State v. PebworthState v. Pebworth
Defendant, Preston Pebworth, who was jointly charged with James Gibson 1 by bill ■of information with armed robbery of '$89.00 from Mary Benn, prosecutes this аppeal from his conviction and sentence to serve 30 years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary relying for the reversal thereof upon three alleged errors committed during the course of the trial to which bills of exception were reserved and timely perfected.
The first bill of exception was reserved when the trial judge following hearing denied defеndant’s motion to suppress certain articles seized from the automobile in which he was riding at the time of his arrest contending that the officers making the arrest and search lacked proper warrants and were without reasonable cаuse to believe defendant had committed the offense.
Under the express provisions of the Code of Criminal Procеdure “A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when * * * (3) The peace officer has reаsonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense although not in the presence of the officer;” (Art. 213) and "* * * when making an arrest without a warrant, shall inform the person to be arrested of his intentiоn to arrest him, of his authority, and of the cause of the arrest;” (Art. 218) and “ * * * shall take from the person arrested all weapons and incriminating articles which he may have about his person.” (Art. 225.) “Reasonable belief — or ‘probable cause,’ as it is termed under the federal standard — to make an arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting оfficer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to justify a man of averagе caution in the belief that a felony has been or is being committed.” State v. Johnson,
*1068 The trial judge in his per curiam, after giving full and detailed account of the facts that gave rise to the defendant’s arrest and subsequent search of the automobile which he was occupying at the time of the arrest that produced the fruits of the crime, concluded that the arresting оfficers in this case had acted upon reliable information that an armed robbery had taken place a short whilе before by a white man who had fled in an awaiting late model red and white Studebaker. Upon observing an automobile fitting the dеscription approaching from the opposite direction only a short distance from the scene of the сrime, the officers continued a block further, circled behind the automobile and with light flashing and siren turned on overtook the Studebaker whereupon the car pulled to the curb. The occupants were promptly ordered by the officers, whо were in full uniform with drawn revolvers, to get out of the car and placed under arrest, finding no money or weapons on the defendants. However, Officer Loper and two other officers, who were also in search of the subject car and had arrived on the scene at the time of the arrest, took possession of the Studebaker and as a result of a seаrch thereof found a brown paper bag containing $89 in bills and silver, a blue steel automatic, a hat, shirt and a pair of glasses. These officers had been alerted immediately after the commission of the crime by radio broadcast from police headquarters of the description of the getaway car that they had received from the assistant manаger who had pursued the robber and observed him ride off in the awaiting red and white Studebaker.
We think under these facts and circumstances the defendant’s arrest was legal; and “under the jurisprudence universally prevailing in both the state and federal cоurts, a search may be made of the place where a legal arrest occurs for the purpose of seizing the things there found that are connected with the crime as its fruits, as well as other proof of guilt within the control of the accused.” State v. Brown & Hadrick,
The second bill of exception was reserved when the trial judge overruled defendant’s motion for a severance based on the allegation that he had been informed by his co-defendant and his attorney that Gibson would takе the stand and testify in his own behalf and in doing so would place the defendant at the scene of the alleged crime greаtly to the mover’s detriment.
This bill of exception is also without merit. The Code of Criminal Pro
*1070
cedure specifically declares that
"Jointly indicted defendants shall he tried jointly
unless: (1) The state elects to try them seрarately; or (2) The court, on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory hearing with the district attorney, is satisfied thаt justice requires a severance.” Article 704. Thus, it may be seen that severance is not a matter of right but rather one that rеsts in the sound discretion of the trial judge, “whose ruling will not be interfered with, unless manifestly erroneous and injurious to accused.” State v. Cоok,
Thе last bill of exception was reserved when the trial judge overruled his motion for a new trial based on the simple, allegаtion that the verdict “was contrary to the law and the evidence,” thus presenting nothing further for us to review as we have no аppellate jurisdiction in criminal cases involving the evidence of the guilt or innocence of the accused and have answered all questions of law presented to us for consideration.
For the reasons assigned the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Notes
. James Gibson was found not guilty.