{¶ 2} On appeal, Palmer argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed his petition without a hearing and in the face of clear and convincing evidence de hors the record that Palmer did not commit the offense. Palmer аlso raises issues regarding the indictment, jury instructions, prosecutorial misconduct, and the sufficiency and weight of the evidence in his original trial.
{¶ 3} Palmer's petition for post-conviction relief was untimely and does not satisfy any of the requirements for consideration of untimely petitions under R.C.
{¶ 5} Palmer was arrested later that day on a charge of aggravated burglary. During processing at jail, Palmer ran out of the police deрartment. Officers apprehended Palmer in an alley shortly thereafter. Palmer was brought to trial, and on November 23, 2004 the jury found him guilty of aggravated burglary and escape. *2
{¶ 6} Palmer filеd a direct appeal which affirmed the judgment of the trial court on all substantive claims, but the case was remanded for resentencing pursuant to Foster. State v. Palmer, 7th Dist. No. 04-JE-41,
{¶ 7} On March 15, 2005, Palmer filed his first petition for post-conviction relief with the trial court claiming that trial counsel was ineffective in representing him. In his petition, Palmer included an unsworn statement by Amber Hood, which included the claim that Palmer had not passed through the doorway of Merritt's residence. On August 18, 2005, the trial cоurt denied his petition. In Palmer's post-conviction appeal, his argument included the claim that the testimony of Amber Hood would have exculpated him, and that counsel was inеffective in failing to obtain her testimony. On August 31, 2006, this court affirmed the trial court's decision denying post-conviction relief. State v.Palmer, 7th Dist. No. 05JE47,
{¶ 8} Palmer filed another petition for post-conviction relief on June 30, 2008, claiming that he was previously unable to obtain the testimony of Amber Hood, which would provide clear and convincing evidence exculpating him from the alleged offenses. In this second petition, Palmer included a sworn affidavit by Hood. The sole reason Hood gave for not testifying at Palmer's trial was because she thought the charges agаinst him were not true. The trial court denied Palmer's petition as untimely, not subject to a late-filing exception, successive and otherwise already addressed in the trial court's judgmеnt resolving his first post-conviction petition.
{¶ 10} "The trial court coomitted [sic] error in denying appellant a hearing on his petition thus depriving appellant of liberties secured by U.S. Const. Amend.
{¶ 11} The trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits or hold a hearing on Palmer's second petition for post-conviction relief because Palmer failed to satisfy the criteria governing untimely and successive post-conviction relief petitions.
{¶ 12} Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 13} Palmer's original trial and sentencing occurred in November 2004, and his June 30, 2008 post-conviction petition was thus well after the one hundred eighty day filing deadline had passed. Additionally, Palmer had previously filed a post-conviction petition in 2006. Because the instant рetition was both untimely and successive, Palmer needed to show that he satisfied the requirements of R.C.
{¶ 14} The new faсts that Palmer offers in his petition are the statements of Hood. Palmer does not argue that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering or obtaining Hood's testimony at the time of trial or at any other point, but merely that such testimony would have undermined the State's case. The only statement addressing the previous unavailability of the evidence is Hood's sworn statement that she did not testify at trial *4
because the charges against Palmer were untrue. Thus nothing in Palmer's petition indicates that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which his claim for relief is based. Additionally, Palmer's petition makes no claim based on a new federal or state right recognized by the United States Supreme Court that applies retroactively to his case . Therefore, Palmer has not satisfied the alternative criteria set forth in R.C.
{¶ 15} Because Palmer did not satisfy the criteria set forth in R.C.
{¶ 16} Moreover, the issues Palmer has raised in this petition are barred by res judicata as they were previously addressed on direct appeal and in Palmer's first petition for post-conviction rеlief. Principles of res judicata bar claims that were or could have been raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in a first petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Davis, 7th Dist. No. 04 MA 211,
{¶ 17} Palmer's first petition for post-conviction relief included the claim that Hood's testimony would have undermined the State's case, and that his counsel was constitutionally ineffeсtive for having failed to procure her testimony. Palmer's second petition for post-conviction relief repeats the same claim regarding the importance оf Hood's testimony, with the assertion that the absence of her testimony alone constituted a constitutional violation.
{¶ 18} Palmer has narrowed the legal issues in his second petition, but did not raise any new ones. He has only raised identical issues which this court already addressed in his first petition. Palmer's additional discussion regarding the indictment; jury instructions; prosecutorial misconduct; and, the sufficiency and weight of the *5 evidence in his original trial were addressed both on direct appeal and pursuant to his first petition. Given the foregoing, Palmer's arguments are barred by res judicata, and his sole assignment of error is meritless.
{¶ 19} The trial court was correct in denying Palmer's petition as untimely, successive, and barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vukovich, P.J., concurs.
Donofrio, J., concurs. *1