novo. Defendant has filed a notice of appeal from her conviction for obstructing the administration of justice contrary to
Both trials resulted in the establishment of the same basic facts surrounding the incident in question. On June 6, 1984 Officer Lizzano saw Ms. Perlstein driving down Main Street in Bradley Beach in her four-door Volvo. His attention was drawn to her car because he saw a PBA door decal on her windshield just above the inspection sticker. He and Officer Sisliano followed and when she parked her car, Officer Sisliano pulled up alongside the rear portion of the Volvo. Officer Lizzano alighted from the car, while Officer Sisliano went down the block to turn around and park on the other side of the street out of traffic. Officer Lizzano walked up to the driver‘s side of the Volvo, confirmed that it was a PBA decal and said, “Brenda, you‘re going to have to take this out of the car right away.” Ms. Perlstein asked “Why?” Officer Lizzanо informed her that it was a violation of state law to obstruct the windshield and the prosecutor had advised the police that the PBA should not allow them to be placed anywhere on motor vehicles. Ms. Perlstein then asked Officer Lizzano if she had to remove it “right away.” When he told her it had to bе removed immediately, she asked if he had a scraper. She intimated that she might have one in her office a half block away. Lizzano was
As a result, Lizzano crossed thе street to the patrol car to obtain his summons book. Then he asked Ms. Perlstein for her license and registration which she refused to tender. She continued to spew a barrage of comments at Lizzano. Lizzano told her that if she did not show her license, registration and insurance card he would issue her three more summonses. She persisted in her refusal. Then she said that she was going to see the Chief of Police to see what he had to say about this incident. With the car door open, she picked up her keys from the seat, put them in the ignition, turned on the car and put it in reverse. Lizzano was standing in the open door and knew he could be hurt if the car moved so he reached in and grabbed the keys. Thereafter, he placed her under arrest.
After arresting Ms. Perlstein, Lizzano told her to get out of the car but she refused. He asked her several times to get out of the car and finally he grabbed her left wrist and gave a “slight tug” to encourage her to move. He warned her that if she continued to refuse to move he would charge her with resisting arrest. Finally, she did get out of the car, was handcuffed and was taken to police headquarters where she was given her Miranda rights. Initially, she refused to give any arrest information but finally cooperated. After the arrest information was taken and the complaints signed, Ms. Perlstein was released. She was in police headquarters approximately 45 minutes.
Ms. Perlstein denied ever having been told prior to this incident that it was illegal to have the PBA decal on her
Brenda Perlstein was charged with having a PBA sticker in her windshield in violаtion of
Appellant contends that her conviction of having violated
We feel it difficult to restrain from comment about the unprofessionalism of projecting such complex contentions without any attempt to support their validity by citations to authoritative sources or by utilization of the principle of stare decisis. Nonetheless, we will briefly address each contention as best we can comprehend it.
Appellate review of a judge‘s decision in a non-jury case is limited in its scope. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964). The appellate tribunal needs to inquire “... whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.” Id. at 162. In pursuing this inquiry, deference should be given to those findings of the trial judge that arise from his opportunity to hear and see witnesses and to have the “feеl” of the case. Id. at 161. A review de novo should occur only when the appellate court “... is thoroughly satisfied that the finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.” Id. at 162.
In this case, both judges below found that defendant was guilty of violating
A person commits a disorderly persons offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act. This section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliаnce with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.
This statute is designed to prohibit a broad range of behavior directed at impeding or defeating the lawful operation of government. Final Report of New Jersey Criminal Law
Under statutory provision, municipal police are empowered to enforce the motor vehicle laws.
The facts clearly show that appellant engaged in independently unlawful acts when she refused to show her driving credentials and when she attempted to move her car contrary to Lizzano‘s directions. State v. Kent, 173 N.J. Super. at 222-223; State v. Manning, 146 N.J. Super. 589 (App.Div. 1977); Tp. of East Brunswick v. Malfitano, 108 N.J. Super. 244 (App.Div. 1970). While these cases involve statutes whose wording differs from the statute in question they are indicative of the types of behavior found to obstruct the administration of justice. See also Spears v. State, 412 N.E.2d 81 (Ind. App. 1980).
She claims that she did not purposely obstruct the administration of law. A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct if it his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature.
Defendant further claims that she cannot be found to have violated
Courts have held repeatedly that a stop for a motor vehicle violation does not necessarily constitute an arrest. State v. Harbatuk, 95 N.J. Super. 54, 60 (App.Div. 1967); see State v. Evans, 181 N.J. Super. 455 (App.Div. 1981); Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J. Super. 279 (App.Div. 1967); State v. Bell, 89 N.J. Super. 437 (App.Div. 1965). In fact, the usual traffic stop has been found to be more analogous to a Terry stop, (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)) than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 334 (1984). Defendant‘s argument that an arrest occurred at the time of the stop lаcks merit. Moreover although defendant contends that it is impossible to say when the arrest actually occurred, the evidence clearly established that she was arrested when she attempted to leave the scene. Finally, defendant‘s claim that she must have been under arrest in light of Lizzano‘s actions in grabbing the keys is meritless.
Also,
Lastly,
Defendant contends that her arrest for violating
The defendant correctly points out that
Any constable, sheriff‘s officer, police officer, peace officer, or the director may, without a warrant, arrest any person violating in his presence any provision of Chaptеr 3 of this Title, ....
The court in State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563, 568 (1971) adopted such a construction of
Additionally, it does not appear from thе facts that she was arrested only because she failed to produce her driving credentials. It was not until Perlstein attempted to leave the scene that she was placed under arrest. This action constituted an attempt to obstruct the administration of the law. As such, Perlstein committed a disorderly person‘s offense in the presence of Lizzano, and he was empowered to arrest her. State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 8 (1970); see State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 386 (1964).
Affirmed.