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State v. Palmer
239 S.E.2d 406
N.C.
1977
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*1 v. Palmer No error. rape: for Judgment with a child: Arrested. taking indecent liberties

Judgment PALMER, STATE v. JAMES OF NORTH CAROLINA alias James Burrell No. 6 (Filed 1977) 15 December statutory language § and Warrant 9.4— indictment 1. Indictment language generally An indictment couched in the of .the statute is suffi- statutory charge cient to offense. allegation § 2. Indictment and Warrant 9— of ultimate facts generally only allege Indictments and warrants need the ultimate facts constituting allege criminal eviden- each element of the offense and need tiary facts. 11.1; Battery § § Indictment and Warrant 9.2— 3. Assault allegation weapon sufficiency of — seeking indictments or warrants a crime in It is sufficient for (1) to name the which one of the elements is the use of “deadly expressly weapon and either state that the used was a allege necessarily weapon” or to such facts as would demonstrate the weapon. character of the “stick, weapon” Battery § 11.1— assault with —sufficien- 4. Assault cy of indictment deadly weapon” charging an assault with “a An indictment size, description weight properties showing further or other support a character of the stick is sufficient to verdict of Porter, deadly weapon. with a The decision of 101 N.C. 713 assault (1888)is overruled. Battery deadly weapon per aggravated § 5. Assault and 16— assault —stick not simple assault se—failure to submit prosecution intent In this for assault stick—with —a injury, prejudicial inflicting the trial court error to kill committed jury simple possible failing as a to submit to the issue of assault verdict not, case, the stick used where under evidence.in law; deadly weapon as a matter of and where the determined other defendant, aggravation elements of in defendant’s favor and could have if had that the stick been convicted of not determined deadly weapon. was a Sharp dissenting. Justice Chief IN THE COURT SUPREME *2 discretionary review of the deci- for petition

On the state’s App. of Appeals, sion of the Court J., McLelland, (1977), at the 10 by judgment entered arresting County Superior Court. May 1976 Session of PERSON Criminal Hudson, Edmisten, General, by Isham B. Attorney L. Rufus General, Jr., the state. Attorney Assistant for Tolin, Jr., attorney James W. for defendant.

EXUM, Justice. with a tried on an

Defendant was injury.1 The inflicting with intent to kill deadly weapon.2 with a a verdict of of assault returned years imprisonment. was sentenced to two Defendant The first is two for decision. presents questions This case in- the indictment holding erred Appeals whether Court it charged the verdict and because judgment sufficient to support stick, further weapon” “a an assault with. size, showing or other weight properties description The second is whether deadly character of the stick. submit failing error prejudicial committed in the af- verdict. We answer both possible questions

assault as a Appeals consequently firmative. The decision of the Court a new trial. and the case remanded for reversed an indictment worded as follows: Defendant was tried on present jurors the State their oath “The June, 1975, day County in Person the 13th on or about Palmer, unlawfully wilfully alias Burrell James James Whitfield, Sr., A. feloniously did assault Grover by body him about and head. beating in serious bodi- was intended to kill and resulted The assault and face in that some teeth were knocked out ly injury, very badly.” beat twenty years, G.S. felony by imprisonment 14-32(a). punishable fine, for not more than or both.

1. A years, G.S. punishable imprisonment fine, two or both. for not more than 2. A misdemeanor 14-33(b)(l). v. Palmer The “stick” mentioned in the bill of indictment was examined It is Appeals Court Court. a hard wooden club ounces, weighing two and eleven pounds approximately 43 end, long, inches two inches in diameter at the club and one and one-half inches in diameter at Conceding handle.

“stick” “could have been described in the bill of indictment suffi- ciently to show its character as a weapon,” Court of described, Appeals nevertheless held that since it was not so bill failed to an assault with a weapon. Therefore of Appeals arrested the entered against in the superior court. Porter, relied Appeals principally *3 Court on v. State (1888). 101 In N.C. 7 S.E. 902 that case the indictment assault, charged unlawfully wilfully that the defendant “did wit, beat and wound one Porter with a Candace weapon, a .” certain stick . . . The held the Court indictment insufficient said, an charge aggravated assault. It 101 at 7 S.E. at N.C. 903-04: present manifestly

“The falls short this re- for while quirement, called a it is designated size, as simply a with no description weight or other or from which it qualities properties can be seen to be dangerous implement, or calculated in its put use to in peril great life or inflict physical injury upon the assailed.” We now think the decision in Porter should be longer no con- authoritative, sidered and the decision is overruled. consequently It is that the in Porter apparent Court con- primarily cerned whether with indictment on its face was sufficient vest in in original jurisdiction superior court.3 The rule Porter by seems to have been one of convenience in that requiring in regarding detailed statement the bill the nature of the could, limine, jurisdic- the trial court in determine whether it had in proceed. analogous tion to The same concern case appears for kill, jurisdiction 716, cited in able, calling 3. Apparently to commit period text; from an at attaches, of six months after their commission unless the assault was such, ‘deadly,’ rape, inspection and when so at the time Porter was decided with that the unless v. Phillips, described so charge, describing with which in the terms in which it is 786, 10 inflicting jurisdiction it by name, the. S.E. 463 justices serious assault was becomes or with such of the (1889). injury. apparent peace made See made Court was a had exclusive attending aggravated, and will be exercised.” opinion in Porter indictment, circumstances as show its in ie., instrument, Porter; jurisdiction said, done with intent to “[T]he to see that its court of assaults v. N.C. merely Battle, must at IN THE SUPREME COURT Palmer Battle, (1902), where Court 41 S.E. 66 N.C. of State alleged of indictment held that bill was insuffi- inflicting injury” an assault “serious had committed because it did not describe aggravated cient to inflicted. injury what precisely in detail questioned in Battle was holding The soundness In Gregory 2d 140 Gregory, N.C. statutory assault with a crime of defendant was indicted for injury.4 inflicting with intent to kill a con- have “afforded might the rule Battle Recognizing in limine determine its might which the venient method Court investigation,” a fruitless jurisdiction entering upon 419-20, concluded, at nevertheless Gregory S.E. 2d 143: think, however, and ex- that the nature requirement

“We described was specifically should be more injury tent of the standards of the common much due to the more meticulous as law, which the and definitions of offenses concepts under of administration largely through experience form took and, statutes; as a means of and without the aid of definitive safe,’ and often great, indictments were viewed ‘playing Now, a motion for arrest of unnecessary, strictness. under indictment, liberally in the it must be for a defect Jur., Law, s. and cited cases. 15 Ám. construed. Criminal *4 First, is at least twofold: “The of an indictment purpose the charged investigation clear the offense so that to make offense, may that may proper procedure confined to that be invoked; second, followed, put law and applicable be him so as to enable to make on reasonable notice served, functions of are purposes defense. When these his of subor- are so the omission impaired the indictment description particular this case more dinate details —in in- judicial abruption to necessitate an injury —as which, proceed, ques- if it is allowed to in vestigation rights made clear and the condition be tioned standards.” legal application accused protected kill, and what is now prisonment 4. The statute enacted as inflicts ... G.S. for a 14*32{a)), period injury provided: not less not resulting Chapter 101, “Any person than four in Public Laws of death, months nor more than who shall be assaults another with a 1919, first codified as of a felony years." and C.S. shall (the punished by with intent to precursor im- in Although Gregory pains expressly Court took to avoid Battle and overruling attempted distinguish ground it on the dealt with a common law offense while involved a Gregory crime,5 statutory it cast serious doubt on the soundness of the rule in Battle even as to common law applied offenses. seriously The Porter rule was eroded v. Randolph, 228, (1947), 45 S.E. 2d 132 a prosecution under General

Statute 14-32 in which the indictment described the “a wit, a certain weapon, knife.” Without mentioning Porter, held the allegation concerning weapon to be sufficient without further description weapon. Court, however, in relied on Porter in part 507,

Wiggs, N.C. 153 S.E. 2d 84 One of the charges against the defendant was an Wiggs “assault . . . with a wit, a gallon glass jar, by to hit vic- threatening [the Court, with the said jar.” The distinguishing on Randolph tim] ground that it was a prosecution statutory for a crime and citing Porter, held the warrant insufficient to an assault Court, however, deadly weapon. The placed some reliance on the allegation in the warrant merely that defendant threatened the victim jar. with the It also recognized, 269 N.C. cases, 2d at that there are difficult “borderline such as State v. Phillips, which an indictment Butler, ‘upon an assault one W. R. with a certain wit, club,’ etc., weapon, to was held (Emphasis sufficient.” original.) to the rule that an

Adhering indictment which uses the sufficient, language ordinarily of the statute v. Randolph, supra; Gregory, supra,6 following reasoning we could limit the Gregory, holding Porter to warrants charg- without further separate injury. cumstances theretofore considered determining significant law. In the crimes should be 5. “As we have In our an present distinct *5 expression opinion, elaboration, jurisdiction pursued. instance, stated, statutory the statement as ‘serious of the court in the first the effect of the we offense which are the fact becomes matter of feel merely injury’ in the as an the more reasonable rules be further aggravation instance, Act—section incorporated explained it is the assault proof upon served questionable as essentials to the crime a number of cir- assault — pertaining Michie’s any the trial. inflicted serious amongst useful whether the insistence that so to indictments for Code, Except purpose, them supra— as a convenience in injury the fact even at common is to create a is sufficient of serious statutory 223 N.C. “As a general [27] rule, an 2d at indictment is sufficient when 143. charges the offense in the language of the statute.” 6. For a discussion of the general rule and several exceptions thereto see Note, 35 N.C. L. Rev. [118] (1956). COURT IN THE SUPREME 638 Palmer only rationale Gregory apply law assaults common ing would approach 14-32. This Statute General indictments under would be dif- Porter, The result and Wiggs. Randolph, reconcile to the respect requirements ferent pleading .assaults law misdemeanor common charging warrants element in statutory felony and indictments hand on the one could, follow alternatively, continue to We the other. assaults on statutory offenses law its rule to common and apply Porter course, then, ra- holdings and ignore would alike. We and Randolph. Gregory tionales of for the an undue concern was the result of Porter Whether limine, determine, jurisdiction ability to

trial court’s of the cases, requirements pleading of the meticulous law, to declare that simply course is the better we think common arose, it is out the time the case validity Porter had at whatever and should be criminal pleading notions of with modern step overruled. that an to the rule already alluded

[1, We have 2] sufficient generally the statute is language in the couched indict true that generally It is also statutory offense. charge facts con the ultimate allege need and warrants ments Evidentiary criminal offense. element each stituting 261, 271, Beach, 283 N.C. alleged. not be matters need 328-29, Greer, (1973); 77 221 196 S.E. 2d Information, (1953); Indictments and 42 920 C.J.S. S.E. 2d 15A-924(a)(5), the time in effect at Statute 115 General § thereto,7 provides applicable was returned and this indictment and concise plain contain ... must pleading “A criminal part: which, allegations in each count factual statement nature, every element of supporting asserts facts evidentiary with suf thereof defendant’s commission and the criminal offense ... of con clearly the defendant apprise ficient precision supplied.) (Emphasis of the accusation.” subject which is the duct they if sufficient generally indictment are and bills of Warrants manner intelligible, explicit a plain, “in the offense to judg- to proceed to enable the court sufficient with averments September Session tive on proceedings plicable While July 1, Laws. all criminal 1975 Session pending Section 1974.” warrant on proceedings that date to the extent of Person in this case was executed Chapter Superior begun on and after provides: Court. practicable, G.S. 15A-924 "This on that date and each act becomes effective on except June is a codification of Section provision indictment- was returned of this act which becomes Chapter July applicable 1, 1975, to criminal and is at the effec- ap- *6 639 ment and bar a for offense. subsequent prosecution the same G.S. Arnold, 751, 755, 15-153.”8 v. 285 2d State N.C. 208 S.E. 648 (1974). Greer, We said in 238 77 S.E. N.C. at 2d supra, (and (1953), at an that indictment the true same holds for war- rants) allege lucidly accurately “must the and all essential elements of offense the endeavored to be order charged” that him,9 may duly against informed the charges trial, protected from double and able for jeopardy, to and prepare that the court be able an pronounce to sentence appropriate conviction or plea. See also State v. Gregory, supra, N.C.

Specifically, with regard to an indictment or warrant charg- ing deadly the offense of assault said in we Wiggs, S.E. 2d supra, at 89: requisites

“The of an indictment or warrant criminal a deadly offense assault with are set weapon forth C.J.S., Battery Assault and ‘In 110g(2), as follows: an § a deadly for assault with or dangerous weapon, or dangerous deadly weapon character of the must be averred, statute, either in the or language state- ment of facts from which can it necessarily the court see that however, only necessary, was such. It describe to and charge weapon to be or where dangerous it is a not, termini, ordinary which vi weapon name of does ex character; import its or is a dangerous if it ordinary name of imports dangerous its or character, termini, vi ex it is sufficient to describe name, it was a or alleging dangerous that ” weapon.’ [3] Guided foregoing principles, we hold it is suffi cient for indictments or seeking warrants to crime in (1) which one of the elements is use of a deadly weapon name the and either to state expressly 8. — G.S. 15-153 provides: quashed informality. Every proceeding by “Bill or warrant not criminal impeachment purposes warrant, presses quashed, indictment, information, or is sufficient form for all intents if it ex- plain, explicit manner; the defendant in a the same shall not be charge against intelligible, stayed, by any informality proceed pro- refinement, if in nor the thereon reason of or the bill or appears judgment.” ceeding, sufficient matter enable the court to

9. See N.C. Constitution, I, Article § IN THE SUPREME COURT v. Palmer such facts as “deadly weapon” allege was a used necessarily demonstrate would *7 is, course, allegation can prove Whether state

weapon. until trial. which cannot be determined a of evidence question [4] port The indictment a verdict of guilty in of assault case was, therefore, with a sufficient to sup and a thereon. based II [5] defendant While also assigns as error Appeals the failure of the did not reach this question, trial to assault. verdict possible submit to the in this assignment. We find merit following: to show On June evidence tends

The state’s in the middle of Lamar Street parked car was 1975 defendant’s a water truck on while defendant talked someone Roxboro was driving Grover A. Whitfield at the side the street. parked by the two way and found his blocked on Lamar Street home car, about his and after five He asked defendant to move vehicles. to Im- Whitfield then complied. proceeded minutes defendant station, at the stopped Station. As Whitfield perial Service his him out of car. attempted and force appeared began fighting. out of car and two men got Whitfield into the service station building, Whitfield pursued Defendant began and it at him. heavy swinging picked up large, as follows: described this attack Mr. Palmer inside station when came “I was the service him, he thinking I the chair back towards would pushed other the service station out. went out the door of go back I was out me. the service station and he came behind inside a few just for seconds. Palmer hit me on the arm or five different

“Mr. four things I received several knots on times with the stick. arms, any did my but not receive treatment medical my seriously injured.” arm was My arms. injuries attendants, started Lacy Compton, service station One of the the idea defendant threatened but abandoned when police call the attendant, Gary Compton, pointed stick. him with the Another FALL TERM 1977 gun the air and pulled trigger, but it failed to fire. Then defendant left the station.

Ten or twelve minutes later defendant returned to the serv- ice station with his They brother. both attacked Whitfield as he car, got out of his him to knocking ground him stomping repeatedly the face. The stick was not used during this second fight. As a result of the second fight Whitfield lost ten of his teeth and his severely face was bruised. Defendant and his briefly brother left and then just returned police arrived. Defendant’s evidence presented somewhat different picture defendant, incident: As Whitfield drove he cursed the who then followed to the him service station to demand an ex- planation. They began fight and Whitfield ran into station *8 stick, building. Defendant picked up but he hit neither Whit- field nor threatened the attendant with it. As defendant started to leave Whitfield cursed him again, and when he came back into the building Whitfield hit him in the side of his head with the stick so that he later required seven stitches. About this time Gary misfired Compton gun while he was it at pointing de- badly, Bleeding left in his car. He started to fendant. but go hospital changed his mind and returned to the serv- time, ice station. While he and Whitfield were fighting the second defendant’s brother arrived and managed to extricate defendant fray. from At no time did defendant ever hit Whitfield with heavy stick. The trial judge submitted six alternative verdicts: guilty of deadly a weapon assault with with intent to kill inflicting serious kill;10 injury; guilty deadly of assault with a with intent to with a guilty deadly of assault weapon inflicting injury,11 serious of assault with a weapon; guilty of assault inflicting injury;12 guilty. or not each On of these possible verdicts judge jury’s the trial limited the consideration on the assault ele- ment itself to the assault with the stick. He did not permit the the second jury beating.13 to consider by

10. felony punishable imprisonment years, fine, G.S. 14-32{c). A a for not more than ten or both. felony imprisonment punishable years, G.S. fine, 14-32(b). A a 11. not more than ten or both. punishable imprisonment years, G.S. fine, 14-33(b)(l). 12. A misdemeanor for not more than 2 or both. appear record, The trial also submitted written issues to the in the with together intentionally Grover thereto, "1st the answers him with a as follows: Issue: Did defendant striking Was stick? 3rd deadly weapon? used, Yes. 2d Issue: Answer: as Answer: Yes. Issue: IN THE SUPREME COURT v. Palmer consideration of jury’s limitation on the this

It is clear understanding judge’s the case was due to drawn seems to refer The bill as in the bill of indictment.14 as laid According with a stick.15 made one assault —one evidence, however, assaults. The were two distinct there state’s or twelve the stick. Some ten first one was committed The in- assault without the stick. there another minutes later separately these assaults alleged have dictment should 15A-924, ap- Statute addressed to each. General count separate indictment,16 must pleading “A criminal provides: plicable to charged, offense addressed to each ... count separate contain by reference in incorporated in one but count allegations another count.” tried, theory which this case was whether upon

Under the as an alternative ver- have submitted assault should been simple se, was a weapon per whether stick dict depends upon was, assault need been law. If it not have or a matter of not, given should have been this ad- If it was submitted. ditional alternative. not, evidence, under this that the stick

We hold “any of law. A instrument as a matter harm, bodily under the likely great death produce which is the weapon its use .... circumstances of use, manner of its and the con- more upon sometimes depends assaulted, than the intrinsic character of person dition of the *9 Whitfield? Grover specific intent to kill Answer: No. 4th Issue: Did defend- at the time Did defendant have injury? thereby Answer: No.” serious inflict on ant question judge colloquy jury While of the trial it returned to ask and the following was deliberating the your your FOREMAN: you question? “COURT: issues, sir, As outlined in four we will state All right, occurred: have arrived at the fourth field serious sider thereby Whit- question was as stated . . . did the defendant inflict on issue and the question Our injury? or are we to con- Are we to consider the entire the second fight, fight is: you, may stick? COURT: only Thank sir. You be seated. Mr. Tolin which occurred with the the fight here? COURT: you up BENCH.) may (DISCUSSION AT THE Mr. Foreman and members of Waters, I see Mr. intentionally. jury, The bill of indictment in this case alleges in that fashion the with a was drawn the issue may, question deadly weapon, therefore, in- consider on the of whether serious wit: a stick. You to by injury jury injury inflicted with the use of a stick. An inflicted, whether the defendant inflicted was prove State you burden, any by course, to not to consider. The of is the the evidence are other means under injury by beyond a stick on the defendant inflicted serious the use of a reasonable doubt evidence your may Whitfield. deliberation.” retire and resume You See supra. 14. n. by by injury the state’s the inflicted the second assault as is revealed does describe 15. The indictment separate question Whether two assaults is as drawn could be construed the indictment

evidence. not now before us. Obviously erred, it. If he the error was defendant’s favor. did not so construe 16. supra. See 7,n. Smith, itself.” weapon the 187 N.C. 121 S.E. 737

(1924). Where there is no in the conflict evidence both regarding use, the nature of the weapon and the manner of its the ap- plicable its principles determining deadly character are well Smith, stated id.: deadly

“Where the alleged weapon and manner the of its conclusion, use are of such to character as admit of but one the as to question or not it is within whether. the law, foregoing definition is one of and the must take of responsibility declaring. so . . may . where it But or likely results, not be to fatal produce to according use, manner of its or the part body the blow aimed, is alleged its deadly character is of fact one to be (Citation omitted.)17 determined by jury.” If there is a conflict the evidence regarding either the nature use, the weapon or the manner of its some the evidence tending to show that the or as weapon used used would likely not produce bodily death or great harm and other evidence tending to must, course, contrary, jury show resolve the conflict. In evidentiary this case there is no conflict regarding the nature of the used nor in manner its use against Defendant’s Whitfield. evidence was that he picked up the stick did not use it at all. if but Nevertheless the state’s version of its was accepted jury use we persons believe reasonable could draw different conclusions regarding character. The be, of its question character must therefore as in fact it case, in this jury’s left determination. Had the determined stick was a deadly defendant, jury’s because of the determination favor, aggravation other elements of in defendant’s could have only of been convicted assault. option This not given case, therefore, It was raised jury. the evidence. The falls within the that a principle entitled have all lesser of offenses degrees supported the evidence submitted to State the (1956) v. (heavy pine (leather Illustrative Archbell, 2d belt with (1939) (brick “stub” which defendant 139 N.C. cases metal buckle used declaring 537, rock hurled to be a [801] swung to inflict severe bruises over through to be so as question (heavy windshield of fracture are leather as a matter of law are deceased’s strap truck) Cauley, used body skull). to beat of a Illustrative cases holding *10 three-year-old defendant’s Craton, v. Hobbs, child), sick, N.C. 164 frail and THE IN SUPREME COURT State Palmer v. Bell, alternate verdicts. State v. N.C. jury possible Wrenn, (1973); S.E. 2d v. 200 S.E. 2d 601 (1971). the ver submit this not cured option Failure to Bell, v. deadly weapon. stick was dict that the See finding Riera, The v. 276 N.C. 172 S.E. supra; State whether would have it cannot be known reason is that permitted if of the lesser offense it had been convicted defendant (1972); Thacker, 2d 145 to do so.18State Wrenn, to submit assault as Failure supra. defendant. It prejudicial therefore error possible verdict was trial. entitles him to new error judgment Appeals of the Court of is reversed. For case with that it further

committed the is remanded direction in remanded to the Court Division order that Superior defendant a new trial. receive and remanded. Reversed dissenting. SHARP

Chief Justice I of the majority in accord with the decision the in- am in this case is sufficient to verdict support dictment of assault based thereon. majority’s is dissent from decision entitled a new because the court failed to submit the issue of simple trial verdict. possible assault as a correctly in majority opinion

It stated that “there is no is conflict the nature used evidentiary regarding stick, the manner of use.” The which accompanied nor [stick] exhibit, to this Court as is described appeal the case on correctly there as “a hard denominated wooden club.” opinion Dictionary New As defined (1961) Webster’s Third International staff, heavy “a . esp. tapering of wood usu. . . a club as a . . . .” striking weapon hand The stick wielded this precisely. fits definition case my In view this when used as club an able bodied man, se, all per the evidence tends is a supra, “No,” it, issue n. not have If had answered the second submitted see could comported judge’s alone, with the trial This fact rather than the returned a verdict instructions. unduly impelled evidence, it to answer the issue “Yes.” have might *11 Palmer State v. show defendant used it as such. v. Perry, See State 226 N.C. Defendant, testimony, to his according years is 35 old and employed the State Highway Department. “The nature of his duties” are “the of new cutting highways, and different straightening up things.”

At the of the beginning fight, after defendant and Whitfield fisticuffs, had engaged Whitfield went into the filling station. and, inside, Defendant followed picked he the stick. up described events as follows: subsequent I

“When went out he started at me and swinging tried to hit me over the head with it. He tried to hit me on the I head but my threw arms and it I up my blocked off. had big knots on arms. He hit me on the arm with I the stick. hit him in an effort to stop stick, him from me with I hitting the stick. hold caught try- head, him ing keep from me on the hitting but could not get away him. from After he saw that he could not do much to me stick, the defendant in an left automobile.” A short time thereafter defendant returned filling to the sta- stick, tion. This time Whitfield had the and when defendant stuck his head in the service station door Whitfield hit him “in the side of the head with the stick.” As a result of the wound thus in- flicted defendant said that “seven stitches performed were at the County Person Memorial the same Hospital afternoon and [he] inwas a lot of pain from the cut.” offensively by

This used either defendant or Whitfield clearly That weapon. Whitfield was able to protect his head from the blows which defendant attempted to inflict him upon with the stick and that the blows his arms raised knots instead of breaking flesh and change bones does not or the assault which defendant made upon him. Had defendant been attempting to shoot Whitfield with a gun and Whitfield had deflected the shot upward grabbing armhis or the gun, would have been nonetheless Hobbs, of an a deadly assault with In weapon. 14, 3 S.E. 2d 431 held that the trial court correct- ly charged that “if intentionally the defendant threw a brick at the witness prosecuting and struck and broke wind- (cid:127) shield of the truck he was driving, although he not have witness, stricken the the defendant was guilty assault with IN THE SUPREME COURT

State v. Small further held that deadly weapon. judge’s The Court of a failure to submit of simple “for the there no evidence not error reason assault.” *12 defendant injury

The serious inflicted course, occurred, when defendant his face. trial stomped however, did being opinion not judge, assault, to consider instructed encompass in which defendant used stick. to affirm the Court. Superior vote OF NORTH v. RONALD EARL SMALL STATE CAROLINA

No. 36 (Filed 1977) December promises by § 75.2— threats 1. Criminal Law confession—no officers —ad- missibility support was that an Evidence sufficient to court’s conclusion in- freely voluntarily custody was made where statement defendant defend- lying ant contended that officers told him he was and one officer offered to in- behalf; any specifically with the in his denied tercede officers such conduct; rights any before the officers read defendant his and he waived them interrogation place; took of the officers told that he could one defendant “buy” he should one of his statements and defendant then told that tell truth; family shortly police when station defendant’s arrived at the family interrogation began, interrogation per- ceased after and defendant’s privately thirty visit him for about mitted to minutes. bloody probable §Bail 3.1— 2. Arrest and warrantless cause — arrest — crime at scene of illegal police person where a Defendant’s arrest was not officer observed bloody morning wearing clothing 200 feet on the murder within beaten, discovered; bloody place where the victim was later the officer a made annual; high from a he and tentative identification of defendant school other of- person proceeded to where he same ficers defendant’s home observed the he morning; approximately he had seen earlier that the same time saw blood clothing person spotted worn he saw him in similar to that when early day; accompany them to hours of the officers asked defendant to police agreed; and he officers then station handcuffed defendant.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Palmer
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: Dec 15, 1977
Citation: 239 S.E.2d 406
Docket Number: 6
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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