OPINION
VIA jury found appellant Jill Irene Paris-Sheldon guilty of two counts of disorderly conduct. Paris-Sheldon argues on appeal the trial court erroneously denied her motion for substitute counsel and motion to dismiss. She also asserts the jury selection procedure was improper and the court erred when it denied her motion for a judgment of acquittal made pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R.Crim. P., 17 A.R.S. Finding no error, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
V 2 On appeal, “[w]e view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict[s].”
State v. Cropper,
V3 That same day, Frank Palmer had been visiting his friend, Gary Hyatt, Love’s neighbor. Palmer had been friends with Paris-Sheldon for about four years, and the two of them had worked together. Palmer went to Love’s trailer to find out what had happened, and he and Paris-Sheldon began talking and drinking. Paris-Sheldon was packing items from the trailer and moving them to her truck while he sat at the kitchen table. Palmer testified there was a revolver and a box of ammunition on the kitchen table and Paris-Sheldon had told him she “had worked on the gun and made it so it had a hair-trigger on it.” He stated he had had “three or four shots of whiskey and probably about four or five beers” when he “saw [Paris-Sheldon] leave the trailer at one point and then come back in and, bam, [he] got shot in the face.” When she came into the trailer, he could “see that she was holding something in front of her, ... but it was ... so quick____ [A]s soon as she stepped in the door it was like instantaneous, the gun went o[ff].”
V4 Gary Hyatt testified he had heard a loud pop, “like someone had slammed the trailer door,” before “[Paris-Sheldon] came over and told [him] that [s]he had shot [Palmer] and for [him] to call 911.” While Hyatt was on the telephone with the 911 *504 operator, he heard what he believed to be a gunshot, and then “lock[ed][his] doors and turned out [his] lights and went and got [his] pistol.” The same deputies who had come earlier in the day responded to Hyatt’s 911 call and saw Paris-Sheldon exiting Love’s trailer as they arrived. She initially told the deputies “that nobody had been shot,” but when asked where the revolver was, she stated she had shot Palmer and “thrown [the gun] near a truck.” The deputies then took Paris-Sheldon into custody.
¶ 5 A grand jury indicted Paris-Sheldon on charges of disorderly conduct and attempted first-degree murder in CR-20033007. On the first day of trial, following Paris-Sheldon’s rejection of the state’s plea offer, the court granted the state’s motion to dismiss all charges without prejudice, but denied Paris-Sheldon’s motion to dismiss them with prejudice. Approximately one month later, in April 2004, a second grand jury charged Paris-Sheldon with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, aggravated assault causing serious physical injury, disorderly conduct, and attempted second-degree murder in this case, CR-20041301.
¶ 6 Approximately eight months later, Paris-Sheldon moved to dismiss the disorderly conduct and attempted murder charges in this case, arguing, pursuant to Rule 16.6(a), Ariz. R.Crim. P., 16A A.R.S., that the state had sought to dismiss the charges in CR-20033007 to avoid the speedy trial requirements of Rule 8, Ariz. R.Crim. P., 16A A.R.S. Although argument on the motion was scheduled, it apparently was never held, and the trial court did not rule on the motion before trial. On the first day of trial, before a different judge, Paris-Sheldon brought the motion to the court’s attention. The court stated it was “not prepared to rule on the motion,” but noted, “we’ll have an appellate record,” and permitted the trial to proceed. The court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the attempted second-degree murder charge with prejudice on the third day of trial.
¶ 7 The jury did not reach a verdict on the aggravated assault charges but found Paris-Sheldon guilty of the lesser-ineluded offense of disorderly conduct as to Palmer and of disorderly conduct as to Hyatt. The jury found both offenses to be of a dangerous nature. The trial court sentenced Paris-Sheldon to concurrent, presumptive prison terms of 2.25 years for each count. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Motion for Substitute Counsel
¶ 8 Paris-Sheldon first contends the trial court erroneously denied her motion requesting substitute counsel. We review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request for substitute counsel for a clear abuse of discretion.
See State v. Moody,
¶ 9 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to competent representation but does not guarantee a defendant “counsel of choice,” or “a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.”
Moody,
whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between counsel and the accused, and whether new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict; the timing of the motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time period already elapsed between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel; and quality of counsel.
Id., quoting State v. LaGrand,
¶ 10 On the morning of the first day of trial, November 1, 2005, Paris-Sheldon called the trial court’s office concerning her appointed attorney. When the court later questioned her about the telephone call in *505 open court, she stated she wanted to “fire” her attorney “and have a change of counsel.” The court further questioned her concerning the basis for her request, and she stated her attorney had lied to her and “failed to investigate the case.” She asserted her attorney had maintained she “had a good defense” until a recent meeting when he told her she “had no defense, and he had done nothing.” She was initially unable to recall when that meeting had occurred but later stated she “believ[ed] it was the 19th [of October].” She also stated she had, at that time, asked her attorney to withdraw from the case, although her attorney asserted she did not ask him to do so until the Friday before trial. When queried by the court, Paris-Sheldon’s attorney stated he was prepared for trial and denied having told her she “had a good defense.” The court denied Paris-Sheldon’s motion, stating her request was not timely and “[her attorney was] prepared to go to trial.”
¶ 11 Paris-Sheldon asserts the trial court’s inquiry into the basis for her request for new counsel was improper because it was “limited” and “based solely on its being untimely ..., because timing is only one of several relevant factors the court is to consider.” Paris-Sheldon cites no authority, however, and we find none, requiring a trial court to make explicit findings in support of its decision to deny a motion for substitute counsel. All
Torres
requires is for the court to “inquire [on the record] as to the basis of a defendant’s request,” and, if necessary, conduct a hearing to determine whether substitution is proper.
Torres,
¶ 12 Paris-Sheldon also contends the trial court’s inquiry revealed evidence demonstrating “a breakdown of communication and an irreconcilable conflict ... between [Paris-Sheldon] and her appointed counsel.” “[W]hen there is a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict between a defendant and his appointed counsel, that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated.”
Id.
¶ 6,
¶ 13 When a trial court encounters a factual dispute in conducting the
Torres
inquiry, as the court did here, the court must resolve it. And we must defer to that resolution so long as the record supports it.
Cf. State v. Rosengren,
¶ 14 Paris-Sheldon also apparently asserts she was entitled to a new attorney because she had lost trust in her appointed counsel. We, however, do not agree a loss of trust, without more, requires a trial court to appoint new counsel.
See Thomas v. Wainwright,
¶ 15 Paris-Sheldon next argues the trial court’s ruling was improper because it “questioned defense counsel as to the veracity of [Paris-Sheldon’s] statements, thus violating the attorney-client privilege.” We fail to see how a trial court can comply with our supreme court’s instructions in
Torres,
particularly where a defendant asserts his or her attorney has been dishonest, without some inquiry into confidential matters.
2
Paris-Sheldon’s assertion her attorney had lied to her and failed to properly investigate her case clearly “question[ed] the competency and reputation of the attorney who represented [her].”
State v. Cuffle,
¶ 16 Paris-Sheldon also contends, relying on
Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office v. Superior Court,
¶ 17 Additionally, Paris-Sheldon reasons the trial court’s inquiry placed her attorney “in a position adverse to [her,]” thereby creating an “irreconcilable conflict” requiring substitution of counsel. She relies on cases from other jurisdictions holding a defendant is entitled to new counsel when his or her attorney takes an adverse position concerning a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, or at sentencing.
See People v. Lawrence,
¶ 18 In a related argument, Paris-Sheldon asserts the “denial of conflict free counsel at the hearing on [her] motion to substitute counsel requires that the case be remanded for a hearing at which new counsel should be appointed.” She relies primarily on
United States v. Wadsworth,
¶ 19 Although the Ninth Circuit in Wads-worth stated, “[t]here can be no question that th[ose] proceedings were critical,” id. at 1510, it confined its determination to the “unusual circumstances of th[e] case.” Id. at 1511. In contrast, Paris-Sheldon’s attorney avowed he was prepared for trial and expressed no animosity toward his chent or unwillingness to proceed as her attorney. Moreover, Paris-Sheldon does not articulate how an appointed attorney could have assisted her at the hearing. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by failing to appoint Paris-Sheldon new counsel to advise her during the hearing on her motion for substitute counsel.
Dismissal Without Prejudice in CR-20033007
¶20 Paris-Sheldon raises in this appeal the propriety of the trial court’s grant of the state’s motion to dismiss without prejudice the charges in CR-20033007. As the state correctly points out, we lack jurisdiction to address this issue.
See State v. Alvarez,
¶ 21 In this ease, Paris-Sheldon filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the charges of attempted murder and disturbing the peace should be dismissed with prejudice because the state previously obtained the dismissal in CR-20033007 “solely ‘to avoid the provisions of Rule 8, [Ariz. R.Crim. P., 16A A.R.S.]’ ” in violation of Rule 16.6(a), Ariz. R.Crim. P., 16A A.R.S. On appeal, she argues that, because the dismissal without prejudice in CR-20033007 “was based upon legal error ... the subsequent motion to dismiss the re-filed counts with prejudice should have been granted.”
¶ 22 The state, relying on
State v. Lujan,
*508
¶ 23 Paris-Sheldon waited eight months after the indictment was issued in this case to file her motion to dismiss and provides no explanation for this delay. Moreover, the proper method to raise the issue was through a motion for reconsideration or petition for special action filed in CR-20033007, not by a motion to dismiss filed in a different case.
3
See, e.g.,
Ariz. R.Crim. P. 16.1(d) (“Except for good cause, or as otherwise provided by these rules, an issue previously determined by the court shall not be reconsidered.”);
Alvarez,
¶ 24 The situation before us is analogous to those in which courts have applied the invited error doctrine. “The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a party from ‘injecting] error in the record and then profiting] from it on appeal.’ ”
State v. Logan,
Jury Selection
¶ 25 During jury selection, after the parties had exercised their allocated peremptory challenges pursuant to Rule 18.4(c), Ariz. R.Crim. P., 17 A.R.S., fourteen jurors were impaneled and both parties approved the panel. Before the jury was impaneled, the trial court asked the jurors if any had scheduling conflicts “that suggest you cannot be here all day Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.” After closing arguments, the court, with the agreement of the parties, designated an alternate juror. Paris-Sheldon then stated, “we’ve impaneled essentially a 12-person jury,” and requested the court to “change ... to a 12-person jury.” The parties agreed only an eight-person jury was required. See A.R.S. § 21-102(B). The court decided, over Paris-Sheldon’s objection, that “it’s an eight-person jury by law, and based on a miscalculation by the Court and counsel I’m not inclined to let four more people sit on the case.” The court then, again over Paris-Sheldon’s objection, excused two jurors because they could not return the following Monday for further deliberations. Three alternates were then selected by lot.
¶ 26 Paris-Sheldon argues that, by “changing the number of jurors the parties had anticipated hearing the ease” and “bifurcat[ing] voir dire” by “ask[ing] hardship questions of the jurors after the parties had exercised their peremptory challenges,” the trial court interfered with her right to peremptory challenges.
7
“Although the right to exercise peremptory challenges is not protected by either the federal or the state constitution, such challenges have long been viewed as one means to assure the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.”
State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court,
¶ 27 It was not error, however, for the trial court to reduce the jury to eight members. Section 21-102(B) states that, in cases where the authorized sentence is less than thirty years imprisonment, a jury
“shall
consist of eight persons.” (Emphasis added.) A trial with a larger panel is not permitted. Moreover, we cannot ascertain how this necessary reduction interfered with Paris-Sheldon’s right to exercise her peremptory challenges. She asserts only that a “different” jury tried her than the one she participated in selecting. A defendant, however, “ ‘is not entitled to be tried by any particular jury, but merely by one which is fair and impartial.’ ”
State v. Eisenlord,
¶ 28 The Louisiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
State v. Mosley,
¶29 Nor was it error for the trial court to excuse two jurors for cause after closing arguments. It is not uncommon for a court to excuse a juror after a trial has begun; a variety of personal or economic hardships might arise during a trial. Cf. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.4(b) (“A challenge for cause may be made at any time.”); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.5(h) (deliberating juror may be “excused due to inability or disqualification to perform required duties”). Faced with the need to reduce the jury panel to its statutorily required size, and with the possibility deliberations could continue into the following week, the court chose an appropriate solution. This procedure could not have interfered with Paris-Sheldon’s use of her peremptory challenges because the record does not suggest there was any risk apparent to the court during jury selection that deliberations might continue into the following week. Therefore, there is no possibility Paris-Sheldon used a peremptory challenge on a juror who should have been excused for cause at the time the jury was selected.
¶ 30 Indeed, although the trial court did not dismiss the two jurors “by lot,” what occurred here is otherwise indistinguishable from a trial court’s designation of alternate jurors.
See
Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.5(h). Paris-Sheldon neither argues the trial court’s method of excusing jurors resulted in a jury panel that was not impartial nor suggests that the panel was biased.
See Eisenlord,
¶ 31 The case Paris-Sheldon primarily relies on,
State v. Tinnes,
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
¶ 32 Lastly, Paris-Sheldon contends the trial court erroneously denied her motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of disorderly conduct as to Hyatt, made pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R.Crim. P. “We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal for an abuse of discretion” and will reverse only if there is “ ‘a complete absence of probative facts to support a conviction.’”
Alvarez,
¶ 33 The state indicted Paris-Sheldon under A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(6), which
*511
states: “A person commits disorderly conduct if, -with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so, such person ... [r]ecklessly handles, displays or discharges a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” Paris-Sheldon asserts the evidence was insufficient that she “knew ... Hyatt would be able to hear the firing of the weapon in the back trailer from his location at the front of the property.”
See State v. Burdick,
¶34 Palmer testified Love’s trailer was “right behind” Hyatt’s “on the same property.” This testimony, together with evidence that Paris-Sheldon lived for some time in Love’s trailer, supports the inference the trailers were close enough together for Paris-Sheldon to know an occupant of the neighboring trailer would hear the revolver’s report when she fired it. The record does not suggest there was any significant distance between the trailers or the presence of any obstruction that might have blocked the sound. And Hyatt testified that, when he heard the gunshot, he initially believed “someone had slammed the ... door” of Love’s trailer. A jury could infer from this evidence that, if the trailers were close enough for an occupant of one to hear a door slammed in the other, Paris-Sheldon would know an occupant of the neighboring trailer could hear a gunshot. Moreover, the evidence established Paris-Sheldon was intimately familiar with firearms, which supports the inference Paris-Sheldon would know the sound her revolver made and would also know that, when she fired it, that sound would be heard in the neighboring trailer. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Paris-Sheldon’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
See Alvarez,
Disposition
¶ 35 We affirm Paris-Sheldon’s convictions and sentences.
Notes
. We do not address what effect, if any, that asserted miscommunication may have on any future ineffective assistance of counsel claim Paris-Sheldon may assert. As Paris-Sheldon correctly notes, such claims cannot be raised on direct appeal.
State v. Spreitz,
. If the trial court determines it must malee a detailed inquiry into confidential communications between a defendant and his or her attorney, it may need to conduct that portion of the hearing when the state is not present. Paris-Sheldon does not argue, however, that the state's presence during the court's inquiry prejudiced her.
. Indeed, it could be fairly argued Paris-Sheldon failed to raise this issue before the trial court in CR-20033007. She asserted there only that she had “been in custody for a long time” and there was no reason the state could not go forward with its charges.
. Paris-Sheldon reasons
Duron
and
Alvarez
do not control because those cases "did not in any way state that the defendant could not have waited until the charges were refiled and then moved to dismiss them under the new cause number.” As we explain, however, that procedure was improper. For the same reason, we do not address Paris-Sheldon’s argument that the grant of the state’s motion to dismiss is an appealable order in light of this court’s decision in
State v. Felix,
. Moreover, "a defendant may waive speedy trial rights by not objecting to the denial of speedy trial in a timely manner.”
State v. Spreitz,
. Paris-Sheldon, relying on
Cornell v. Superior Court,
. When objecting at trial, Paris-Sheldon stated she did not "think it[][was] unlawful to impanel a 12-person jury even if the imposing sentence is less than 30 years” and argued she "might have had a different strategy” in exercising her peremptory challenges had “[the parties] not been heading towards 12 rather than 8.” The state asserts Paris-Sheldon’s “nebulous general objection was insufficient to preserve th[is] issue on appeal.” We disagree. The fact that a defendant qualifies his or her objection does not mean the issue has been waived on appeal. Paris-Sheldon’s objections gave the trial court "the opportunity to rule on the issue and correct possible errors," and thus were sufficient to preserve the issue.
State v. Deschamps,