20 A. 6 | N.H. | 1889
The testimony of F. S. Palmer, Reagan, and Coffin, as to conversations with the defendant, and as to matters occurring before the murder, was relevant if it tended to show a motive for the commission of the crime with which he was charged; and the question is, Did it tend to show motive? Their testimony was inadmissible for the purpose of discrediting the defendant. His character could not be attacked by showing that he had been guilty of other crimes or offences. It was not competent to prove that he committed the crime of larceny or malicious mischief for the purpose of showing that he was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial. State v. Lapage,
Upon an indictment for murder, evidence of former grudges and antecedent threats is received, because it tends to show malice in the defendant against the deceased. 1 Phil. Ev. 169; Rosc. Cr. Ev. 71. Such evidence is admissible because it supplies a motive for the act. The absence or presence of motive renders the alleged fact less or more probable. State v. Dearborn,
The testimony of Raitt, not objected to and unobjectionable, if credited by the jury, proved that the defendant believed he had lost his position at the electric light station in consequence of a charge of theft made against him by the deceased, or of the exposure by the deceased of theft actually committed by the defendant. The defendant's threat, that he would "fix them for it." showed that he harbored feelings of enmity against the deceased, and intended to do him some bodily harm. The evidence tended to show a motive stimulated by revenge for the commission of the crime with which he was charged. The evidence objected to was competent for the same purpose. The absence of any apparent motive is always a fact in favor of the accused. Hence any fact which supplies a motive for the crime charged is relevant. Best Ev. (Chamberlayne's ed.), s. 453; State v. Dearborn,
It was claimed at the argument that the stenographer's notes show that he said he "thought it was Whitehouse, but didn't know." If the fact is assumed to be as claimed, it did not render the evidence incompetent. Evidence that he believed the deceased had been instrumental in losing him his position at the light station, and in involving him, either rightly or wrongly, in the charge of larceny and malicious mischief, was admissible, as evidence would be that the fact was so. In either case the grounds of the defendant's hostility would appear. The declarations of the deceased, communicated to the defendant, would have been admissible if they were such as to influence his conduct. His acts, so far as they might influence the conduct of the defendant, were admissible for the same reason.
The fact that the defendant had in his possession, after he was committed to the jail, a razor and a gun-wrench may have had some tendency to show his guilt. The razor, if not the wrench, could be used in aiding his escape. It is claimed that the wrench was a thing so insignificant no use could be made of it in effecting an escape. If this was so, the evidence as to the wrench was immaterial, and could not confuse or embarrass the defendant in his defence. State v. Clark,
The evidence was open to explanation, and if the explanation was satisfactory to the jury, no injustice was done by its admission. If not explained, the jury would give it such weight as it *221 deserved. That the evidence might not be entitled to very much consideration does not affect the question of its admissibility.
Exceptions overruled.
DOE, C. J., and CARPENTER, J., did not sit: the others concurred.