318 So. 2d 455 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1975
By this interlocutory appeal, the state seeks reversal of the trial court’s order suppressing certain evidentiary items and directing the return of same to appellees Pearce and Kinner. We agree and reverse.
We recite the evidence most favorable to upholding the trial court’s order. On August 13, 1974, at 11:00 p. m., a Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission wildlife officer, after having received a report of possible game law violations, parked his car on the shoulder of Highway 90 approximately 60 yards east of a gate leading into private property in Madison County. Two large ponds were situated approximately one-half to three-quarters of a mile
Appellees contended in the trial court by their motion to suppress, basically, that the items (airboat, shotgun and rifle) were seized by reason of an unlawful search without probable cause and as an incident to an unlawful arrest.
The poaching and killing of an alligator is a third degree felony. Furthermore, such items as were seized in the cause are subject to confiscation when used in unlawfully poaching or killing alligators.
The sophism of the trial judge’s order granting the motion to suppress is found in his statement: “I might add he had heard one shot, which could require inference upon an inference to conclude that that shot had been directed at an alligator or any game animal.” It is not the one shot that furnished the probable cause; it is the totality of the factors enumerated that furnished the foundation for the wildlife officer’s visual inspection of the airboat and the clear view of contraband that he found.
It is so ordered.
. The officer testified, “When they got to the gate going into the pasture I pulled in front of them and blocked them, with my patrol car and blue light on and asked them to step out, please.”
. Florida Statute 372.663.
. Florida Statute 372.07(2) (e) — Arrest upon probable cause without a warrant.
.State v. Outten, 206 So.2d 392 (Fla.1968), wherein the Supreme Court held: “The facts constituting probable cause need not meet the standard[s] of conclusiveness and probability required of the circumstantial facts upon which conviction must be based.
[I]t is to be measured by the test of what a reasonable man would have believed.”