State v. OsborneState v. Osborne
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- W. William Leaphart
Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Steven Lee Osborne (Osborne) was convicted of felony driving under the influence (DUI). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court designated Osborne as a persistent felony offender and sentenced him to ten years in prison, five of which were suspended.
¶2 Osborne filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that the court exceeded its sentencing authority. The District Court denied his petition. Osborne now appeals. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On July 30, 2003, the State charged Osborne with felony DUI. Osborne had previously been convicted of DUI four times, the most recent of which had resulted in Osborne’s being convicted of felony DUI in 1999. Consequently, the State filed a notice seeking to have Osborne declared a persistent felony offender pursuant to
¶4 Osborne did not appeal this judgment and sentence. On January 5,2005, however, Osborne filed a petition for postconviction relief. His petition argues that, pursuant to
¶5 The State argues that the persistent felony offender statute,
¶6 The District Court dismissed Osborne’s petition for postconviction relief, concluding that the petition failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The District Court’s proffered rationale was that the felony DUI statute had not been amended since Yorek was decided in 2002 and Yorek controlled the disposition of Osborne’s petition.
¶7 Osborne now appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his petition. He claims that the court failed to recognize that this Court’s decision in Yorek applied the pre-amendment version of
¶8 We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief to determine whether the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct. State v. Root, 2003 MT 28, ¶ 7, 314 Mont. 186, ¶ 7, 64 P.3d 1035, ¶ 7 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶9 Did the District Court err in dismissing Osborne’s petition for postconviction relief?
¶10 In addition to contesting the merits of Osborne’s petition, the State argues that, pursuant to
¶11 Generally, we will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Baker (1995), 272 Mont. 273, 280, 901 P.2d 54, 58 (citing Rule 2(a), M.R.App.P.) (other citations omitted). Nevertheless, this rule does not preclude consideration of a jurisdictional issue that is raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Abe, 2001 MT 260, ¶ 14, 307 Mont. 233, ¶ 14, 37 P.3d 77, ¶ 14; see also Rule 12(h)(3), M.R.Civ.P. (“[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action”).
¶12 Jurisdiction is conferred on the courts only by the Constitution or statutes adopted pursuant to the Constitution. State ex rel. Johnson v. Dist. Ct. (1966), 147 Mont. 263, 266, 410 P.2d 933, 935. “Jurisdiction as applied to courtsTs the power or capacity given by law to a court to entertain, hear and determine the particular case or matter.” Johnson, 147 Mont. at 267-68, 410 P.2d at 935 (quoting State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner (1950), 123 Mont. 414, 214 P.2d 747, 753) (emphasis in original); accord State v. Peña, 2004 MT 293, ¶ 35, 323 Mont. 347, ¶ 35, 100 P.3d 154, ¶ 35. In Johnson, we held that a district court lacked jurisdiction to compel a county to pay an attorney the court had appointed to represent an indigent defendant in justice court. We concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction because neither the state constitution nor statutory law required or allowed a district court to appoint an attorney under such circumstances or to impose a remuneratory obligation on the county. Johnson, 147 Mont. at 268, 410 P.2d at 936.
¶13 In Peña, we reasoned that postconviction relief is a “special proceeding” that is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure only to the extent that those rules are not inconsistent with the procedural provisions of the postconviction relief statute. Peña, ¶ 32. Moreover, we observed that postconviction relief is not a constitutional right; rather, it is statutorily created. Peña, ¶ 35. Accordingly, we determined that “the statutory rales which circumscribe the postconviction process are jurisdictional in nature.” Peña, ¶ 35 (dicta as applied to the procedural bar of
¶14 The statutory scheme that establishes the postconviction relief procedures provides that a person who has been adjudged guilty, “who has no adequate remedy of appeal and who claims that a sentence was . . . in excess of the maximum authorized by law . . . may petition the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence[.]”
When a petitioner has been afforded the opportunity for a direct appeal of the petitioner’s conviction, grounds for relief that were or could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised,considered, or decided in a proceeding brought under this chapter.
WHEREAS, it is the public policy of the State of Montana to provide persons accused of crimes with a fair and speedy trial and direct appellate review of legal issues fairly presented to the trial court; and
WHEREAS, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is preserved by Article II, section 19, of the Montana Constitution; and
WHEREAS, there is no federal constitutional right to a specific statutorily prescribed postconviction procedure; and
WHEREAS, amendments to Montana’s postconviction relief and death penalty statutes will further the goal of finality by codifying certain interpretations of those statutes by the Montana Supreme Court and clarifying legislative intent with respect to other provisions.
THEREFORE, it is the policy of the State of Montana to prescribe and limit, consistent with constitutional safeguards of the criminal justice process, the authority of an appellate or other reviewing court to consider legal and factual issues determined by the trial or sentencing court.
1997 Mont. Laws Ch. 302, Sec. 3 (Preamble) (emphasis added). Thus the legislature intended the statutory language as a limit on the courts’ authority to hear and decide, in the context of postconviction proceedings, issues that were, or could have been, raised on direct appeal. Because there is no other source of law granting courts jurisdiction over such issues,
¶15 Lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. In re Marriage of Miller (1993), 259 Mont. 424, 427, 856 P.2d 1378, 1380. Without exception, a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction may not hear or decide a case, but must dismiss it once its lack of jurisdiction is raised. Miller, 259 Mont. at 427, 856 P.2d at 1380. Although this Court has permitted petitioners for postconviction relief to raise issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, we have done so only when the petitioner lacked an adequate remedy of appeal. See, e.g., Petition of Hans, 1998 MT 7, ¶ 19, 288 Mont. 168, ¶ 19, 958 P.2d 1175, ¶ 19 (allowing the petitioner to raise issues that could have been raised on direct appeal when the petitioner was denied the (adequate remedy of, or) opportunity to appeal because he was abandoned by counsel during the course of his appeal).1 Obviously, if no adequate remedy of appeal were available to the petitioner, then no grounds for relief could reasonably have been raised on appeal. Thus, Hans does not establish an exception to the jurisdictional limit embodied in
¶16 Our previous holdings concerning the application of
¶17 We find that
¶18 Unfortunately, the State inexplicably failed to raise this procedural bar before the District Court. We do not condone the State’s litigation strategy. Should the State choose to contest petitions on the merits before the district courts, reserving the procedural bar for its arguments on appeal, courts will unnecessarily rule on the merits of petitions or be forced to independently assess their jurisdiction over each of the issues raised in the petition. Asking an appellate court to dismiss a petition on procedural grounds after the trial court has addressed the merits is the epitome of judicial inefficiency. Nevertheless, “Q]urisdiction-the right to hear and determine an issue-transcends procedural considerations and involves the fundamental power and authority of the court itself.” Corban v. Corban (1972), 161 Mont. 93, 96, 504 P.2d 985, 987.
¶19 The procedural bar is jurisdictional and we may address the State’s argument that Osborne’s petition is procedurally barred because it raises issues that could have been raised on direct appeal. Consequently, we must determine whether Osborne could have challenged the District Court’s authority to sentence him as a persistent felony offender on direct appeal.
¶20 Osborne acknowledges that he did not object to his sentence when it was announced by the court. Nevertheless, he contends that this Court may review his sentence to determine whether it is statutorily permissible. This Court may review a sentence to determine whether it is illegal or exceeds statutory mandates, despite the fact that the sentence was not objected to at the trial court level. State v. Lenhian (1979), 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000. Such review is permitted on direct appeal. Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 339, 343, 602 P.2d at 1000; State v. Hatfield (1993), 256 Mont. 340, 346, 846 P.2d 1025, 1029. Here, Osborne contends that the court exceeded the statutory mandate of
¶21 We will not reverse the District Court when it reaches the right result, even if for the wrong reason. State v. Veis, 1998 MT 162, ¶ 16, 289 Mont. 450, ¶ 16, 962 P.2d 1153, ¶ 16; see also Peña, ¶ 38 (affirming dismissal of a petition for postconviction relief on grounds other than those relied on by the district court). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing Osborne’s petition for postconviction relief.
¶22 We affirm.
CHIEF JUSTICE GRAY, JUSTICES COTTER, NELSON and RICE concur.ORDER
There being insufficient votes to grant a petition for rehearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is denied.
DATED this 13th day of December, 2005.
CHIEF JUSTICE GRAY and JUSTICE RICE concur.Notes
Hans was
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Osborne has petitioned this Court for a rehearing on the grounds that “the decision is in conflict with an express statute or controlling decision to which the attention of the court was not directed.” Rule 34, M.R.App.P. Osborne suggests that Eberhart v. United States (2005), _U.S._, 126 S.Ct. 403, 2005 WL 2838595, issued by the Court six days after we decided State v. Osborne, 2005 MT 264, 329 Mont. 95, 124 P.3d 1085, requires reconsideration of this Court’s conclusion that
Although Eberhart addressed a time limitation while Osborne addressed a statutory procedural bar premised on one’s ability to have previously raised a claim on direct appeal, I consider this to be a distinction without significance. The procedural bar precludes one from bringing a claim in postconviction proceedings if that claim was or could have been raised on direct appeal. In effect, this is no different than a simple time limitation: the claim should have been brought at some earlier time (i.e., within sixty days of the entry of judgment, Rule 5(b), M.R.App.P.), so we cannot now consider it. Furthermore, Osborne relies on Peña v. State, 2004 MT 293, 325 Mont. 347, 100 P.3d 154, wherein this Court concluded that
Accordingly, I dissent.
JUSTICE NELSON concurs in the dissent of JUSTICE LEAPHART. JUSTICE COTTER concurs in the dissent of JUSTICE LEAPHART.