delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant, Camile Peres, was convicted of the crime of rape committed on the person of one Adrienne Baque, a female under the age of 16 years;, and from the judgment and an order denying his motion for a new trial he appeals.
On the trial of the cause the prosecuting witness was permitted, over the objection of the defendant, to- testify to acts of intercourse between herself and the defendant prior to the act complained of and for which the defendant was then being tried. This is assigned as error. While there may be some slight conflict in the authorities on this point, confessеdly the great weight of authority is in favor of the admissibility of
In this connection it is urged that the court erred in giving instruction numbered 8, in which the jury was told that the evidence of prior acts of intercourse between the prosecutrix and defendant was admitted only for the purpose оf corroborating her testimony regarding the commission of the act charged. On the argument of this cause counsel for defendant admits
It is next urged tbat tbe district court erred in permitting tbe prosecutrix to testify tbat on Wednesday after tbe Friday .on whiсh tbe alleg'ed crime was committed she told her teacher, Miss Sutton, tbe fact tbat she bad been raped, and repeated tbis to all of tbe teacher’s on tbe Monday following; the contention being tbat a considerable time bad elapsed, with good opportunity for her to have told of tbe occurrence ;• and tbat her statement was not voluntary, in tbat it was elicited by her teacher by reрeated questioning.
Considering tbe last phase of tbis question first, was tbe statement of tbe prosecutrix to her teacher in fact voluntary ? Tbe testimony tends to show tbat tbe alleged crime was committed on Fridаy; tbat on Monday she went to school, was nervous, and cried, and, when asked by her teacher the cause of her trouble, evaded tbe question; tbat on Tuesday much tbe same thing occurred, and she was excused from reciting in her classes. On Wednesday, when her teacher found her crying, and urged her to tell tbe cause of her trouble, she did so. TTn-dér tbe circumstances we cannot say that tbe statement was involuntarily made, and the objection on tbat ground is not tenable.
By tbis, however, we are not to be understood as saying tbat tbe testimony would not have been admissible unless tbe statement was voluntarily made. Tbis was not in tbe nаture of a confession or admission as those terms are generally used and understood in the decided cases or text-books, and tbe rule governing there has no application here.
Tbe evidеnce was properly admitted, and tbe qiiestion as to whether the statement was made under coercion, or otherwise than voluntarily, was one which affects tbe weight, rather than tbe admissibility, of tbe evidеnce, and was a matter properly for tbe jury’s consideration. Under tbe information in tbis case, which charged tbat tbe prosecutrix was under tbe age of consent, viz., under tbe age of 16 years, it will Readily be ob
Was the testimony then properly admitted; in other words, is there any fixed and definite time within which such declarations must be made in order for the evidence of their having been made to be admissible, and what, if any, explanation has the prosecutrix to make for not having spoken sooner ? In the first place, she testified that she was naturally reluctant to tell any one; that she would not tell her stepmother, for they were not on good terms, did not get along well together, and frequently had trouble; that she disliked her stеpmother very much, and, further, that her stepmother knew of the improper relations existing between her and defendant, she having once caught them in the act. She further says she. was afraid to tell her fathеr, for fear he would not believe her, and would think she had consented. With this explanation before the court, can it be said that the testimony should not have been 'admitted ? In Higgins v. People,
The third and last contention of counsel is that the evidence is insufficient 1» support the judgment, because the verdict rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prоsecutrix; that her testimony is contradictory within itself; that she was contradicted by numerous witnesses, and that she was impeached.
Upon the first proposition it is sufficient to say that it has been quite generally held by courts of last resort in this country, in the absence of any statute, that such a conviction is propea.*, and will not be disturbed for lack of evidence corroborating the prosecuting witness; while Sectiоn 3120 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Montana provides that the direct evidence of one witness, who is entitled to full credit, is sufficient for proof of any fact except perjury and treason, and the question of the credibility of this witness was one for the jury’s determination exclusively. However, in passing, we may say that we do not
It is sufficient to say, with reference to the claim that the prosecutrix was impeached, that certain witnesses testified that her reputation for truth and veracity is bad, while even a greater nrunber testified that such reputation is good. It was for the jury to determine from the evidence what credit should be given to the testimony of the prosecutrix.
We are satisfied, upon a careful examination of the record, that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and that there is no merit in the errors assigned.
The judgment and the order appealed from are affirmed.
Affirmed.