48 La. Ann. 311 | La. | 1896
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Defendant appeals from a sentence for murder and relies on bills of exception to the rulings of the lower court,, permit - ting testimony of threat of the defendant against the deceased; allowing the State, on cross-examination of character witnesses produced by defendant, to ask whether the witnesses had not heard particular acts of violence imputed to the accused, and excluding the wife of the accused from testifying.
It is, we think, too clear to admit of discussion that threats of violence against the deceased, made by the accused preceding the homicide with which he is charged, are admissible in evidence to show malice: 1 Bishop Criminal Law, Ed., p. 1110; State vs. Edwards, 34 An. 1012; State vs. Birdwell, 36 An. 859. The learned judge of the lower court, in signing the bill, discriminates the principle, authorizing such testimony, from the test of admissibility of testimony of threats of deceased when relied on by the accused. In the decision cited by the defendant in this case, the accused sought to prove in his defence on a charge of murder a conditional threat
Witnesses testifying to the good character of the deceased for peace and quietness may properly be cross-examined as to the grounds on which they found their testimony. In testifying on direct examination on this point the witness is confined to his knowledge of the general reputation of the party whose character is under investigation. General reputation is made up of that which people in general say of the party of which the witness' has knowledge. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 101. It would seem, therefore, competent to ask the character witness on cross-examination if he has not heard evil conduct imputed to the party. In this case the questions on cross-examination were whether the witnesses had not heard the accused had whipped a woman, and whether the witness had not also heard of another instance in which the accused had drawn a pistol on another. , The court admitted the testimony, not to prove the particular acts, but to test the knowledge of the witnesses and enable the jury to properly appreciate their testimony as to the character of the accused. For that purpose, we think the testimony was admissible. Mr. Rice, in his volume on Evidence, in criminal cases, thus states the law: While particular acts of bad conduct are not admissible to assail character on direct examination, a witness deposing to character may be cross-examined as to particular facts, in order to test the soundness of his opinion and elicit the data on which it is founded, and the author supports the text by authorities. 3 Rice on Evidence, p. 604, Sec. 376; 1 Taylor, Sec. 352; 2 Starkie, 304.
' The other bill reserved by the defendant was to the exclusion of his wife, as a witness offered on his behalf. The purpose of the offer, the bill states, was to show that the defendant .made her, his agent to deliver a message to deceased bearing on this litigation. The general rule that disqualifies the wife as. a witness for or against her husband is conceded, but it is claimed, there is . an , except
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the sentence of the lower court be affirmed with costs.