William Thomas Perkins was charged in separate citations with felony vehicular homicide and reckless driving, both of which crimes arose out of the same automobile collision. Where a death is caused by reckless driving, the offense is felony vehicular homicide. OCGA § 40-6-393 (a). Perkins pled guilty in probate court to reckless driving and was convicted of only that offense. Thereafter, the grand jury indicted Perkins for felony vehicular homicide and for the underlying reckless driving offense. He filed a plea in bar on the ground of former jeopardy, and the State moved to set aside the prior reckless driving conviction in probate court pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-376 (d), which provides the following:
No court, other than a court having jurisdiction to try a person charged with a violation of Code Section 40-6-393, shall have jurisdiction over any offense . . . which . . . arose out of the same conduct which led to said person’s being charged with a violation of Code Section 40-6-393 and any judgment rendered by such court shall be null and void.
The trial court sustained the plea in bar, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Perkins’ reckless driving conviction was not null and void under this statute, because the probate court had jurisdiction to try misdemeanor vehicular homicide cases charged under subsection (b) of OCGA § 40-6-393.
State v. Perkins,
In order to discern the meaning of the words of a statute, a court “must look at the context in which the statute was written, remembering at all times that ‘the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes.’ [Cit.]”
Busch v. State,
This analysis is confirmed by the statute’s subsequent reference to a court’s lack of jurisdiction over any offense arising “out of the same conduct which led to
said person’s
being charged with a violation of Code Section 40-6-393. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 40-6-376 (d). “The word ‘said,’ when used as an adjective, means ‘aforementioned.’ ”
Aguilar v. State,
Furthermore, we broadly construe the word “charged” in OCGA § 40-6-376 (d), in accordance with its ordinary meaning in criminal contexts, to refer to an “[a]ccusation of crime by complaint, indictment, or information.” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 212 (5th ed. 1979). “[A] uniform traffic citation and complaint form . . . shall serve as the citation, summons, accusation, or other instrument of prosecution of the offense or offenses for which the accused is
charged. . .
.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 40-13-1. Thus, an accused is “charged” with an offense as soon as a uniform traffic citation is issued. Accordingly, the issuance of a uniform traffic citation and complaint form charging Perkins with felony vehicular homicide clearly triggered the jurisdictional limitations in OCGA § 40-6-376 (d). The fact that an indictment was later necessary under OCGA §§ 17-7-70 (a) and 40-13-3 in order to bring Perkins to trial for the violation of OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) did not destroy the validity of the uniform traffic citation as the initial charging document. See OCGA § 40-13-3. The citation for felony vehicular homicide was not void, but merely expired and was superseded as the charging instrument by the indictment. See
Smith v. State,
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Even assuming OCGA § 40-6-376 (d) to be ambiguous, the courts must keep “in mind the purpose of the statute [cits.] and “ ‘the old law, the evil, and the remedy.” OCGA § 1-3-1 (a).’ [Cits.]”
Busch v. State,
supra at 592. The purpose of OCGA § 40-6-376 (d) is undoubtedly to prevent the scenario where, as here, whether by inadvertence or chicanery, “the lesser offense underlying a vehicular homicide gets separated from the homicide and disposed of in another court, thereby preventing prosecution on the vehicular homicide because of double jeopardy.”
State v. Perkins,
supra at 857 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). This purpose applies equally regardless of whether, as here, the court which disposes of the underlying offense is without jurisdiction to try the person charged with vehicular homicide because it is of felony grade or whether the court has no jurisdiction with respect to any grade of vehicular homicide. In either case, the old law, as stated in
Brock v. State,
For double jeopardy purposes, vehicular homicide and reckless driving are the same offense.
Brock v. State,
supra. However, under the jurisdictional exception to the bar of former jeopardy, “ ‘[a] party who has been tried and convicted by a court not having jurisdiction of the offense cannot plead prior jeopardy if subsequently indicted for the same offense in a court having jurisdiction thereof.’ [Cits.]”
State v. Ramsey,
The record shows, however, that Perkins challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-6-376 (d) on grounds which the trial court did not have to address, because of its determination that the statute did not apply. In light of our reversal of the ruling on the question of statutory construction, we direct the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the trial court for consideration and resolution of any constitutional issues which were properly raised by Perkins, but which were not ruled upon.
Collins v. Adam Cab,
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.