*1 Plaintiff-Respondent, Wisconsin, State
v. Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. Pallone, Robert J.
Supreme Court argument April No. 98-0896-CR. Oral 2000. Decided June 77WI (Also 568.) reported in 613 N.W.2d *4 defendant-appellant-petitioner For the there were by Steven briefs J. Watson and Steven J. Watson Law argument by Elkhorn, and Office, oral Steven J. Watson. argued plaintiff-respondent
For the cause was by attorney general, Nashold, E. assistant Jennifer Doyle, attorney with whom on the brief was James E. general.
¶1. PROSSER, J. Robert J. Pallone DAVID T. (Pallone) published review of a decision seeks appeals, Pallone, 2d State v. 228 Wis. court of (Ct. 1999). appeals App. The of court N.W.2d of the Circuit Court for Walworth affirmed County, decision Kennedy, Judge, denying J. Pallone's
Robert police suppress to evidence obtained when motion in Pallone was arrested the driver of the vehicle which bag belonging passenger to and searched a duffel the search Pallone. The circuit court concluded proper it conducted incident to an because was was arrest. holding appeals affirmed, of 2. The court bag pursuant the duffel was valid
the search of
Wyo-
Supreme
in
States
Court
decision of the United
ming
(1999).
Houghton,
Under
v.
FACTS dispute. ¶ 4. Some of the facts in this case are in (Riff) On June James P. Riff and his school- Friday-night mate, Pallone, embarked on a drive from pickup Illinois to in Riffs Ford Wisconsin black truck. They planning meet were a friend at a local road- drink house. Riff had consumed one alcoholic at his Barrington home he and Pallone before set off on trip. approximately p.m., pul- At 11:20 Riff and Pallone Parking Municipal Village into #1 in led Lot County. They Fontana in Walworth had with them a 12 pack ripped open beer, which had been and con- empty dispute tained both and full bottles. There is a pack lay the 12 whether on bench seat inside the pickup lay driver, Riff, cab next to the or whether it in undisputed of the bed truck near the cab.1 What is grabbed 12-ounce, is that Riff short-neck bottle of pack pulling Budweiser out of the as he was into the opened stepped lot, it, it, drank half of and out of the truck with the in his hand. bottle cab, pack Riff testified that the 12 was in the on the bench seat, Recknagel of the truck. Officer stated that he found the explained beer at the front of the truck bed and did he any find beer inside cab. Village
¶ 5. of Fontana Police Officer Jeff Recknagel duty night was on summer and had parked squad parking his marked car in the same lot. Recknagel standing at the north end of the lot with pull park officer he Riff in and in a fellow when saw stall about 20 feet from the uniformed officers. Riff two holding pickup Budweiser, exited the and he took Recknagel approached drinks as the truck and two pointed flashlight separate Fontana, his on Riff. In vil- lage prohibit open public ordinances intoxicants in Seeing Recknagel truck, motor vehicles. Riff exit the possessed open was concerned that Riff intoxicants the truck. Recknagel
¶ 6. directed Riff to hand over the bot- complied, Recknagel tle. Riff noticed that liquid. bottle still contained inch Officer about one Recknagel got you," remarked, "I to that or words effect, and the two men to the walked back pickup, Recknagel where asked Riff for identification. standing Recknagel *7 truck, at the rear While inquired any open in whether there were beer bottles replied truck, the Recknagel and Riff in the affirmative. Officer go get if it," asked he "could or "take a right look," answered, and Riff ahead."2 The "Go exchange Recknagel comfortable, Riff and was between polite, even relaxed. Recknagel explained
¶ 7. Officer
that he then
Recknagel
Riff that he
under arrest.
believed
told
was
prohibiting open intoxi-
Riff had violated the ordinance
Riff,
hand,
in motor
on the other
cants
a
vehicle.
statement,
right
that Riff s
"Go
The State does not contend
ahead" constituted a consent under the "consent to search"
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Consent is one of the
exceptions
requirement.
to the warrant
See State v.
established
(1985).
13, 18,
Douglas, 2d
¶ 9. As Riff s on search, the driver's side to conduct a he noticed that by walking parallel Recknagel him Pallone followed along opposite side of the vehicle. Pallone then by passenger stood door. put zippered,
¶ 10. Pallone
his hands on a
blue-
green
bag
duffel
that rested on the middle of the truck
Recknagel,
cab's front
seat. To Officer
Pallone
bench
appeared
spoke
He
nervous:
short sentences and
kept looking up and down at the officer and the duffel
bag. Pallone commented that he wished to remove the
bag. Recknagel
duffel
directed him to leave the
Arizona,
3 Miranda v.
alone, that he to search the duffel Recknagel it was situated inside the vehicle. because suggested behavior, later testified that Pallone's which bag something to the officer that the duffel contained [ ] supposed see," he "wasn't to know about or caused safety: "I concern for his own didn't know what was bag, weapon possibly if inside of that there was a inside bag, maybe open the or there could have been more bag." Recknagel containers of alcohol inside the indi- cated that are trained to assume that there is a potential for harm in similar he encounters. When saw bag, Recknagel suspected reach the Pallone for duffel might reaching weapon. Pallone for a Recknagel ¶ 11. instructed Pallone to back walk kept truck, to the rear of the where the other officer an eye Recknagel on Pallone while searched the vehicle. Recknagel through glove cab, looked the in the com- partment, During and under seats. the course pack ripped open, search, beer, he found missing it. with two or three bottles from Riff testified Recknagel pack open found the 12 of beer with point placed in the full bottles at this it back of testimony clarify pickup Recknagel's truck. does not he did what with beer. Recknagel luggage
¶ 12. Officer saw two airline bag's tags that identified Pallone as the duffel owner. Recknagel bag. then searched the duffel He testified looking relating weapons that he was for and evidence charge. open Upon opening duffel to the bag, intoxicants Recknagel personal items, Officer saw a number of including clothing, products. shoes, and hair care up clothing, Recknagel he lifted noticed that When enough foot room remained the two-and-one-half long open or, duffel to conceal an container of beer *9 handgun, any type "[a]ny type knife, of a a reasoned,
he weapon used to hurt us." of a that could be clothing, Recknagel
¶ also Underneath the 13. bags. open, 150-count, box of clear sandwich found an Recknagel Although train- that, testified based on his baggies usually ing experience, plastic are and substances, he narcotics or controlled associated with eight approximately explained box, to 10 that the also long, potentially weapon. could contain a inches baggie open four-ounce, box, In a white 14. the caught plastic labeled "Inositol Powder" bottle Recknagel opened Recknagel's eye.4 the bottle Officer large containing full, that it amount of and saw was Thinking powder might powder. cocaine, be white baggie Recknagel He examined the inside of box. stage, baggie he did testified that at this knew box looking and he not inside not contain a beer bottle was weapon. for a box Recknagel plastic baggie ¶ 15. noticed a tied into baggie the "Inositol bottle. The a knot next to Powder" ball, contained a hard white about one inch diame- powder. Assuming comprised to ter, of a white ball baggie, Recknagel bottle, and cocaine, seized the bag. Recknagel placed Pallone arrest the duffel under transported him and Riff the Fontana Police to Department. station, At read the Miranda Pallone department
warnings Nonetheless, from a form. agreed questions, spoke to some and he Pallone answer 4According complaint, inositol is a common to the criminal cutting agent Although Recknagel for cocaine. Officer testified label, that he read the word "inositol" on the bottle the circuit Recknagel cutting stated that it was a court found never might agent presence for cocaine or that he knew the of inositol activity. implicate drug Recknagel Officer for 15 to 20 minutes. Pallone
with belonged adding him, that the duffel stated Although he he used inositol as laxative. would precise ball, address the nature of the white Pallone Recknagel purchased told he had the substance from a Chicago wrong that it middleman conceded According Recknagel, possess it. to Officer at that by point Pallone said that he did not want more trouble *10 making incriminating statements. laboratory analysis
¶ revealed that 17. After grams cocaine,5 the the white ball consisted of 5.85 County Attorney District filed a Walworth Assistant Complaint September 15, 1997. The com- Criminal on plaint charged possession Pallone with of more than grams grams not than 15 of cocaine or five but more contrary deliver, cocaine with intent to Wis. base 961.41(lm)(cm)2 (1995-96).6 § Stat.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2, 1997, On Pallone submitted a 18. December suppress, arguing police the that obtained motion during cocaine evidence an unlawful bag.7 Recknagel Riff of his duffel seizure Officer 5Laboratory analysis powder that the also indicated white was, fact, plastic labeled "Inositol Powder" thé bottle inositol. 6 the to the Wisconsin Statutes are to All references indicated otherwise. 1995-96 volumes unless the initially challenged also admission state Pallone Recknagel Village of Fontana he made to Officer ments admissibility challenge .the of that evi Department. He did not appeals or to this court. appeal in his either to the court of dence (Ct. Pallone, n.1, State v. 228 Wis. 2d N.W.2d 1999). App. hearing February suppression
testified at a on 1998.
¶ 19. The circuit court denied Pallone's motion to concluding suppress 13, 1998, that on March high- search was as incident to Riffs arrest. After valid lighting exceptionally candid manner in which Recknagel testified, the circuit Officer court made a finding Recknagel fact that told Riff he was "under arrest" before the search of the vehicle occurred. Once arrest, entitled to Riff was under were continue searching agreed for more beer. The court that beer normally does constitute but nonethe- contraband presence in a can less concluded that of beer vehicle be only contrary offense, evidence of an even if an offense to an ordinance. Although expressed circuit court dis- belongings
comfort with the notion that of a presumably passenger innocent can searched inci- explained arrest, dent to driver's the court expressly case law authorizes such searches. Officer Recknagel, justifiably observed, court con- might grab weapon cerned Pallone from the *11 bag.8 bag weapons duffel The search of the duffel for Kennedy Judge remarked: that, My ][ conclusion from the facts seemed to be the man before bag, Recknagel] [Officer reached for no had intention to it-r-I'm not even sure he had an intention to search the car—but out, bag [Pallone] that when reached for and tried to take that with, [whoa], trying instincts of the officer took over he's hide something. trying I'm I interested. What is he to hide? want to know what it is. And I realize in the defendant this case tried to remove his duffel bag. Certainly going indicated he was But I think the to. officer was "No, perfectly justified particular point saying, stop." at that when Why? danger weapons. Admittedly, Because of the of he wasn't too Recknagel led to see the "Inositol Powder" bottle and laying plastic baggie next to it. Once the officer saw items, reasoned, those the court he was entitled to "logical in its extend the search direction" because probable cause to there was believe that bottle and baggie contained controlled substances.
¶ 21. After the circuit court denied Pallone's
suppress,
attorney
motion to
the district
amended the
allege
possessed
grams
information to
that Pallone
five
or less of cocaine or cocaine base with intent to deliver
961.41(lm)(cm)l.
§
Stat.
violation Wis.
On March
guilty
pled
charge
26, 1998, Pallone
to this reduced
pursuant
plea agreement.
to a
The circuit court with-
placed
probation
held Pallone's sentence and
him on
years
including
foi;
conditions,
three
with
a four-month
period
county jail.
of incarceration in the
then
Pallone
appealed
suppression
Pallone,
denial of his
motion.
Wis.
Houghton,
295,
decisions
U.S.
526 U.S.
two
by
issued
the United States
Court after the
ruling
suppress.
court made its
in the motion to
circuit
Pallone,
from a case which the Supreme Court held that a search incident warrantless the Fourth to the issuance of a traffic citation violated afraid; [mind]. And but it was a matter —an item of concern of that, objectively, really besides he better be concerned. If he wasn't concerned, very point someone he should have been at when pull grab to reach in and this it out. all of sudden wants himself, protect you be concerned. As an officerwho wants to better every right [the I also in that case to search duffel So think he had bag] weapons protection though particu- he wasn't for for his even larly concerned about it.
175
The
of a citation
an
Amendment.
issuance
without
authority
give
to
to search under an
arrest does not
rise
requirement
exception
the constitutional warrant
to
stop poses fewer threats to
because a routine traffic
discovery
safety
compromise
and does not
officer
preservation
Pallone,
of evidence.
of a but rather there is rea- whether sonable cause to that the area to searched believe yield object (citing Houghton, of the search. Id. will 302). 526 U.S. at appeals emphasized
¶ 25. The court of that the Houghton requires only probable search, rule cause to probable cause to arrest. Id. at 280. The court proper determined that the search ofthe duffel Recknagel Officer had cause arrest because *13 Riff and therefore to search truck and its contents relating for evidence to arrest. Id. at 280-81. The Recknagel court concluded that once found the "Inosi- baggie tol Powder" and the box, he could not be expected incriminating simply to overlook the evidence because it was not the item, beer, same for which he initially had searched. Id. at 281.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 26. The issue this case is whether the search proper of Pallone's duffel under the search and provisions seizure of both the United States and Wis- application consin Constitutions. The of constitutional principles evidentiary to a set of or historical facts poses question of constitutional fact. State v. Martwick, ¶5, 17, 2000 WI 801, 231 Wis. 2d 604 N.W.2d 552. engages two-step inquiry
¶ 27. This court
in a
analyzes
when it
issues of constitutional
fact. Id. at
reviewing
suppress,
¶
First,
16.
a motion to
this
applies
court
a deferential
standard
circuit
findings
evidentiary,
court's
¶
historical
Id.
facts.
findings
fact,
18. We thus affirm the circuit court's
they
facts,
and inferences drawn from those
unless
are
clearly
Id.;
Harris,
243,
erroneous.
State v.
2d Wis.
(1996).
249-50,
Second,
ANALYSIS United to the Amendment 28. The Fourth §I, 11 the Wisconsin art. States Constitution9 protect citizens from unreasonable both Constitution10 historically follows This court and seizures. searches interpretations States of the United provi- seizure the search and it construes Court when 2d Secrist, Wis. State v. constitutions. sions of both (1999). By interpreting 208-09, 589 N.W.2d *14 provisions that is consistent with in a manner these by precedent Court, we established consistency application of constitutional in the Fry, ensure principles. 173-74, 388 153, 2d v. 131 Wis.
State (1986). 565 N.W.2d per unreasona- search is se A warrantless specifically and established of the "few unless one
ble well-delineated justifies exceptions" the search. State Phillips, 794 180, 196, 2d 577 N.W.2d 218 Wis. v. (1998) Hampshire,
(citing Coolidge 403 U.S. v. New 9 United States Constitution Amendment to the The Fourth provides: houses, persons, right people secure their
The of the seizures, effects, against and papers, unreasonable searches and issue, upon proba- violated, shall but shall not be and no Warrants affirmation, cause, by particularly supported and Oath or ble searched, things persons describing place or to be to be and seized.
10
I,
states:
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution
Article §
houses,
persons,
right
people
in their
of the
to be secure
The
against
papers,
searches and seizures
effects
unreasonable
upon probable
violated;
shall issue but
shall not be
and no warrant
affirmation,
particularly
cause,
by
supported
describ-
oath or
things
persons
ing
place
or
to be seized.
to be searched and the
178
(1971));
States,
454-55
v.
Katz United
proving
347, 357
The State bears the burden of
that warrantless search falls under one of the estab-
exceptions.
Katz,
lished
See
(1) attack; Protecting the officerfrom (2) Preventing person escaping; from (3) Discovering seizing crime; and the fruits of the or (4) instruments, Discovering seizing any things and articles or may of, may which have used in the commission or been which of, constitute evidence the offense. Incident to Arrest
1. Search
Officer
¶31.
consider whether
We
first
permissible
Recknagel's
of the duffel
exception to the
incident to arrest"
under the "search
requirements.
arrest
incident to
The search
warrant
pas-
exception permits
search of
the warrantless
any
compartment
senger
containers
a
and
of vehicle
compartment
incident
if the search is
in that
situated
Belton,
York v.
a
arrest. New
to lawful
exception
arrest
incident to
32. For the search
apply,
Knowles, 525 U.S.
must
an arrest.
there
to
"bright
requirement
is a
line
of an arrest
117-18. The
(quoting
Robinson,
States v.
United
rule." Id. at 118
(1973)).
"fact
the lawful
Because the
of the United
(1969), the search incident
U.S. 752
fornia,
exception
those
officers to search
allows
arrest
the "immediate control"
a vehicle within
areas of
Fry,
person
This
¶
meaning
34. The
Court refined the
of
which areas of a vehicle are within an arrestee's
Belton,
"immediate
in
control"
senger compartment, open or whether Id. closed. at 460-61. The Court determined that a lawful custodial justifies infringement privacy arrest interests. holding, Id. at 461. Based on the Belton this court held glove that a search incident to arrest extends to the compartment Fry, a vehicle. 131 Wis. 2d 180. though The search was lawful even both defendants Fry separate squad handcuffed, were confined in cars, guarded by officers at the time of Id. the search. (Bablitch, dissenting). Theory J., 186 n.l decision thus gauge actually did not whether the' defendant had access to the interior of the vehicle. See State v. Mur dock, 217, 233, Wis. 2d N.W.2d years Belton, In the since the United States "bright-line Court revisited the rule" under- pinning exception: the search incident to arrest A exception requires warrantless search under the an Knowles, actual arrest. U.S. 118. Warrantless *17 exception permitted are under this when searches not placed is not receives a traffic citation but a driver under arrest. Id. police pulled
¶
Knowles,
In
an Iowa
officer
37.
during
stop
a
traffic
because the
over
routine
a vehicle
traveling
per
hour in a
Knowles,
miles
driver,
was
Although
per
114.
zone. Id. at
Iowa law
25 mile
gave
hour
for
discretion to arrest drivers
traffic
officers the
only
a
violations, the
officer in Knowles
issued
issuance,
at
After
the
traffic citation. Id.
114-15.
its
engaged
full
car and
in a
the
found
officer
marijuana
"pot pipe." Id.
114. The
and a
officer
charged
Knowles,
with a viola-
arrested
who later
tion
laws. Id.
of Iowa's controlled substance
sought
suppress
evidence,
the
to
38. Knowles
exception
arguing
to
did
that the search incident
arrest
apply
he
arrest. Id. at
not
because
was not under
suppression
The
court
his
motion.
114-15.
trial
denied
Supreme
court,
trial
Id. The Iowa
Court affirmed the
reasoning
exception
to
a "search incident
citation"
applied
can
the Fourth Amendment when the
to
arresting
officer has
cause to arrest
(citing
Knowles,
Id. at 115-16
State v.
driver.
(Iowa 1997),
rev'd,
Justice ing that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. holding The the two historical Court's underscored justify to rationales that the search incident arrest safety (1) heightened exception: threat officer (2) implicit arrest, in an the need to discover and preserve trial. evidence that later can be used at See id. at 116-17. explained
¶ 40. The Knowles Court these exception implicated rationales two ing for the are not dur- speeding danger First, issuance of a citation. officer arrest, an "flows from fact of the and its proximity, uncertainty." stress, attendant Id. at The issuance of citation for a minor traffic viola- by place any tion, contrast, does the officer in exposure extended Rather, with driver. Id. a cita- usually product during tion is the encounter, a brief likely person it which is less that a bewill hostile. Id. preserve Second, the need to evidence for later use at speeding trial does not arise when driver receives a *18 instances, citation. In most once issue a citation, necessary prosecute the "all evidence to that offense been at instance, had obtained." Id. 118. For under the "[n]o of Knowles, facts further evidence of excessive going speed person.. was to be found either on the .or in passenger compartment." Id. agree ¶ 41. in Knowles, Commentators Supreme Court clarified that "a search incident to really says something arrest means what it other —if beyond jus- occurs, than an arrest one should look this justify Thus, tification to the search."12 if even exception might apply not to the issuance of a traffic independent citation, other, "officers have bases to protect weapons for and themselves from dan- ger." may Id. at 117. Those bases include the other recognized exceptions to Amendment, the Fourth including exception cause to search we examine below. See id.
12 Bright-Line Rules: Devel Gillespie, T. Honorable Daniel opment During Stops, Law Search and Seizure Traffic (1999) Loy. 1, Major U. (quoting Chi. L.J. 26 Walter M. Amendment, Hudson, Developments A Few New in the Fourth 35). 25, Army 1999-APR Law. Having explored scope
¶42. and rationale exception, underlying we the search incident arrest explain applies this it to Pallone. Under next how (1) exception, was an arrest we consider: whether there (2) bright-line requires, rule of Knowles and as the safety heightened or a need whether a threat officer justified preserve evidence to discover or warrant- requirements met, less If then Belton search. these are Fry passen- authorize a warrantless search open ger compartment any containers, closed, or compartment. in that located case, In the search incident to arrest this exception applies Wis Riff under arrest. because 800.02(6) person may provides § "A that, Stat. consin a warrant for the violation of be arrested without municipal Moreover, arrests for for ordinance." civil Fry, per are not se unconstitutional. 131 Wis. feitures Consequently, 2d 158-66. the Fourth Amendment preclude incident to arrests for non does not searches King, criminal violations. State v. 142 Wis. 2d (Ct. 1987) (citing App. 210-11, 418 N.W.2d Gustaf (1973); Fry, Florida, 131 Wis. son v. Mabra, 613, 623-24, 2d 2d 153; State v. 61 Wis. (1974)). For incident to arrest to N.W.2d 545 a search just arrest, valid, there must be an actual *19 suspect likelihood that a be arrested. reasonable will argument, proposed ¶44. At Pallone that oral presents question under arrest of whether someone is law, make and he therefore asks this court to its own finding independent that Riff was not under arrest. reviewing understanding the standard for Pallone's of only partially is an arrest is correct. Whether someone "custody" question is a in "under arrest" or in of law
184
undisputed.
those
cases which the facts are
State v.
(1991).
Swanson,
437, 445, 475
164
2dWis.
N.W.2d 148
disputed
suppression
To the extent that facts are
in a
deferentially accepts
matter, however, this court
findings
they
factual
of the circuit court unless
are
clearly
Guzy,
erroneous. See
v.
663,
State
139 Wis. 2d
(1987).13
671,
The circuit court made an
upon
Recknagel's testimony,
fact. Based
Officer
the cir
cuit court found
Riff
that
under
arrest. The court
praised
particularly
qualities
frank
of the testi
mony, noting
gratification
Recknagel
with
did not
exaggerate or otherwise color his rendition of the
accept
findings
events. We
these
it is
because
the role of
listening
testimony,
appel
the fact finder
to live
not an
relying
transcript,
gauge
late court
on a written
credibility
Hughes,
v.
24,
witnesses. State
2000 WI
¶ 2 n.1,
280,
2dWis.
¶ 46. Because this awas search incident to an arrest, anot search incident to the issuance of a traffic apply arrest, citation with no the Knowles rule does not to this case. explore particular
¶ 47. We next whether the cir- gave cumstances of this case rise to either the two justifications historical for the search incident to arrest exception. firstWe consider whether this situation posed heightened safety. threat to officer The facts of compelling analyzed this case are more than those explicit if Even the circuit court does not make an factual finding, finding we assume that the court in a manner made supports Jensen, 2d its final decision. Sohns v. Wis. 453, 105 N.W.2d *20 occupants
Fry. in both This not a scenario which was by guarded police, handcuffed, and a vehicle were squad Here, conceivable that to car. it was confined a unguarded, a could have seized Pallone, who stood weapon Officer when he followed from the duffel occupant, Recknagel An no less back to the truck cab. safety, danger pose arrestee, can to officer see than an passenger, Robinson, no less 414 U.S. at and objects weapons arrestee, can seize or than an escape. an officer or effect an assault safety during officer an arrest 48. The threat to arrest, and its attendant from the fact of "flows uncertainty, proximity, from the stress, and and not grounds Knowles, for 525 U.S. at In this arrest." Recknagel danger from the case, the to Officer flowed uncertainty posed proximity Riff Pallone once and under arrest. exchange Recknagel first, 49. At between polite not hostile rather and relaxed.
and Riff was but posed apparent in threat; fact, no he stood Pallone squad unguarded car the truck. and between importance safety paramount is of fourth "Police jurisprudence." Murdock, State v. 155Wis. amendment (1990) (Abrahamson, J., 217, 237, 2d N.W.2d dissenting). atmosphere Here, Riff altered once sat Recknagel squad reapproached car and Officer steps along paralleled the officer's the truck. Pallone passenger appeared side, he nervous as he bag. Recknagel suspected reached for the duffel Officer might reaching weapon, he for a testi- Pallone punctuated training and instinct his fied that his bag had sufficient to conceal a concern. The duffel room large enough weapon, baggie con- and the box was weapon. aptly stated, if tain a As the circuit court *21 Recknagel really very "wasn't concerned, he should point" have been at that and had reason to search for weapons. agree the We with circuit court that the total- ity presented potential circumstances for harm to the officers. justifi-
¶ 50. We to now turn the second historical exception, cation for the search incident to arrest the discovery preservation and of evidence. This was not a Knowles in situation which the issuance of a citation speeding gave for officers the the all evidence neces- sary prosecute Here, to evidence, the offense. further namely likely open beer, bottles of were to found in passenger compartment. stepped holding
¶ 51. When Riff out the truck open Recknagel an bottle, beer had Officer reason to suspect open there that were more in bottles beer Village motor in vehicle violation of the of Fontana Recknagel important, More ordinance. Riff told that open Recknagel bottles, truck contained he told "goright situation, to ahead" look. In an arrest we expect stop looking cannot an to Although officer for evi- further Recknagel dence of the offense. Officer open the one held, confiscated bottle Riff it within scope investigation preserve of his to discover and open Admittedly, additional evidence of beer it bottles. unlikely occupants spil- is of a truck would store open bag lable, bottles of in a beer duffel while the they vehicle is in motion. But it is conceivable that might open zippered conceal the bottles in a duffel they pull parking step once into a lot and out. adopt
¶ 52. Pallone this asks court the reason- ing by Washington Supreme set forth in Court (Wash. 1999). Parker, Parker, State v. In P.2d police the court three in consolidated cases which passenger belongings searched incident to the arrest apply decline to the Parker Id. at 76. We the drivers. holding not, are as Pallone con- those cases because factually did not similar to this one. Parker tends, implicate that buttress the search the two rationales exception. Parker, no In had incident to arrest dangerous, passengers suspicion armed, were Moreover, the Id. at 82. or had concealed evidence. violations, for traffic in Parker were arrested drivers which, Knowles, as no further for much there was tangible evidence to be lost. Id. Although Pallone himself was under exception applies
arrest, the incident arrest Knowles, case, unlike in Parker or because this gave here rise to both of the two histori- circumstances *22 exception, namely of the the cal rationales at heart safety arresting officer and the need to discover of the preserve and evidence.
¶ 54. The warrantless search Pallone's duffel legal bag a search incident to an arrest. Under was Fry, Recknagel Officer was authorized to Belton passenger compartment of the conduct search any compart- situated in truck and containers Fry, according appropriate search, ment. That to was though sitting squad legiti- Riff was in the car. Its even macy strengthened here Pallone was because was bag. standing length at arm's from the duffel The authority broad, search incident to arrest is Robin- to son, 232-33, 414 U.S. at and so it remains under the facts of case. this passenger property
¶ 55. to exclude We decline exception under the from the search incident to arrest may passenger facts of partment case. Police search the com- this "occupant" a motor an is vehicle when Together, Belton, U.S. 460. under arrest. Belton "any Fry containers" situated the search of allow Fry, compartment. Id.; 2d at 176-77. Wis. reality contrary ¶ A rule would overlook 56. passenger weapons can reside and evidence belong- easily they just property can in arrestee as as adopt ings.14 rule, we would If this court were to such provide occupants the incentive to sabo- vehicle with legal by concealing weapons tage an otherwise occupant's an in areas that remain within or evidence easy danger Recknagel was case, In this reach. by Riff s arrest had been diminished the fact that bag the duffel was within consummated and because Pallone's reach. that the warrantless 57. We therefore conclude proper the incident the duffel was under
search of requirements exception of to to arrest warrant §I, 11 of the Wiscon- Fourth Amendment and art. sin Constitution. Search a Motor Vehicle Cause to Probable Officer next consider whether 58. We
Recknagel's there constitutional because search was exception permits probable the war- cause. This any or containers within rantless search of a vehicle compartment passenger if there is cause hold the or the containers that the vehicle to believe object rule at 824. This Ross, of the search. *23 parking stopped lots. to vehicles extends California (1985). exception Carney, The 386, 392-93 471 U.S. v. belongings capable applies passenger of con- also 14 greater consequence, as we out even principle This is of below, that allows a warrantless exception line under a motor vehicle. See probable cause to search police have when (1999). 295, 303-06 Houghton, 526 U.S. Wyoming v.
189 taining object Houghton, of the search. 526 U.S. at again emphasize 307. We that the rationales and requirements exception for this differ from those that satisfy exception. key the search incident to arrest One exception requires overriding distinction is that this an probable standard of cause. "pre
¶ 59. Warrantless
searches of homes áre
sumptively unreasonable;" searches of vehicles are not.
(1984).
Wisconsin,
See Welsh v.
ing
gested "balanc[es] that a test that the multifarious presented by circumstances different cases" under the probable cause threshold offers little with which to guide police engaged competitive officers in the "often enterprise ferreting Dunaway out crime." v. New (1979). York, 200, 442 U.S. 213-14 One standard was measuring probable essential for the reasonableness of eventually search, id., cause to and the Court created one standard for containers situated in vehicles. In Ross, 800, 456 U.S. at Court held that probable when law enforcement officers have cause to they may search a warrant, vehicle without a also con- duct a warrantless search allof containers found inside capable containing object the vehicle of the search. See also Acevedo, v. 565, 500 U.S. California ¶ 65. The Ross Court reached this conclusion for distinguished First, two reasons. the Court both Chad- finding Sanders, wick and explored that those decisions proba- situations which did not have only luggage ble cause to search the vehicle itself, by Ross, it. within Ross, at 814. In contrast, probable cause existed to believe that the automobile contained contraband. Id. at 824. The Court "object stressed that search," not the "nature parameters legal of the containers," defines the of a recognized search. Id. at Second, 824. the Court practical benefits of a rule that extends the Noting that Id. at 822. all containers. standard to rarely goods "[contraband are across the trunk strewn declined to burden law car," the Court or floor of require to that would officers a rule enforcement with they permissible if encoun- halt an otherwise required Id. at 820. warrant. tered a container no distinction The Ross Court drew possession of the driver containers between Houghton, belonging passengers. See containers Houghton, decision In a six-to-three U.S. at 301-02. by "if Scalia, the Court reasoned authored Justice limited to that Ross announced were the rule of law belonging than driver, or contents other contents to the belonging passengers, have one would those expressed." expected limitation to that substantial Houghton applied Ross rule to therefore Id. at 301. proba- *26 belongings, holding passenger with that officers may inspect also search a motor vehicle cause to ble object capable concealing the those containers Id. at 307. search. Highway Houghton, Wyoming Patrol a 67. In speeding pulled and dis- for over an
officer
automobile
during
faulty
light
playing
a routine traffic
a
break
Houghton,
stop.
driver and two
U.S. at 297. The
occupied
passengers
Id. at 297-98. As
the vehicle.
hypodermic
questioned
driver, he noticed a
officer
pocket.
syringe
The driver con-
in the driver's shirt
drugs." Id.
used it to take
"that he
ceded
backup
Following
admission,
officers
this
68.
passengers
and
out of the vehicle
the two
directed
compartment
passenger
for contraband.
searched the
belonging
pocketbook
to one of
Officers found a
Upon
Houghton,
passengers,
search-
the backseat.
on
pouch
ing
pocketbook,
officers discovered
drug parapher-
object containing
syringe,
wallet-like
methamphetamine.
Houghton sought
nalia, and
Id.
suppress
evidence,
the trial court denied the
suppress,
Houghton
motion to
was convicted. Id. at
Wyoming Supreme
¶ 69. The
Court reversed the
holding
conviction,
that the search violated the consti-
tution because the officer
or
"knew should have known
purse
belong
(quoting
that the
did not
to the driver." Id.
Houghton
1998),
(Wyo.
State,
v.
956 P.2d
(1999)).
rev'd,
¶ 70. The Court reversed, "police may officers with cause to search a car inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that capable concealing object are of the search." Id. inquiry at 307. The Court determined that the turns property suspected not on whether "the owner of the is of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe specific 'things' that the to be searched for and seized are located" therein. Id. at 302. Relying
¶ 71.
Ross,
on
U.S. at
Houghton
every
Court reasoned that
container within
may
a vehicle and its contents
contain contraband.
Houghton,
explicitly
J., Re, United States v. Di 332 U.S. (1948)).17 belongings 581 Police examination of does deprive an individual of the freedom of movement. (citing Guzy, Harris, See 2dWis. at 256-57 674-75) (same person Wis. 2d at standard of seizure of applies passengers). to drivers and Although Houghton
¶ 73.
Court, not unlike
appeared
the Knowles Court
it,
before
to draw another
"bright
analy-
line" in the sand of Fourth Amendment
Houghton,
exception,
sis,
like other cases under this
requires
showing
overriding
still
a threshold
of the
probable
Carney,
standard of
cause. See
Officer open illegal possess con- it ordinances made Fontana public The in motor vehicles. in or tainers of alcohol per may se, but "contraband" not have been beer bottle or may possess open an or unsealed 18 Anadult beverages privately in a owned containing receptacle alcoholic 346.935(2) and Wis. Stat. § motor vehicle.
possibility open that containers ofbeer were situated object the truck rendered beer ofthe search.19 Were meaning this court to limit the of "contraband" to the parameters many crafts, that Pallone evidence vital to might proceedings be excluded. agree appeals
¶ 77. We with the court of Recknagel probable carry had cause to aout full search of the truck and its contents for additional containers of open Pallone, beer. See 2dWis. at 280. When Riff stepped holding open out of the truck an bottle and Recknagel open then told there were more bottles probability truck, there was more than a fair Recknagel the vehicle contained additional evidence. had cause cab, the truck and it was "fairly large reasonable for him to search the duffel bag, high, wide, about twelve inches twelve inches maybe long" two, two-and-a-half feet that was situated spacious on the bench in the cab. This container had *30 capacity open to hold additional or closed of bottles support per- beer, evidence that would Riffs arrest and haps charge. Recknagel explained lead to an additional planned bag that he to search the duffel because it was Recknagel apparently located inside the vehicle. thus Ross, followed 456 U.S. at which authorizes the every part search of of the vehicle and its content that may object conceal the of the search. When Pallone bag, upgraded reached for the Recknagel's he the cause for Recknagel search. testified that when he bag, looking weap- searched the duffel he was both for relating open ons and evidence to the intoxicants charge.
19 Similarly, money can constitute "contraband" when it is State, 565, 592, 594, used as evidence. Jones v. 226 Wis. 2d N.W.2d 738 Houghton, was not ren-
¶ the search 78. Under bag belonged improper the duffel dered because inquiry Pallone or turned not on whether Pallone. The bag, open containers the duffel but whether Riff owned Recknagel thing specific for which of beer —the bag. Houghton, might in the duffel searched — at 302. U.S. inspected Recknagel
¶
the duf-
After Officer
79.
candidly
baggie
bag
upon
box,
he
fel
and came
looking
longer
for beer or for
that he no
stated
weapon.
cause to believe
But there was
baggie
box con-
"Inositol Powder" bottle and
therefore
substances. We
tained narcotics or controlled
Recknagel
agree
had a basis
circuit court that
with the
logical
extending
If
its
direction.
the search to
for
serious crime
evidence of a more
authorities discover
during
they
inspec-
search,
not halt their
a lawful
need
(citing
Robinson,
Mabra, 61
2d at 623
tion.
Wis.
260).
As the court
218; Gustafson,
U.S.
defy
appeals
sense to
determined,
it
common
would
incriminating
require
evidence
an officer to overlook
pur-
the initial
did not relate to
the evidence
because
pose
281;
also
Pallone, 228
2d at
see
the search.
Wis.
Ross,
Under Searching privacy. expectation of a diminished shared traumatically intrusive was not a the duffel person. of his and seizure § Constitution 11 of the Wisconsin I, 81. Article expectations greater privacy no individuals
affords *31 provided Fourth Amendment. under the than those respect, some other Wisconsin, in is different from this Washington. states, Parker, like In 987 P.2d Washington Supreme passengers Court afforded privacy protections. premised enhanced The court its long-standing grants conclusion on state case law that greater privacy protections individuals than the Fourth I, Amendment. Id. at 78. Article section 7 of the Washington provides, person Constitution "No shall be private disturbed in his affairs, or his home invaded, authority without of law." Id.
¶ 82. The Wisconsin Constitution contains no "private contrary, similar affairs" clause. On the language virtually § 11 I, of art. is identical to that of Consequently, the Fourth Amendment. this court "has interpret refused to Wisconsin's search and seizure provision differently Supreme than the Court," and has heightened privacy protections not afforded under the state constitution than under the Fourth Amendment. nothing tempts depart There is in this case that us to approach. from this seasoned We thus follow the inter- pretation by Houghton, set forth Court in passengers greater which entitles motor vehicle to no privacy expectations Houghton, than drivers.
at 303-04.
¶ 83. We therefore hold that the warrantless bag search of Pallone's duffel was valid under the exception that allows warrantless searches when authorities have cause to believe that a vehi- object'of cle contains the the search.
CONCLUSION ¶ 84. We conclude that the search of the duffel proper under both the search incident to arrest exception probable-cause-to-search-a-motor- and the exception require- vehicle to the constitutional warrant *32 requirements of the ments. The search fulfilled exception it search incident to arrest because was inci- heightened posed arrest, dent to a valid the situation danger, threat of and there was a need to discover and preserve evidence. The warrantless search also was permissible because the officer had cause to object the vehicle contained the believe capable search, duffel a container and the was object containing the of the search.
By appeals the Court.—The decision of the court of is affirmed.
¶ ABRAHAMSON, 85. SHIRLEY S. CHIEF (dissenting). In all JUSTICE a refrain that has become opinion dutifully repeats majority familiar, the too per principle search is se unreason- "warrantless specifically unless one of the 'few established able justifies exceptions' search,"1 and well-delineated agree proceeds yet exception. I then to find another Justice Antonin Scalia that with U.S. Court requirement "has become so riddled with the warrant basically unrecogniz- [has become] exceptions that it majority opinion recognizes Because the able."2 requirement, exception I another warrant dissent. began
¶
case,
as a civil
a traffic violation.
86. This
encounter with the
involved
The initial
municipal
prohibiting
of a
ordinance
driver's violation
1
Phillips, Wis. 2d
Majority op.
(quoting
State v.
218
at ¶
(1998)).
180, 196,
I majority by ¶ 87. The holds that the search law (the defendant's) passenger's enforcement of the duffel bag justified was because it a search was incidental to majority the driver's arrest. The concludes a "heightened safety threat officer or a need to dis- preserve justif[ied] cover or evidence the warrantless Majority op. search" in this case. at 42. Although passenger's bag might
¶ 88.
the
duffel
weapon dangerous
have contained a
officer,
to the
might
justified
weapon
search,
which
have
a
no
beverages
during
found. No alcoholic
were found
Nevertheless,
search either.
the search of the duffel
proceeding beyond looking
weapon
continued,
for a
prohibit
The Wisconsin statutes also
such conduct and
provide for a civil forfeiture of not more than $100. Wisconsin
346.95(2m) (1997-98).
Stat.
346.935 and
§§
challenged
arrest,
validity
No one
I
and do not
(5th
Vista,
Lago
address this issue. See Atwater v.
(1986). (1981). Belton, 454, 8 NewYork v. 453 U.S. 458 9 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the LaFave, Wayne R. 7.1(c) (3d 1996). Amendment,
Fourth at 457 ed. § newspaper quoted A article a state recent Wisconsin by say- trooper explaining high drug as his number of seizures ing going beyond stop." the traffic Another "[t]he secret is
203 by point Justice William A. similar was made Bablitch Fry, 153, 187, 2d 388 in his dissent to 131 Wis. N.W.2d (1986), joined, by Supreme I 565 and U.S. Court which Justice John Paul Stevens his dissent Robbins v. 420, U.S. California, 453 Supreme Court, in 91. The U.S. both civil liber- espousing law, is
ties and other areas of a new diminishing powers federalism, increasing national with importance.10 keep- influence and In state that, saying drugs, in the for trooper quoted was as "looking any [traffic] and all A state are for violations. bad driver, headlight might drug turn into an arrest of a drunk drug trooper quoted saying A third "I dealer or a user." as Drug Busts having working stopped them for not trunk latch." Stops, Journal, 26, 2000, Start as State June Wisconsin Traffic at 3B. Other academic commentators have also criticized the Bel- critics, ton rule. For a see lengthy the rule and its discussion of (N.J. Pierce, v. 947, 1994); State Common- 642 A.2d 955-58 (Pa. 1995) White, 896, wealth v. (Montemuro, 669 A.2d 907-08 J., concurring).
10 For cases in which the U.S.
Court reminded
they
interpret
are free
their own
state courts
constitu
granting
protections
more
than
tions as
individuals
does
Greenwood,
see,
e.g,
Constitution,
35,
v.
U.S.
486 U.S.
California
(1988) (Fourth Amendment); City Mesquite
v. Aladdin's
(1982) (First
Castle, Inc.,
283,
455 U.S.
Amendment
Robins,
Shopping
v.
PruneYard
Center
vagueness);
(First
(1980)
property rights).
Amendment and
invalidating
beyond
For recent cases
federal statutes
as
see,
Morrison,
e.g.,
v.
United States
Congress's powers,
120 S.Ct.
(Violence
(2000)
v.
Against
Act);
United States
Women
(1995) (Gun-Free
Act).
Lopez,
204 significant ing federalism, a with this new number holding adopt Belton, courts have refused to state respective inconsistent their state such a rule is with guarantees.11 This court should follow constitutional these states and refuse to adhere to Belton as correct interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution.12 Brennan, 801, (1981); 803-804 William J. State Constitutions 489, Rights, L. and the Protection Individual 90 Harv. Rev. (1977). (Ohio See, Brown, e.g., State v. 588 N.E.2d 114-16 1992) (declining to follow Belton if Belton means that an arrest automatically authorizes detailed search of for a traffic offense Pierce, 947, 956, vehicle); State v. 642 A.2d 959-60 arrestee's (N. 1994) (declining apply arrests for J. Belton warrantless cases); offenses; discussing motor-vehicle other state Common 1995) (Pa. White, (rejecting A.2d Belton wealth v. limiting adhering rule and to earlier decision the warrantless clothing areas of a vehicle incident to an arrest to arrestee; immediately accessible to the see also concurrence cases). 906-08, discussing other strong argument, not
12 Inote that the defendant has
by
majority
police
did
opinion,
that because
addressed
contact with the driver of the car until he was
not initiate
car,
the Chimel "immediate control" test should
outside
/Fry bright-line
the Belton
rule. Chimel v.
apply rather than
California,
Under
the search would
The people then made
this
adopted it as their primary law. The
of other
people
states made for themselves
respectively,
constitu
tions which
by
are construed
their own appropriate
functionaries. Let them construe theirs —let us con
strue,
ours. Attorney General ex rel.
by
and stand
Barstow,
[*785](1855).
v.
f—I hH majority opinion ¶ 94. The also holds that the passenger's bag search of the duffel was constitution- ally permissible probable the because had cause they object believe would find the of their Majority op. holding ¶¶ search. at 75-77. This is not necessary opinion, disagree to the and I with this dictum. police may probable
¶ 95. While the have had open cause to believe that containers of an alcoholic beverage would found in itself, be the vehicle the search passenger's bag of the duffel was unreasonable as a matter of constitutional law and common sense. According majority, proper inquiry to the is whether "there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific things to be searched for and seized are being Majority located" within the container searched. op. quoting Wyoming Houghton, ¶ 70, at v. (1999). Similarly, empha-
295, 302 Professor LaFave sizes that a "for warrantless search of a container lawful, cause to a
inside vehicle be objects . .could must be as to which. vehicle opened."15 concealed in the container present ¶ case do 96. The.circumstances majority opinion and Professor not meet the test already put found the forth. The officer had LaFave twelve-pack vehicle, remnants in con- of beer Majority op. taining open at both and closed bottles. expect open simply ¶ reasonable to to find 11. It is majority opinion bag. a duffel The of beer inside bottles "unlikely" that the defendant concedes at 51 that it is open spillable bottles of beer a duffel "would store majority opinion's bag as the is in motion." The vehicle by is its subse- candor in this admission quent diminished assertion that it was "conceivable" bag put open in the duffel defendant bottles of beer Why put parked. the defendant once the car was open would leaving in a duffel while bottles of beer twelve-pack containing open and closed bottles of beer boggles plain The mind out in view the vehicle? the idea. Try majority opinion will, its reason- as looking
ing further evidence of that the officer was for persuasive. is not The civil offense was the civil offense *38 open completed the officers found the containers when showing beverages. multi- of alcoholic There is no ple multiple containers constitute offenses or increase
15
A
LaFave,
Search and Seizure: Treatise on the
Wayne
R.
1996)
7.2(d)
(3d
Amendment,
Fourth
(discussing
ed.
at 506
§
Ross,
and United States v.
(1982),
United States v.
798
456 U.S.
(1991)).
Acevedo,
LaFave,
See also
Supp.
1999
7.2
I I I Today's opinion, together ¶ 98. with the deci- Fry16 King,17 sions in State v. and State v. means that any municipal violation of a civil state or traffic law, no minor, matter how can result in a driver's arrest and every piece luggage any the search of and container belongs car, in a no matter to whom it and no matter any whether there is reason to believe such a container weapon holds a or evidence. any I doubt member of this court would
find it
him
reasonable for a
officer to arrest
or her
for a civil traffic offense
then
search the entire
passenger compartment
lug-
all
the briefcases and
gage
relating
scope
therein. The law
to the
warrantless automobile searches has reached a shock-
ingly low standard and is inconsistent with the
principle espoused recently by this court in State v.
Griffith,
70,
¶ 100. For the
I
stated,
reasons
dissent.
16 Fry,
131 Wis. 2d
¶ 101. I am authorized to state that Justices A. BRAD- WILLIAM BABLITCH ANN WALSH join LEY this dissent.
