124 Minn. 307 | Minn. | 1914
Defendant was convicted in the municipal court of the city of St. Paul of giving short weight in the sale of ice. Six different offenses were charged against it which by agreement were all tried together, but a separate judgment was rendered as to each offense.
To the same general effect are the following:
State v. Board of Control, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N. W. 533, in which numerous authorities are cited; First Nat. Bank v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N. W. 994; State v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Red Lake County, 67 Minn. 352, 69 N. W. 1083; Ek v. St. Paul Permanent Loan Co. 84 Minn. 245, 87 N. W. 844; Lien v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Norman County, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 1094; Gaare v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Clay County, 90 Minn. 530, 97 N. W. 422; State v. Leland, 91 Minn. 321, 98 N. W. 92; State v. Boehm, 92 Minn. 374, 100 N. W. 95; Atwell v. Parker, 93 Minn. 462, 101 N. W. 946; State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N. W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 41; City of Crookston v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Polk County, 79 Minn. 283, 82 N. W. 586; 79 Am. St. 453; City of Duluth v. Abrahamson, 96 Minn. 39, 104 N. W. 682; State v. Sharp, 121 Minn. 381, 141 N. W. 526.
In Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. 374 (465), 82 Am. Dec. 108, the title, “An act for a homestead exemption” was held sufficiently suggestive to satisfy the constitutional requirement, although the act also embraced exemptions of personal property.
In Boyle v. Vanderhoof, 45 Minn. 31, 47 N. W. 396, the title, “An act to fix the amount of wages of laborers exempt from process of attachments, garnishments, or execution,” was held sufficient to
In Putnam v. City of St. Paul, 75 Minn. 514, 78 N. W. 90, an act reorganizing the school system of the city of St. Paul and establishing the city as an independent school district took the power of levying taxes for school purposes from the school officers and conferred it upon the city council, without making any reference thereto in the title. The court held that raising money for school purposes was germane to the subject of the act, and the method by which it was accomplished was a mere detail.
In Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 84 N. W. 788, the expression, “for damages to persons injured on streets and other public grounds,” in the title of an act relating to actions against municipalities, was held broad enough to apply to an injury received in the machinery of the pumping station.
In Board of Supervisors of Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 281 (330), the title, “A bill for an act to provide for township organizations,” was held sufficient, although the act also provided the manner in which counties should be governed. The court saying: “It is true that this act, in the technical sense, does embrace more than one subject, and but one is expressed in its title; yet so intimately blended are they in the popular understanding, and so inseparable by general custom and adoption, that although the technical sense may bring it within the letter of the Constitution, it leaves it entirely without the spirit. There is no attempt at fraud, or the interpolation of matter foreign to the subject expressed in the title, but an honest effort to create a system of town, and through the town, county government, similar to that of other states. What is not within the spirit of a law, is not within the law, although within the letter of it.”
In Gillitt v. McCarthy, 34 Minn. 318, 25 N. W. 637, “An act to regulate the foreclosure of real estate,” was held sufficient to include the matter of redeeming from execution sales.
In First Nat. Bank of Shakopee v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N. W. 994, under the title, “to provide for incorporation and regulation of co-operative or assessment life, endowment and casualty in
In State v. Board of Commrs. of Bed Lake County, 67 Minn. 352, 69 N. W. 1083, under the title, “An act to provide for the creation and organization of new counties and government of the same,” provisions for the organization of towns and school districts, and for the division of éxisting indebtedness between the old and new counties was held proper.
In State v. Board of Control, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N. W. 533, under the title, “An act to create a state board of control, and to provide for the management and control of the charitable, reformatory and penal institutions of the state,” it was held proper to include the state normal schools.
In Gaare v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Clay County, 90 Minn. 530, 97 N. W. 422, under the title, “An act to create a board of state drainage commissioners and prescribe its duties,” it was held proper to require the board of county commissioners to make repairs upon the ditches established by the drainage board and to pay therefor out of the county funds.
In State v. Leland, 91 Minn. 321, 98 N. W. 92, the expression, “relating to receiving deposits in insolvent banks,” was held sufficient to sustain penal provisions against any corporation, firm or person receiving deposits.
In State v. Boehm, 92 Minn. 374, 100 N. W. 95, under the title, “An act to declare certain weeds common nuisances and to provide for their destruction,” it was held that a provision making it a penal offense to fail to destroy such weeds upon one’s own premises was valid, although the title made no reference to a penalty.
In State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N. W. 496, under the title, “An act to prevent unlawful discrimination in the sale of milk,” it was held proper to insert penal provisions in reference to the buying of milk.
The act in controversy is entitled: “An act creating a department of weights and measures, to be under the jurisdiction of the railroad and warehouse commission, defining its duties and powers and
It appears from the title that the act is general in its character, and that no attempt is made to define or index, in the title, the details contained in the act. It does not give notice that the act is confined to a particular part or phase of the general subject, as did the title of the act considered in Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 210, 100 N. W. 1104, but announces in general terms that it is creating a department of weights and measures. TJnder the rule established by the authorities hereinbefore cited, any matter germane to, or connected with the subject of, weights and measures might properly be placed under this title unless excluded therefrom by the phrase “providing penalties for interfering therewith.” A complete code embracing all. matters relating to weights and measures would be no more obnoxious to the constitutional provision than was the probate code considered and sustained in Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W. 923, 28 Am. St. 382, unless the general terms of the title be restricted by the phrase last quoted. But the rule is firmly established that all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the validity of the act, and it is fairly inferable from the title, taken as a whole, that the clause in question was not inserted for the purpose of limiting and restricting the provisions of the act to a part only of such matters as are germane- to the general subject. The body of the title shows that the act is unrestricted, and broad and general in its nature, and under the rule, the act cannot be held unconstitutional on account of a possible inconsistency between the body of the title and a minor phrase therein. The word “therewith” may well be held to refer to the inhibitions contained in the act, and must be so held if necessary to sustain its validity.
In many of the cases cited the provisions of the act extended beyond the apparent limitations of the title to a greater extent than
“It is at once apparent, on reading this section [5115], that fraud is of its essence. On the other hand, it is equally as apparent from the reading of the act of 1911, that the things there penalized are mala prohibita, pure and simple, of which, in the contemplation of the law, intent to defraud or commit wrong is not an element. It*314 is in this difference between the two acts that, in our opinion, the purpose of the legislature in incorporating in the act of 1911 the provision in question is to be found. In other words, the legislature wished to dispense with the difficult, and often insuperable task of proving intentional wrongdoing on the part of the seller.”
The case comes within the rule of State v. Heck, 23 Minn. 549; State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22; State v. Edwards, 94 Minn. 225, 102 N. W. 697, 69 L.R.A. 667; State v. Quackenbush, 98 Minn. 515, 108 N. W. 953; State v. Sharp, 121 Minn. 381, 141 N. W. 526. As said in the latter case: “The question of intent is not material in this class of statutory offenses. Such statutes are in the nature of police regulations and impose a penalty irrespective of intent to violate them, the object being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible.” Under this rule it was not error to exclude evidence that the employees who delivered the ice had been given general instructions to give full weight.
