68 Me. 473 | Me. | 1878
The respondent was indicted, for sending to the complainant a threatening letter with the intent to extort money. The first question that arose at the trial was whether it was the province of the court or of the jury to interpret the letter.
As a rule, both in civil and criminal cases, cases of libel to some extent excepted, writings are to be expounded by the court. Whenever a paper can be understood from its own words, its interpretation is a question of law for the court. Nichols v. Frothingham, 45 Maine, 220. Nash v. Drisco, 51 Maine, 417. Fenderson v. Owen, 54 Maine, 372. State v. Goold, 62 Maine, 509. Wills, deeds and other contracts usually fall under this classification. In such cases, the meaning of the instrument, the promise it makes, the duty or obligation it imposes, is a question of law for the court.
Thei’e is, however, a large class of writings where the meaning of particular words or phrases or characters or abbreviations must be shown by evidence outside the writing, and there may be extrinsic circumstances of one kind or another affecting its inter
Of course there are exceptions to the rule. It frequently happens that a writing is introduced merely as a fact or circumstance tending to prove some other fact. In such case it is generally but a link in a chain of evidence, the accompanying evidence being mostly or altogether oral. When that occurs the jury have to pass upon the whole transaction, of which the writing is but a part. The question then is, not so much what the document moans, but what inference shall be drawn from its meaning, and what effect it shall have towards proving the point at issue. The writing and all the concomitant evidence go to the jury together. Here the duty of the court is comparatively unimportant. It may pronounce what meaning the writing is or is not capable of, and whether it is or not relevant to the issue ; still the value and effect of such evidence is a question of fact for the jury. The opinion in Barreda v. Silsbee, 21 How. 146, 147, speaks of such a writing as evidence “ collaterally introduced.” Other cases denominate it “ indirect evidence.” The case of Miller v. Fichthorn, 31 Pa. St. 256, defines it thus: “ A writing, as evidence of a relation or right, must be direct or indirect evidence of it. Statutes, ordinances, wills, conveyances and other contracts which, per se, declare the right or relation, are direct evidence of it. Letters,
The rule may be subject to other qualification. It is sometimes difficult to determine, in the construction of papers, where the office of the court ends and that of the jury begins. But, in view of the rule or any possible qualification, we think the judge at nisi prius was right in undertaking, as matter of law, to give an interpretation of the letter relied on by the government as Deing a threatening communication. His course is sustained by direct authorities. Regina v. Smith, 2 Car. & Kir. 882. Rex v. Boucher, 4 Car. & P. 562. Rex v. Pickford, Id. 227.
The other question is whether the judge interpreted the letter correctly or not. He directed the jury to regard the letter as, per se, a threatening communication. He does not say what the crime or offense indicated in the letter was. He merely informs the jury that an accusation of some person for some crime or offense was intended. The letter, upon its face, can bear no other interpretation. What extrinsic and independent facts there were to modify the prima facie character of the communication, does not appear in the exceptions. All opportunities of explanation, it is presumed, were allowed to the state and also to the accused. Parol evidence was admissible for the purpose. Arch-bald Grim. Prac. and Plead. Title: Threatening Letters, p. 325. Goodrich v. Davis, 11 Met. 473. Shattuck v. Allen, 4 Gray, 540, 546. White v. Sayward, 33 Maine, 322. Threatening letters are likely to be written with as much disguise and artifice as
It was not necessary to submit to the jury to ascertain what the term “ iubited ” was intended for; it not appearing that any extraneous facts were offered for that purpose. If its intended meaning could be best determined by external facts and circumstances, then the question was one of fact for the jury. If ascertainable from an inspection of the whole paper itself, in such case it was a question of law for the court. It is obvious enough from the context that an indictment was the thing threatened. The letter “ d ” in the word was deficiently made. Fenderson v. Owen, supra. Coolbroth v. Purinton, 29 Maine, 469. Green v. Walker, 37 Maine, 25. Gallagher v. Black, 44 Maine, 99.
Exceptions overruled.