State v. PayanState v. Payan
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Schwartzman
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Sergio Payan was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance, to wit cocaine,
The direct appeal was dismissed by this Court on July 12, 1996. We held that the failure to file a notice of appeal within forty-two days of the entry of the judgment of conviction deprived the Court of jurisdiction. Payan then filed an application for post-conviction relief. In the post-conviction action the parties stipulated that counsel’s failure to file a timely appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. In response to that stipulation the district court vacated and reentered Payan’s judgment of conviction on July 11,1997, “so that the Petitioner’s appeal period may begin.” A direct appeal from the re-entered judgment was then filed.
Having never been granted a hearing or presented with a ruling on his original Rule 35 motion, Payan filed another pro se Rule 35 motion on August 19, 1997. The district court granted a hearing on the Rule 35 motions which was held on December 22, 1997. At the hearing the district court dismissed Payan’s second Rule 35 motion, holding that it was not timely and was a successive motion prohibited under the Rule. The district court then denied the original Rule 35 motion upon its merits. Payan thereupon filed an amended notice of appeal to include the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
On appeal Payan raises four issues: 1) whether
II.
IDAHO CODE
A. Standard of Review
Analysis of a claimed equal protection violation requires this Court to first identify the classification which is being challenged and then determine the standard under which the classification will be judicially reviewed.
State v. Rogerson,
132 Idaho 53, 966 P.2d 53 (Ct.App.1998). The classification in this case is that of persons convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance under
B. Analysis
Payan argues that these statutes proscribe the same conduct, unconstitutionally allowing prosecutorial discretion in determining under which statute to charge a defendant. This, he asserts, violates the equal protection provisions of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Essentially, Payan argues that prosecutors can selectively prosecute individuals under
We first note that the statutes at issue do not require exactly the same elements.
State v. Rogerson, supra.
To be charged under
The discretion of a prosecutor to choose between two statutes which proscribe the same conduct, but provide for different penalties, does not violate the United States Constitution. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). In Batchelder, the defendant was charged and convicted under a statute which provided a five-year maximum sentence for convicted felons who receive a firearm which had traveled in interstate commerce. However, another statute existed which, when applied to convicted felons, had the same substantive elements and only provided for a two-year maximum sentence. Id. at 116-17, 99 S.Ct. 2198. The United States Supreme Court held that the ability of the prosecutor to choose between two statutes with different penalties was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. “The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction, but this fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause.” Id. at 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198. The Court noted that prosecutorial discretion is not unfettered, as it is still subject to constitutional restraints. “The Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement ‘based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Id. at 125 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2198, quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).
By a parity of reasoning, a statutory scheme which even further restricts prosecutorial discretion cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause.
We find the reasoning from Batchelder applicable to an analysis under the equal protection provision in the Idaho Constitution as well. It is established law in Idaho that a prosecutor has discretion in determining whát charge to file against a defendant. “Where the facts legitimately invoke more than one statute, a prosecutor is vested with a wide range of discretion in deciding what crime to prosecute.” LaBarge v. State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59, 62 (Ct.App.1989). Furthermore, prosecutors necessarily must choose between statutes with varying sentencing schemes each time a defendant’s actions satisfy the elements of more than one, whether the statutes’ elements are identical or not. See Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198. Choosing to charge under one or the other based upon the possible sentence is not in and of itself a violation of equal protection. Id. To establish a violation of equal protection a defendant must show more than an exercise of prosecutorial discretion; he or she must show an abuse of that discretion.
The United States Supreme Court and Idaho Supreme Court are in perfect accord in their requirement that, in order to establish an instance of discriminatory application of the law such that equal protection standards have been violated, there must first be shown a deliberate plan of discrimination based on some unjustifiable classification, such as race, sex, religion, etc.
Payan has failed to establish that his prosecution under
III.
THIS COURT WILL NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
In his brief Payan makes the general assertion that
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PAYAN’S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL
A. Standard of Review
Payan asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was not substantial and competent evidence to prove that twenty-eight or more grams of cocaine were involved in the drug transaction. In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal this Court independently considers the evidence in the record and determines whether a reasonable mind would conclude that the defendant’s guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, all reasonable inferences are taken in favor of the state. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521, 887 P.2d 57, 66 (Ct.App.1994), citing State v. Printz, 115 Idaho 566, 567, 768 P.2d 829, 830 (Ct.App.1989). We will not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991), citing State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 701 P.2d 303 (Ct.App. 1985).
B. Analysis
At trial, Payan and the state stipulated to the admission of the results of lab tests performed upon the substance found in the four baggies sold to Officer Akins. Pay-an asserts the evidence did not establish that the substance inside of each of the baggies was tested, leaving open the possibility that some of the substance was not cocaine. We disagree. A review of the record discloses that there was sufficient evidence to convict Payan under
The lab test results state that the total weight of the powdery substance found in the baggies was 55.29 grams. It further concludes that the powders contain cocaine. There was also testimony that Payan represented he had possession of two ounces of cocaine to sell. Officer Akins testified that he received four baggies from Payan and that Payan represented to him that each baggie contained one-half of an ounce of cocaine. He further testified that there are twenty-eight grams of cocaine in one ounce. The jury is responsible for determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the lab report. On the basis of this testimo
ny
V.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER PAYAN’S RULE 35 MOTIONS
Payan’s first Rule 35 motion was filed on February 17, 1995. The district court did not issue a ruling on this motion until December 23, 1997, over thirty-four months later. This Court has held that “if a trial court fails to ‘rule upon the Rule 35 motion within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses jurisdiction.’ ” State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 185, 953 P.2d 624, 625 (Ct.App. 1998), quoting State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 354, 825 P.2d 74, 77 (1992). “The 120-day time limitation serves two policies: it protects judges against repeated importunities by those sentenced and it ensures that the court does not usurp the responsibilities of parole officials by retaining jurisdiction indefinitely____” State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 353, 825 P.2d 74, 76 (1992), quoting United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208-209 (9th Cir.1981). Nevertheless, some delays in making a ruling may be justified, in which case the district court will not lose jurisdiction. See State v. Nickerson, 123 Idaho 971, 855 P.2d 56 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that a one-year delay in ruling was not unreasonable in light of a joint motion made by the prosecution and defense requesting that the Rule 35 motion be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the defendant’s direct appeal); State v. Brydon, 121 Idaho 890, 828 P.2d 919 (Ct.App.1992) (holding that a five-month delay in ruling on the motion after the initial hearing was not unreasonable because neither of the Chapman policy considerations were implicated and the court was waiting for additional reports on the defendant while incarcerated). However, it is defense counsel’s responsibility to precipitate action on a Rule 35 motion within a reasonable time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for the delay, to avoid the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction. Day, 131 Idaho at 186, 953 P.2d at 626.
The record is devoid of any articulated justification for the court’s failure to act on the original Rule 35 motion. Payan did have a direct appeal pending during the time the court refrained from making a,ruling. Although this may explain why the court did not rule on the Rule 35 motion, it does not justify its failure to do so. The proper procedure for handling a Rule 35 motion when an appeal is pending is for the district court to rule on the Rule 35 motion, and any appeal from that order can be consolidated into the pending appeal. Nicker-son, 123 Idaho at 974 n. 4, 855 P.2d at 59 n. 4. Further, there is no indication in the record that an abeyance of the Rule 35 motion was either requested or ordered. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the district court’s delay in ruling on Payan’s Rule 35 motion was reasonable. Consequently, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the original motion thirty-four months after it was filed. 4
Finally, the district court properly dismissed Payan’s August 19, 1997, Rule 35 motion due to its untimeliness and the fact that it was his second such motion. It was filed thirty-three months after the original judgment of conviction was imposed. Idaho Criminal Rule 35 requires that a motion to reduce sentence be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment of conviction. Although the district court vacated the original judgment of conviction, it did so for a
limited
purpose. It was stipulated by the parties that Payan had received ineffective assistance of counsel on his direct appeal; the reentry of the judgment was designed to remedy that situation. The district court stated in its order that the re-entry was “so that the
VI.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the prosecutorial discretion allowed by
Notes
. The amended complaint, information and judgment of conviction state that Payan was charged under
. It must be noted that a conviction under either statute carries with it the possibility of a fixed life sentence.
.
See also
. Although the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the original Rule 35 motion, its action in ruling on the merits was harmless error, as the motion was denied.