This wаs a case of circumstantial evidence. His Honor left it to the jury to say whеther from all of the facts and circumstances, they were satisfied by the evidence that the prisoner inflicted a mortal wound, or was present aiding and аbetting the act. There certainly was evidence tending to prove the guilt оf the prisoner, and we think he has no right to complain of the manner in which his Plonor put the case to the jury.
If the prisoner inflicted the mortal wound, or was present aiding and abetting the act, the idea of manslaughter, or of excusable or justifiable homicide, was out of fbe question. It was either a case of cold blooded murder, for the sake of getting the property and money of thе deceased, or else the *477 prisoner was entitled to a verdict of acquittal, because no offence had been proved.
The instruction аsked for in regard to a “reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the prisoner,” and “that a presumption could only be raised frоm a fact, and not from a presumption; and, that having to presume the prisoner’s presence at the murder from the fact of his going in that direction in company with the deceased, the jury had no right to presume from this presumption that he wаs the murderer or present aiding and abetting,” was, in our opinion, fully responded to by his Honor’s charge. The fact of “the prisoner’s going in that direction in comрany with the deceased,” was not the only fact from which his presence at the murder, and his participation in the crime could be presumed. There were many other facts bearing upon the matter; and the prisoner’s counsеl was not at liberty to ask for an instruction predicated on the ground that therе was no other fact in evidence, and thereby isolate the point.
We think thе prisoner has no ground of complaint in reference to the refusal of his Honor to adopt the very words used in Swintis case without explanation. The truth is that no set of words is required by law, in regard to the force of circumstantial evidence. All thаt the law requires is, that the jury shall be clearly instructed that, unless after due consideration of all of the evidence, they are “fully satisfied,” or “entirely convinсed,” or “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” of the guilt of the prisoner, it is their áuty to acquit, and every attempt on the part of the courts to lay down а formula” for the instruction of the jury, by which to “guage” the degrees of conviction, has resulted in no good. State v. Sears, ante, 146; State v. Knox, ante 312.
“The evidence must be as strong to "authorize conviсtion, as if proved by one credible and respectable witness.” *478 What degrеe of certainty is fixed by this proposition? It, of course, must depend upon the attendant circumstances. These differ in every case and never rest upon the testimony of a single witness; e. g., the connection of the parties, werе they strangers, friends or enemies; the motive for the act; the conduct of thе prisoner after the act; aUempts at concealment; telling lies, &c. So the proposition, although it niay sometimes serve the purpose of illustration, is not, and cannot be made a rule of law; consequently it is not error to decline to instruct the jury in these very words.
On the contrary, when the presiding judge thinks frоm the course of the argument, and the signification given to the words by counsel, thаt, to use the very words would tend to give the jury a wrong impression as to what the law rеquires, it is his duty to use other words, or, if he adopt the very words, to do so with such an exрlanation as will convey to the minds of the jury a counter impression, and prеvent misapprehension, as was done by his Honor in this case.
Many things occur аt the trial below, which it is impossible to communicate to this court. Such things cannot be reviewed and must be left to the judgment and good sense of the judge who conducts the trial. This court can only interfere when error appears.
There is no error. This will be certified, &c.
Per Curiam There is no error.