668 S.W.2d 643 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1984
Defendant-appellant Randy Ousley was charged with the Class B felony of burglary in the first degree, § 569.160, RSMo 1978. The jury found the defendant not guilty of burglary first degree but guilty of trespass in the first degree and assessed punishment of six months. The defendant appeals sentence in accord with the verdict.
Defendant contests submissibility on the basis that there was insufficient evidence of identification and that part of the evidence of identification was erroneously admitted after a timely hearsay objection.
Our consideration of the issue of sufficiency of evidence is directed to whether the evidence, considered in a light most favorable to the state and all inferences therefrom, disregarding evidence to the contrary, is sufficient to make a submissi-ble case. State v. Cain, 507 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Mo.App.1974). We view the record to ascertain whether the guilty verdict is supported by substantial evidence, City of Kansas City v. Oxley, 579 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Mo. banc 1979), which is evidence the jury could find the issue in harmony therewith. State v. Gregory, 339 Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d 47, 51 (1936).
If we ignore the contested hearsay testimony which we will consider in Point Two, the evidence of the offense and the identification of the defendant was as follows. On February 1, 1982 at 1:30 A.M., Mr. Jones was sleeping in his cleaning establishment
In summary, the evidence as to identification was that at 1:30 in the morning an individual wearing a jacket and hood was met inside Mr. Jones’ store with a shotgun blast, a trail of blood and footprints blazed a winding trail from the store to a house several blocks distant in which the defendant was found in possession of a jacket and hood subsequently positively identified. Not only was this sufficient evidence of identification it was overwhelming evidence. State v. Mills, 521 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo.App.1975). The evidence not only established the identification of the defendant as the trespasser, it constitutes a testament to the skill of defense counsel considering the result at trial.
Defendant’s second point on appeal contends that the court erred in allowing one of the police officers to testify that Mr. Jones told him at the scene that the person who came in was a Negro male. Mr. Jones had previously testified that he did not know if the person was male or female, black or white. The trial court overruled the defendant’s hearsay objection on the basis that the identification statement was part of the res gestae, a recognized exception to the rule of evidence. State v. Hook, 432 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Mo.1968). We need not decide this point because even if we assume that the admission was improper we conclude that it was merely cumulative to other evidence fully proving the issue and not prejudicial. State v. Bellah, 603 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Mo.App.1980); State v. Vernon, 522 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Mo.App.1975); State v. Mills, 521 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo.App.1975).
The hearsay testimony of the police officer was cumulative evidence of identification. As such its admission was harmless if not insignificant in view of Mr. Jones’ in-court testimony identifying the jacket and hood together with the defendant who was suffering from gunshot wounds and was found at the end of the trail followed by the arresting officer.
We affirm.