State v. PeoplesState v. Peoples
{¶ 2} In August of 2004, Peoples entered guilty pleas to voluntary manslaughter and felonious assault. In exchange for the pleas, the state dismissed two counts of murder and single counts of attempted murder and having a weapon under a disability. The trial court accepted the pleas and fоund Peoples guilty of the charges and their accompanying firearm specifications. The court then imposed agreed sentences of confinement of ten years for voluntary manslaughter, five years for felonious assault, and three years for the specifications, and it ordered that the sentences for voluntary manslaughter and felonious assаult be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the three-year term for the specifications, for a total of thirteen years.
{¶ 3} Peoples did not appeal his convictions. Instead, in May of 2005, he submitted to the common pleas court a single filing titled "Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea" and "Motion to Modify Sentence." The court overruled the motions, and Peoples appealed.
{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, Peoples contends that the common pleas court abused its discretion when it "granted" the state's "motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment." He asserts, in his second assignment of error, that the court erred in overruling his "Motion to Modify Sentence" and "Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea" without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. In his third assignment of error, he contends that the court denied him procedural due process when, in contravention of
{¶ 6} We further note that Peoples, in support of his motions, invoked
{¶ 8} A common pleas court's jurisdiction to entertain a tardy postconviction petition is сlosely circumscribed: The petitioner must show either that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which his petition depends, or that his claim is predicated upon a new or retrospectively applicable federal or state right recognized by the United States Supreme Court since the prescribed time had expired. And he must shоw "by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty."
{¶ 9} Peoples did not, as he could not, demonstrate that "but for" his trial counsel's incompetence in advising him to agree to the aggregate thirteen-year sentence, "no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the offense[s] of which [he] was convicted." See
{¶ 12} Peoples filed his motions on May 24, 2005. The state filed its opposing memorandum on June 7, and on the same day, the common pleas court, upon consideration of the motions and the memorandum, denied the motions.
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} The rule, by its terms, applies to "responses and motions" permitted in a civil action. As we have already determined, Peoples's "Motion to Modify Sentence" was essеntially an
{¶ 16} But the state did not file either a "motion to dismiss" or a "motion for summary judgment." It instead submitted a "Memorandum in Opposition" that "merely brought to the court's attention" the legal basis for dismissal and "added nothing to what the court, presumptively, already knew and was otherwise required to аpply to [Peoples's] claims * * *." See State v.Williams (Aug. 1, 1997), 1st Dist. No. C-960822; accord Statev. Gipson (Sept. 26, 1997), 1st Dist. Nos. C-960867 and C-960881. Thus, the state's submission of a memorandum in opposition to Peoples's "Motion to Modify Sentence" did not implicate
{¶ 18} Again, Peoples's "Motion to Modify Sentence" was reviewable as a postconviction petition. Thus, the state cannot be said to have submitted its opposing memorandum in rеsponse to a "motion," as contemplated by Loc.R. 14(B).
{¶ 19} Even if we construed the local rule to permit a response to a memorandum in opposition to a postconviction petition, the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in Smith v.Conley,
{¶ 21} Peoples contended in support of his motion that his pleas were the unintelligent product of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness. He argued that the court could not, consistent with Blakely v. Washington, supra, have imposed the agreed prison sentences, because a jury had not found, and he had not admitted, the facts necessary to exempt him from the presumptive minimum terms or to subject him to the maximum term. He asserted that, under Blakely, the court could only have sentenced him to the three-year minimum for voluntary manslaughter, concurrent with the two-year minimum for felonious assault, аnd consecutive to the three-year sentence for the specifications, for a total of six years. And he insisted that if he had known that the court could have imposed only concurrent minimum prison terms for the crimes to which he had pled guilty, he would not have agreed to the longer terms. Thus, he asserted, his counsel was ineffective in advising him to agree to the collective thirteen-year sentence.
{¶ 22} Federal and state due-process considerations require that a guilty plea "represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." North Carolina v. Alford (1970),
{¶ 23} We note that Peoples failed to take a direct appeal from his convictions, and that he neglected to submit with his motions a copy of a transcript of the proceedings аt the plea hearing or at sentencing. Consequently, the common pleas court, in ruling upon Peoples's motions, did not have before it the record of those proceedings.
{¶ 24} In the affidavit offered in support of his motions, Peoples insisted that, but for his trial counsel's deficient performance, he would not have agreed to the longer prison terms. But while hе invoked
{¶ 25} Finally, we note the recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Foster,
{¶ 26} Under these circumstances and upon the record before us, we can only concur with the cоmmon pleas court's conclusion, implicit in its denial of the "Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea," that Peoples failed to demonstrate that the withdrawal of his pleas was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. See
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} As we have noted, Peoples did not expressly seek to withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. He instead sought "modif[ication]" of his sentences, relief that
{¶ 33} But, again, the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in Smith v. Conley, supra, is dispositive. Because local rules "do not implicate constitutional rights," the common pleas court did not deny Peoples procedural due process, when it failed to give him the seven days provided under Loc.R. 14(B) to respond to the state's memorandum in opposition to his "Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea." Id. at ¶ 9.3
Judgment affirmed.
Hildebrandt, P.J., Gorman and Painter, JJ.