State of Ohio v. Ryan Craig Parks
Court of Appeals No. L-18-1138
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Decided: June 14, 2019
2019-Ohio-2366
Trial Court No. CR0201801408
Sarah Haberland, for appellant.
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Ryan Parks appeals the May 31, 2018 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court sentenced him to 12 months in prison following his guilty plea and conviction for breaking and entering, in violation of
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The indictment in this case describes three separate criminal incidents. On the morning of February 18, 2018, Parks was observed driving a pickup truck that was reported stolen earlier that day. While stopped at an intersection in downtown Toledo, Parks offered to sell some tools to a person who was stopped next to Parks. The driver declined. Later, when the driver learned of the stolen truck, he reported the incident to law enforcement. Police showed the driver a photo array that included a picture of Parks, and he identified Parks as the person driving the stolen vehicle. This offense formed the basis for Count 3 of the indictment.
{¶ 3} On February 25, 2018, victim No. 2 made a police report of a breaking and entering of his detached garage. Victim No. 2 learned of the event when he noticed a broken door to his garage and viewed video footage from surveillance cameras. The footage showed a person entering the garage the night before, at 11:45 p.m., and then leaving with a snow blower and a welder. Victim No. 2 posted a still shot of the person on social media, and Parks was identified as the person in the photo. Victim No. 2 presented the photo to police, and it matched a picture of Parks in a criminal database. This offense formed the basis for Count 2 of the indictment.
{¶ 4} On February 26, 2018, victim No. 3 contacted the police from Florida to report that his neighbor had called him and told him that he, the neighbor, had found personal property (two heaters) belonging to victim No. 3 in an alley. The neighbor returned the heaters to victim No. 3‘s home, where he found that the door to a detached shed had been damaged. It appeared to the neighbor that a snowblower had been taken. Police questioned a different neighbor, who reported that he had observed Parks pushing victim No. 3‘s snowblower down the street a few days before. This offense formed the basis for Count 1 of the indictment.
{¶ 5} Parks was indicted on March 7, 2018 on two counts of breaking and entering, in violation of
{¶ 6} At the change-of-plea hearing on May 7, 2018, the parties agreed that Parks would plead guilty to one count of breaking and entering (Count 1), and the state would nolle prosequi Counts 2 and 3, although the state requested an order of restitution as to all counts, totaling $2,600. Before accepting the plea, the court advised Parks of his rights, as set forth in
{¶ 7} A sentencing hearing was held on May 30, 2018. Through counsel, Parks acknowledged that the contents of the PSI were accurate and that Parks suffers from an “out of control” substance abuse problem and a lack of impulse control. As described by his counsel, Parks is “a nice guy. Doesn‘t do anything violent, but if there‘s Percocet to be found, if there‘s any snowblowers that he can sell, he just can‘t stop [himself]. * * * [T]he impulse is just too strong.”
{¶ 8} Following victim impact statements offered by victim No. 3 and his wife, the trial court reviewed Parks’ criminal history, which included eight prior felonies, 30
I. The Trial Court erred when it accepted a guilty plea that was not knowingly or intelligently by Defendant, as to Count one, Breaking and Entering. [Sic.]
II. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion at Sentencing, by Failing to Sentence According to the Law Under
R.C. 2929.14 .III. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion at Sentencing by Failing to Access all of the factors in accordance with
R.C. 2929.12 . [Sic.]
Law and Analysis
{¶ 9} In his first assignment of error, Parks argues that his inability to describe “his complete mental health diagnosis,” rendered his plea involuntary and, therefore, the trial court should not have accepted it.
{¶ 10} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). In considering whether a plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered, an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a de novo review of the
{¶ 11}
Here, Parks has not alleged a specific violation of
THE COURT: All right. Are you under the influence of any medications, drugs or alcohol, which would interfere with your ability to understand what we are doing?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Otherwise are you clear-headed this morning?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: [Counsel], I know you met with your client at some length. Would you agree he‘s clear-headed today?
THE DEFENDANT: I do, Your Honor. * * *
THE COURT: Mr. Parks, do you now or have you ever suffered from any mental health or disease?
THE DEFENDANT: Have I suffered? I‘m on, yeah, I‘m on a case. Yeah, I‘m on a caseload for mental health. I‘m on a couple of different medications for my mental health, but I‘m clear now.
THE COURT: What kind of mental health problems do you have?
THE DEFENDANT: I got anxiety, bipolar, I‘ve been ADHD, but I think they call it something different when you are an adult now, and severe depression.
THE COURT: Okay. And are you taking medication now for those conditions?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And are you taking those medications strictly in accordance with the instructions given to you by your doctor?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
{¶ 13} When we consider the exchange between the court and Parks, we find no evidence that he lacked the requisite mental capacity to enter into a guilty plea or that the trial court should not have accepted the plea. To the contrary, Parks and his counsel asserted that Parks was “clear headed,” and the record, as a whole, supports that conclusion. That is, Parks actively participated in the proceedings, and he acknowledged the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, including the potential penalties he could
{¶ 14} In his second and third assignments of error, Parks challenges his 12-month prison sentence as being contrary to law under
{¶ 15} We first address the standard of review in sentencing cases and Parks’ claim that the trial court “abus[ed] its discretion” in fashioning a sentence. “[A]ppellate courts may not apply [an] abuse-of-discretion standard in sentencing-term challenges.”
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section
2929.13 , division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section2929.14 , or division (I) of section2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) .
{¶ 16} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court has considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under
{¶ 17} Here, Parks does not challenge the trial court‘s compliance with the sentencing statutes identified in subsection (a) of
{¶ 18} A trial court that sentences a defendant for a felony offense, “shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing: * * * to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.”
{¶ 19} To comply with the principles and purposes of sentencing, as set forth above, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in
R.C. 2929.12 is a guidance statute. It sets forth the seriousness and recidivism criteria that a trial court “shall consider” in fashioning a felony sentence. Subsections (B) and (C) establish the factors indicating whether the offender‘s conduct is more serious or less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. Subsections (D) and (E) contain the factors bearing on whether the offender is likely or not likely to commit future crimes. While the phrase “shall consider” is used throughoutR.C. 2929.12 , the sentencing court is not obligated to give a detailed explanation of how it algebraically applied each seriousness and recidivism factor to the offender. Indeed, no specific recitation is required. Merely stating that the court considered the statutory factors is enough.
State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, 960 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.) citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38 and State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000).
{¶ 20} Parks complains that the trial court failed to consider “all” of the
{¶ 21} Alternatively, Parks claims that the trial court failed to consider the factors indicating that his conduct was “less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense,” i.e. the
{¶ 23} The court determined that prison was warranted under
{¶ 24} Based upon the record in this case, we do not find clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court‘s decision to sentence Parks to 12 months in prison. Therefore, we may not vacate or modify the sentence. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 513, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, at ¶ 23.
Conclusion
{¶ 25} We find that the trial court did not err in accepting Parks’ guilty plea. We also find that the trial court‘s decision to impose the maximum prison term was appropriate to protect the public and to punish Parks for his offense and that the court properly considered the seriousness and recidivism factors in this case. We find that the trial court complied with all applicable sentencing requirements when it sentenced him to prison and that Parks’ sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law under
{¶ 26} Based on the foregoing, the May 31, 2018 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Parks is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
Arlene Singer, J.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
Christine E. Mayle, P.J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.