STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Ray PADGETT, Appellant.
No. 64554.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Jan. 14, 1981.
145
After reviewing BPO‘s contacts with Iowa, in terms of their quantity, nature, quality, source and connection with the cause of action, we conсlude that the exercise of jurisdiction by an Iowa court does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. We agree with the district court that Iowa courts could constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction over BPO.
We have considered the оther contentions of BPO, whether addressed or not, and find them without merit. We therefore affirm the trial court‘s overruling of BPO‘s special apрearance.
AFFIRMED.
Gordon Liles, Fort Madison, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Jeanine Freeman, Robert J. Blink, Asst. Attys. Gen., Des Moines, Michael P. Short, Lee County Atty., and R. David Fahey, Jr., Asst. Lee County Atty., for аppellee.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, ALLBEE and McGIVERIN, JJ.
ALLBEE, Justice.
This is an appeal by Robert Ray Padgett from his conviction for kidnapping in the first degree, a violation of
On April 26, 1979, defendant was charged by information in connection with the abduction and sexual abusе of an eleven-year-old girl. The victim had been forcibly taken from a Fort Madison dance studio where she attended lessons, driven to a motel in Coralville and held captive for two days. During this period, she was alternatively handcuffed to a bathroom sink and a bed, and was subjеcted to various kinds of sexual abuse. The victim was finally released, and defendant subsequently arrested in Muscatine. After change of venue, trial commenced on November 13, 1979; following submission of the case, the jury returned a verdict against defendant, who was later sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Defendant‘s assignment of error concerns trial court‘s ruling permitting the admission of certаin testimony developed by the State in cross-examination of Robert Standley, Coralville Chief of Police. Standley testified on direct examination by defense counsel regarding his preparation of composite photographs of a suspect constructеd through the use of an “Identi-photo kit.” This process involves the selection by a witness of photographs of various physical features which most closely resemble features of a suspect they saw, and culminates in a composite photograph of that suspеct. Standley‘s testimony indicated that he had utilized this procedure with Kenneth Kinkor to develop a composite of the head and fаce of a man to whom Kinkor had purportedly rented a motel room in Coralville during the time of the alleged abduction and sexual аbuse. This composite photograph, later admitted as defense Exhibit 16, differed from defendant‘s actual appearance in certain respects.
On cross-examination, the State through several questions established, over defendant‘s objection, that Kinkor had еxpressed reservations to Standley about the accuracy of the composite. Defendant asserts that this testimony constituted imрermissible hearsay, and that its admission by trial court amounted to reversible error.
We note initially that defendant‘s objections were sufficient to preserve any error here. While the hearsay objections were interposed in connection with only two of the State‘s questions in the challenged exchange, this does not necessarily dictate an absence of preservation of error with respеct to the remaining questions. “Once a proper objection has been made and overruled, an objector is not required to mаke further objections to preserve his right on appeal when a subsequent question is asked raising the same issue. Repeated objections need not be made to the same class of evidence.” State v. Kidd, 239 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1976); State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Iowa 1973). Here, trial court was alerted by defendant‘s two objections tо his claim of hearsay, and its ruling adequately informed defense counsel that additional objections on the same ground to testimony of thе same kind would be to no avail. Thus, the question as to the propriety of the trial court‘s ruling was properly preserved for appеllate review.
Assuming without deciding that the challenged testimony was hearsay, we
We find no reversible error.
AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur except HARRIS, J., who concurs specially.
HARRIS, J. (concurring).
The trial court‘s ruling was right because the testimony defendant objected to fell outside the definition of hearsay. It is not hearsay unless an out-of-court assertion is offered to prove the truth of that assertion. State v. Horn, 282 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Iowa 1979). The stаtements here were not. They were offered, not to prove their truth or accuracy, but to show their effect—actually their lack of it—upon the hearer when he made the composite picture. The assertions strike me as the same as those in State v. Williams, 256 N.W.2d 207, 208 (Iowa 1977), and State v. Rush, 242 N.W.2d 313, 319 (Iowa 1976), which we held were not hearsay. See also McCormick on Evidence (2nd ed.) § 248 at 587 and § 249 at 589-90;
ALLBEE
Justice