STATE of Louisiana
v.
S. J. PATTON.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
*1212 Don M. Burkett, Many, for defendant-relator.
Williаm J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., James Lynn Davis, Dist. Atty., Herman L. Lawson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent.
DIXON, Justice.
During the afternoon of September 29, 1978 Robert Davidson, an investigator for the DeSoto Parish district attorney's office, was driving south on U. S. Highway 171 en route to Many, Louisiana. Near the small town of Catuna, Davidson glanced in the rear view mirror and saw a car approaching at а high rate of speed. After passing Davidson, the driver of the speeding vehicle attempted to overtake three other vehicles as they were climbing a hill. When another сar came over the hilltop, the speeding automobile swerved off the edge of the road and momentarily forced the three other cars off the road as well. As sоon as all the automobiles returned to the highway, the driver of the speeding car pulled over to pass again. At this point, Davidson switched on the car's red lights and siren and signaled thе other vehicle to stop. After a high-speed chase, the driver of the speeding car pulled over and approached Davidson's car where he handed his licеnse to the investigator. Davidson jotted down the necessary information on a scratch pad and then told the driver, S. J. Patton, that he would have an arrest warrant issued for him as soon as he arrived in Many. Patton then drove away after his license was returned. A few days later Davidson swore out the appropriate complaints and the defendant was сharged with improper passing, R.S. 32:77, reckless driving, R.S. 14:99, and speeding, R.S. 32:61.
At trial defendant testified that he stopped only because he saw the flashing lights and heard the siren and that he surrendered his liсense only because he believed Davidson had the authority to demand it. At the close of the prosecution's case, the defense moved for a directed verdict оf acquittal on the ground that Davidson did not have the requisite authority to arrest the defendant and that any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest was therefore inadmissiblе. The trial judge denied the motion and found the defendant guilty on all counts. The same day Patton was sentenced to forty-five days and a $150 fine on the reckless operation charge, to a $50 fine for improper passing, and to fifteen days and $75 for speeding. The trial judge imposed concurrent sentences, suspended all but five days of each prison sentence, and placed the defendant on inactive probation for one year.
The defendant sought review to this court, contending that the trial judge was *1213 incorrect not to suppress the investigator's in-court identification of the defendant as the fruit of an illegal arrest. We granted writs,
An initial consideration in this case is whether the investigator had the requisite authority to stop the defendant and to order him to produce his driver's license. The answer to this inquiry depends on the proper interpretation of R.S. 16:13.1 which provides:
"The invеstigators of the district attorneys' offices shall be peace officers with all privileges, immunities, and defenses accorded to peace officers, exceрt that they shall not have the right to make arrests, except as citizens under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 214. They shall have the same territorial jurisdiction as the distriсt attorney for whom they work. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, investigators of a district attorney's office shall not receive state supplemental pay."
At trial the defense contended that Davidson had authority to arrest only for a felony, C.Cr.P. 214, and that he therefore could not arrest Patton for the instant offenses which are misdеmeanors. The State, for its part, argued that the roadside detention was not an arrest but instead was analogous to a detention authorized by Article 215.1 of the Code of Criminal Prоcedure and was therefore within the authority delegated to investigators by R.S. 16:13.1.
This court has recognized that "not every authorized detention may constitute an `arrest.'" State v. Breaux,
A second consideration is whether identification testimony must be suppressed if it is a fruit of an illegal arrest or detention. Several courts have hеld the identification of the defendant not to be the fruit of an illegal arrest. See United States v. Young,
"The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physicаl, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding in Silverman v. United States,365 U.S. 505 ,81 S.Ct. 679 ,5 L.Ed.2d 734 , that the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statеments as well as against the more traditional seizure of `papers and effects.' Similarly, testimony as to matters observed during an unlawful invasion has been excluded in order to enfоrce the basic constitutional policies. McGinnis v. United States [CA1 NH]227 F.2d 598 . Thus, verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers' action in the present case is no less the `fruit' of official illegality than the *1214 more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. See Nueslein v. District of Columbia,73 App.D.C. 85 ,115 F.2d 690 . Nor do the policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence. Either in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers, Rea v. United States,350 U.S. 214 ,76 S.Ct. 292 ,100 L.Ed. 233 ; or of closing the doors of the federal courts to аny use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained, Elkins v. United States,364 U.S. 206 ,80 S.Ct. 1437 ,4 L.Ed.2d 1669 , the danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of verbal evidence would seem too great to warrant introducing suсh a distinction."371 U.S. at 485-486 ,83 S.Ct. at 416 ,9 L.Ed.2d at 454 .
Recently the court reaffirmed its adherence to this position:
"An examination of these cases leads us to reject the Government's suggestion that we adoрt what would in practice amount to a per se rule that the testimony of a live witness should not be excluded at trial no matter how close and proximate the connection between it and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. We also reaffirm the holding of Wong Sun, supra, [at 485,83 S.Ct. 407 ,9 L.Ed.2d 441 ], that `verbal evidence which derives so immediately from unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as thе officer's action in the present case is no less the `fruit' of official illegality than the more commonplace tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.'" United States v. Ceccolini,435 U.S. 268 , 274-275,98 S.Ct. 1054 , 1059,55 L.Ed.2d 268 , 276 (1978).
Decisions rendered by this court also indicate that identification testimony is to be suppressed if tainted by illegality. In State v. Phillips,
"On thе facts recited it is submitted that the information furnished by the confidential informer, which was independently verified by the police against the information contained in the police rеport of the robbery provided reasonable cause to arrest without a warrant. The line-up was therefore not tainted by an illegal arrest."354 So.2d at 1285 .
For these reasons, we сonclude that identification testimony can be suppressed if it is the tainted fruit of an illegal arrest.
Nevertheless, evidence which results from an illegal governmental action is admissible if the causal connection between the two "becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States,
For the reasons assigned, the convictions and sentences of defendant are reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with these views.