State v. Peoples
2014 Ohio 5526
Ohio Ct. App.
2014
Check Treatment

State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. Peoples, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14AP-271

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

December 16, 2014

[Cite as State v. Peoples, 2014-Ohio-5526.]

(C.P.C. No. 01CR07-4150) (REGULAR CALENDAR)

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on December 16, 2014

Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.

David A. Peoples, pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

KLATT, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, David A. Peoples, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his “Motion to Find Judgment Entry Void.” For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} In 2001, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant with one count of aggravated murder with two firearm specifications and one count of having a weapon while under disability (“WUD charge“). Appellant entered a not guilty plea and proceeded to a jury trial. After the presentation of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as to the charge of aggravated murder and the firearm specifications. The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated murder and the attendant firearm specifications and the trial court sentenced him accordingly.

{¶ 3} In this entire process, the WUD charge appears to have disappeared. There is no indication that appellant ever waived his right to be tried to a jury on the WUD charge but the jury was not instructed on the charge and did not receive a verdict form for that charge. There were no references to the WUD charge during appellant‘s trial or at his sentencing hearing. The trial court‘s judgment entry of conviction only states that appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder and the firearm specifications. It also did not mention the WUD charge.

{¶ 4} Appellant appealed his conviction to this court and we affirmed. . He did not raise the omission of the WUD charge as an assignment of error in that appeal.

{¶ 5} Twelve years later, however, on February 24, 2014, appellant filed the “Motion to Find Judgment Entry Void.” In that motion, appellant argued that his judgment of conviction is void because it did not dispose of the WUD charge. The state conceded that appellant‘s judgment entry is silent as to the WUD charge but argued that such omission does not create a void judgment. The trial court denied appellant‘s motion.

II. Appellant‘s Appeal

{¶ 6} Appellant appeals and assigns the following error:1

The trial court [erred] and deprived the Appellant of Due Process of law in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment[s] to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, Section[s] 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution in that the trial court is divested of its jurisdiction to impose any sentence in light of the Franklin County [Court] of Common Pleas on the basis that there was no disposition as to count (2) two of the indictment, which the state acknowledges that it has been unable to obtain records regarding the disposition of the charge.

{¶ 7} In this assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because his judgment of conviction did not resolve the WUD charge. We disagree.

{¶ 8} The trial court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction to sentence appellant after the jury found him guilty of aggravated murder and the attendant firearm specifications. , citing R.C. 2931.03; . The only question is the significance of the trial court‘s failure to address the WUD charge. Appellant alleges that the failure renders his judgment of conviction void because it violated Crim.R. 32(C).2 We disagree.

{¶ 9} First, noncompliance with Crim.R. 32(C) does not render a judgment of conviction void. ; . Neither would it deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. . This is so because the rule addresses the finality, not the validity, of the judgment of conviction. Id. Accordingly, res judicata bars appellant from raising this claim because he could have raised it in his direct appeal of his conviction. (rejecting same argument on res judicata grounds).

{¶ 10} Moreover, Crim.R. 32(C) ” ‘requires a full resolution of those counts for which there were convictions. It does not require a reiteration of those counts and specifications for which there were no convictions, but were resolved in other ways, such as dismissals, nolled counts, or not guilty findings.’ ” , quoting . Thus, because appellant was not convicted of the WUD charge, the trial court‘s failure to indicate the disposition of the WUD charge did not violate Crim.R. 32(C) or

affect the finality of appellant‘s judgment of conviction. ; .

III. Conclusion

{¶ 11} The trial court had jurisdiction to sentence appellant and its judgment of conviction satisfied Crim.R. 32(C). Because appellant‘s judgment of conviction was not void, the trial court did not err by denying appellant‘s motion. . Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s assignment of error, and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

TYACK and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.

Notes

1
We will not consider appellant‘s additional assignments of error presented for the first time in his reply brief. , citing (“[A] reply brief is merely an opportunity to reply to the brief of appellee. * * * A reply brief may not raise new assignments, which were omitted from appellant‘s original brief, especially where leave to file a new assignment was not sought from this court.“).
2
A judgment entry of conviction must follow Crim.R. 32(C) to be appealable. , citing . A final, appealable judgment entry of conviction must contain (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge‘s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk. , paragraph one of the syllabus. Appellant does not dispute that his judgment of conviction satisfies these requirements as to his conviction for aggravated murder.
Read the detailed case summary