State v. PerkinsState v. Perkins
On April 22, 1987, the defendant, Timothy Perkins, was indicted by a Grand Jury for second degree murder, a violation of
FACTS
On the night of February 28, 1987, in Glenmora, Louisiana, a group of teenagers were gathered at an area Dairy Queen restaurant. A confrontation arose between William Perkins and Darrell Henry. A fist fight ensued, during which Henry was rendered unconscious. After the fight, Perkins reportedly apologized to Henry and then left the scene. At this point, the defendant, Timothy Perkins, a friend of Henry‘s stated that he intended to kill William Perkins.
Around 11:00 p.m., Henry, the defendant and another friend, Kevin Grantham, drove past the defendant‘s place of employment (a tire repair business) and the defendant fired a shotgun blast at a metal building on the property. The trio then went to the defendant‘s residence where the defendant repeated his threat to kill William Perkins. Henry then left the defendant‘s residence.
The investigation immediately focused on the defendant and Grantham. Police searched the defendant‘s home, a nearby campsite and an unoccupied house near the defendant‘s residence. The police decided to use tracking dogs after seeing an unidentified individual flee into the woods near the defendant‘s home. Upon arriving at the defendant‘s home to obtain an item of defendant‘s personal belonging to assist the tracking dogs, the defendant was found at his residence and peaceably surrendered. The defendant began to speak but was told by the arresting officer not to say anything. After the defendant was brought outside and searched, four .20 gauge shotgun shells were seized from the house. A police detective arrived and advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. After the defendant indicated that he understood his rights, he was asked about the earlier shooting. The defendant stated that after the fight, he and Grantham sawed off the shotgun barrel and went in search of William Perkins. Observing Perkins’ truck on Highway 113, the pair followed. The defendant, riding as the passenger, instructed Grantham to pass Perkins’ vehicle. As they were passing, the defendant fired a single shot at the driver‘s window. After the defendant and Grantham saw Perkins’ truck go into the ditch, they fled the scene.
A witness who was present when the defendant arrived at home testified that the defendant arrived with a .20 gauge sawed-off shotgun. In response to an inquiry from his father, the defendant stated that he had shot the victim and had “meant to do it.” After the defendant‘s parents consented to a search of their home, police seized a sawed off .20 gauge shotgun.
The defendant was again advised of his rights when he was brought to the police station. After again indicating that he understood his rights, the defendant signed a waiver of rights form and agreed to make a formal statement to a detective. As the detective was preparing a tape recorder, the defendant told the officer, “I don‘t know if I want to say too much into that thing or not.” The officer responded, “That‘s your right. You don‘t have to talk to us unless you want to. You‘ve already confessed to us. We‘re just trying to learn some more details of what happened this night but you have the right to have your lawyer present just like I read to you.” The defendant then stated that he would give his statement. In the statement, the defendant essentially repeated the details of the earlier oral confession. The defendant admitted telling Grantham that he was going to kill the victim, stated that he did shoot the victim and identified the gun he used in the shooting.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
The defendant argues that the Trial Court erred in denying his motion to suppress his recorded confession because this confession was taken after he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. Also, the defendant contends that the statement by the police detective coerced him into giving his statement which he would not have otherwise given.
The defendant argues that his remarks made prior to giving the taped confession indicated that he wished to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. After reviewing the full context of the conversation from which the statement was taken, it does not appear that the defendant was invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. At best, it appears that the defendant may have been questioning whether to give a recorded statement, as opposed to his previous unrecorded statement, but the remarks clearly do not constitute an invocation of his right to remain silent. We note that following this apparent hesitancy on the part of the defendant, the police officer reminded the defendant of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination and of the defendant‘s right to consult an attorney. At this point, after having been reminded of his rights the defendant waived these rights and proceeded to confess, again.
We also find no merit to the defendant‘s assertion that the defendant was coerced into giving his statement when the police officer said that the defendant had already confessed. This was simply stating a fact which in no manner undermined the defendant‘s right to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege nor did it coerce him into continuing his statement.
The evidence clearly establishes that the recorded statement was voluntary and was not made under influence of fear, intimidation, coercion or inducements. Additionally, it is apparent that the officers carefully protected the defendant‘s rights during the custodial interrogation.
As the Trial Court‘s ruling is supported by the evidence, it shall not be overruled.
This assignment of error has no merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
The defendant also argues that the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; namely, that the defendant possessed the requisite specific intent to kill the victim. The defendant argues that his confession established that he did not intend to kill the victim when the fatal shot was fired and that his statements that he intended to kill the victim should be considered “typical braggadocio” of a young man who had been drinking.
The defendant was charged with second degree murder under the provisions of
At the trial, the defense counsel admitted that the victim died as the result of a gunshot wound fired by the defendant. The only issue contested was whether the defendant had the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of second degree murder. It is uncontested that the fatal shot was fired from a sawed off shotgun into a moving vehicle operated by the victim. The defendant argues, however, that no specific intent was shown because in his statement he denies seeing the victim‘s face when the fatal shot was discharged because the window to the victim‘s vehicle was up when the shot was fired.
Specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm can easily be inferred where an individual discharges a firearm pointed directly at a victim from a short distance. State v. Noble, 425 So.2d 734 (La.1983). The fact that the victim is behind a glass enclosure does not negate a finding of specific intent. State v. Tatum, 506 So.2d 584 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987).
While young men may often “talk big“, particularly after imbibing in alcohol, the vocalizing of such threats takes on an altogether different meaning when the threat is carried out. Also, when questioned by the defendant‘s father regarding the killing, the defendant responded that he “meant to do it“. It was totally proper for the trier of fact to consider the defendant‘s threats and inculpatory statements in determining whether the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact would have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of second degree murder.
For the reasons stated, this assignment of error has no merit.
For the foregoing reasons the conviction of the defendant is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.