State v. PalivodaState v. Palivoda
{¶ 2} Appellee was indicted for three counts of felonious assault with a firearm in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} On March 21, 2006, appellee filed a motion to dismiss all pending charges against him as a result of the state's failure to preserve the requested evidence which was the subject matter of the trial court's previous order. The trial court granted the motion the next day. Appellant did not have an opportunity to respond prior to the trial court's decision.
{¶ 4} We review a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss pursuant to a de novo standard of review. State v. Wendel (Dec. 23, 1999), 11th Dist. No. 97-G-2116,
{¶ 5} Appellant's first assignment of error states: "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT AGAINST APPELLEE, WITH PREJUDICE, WITHOUT MAKING A FINDING THAT APPELLEE WAS DENIED A CONSITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY RIGHT, AND WITHOUT STATING ON THE RECORD ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND REASONS FOR THE DISMISSAL."
{¶ 6} Appellant's first assignment of error is based on
{¶ 7} "
{¶ 8} Appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 9} Appellant's second assignment of error states: "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE DAY AFTER THE MOTION WAS FILED, WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN ORAL HEARING AND WITHOUT AFFORDING THE STATE OF OHIO AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION."
{¶ 10} Appellee filed his motion to dismiss on March 21, 2006. The next day, the trial court granted appellee's motion and effectively dismissed the indictment pending against appellee with prejudice. Appellant asserts this ruling, without opportunity for appellant to respond, was in violation of
{¶ 11} "[t]o expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition."
{¶ 12} Appellee argues the trial court's decision was proper under
{¶ 13} Although
{¶ 14} The trial court denied appellant the opportunity to submit any oppositional material by granting the motion less than twenty-four hours after it was filed. This constitutes reversible error. State v.Etzler, 3rd Dist. No. 15-04-03,
{¶ 15} Therefore, we find appellant's second assignment of error well taken.
{¶ 16} Appellant's third assignment of error states: "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THIS CASE WITHOUT INQUIRING INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ALLEGED DISCOVERY RULE VIOLATION."
{¶ 17} In appellant's third assignment of error, appellant characterizes the trial court's decision as the imposition of a sanction for a discovery violation via
{¶ 18} However, our review of appellant's third assignment of error does not turn on the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the trial court's decision because the trial court failed to follow proper procedure. "A trial court must inquire into the circumstances surrounding a discovery rule violation and, when deciding whether to impose a sanction, must impose the least severe sanction that is consistent with the purpose of the rules of discovery." Lakewood v.Papadelis (1987),
{¶ 19} In the instant case, the trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the day after it was filed. Appellant was denied any opportunity to respond prior to the ruling. A decision on an alleged discovery violation without inquiry is inappropriate and proper for reversal on appeal. See, Engle, supra, at ¶ 9.
{¶ 20} Appellant's third assignment of error is well taken.
{¶ 21} Appellant's fourth assignment of error states: "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DISMISSED THIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE."
{¶ 22} The trial court ordered the preservation of "any and all 911 calls, regardless of length, on or about August 22, 2005, as well as the ACSO Dispatch logs and journals dealing with this incident."
{¶ 23} Apparently there were some compatibility problems implementing a new phone system at the Ashtabula County Sheriff's Department. As a result of these gliches, calls were not recorded for a period of time until late 2005. According to a written affidavit of Detective Jeff Lewis, Ashtabula County Sheriff's Department, "any call that the Defendant may have made to the 911 system or to the Sheriff's Department would not have been recorded."
{¶ 24} Appellee argues the affidavit of Detective Lewis is insufficient to overcome the appellant's burden to preserve the evidence because the affidavit is not specific as to calendar time. While it is true the affidavit states the recording system malfunctioned until "late 2005," the affidavit also states specifically that appellee's phone call would not have been recorded. The failure to pinpoint a specific date when the system began to properly record does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant destroyed the subject evidence. In addition, appellee failed to demonstrate that the evidence was not obtainable by other means. Certainly, appellee could call the 911 operator to testify as to the circumstances of the 911 call.
{¶ 25} "[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Arizona v. Youngblood
(1988),
{¶ 26} In the instant case, the questions of whether or not the evidence was exculpatory and whose burden it was to prove the nature of the evidence are irrelevant and unable to be answered because the requested evidence never existed. It was not destroyed in bad faith. It was not lost in a negligent fashion. It never existed. It is illogical to punish the state for failing to preserve that which never existed.
{¶ 27} For the reasons stated in the Opinion of this court, it is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WILLIAM M. O'NEILL, J., DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concur.