182 Iowa 1 | Iowa | 1917
It appears that the district court in and for Pottawattamie County convened at Avoca, which is east of Range 40 in said county, on the 6th day of April, 1915, and on said day, at Avoca, the court impaneled a grand jury for the April term. On the 7th day of April, 1915, this grand jury returned the foregoing indictment. The caption to the indictment read, “District Court of Pottawattamie County, Iowa, at Council Bluffs.” On the 8th day of April, 1915, the defendant, Charles W. Pelser, appeared in person and by attorney, waived the reading of the indictment and took time to plead, and, on the 12th day of April, appeared again in person and with his attorney, and entered a plea of net guilty. On April .16, 1915, the defendant appeared before the said district court, sitting at Avoca, and filed a motion for continuance, and by consent the same was sustained. The original indictment bears the following endorsement :
“Presented in open court by the foreman of the grand jury in the presence of his fellows, and filed with the minutes of testimony attached, this 7th day of April, 1915.”
On the 28th day of September, 1915, the county attorney filed an amendment to the indictment, alleging that the incest charged in the indictment was committed on or about the 1st of January, 1915. On October 4, 1915, a jury was impaneled and sworn to try the cause, and thereafter evidence Avas taken. On the 7th. day of October, 1915, the county attorney filed a second amendment to the indictment, striking out the words “Council Bluffs” in the
To better understand this controversy, it is necessary that we go back a bit and see on what such an objection rests. Pottawattamie County is divided east and west, for judicial purposes. The twentieth general assembly, by a special act, provided for holding sessions of the old circuit court of Pottawattamie County at Avoca, in addition to sessions held at Council Bluffs, the county seat, and divided the county, for judicial purposes, by an imaginary line running between Ranges 40 and 41, and gave to the Avoca court exclusive jurisdiction of all matters arising east of the line and to the Council Bluffs court exclusive jurisdiction of all matters arising west of that line. The twenty-first general assembly abolished the circuit court, placing all powers and duties of the circuit court upon the district court, and, by flection 5 of Chapter 134, provided
The district court sitting at Avoca has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the guilt or innocence of parties indicted by a grand jury sitting at Council Bluffs. The jurisdiction to hear and determine rests in the district court sitting as such at Council Bluffs. A grand jury impaneled by the distinct, court sitting at Council Bluffs has no jurisdiction to indict for offenses committed outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the district court sitting at Council 3Íluffs. So it follows that, if defendant’s contention that the indictment was found and returned by a grand jury impaneled by the district court sitting as such at Council Bluffs is true, the district court sitting at Avoca had no jurisdiction to try the defendant on that indictment. If it be true, as contended by defendant, that the indictment charged the commission of an offense within the territorial limits of the district court sitting at Avoca, then a grand jury impaneled at Council Bluffs had no right to return the indictment, for want of jurisdiction.
What are the facts disclosed by the record in this cause? The offense, if any was committed, was committed within the territorial limits of the district court sitting at Avoca. The defendant was indicted by a grand jui’y duly
Did the county attorney have a right to amend the indictment under these facts, all of which appeared in the record at the time the amendment was offered?
The State contends that the objection was filed too late. We pass this, however, preferring to decide the matter upon the issue involving the right to file it at all.- Subdivision 7 of Section 5289, Code Supplement, 1913, provides that the county attorney may, at any time before or during the trial of the defendant upon indictment, amend the indictment so as to correct errors or omissions therein as to matters of form. As said before, the indictment was returned by -a grand jury impaneled by the district court sitting at Avoca. The crime, if any committed, was Avithin the jurisdiction of the Avoca court. The record shoAVS that the grand jury that returned the indictment Avas impaneled by the district court of Avoca. The indictment shows that the offense was committed within their jurisdiction. The record shows every essential to give the grand jury sitting at Avoca jurisdiction over the offense and to return an indictment therein. The record discloses every fact essential to give the Avoca district court jurisdiction to try and determine the guilt of the defendant upon the indictment.
■ The defendant in a criminal case is entitled to protect himself, and to this end may fence against punishment with all the instrumentalities which the law places at his command; but courts are not, in these later days, inclined to burnish his weapons or aid him in their use, nor will the courts hold him to have been fouled unless the act complained of violates the letter and spirit of the law. The courts hold to the spirit of tlie law in protecting the substantial rights of the defendant, but not to the letter only, to afford him an avenue of escape. We think there is nothing in this contention of the defendant’s, and the court Avas right in permitting the amendment.
It is next urged that the court erred in overruling defendant’s motion to strike from the record and take from the consideration of the jury all evidence of the prosecuting witness relating to an alleged miscarriage, occurring in 1913.
4. Criminal law : trial: reception of evidence: limely motion to strike : in cost. HoAA'ovor, after tiie Btate had elected to hold the defendant for an offense alleged to have been committed on the 5th day of December, 1914, the defendant moved to strike from tiie record all (his testimony touching
If the court was right in overruling defendant's motion to strike from the record all evidence of illicit intercourse between the parties prior to the 5th day of December, 1914, then we think the court was right in overruling the motion to strike this testimony from the record.. It tends to corroborate the prosecuting witness in her statements touching intercourse at a time prior to the 5th day of December, 1914, and at a time when this condition of the prosecuting witness could well have been the result of such, intercourse. It is a circumstance bearing upon the relationship of the parties, and tends to sustain the prosecuting witness in her statements touching such prior intercourse. Tt is the natural result, ordinarily, of such relationship. We think there was no error in the court’s ruling on this point.
This brings us to a consideration of the next complaint, which involved the action of the court in striking out and withdrawing from the consideration of the jury all the evidence of illicit intercourse after December 5, 1914, and in permitting to remain in the record, over the objection of the defendant, evidence of illicit relations between them prior to that date.
The court permitted this testimony to remain, on the th«)ry that it might throw some light upon the inclination and disposition of the defendant towards the prosecuting witness on or about the 5th day of December, 1914, when the act relied upon for conviction is alleged to have taken place, and for the purpose of throwing light, if any it does,
“Evidence of undue intimacy or of intercourse prior to that charged was admissible.”
In State v. Goodsell, 138 Iowa 501, 507, third paragraph, this court said:
“In the' eighth instruction, the court told the jury that other acts of undue familiarity could be considered, as tending to prove that occurring in the river, and unless he was found guilty of that, he should be acquitted. Appellant argues that this was error, in that such act could be considered only as tending to show the disposition or inclination of the parties. Conceded, but for what purpose? Plainly enough, to prove his guilt of the ojíense charged.”
See, also, State v. Hurd, 101 Iowa 391. In the Hurd case, the evidence tended to show illicit intercourse between the father and daughter covering a period of nearly two years. As the trial progressed, different acts of intercourse were shown. The court was asked to require the State to elect, as it proceeded, on which of the several acts disclosed at each time, it would stand for conviction, and moved the court to require the State to so* elect. These several motions were overruled, and at the conclusion of the State’s testimony, an election was required, and the State made its election, and error was predicated upon the action of the court. This court said:
“The rule is well settled, and not questioned, that the State is not limited in its proof to the particular time of the act charged in the indictment, where time is not an*12 element of the crime, but it may cover the period of statutory limitation; but, of course, the conviction can only be of some specific offense. It is also the rule, as to adultery and crimes of that character, that similar acts between the parties, not contemplated by the charge, may be shown, to disclose the relationship and disposition of the parties as bearing on the probabilities of the act as charged.”
See, also, State v. Heft, 155 Iowa. 21, 36, Div. VI.
We find no reversible error here.
“In State v. Heft, 155 Iowa 21, 36, the case was sub*14 mitted. to the jury upon the theory that voluntary submission to the act by the prosecutrix would render her an accomplice, whose testimony must be corroborated. * * * But that • rule, whatever its application to that case, is without force here, for the reason that the daughter of the defendant was below the age of consent, and could not, as to that act, be an accomplice.”
We do not think 1he court erred in refusing to enter this field of inquiry.
“I Avish to Avithdraw the remark the court made with reference to the old saying advanced merely in a spirit of pleasantry, without -a thought of its being taken seriously by counsel or the jury. It was not said Avith any intention that it should be taken seriously, and without any thought that the jury Avould for a moment consider it, or that anyone’ would, and the court withdraAvs the remark, and instructs the jury that it is to be absolutely disregarded, and has no place in the case. The jury will not refer to it or consider it at any time, from Ibis time on, or from the lime it Avas actually' made.”
In the first place, Ave think there was no prejudicial error in the remark. Tf there was, the court so pleasantly
This brings us to a consideration of the instructions of the court on which considerable complaint is made. The complaint is aimed at the third and tenth instructions.
“Having thus elected to stand upon this particular act upon this particular occasion, the State must show, by the evidence before the jury, that the act of sexual intercourse did take place between the defendant and the prosecuting witness upon this particular occasion, and under the circumstances under which the State.claims it occurred.”
We are not advised clearly what the complaint is against this instruction. Tt clearly and rightly sets forth the fact concerning which it deals, and advises the jury that it is limited in its consideration to what is claimed to have taken place on the 5th day of December, 1914. We discover nothing wrong with this instruction.
This instruction deals only with the evidence of facts, and not with the facts. It deals with the consideration of evidence offered by the State, and not Avith the facts Dial: the evidence tended to prove, and cautioned the jury that, in the use of this evidence, they should limit it to the purposes indicated by the court.
“The evidence of such acts occurring af^er †]16 occasion submitted to you has been AvithdraAmi from your consideration, and such subsequent acts will not be considered by you for any purpose AAdiatever.”
We fail to see where any prejudice could result to the defendant in this. The jury were distinctly told that the
“The defendant has introduced evidence . before you with reference to his general moral character, and his character with reference to sexual matters, and his general reputation for general moral character in the community in Avhich he lives. This testimony was introduced by him upon the theory that a man of good moral character, or of good character in sexual matters, or bearing a general reputation for good moral character in the community in which such person lives, would not be likely to commit a crime of the character charged in this indictment. In this connection, you are instructed that, while good moral character, .or good reputation for good moral character, are no defense Avhen a crime is shown to have been committed, they are proper matters to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not a party did in fact commit the crime charged against him. And in this case, if you find from the evidence before you that the defendant, at the time it is claimed by the State that this crime was committed, Avas a man of good moral character, or of good character so far as relates to sexual matters, or at the time bore a good reputation for good moral character in the community in which he lived, then you should consider such good character and reputation and give it such weight as you deem it entitled to, in arriving at your conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the*20 charge contained in this indictment.”
We see no basis for interfering with this instruction, in view of what has been said by this court in State v. House, 108 Iowa 68; State v. Jones, 145 Iowa 176; and State v. Shultz, 111 Iowa 321.
It must be remembered that the instructions are to be read as a whole and, when read as a whole, must fairly servé the jury as a guide to the law which governs them in the consideration of the case. Oases cannot be and are not reversed by this court because some detached sentence, considered separately and apart from the subject matter
We find no error in the instructions, whether complained of or not, which would justify us in saying that any substantial right of the defendant was denied or even impaired in the giving of the instructions presented by this record.
Complaint is also made of the conduct of the State’s attorney in argument. No good purpose would be served by setting out these complaints. Suffice it to say that the court’s prompt action in sustaining objections, -and in admonishing the jury not to consider these matters, saying to them, “The jury will consider only such acts as are disclosed in the evidence and shown in the evidence, and the jury will not speculate on any others that may have occurred, and counsel, of course, should withdraw any statement as to any acts, if he made it, as to any acts of intercourse other than those which the evidence showed,” followed by counsel’s prompt withdrawal, leaves no basis for prejudicial error.
The next' complaint involves the amendment to the motion for a new trial. In this the defendant claims a right to retrial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. We will not review this evidence, but say that we find no
This brings us to a consideration of the case upon its merits.
It is claimed that the evidence did not justify the verdict. There are many things in this record that are out of the line of the common experience of men. A motive is suggested for the complaint made against this defendant. The revolting character of the crime, if committed, argues somewhat against the probability of its commission by this defendant, who, as the record shows, had always borne a fairly good reputation in the community in which he lived-. It sometimes happens, hOAvever, in the experience of men, that those who have on the surface maintained themselves within the appearance of right living are in fact bad at heart, and frequently when it is said that a good man has gone wrong, it should be said that a bad man has been found out. The evidence, considered as a whole, viewed from all the angles. of approach, we think, fully sustains the verdict. As we have frequently remarked, the jury had the witnesses before them, the cause was tried in the neigh-, borhood in which this man lived; the witnesses were not strangers to that community; and yet the jury, upon the evidence submitted, having seen and heard the witnesses, pronounced the defendant guilty. The matter was brought before the district court for review. That court found that the evidence justified the verdict. No good purpose would be .served by setting out any portion of this evidence. It is sufficient to say that we too, upon a review, have reached the same conclusion that the jury reached, and the verdict and the judgment upon the verdict must, therefore, stand. The cause is — Affirmed.