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State v. Osborn
631 P.2d 187
Idaho
1981
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*1 631 P.2d 187 Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

STATE of OSBORN,

David Allen

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13400.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July

407

cisión, fact, findings of and conclusions of appellant law were issued was sentenced to death.

Appellant filed motions for correction or sentence, reduction denied were *3 Appellant filed district court. also petition for review of the sentence and a appeal to this court. The matter notice of a dual basis: under the before us on procedure mandatory set forth in review appeal and under I.C. brought by appellant. background

II Factual having place, following No taken trial Gaylen L. Box of McDermott & McDer- facts are established and taken from the mott, Pocatello, defendant-appellant. hearing. preliminary record of the Gen., Leroy, Atty. Lynn E. David H. Appellant and the murder victim were Gen., Boise, Thomas, Deputy Atty. cafe, employed both at a Pocatello worked plaintiff-respondent. together, appeared get along and well. They together were seen in a room the McFADDEN, Justice. Holiday Pocatello Inn on October background I Procedural employee of the hotel who delivered a room service employee order. This testified Osborn, appellant, David Allen was appellant that sign instructed the victim to charged with October arrested and his spelled name to tab and out “Os- murder of Charlotte Christine Carl. born” for her. Appellant arraigned magis- was before trate division of the Judicial District Sixth evening, appellant The next October 29,1978 charge on on November first stopped was aby police Pocatello officer for degree public murder and a defender was driving in an inattentive manner. The offi- appointed. a preliminary On December cer appellant felt that was sufficiently not hearing appellant held was was and bound arrested, intoxicated to be he did but ask Judge over District for trial. Before Sixth vehicle, passenger the female in the whom 11, appellant Arthur on December Oliver Chris, appellant called drive. Later that pled guilty and filed a notice intent night, partially Christine Carl’s clothed rely upon mental or defect as an disease body along was found road on the out- examining psychi- affirmative defense. An skirts of Pocatello. been She had shot appointed by atrist court at was this head, three times in the once the shoul- time. 18-211. I.C. der, and once in the abdomen. Her face Following discovery argument bruising side, and on showed extensive on the left here, appellant, various not in and patholo- motions issue her nose was fractured. The 21, 1979, May plea gist his performed on withdrew of not who autopsy believed guilty guilty plea entered a to the and bullet wound behind the victim’s ear charge degree of first murder. The was a close contact wound while other assuring knowing voluntary after head were probably wounds distance plea, presentence nature of the wounds although possible ordered he stated it was investigation aggravation- they scheduled an that have could been incurred within mitigation hearing. eighteen 19-2515. This pathol- inches firearm. The hearing ogist was held on large June stated that the amount blood matter of was taken under ad- loss that would indicate the victim’s nose prior visement. On June de- had being a memorandum been broken to her shot. opinion He beating also his alcohol/polydrug stated that the social behavior and abuse. could prior shooting, appellant have occurred He also noted that claimed conjectural but noted drugs was as the been on have and alcohol at the time bruising same appellant’s could have occurred had the crime. As to claim beating with simultaneously nothing occurred he remembered the events shooting. evening, psychiatrist stated that in opinion the claim of amnesia was evening, appel- About 10:30 that same genuine, although im- he noted that it was lant, car, driving Christine Carl’s arrived at possible to be sure. It also mentioned acquaintance. the home of an Witnesses at appellant episodes had several pistol home that Osborn testified had amnesia associated with intoxication vest, possession in his and blood on his chest violent behavior. boots; appellant appeared *4 proceedings Ill District court acting “weird,” though the people the house could tell if he drunk was or presentence After report, a submission of drugs; appel- under the of influence aggravation-mitigation hearing “Chris,” he lant stated that had shot and hearing, At held. I.C. § 19-2515. within an time hour’s stated that he had prosecution neither nor defense called buried her in the mountains and that he had witnesses. The state advised the court that placed tracks; body her on some railroad I good “because think we do have a —a appellant also stated that the victim of transpired prelimi- record what in the police had to call the threatened and turn nary hearing calling instead witnesses robbery why him in for and that was he today, rely testimony to on the [I choose] ” occupants shot her. Two of the house were presented preliminary hearing at the . . . . requested car, by appellant to hide the and Similarly, appellant’s counsel upon relied doing large they so observed a amount of brought preliminary the facts forth the passenger seat blood on the front and door hearing reports and in and the the of the car. witnesses, the although no called additional appellant did the court in his own address premises later

Police officers searched the behalf. and found a .22 caliber nine-shot dismantled was at the F.B.I. revolver. This revolver The trial had for court therefore sentenc- Washington laboratory at the time the ing purposes arguments the of counsel and hearing, photograph so a preliminary appellant, presen- the oral statement of

of it was into evidence. An introduced report, transcript investigation tence similarity that due report F.B.I. stated hearing, preliminary and exhibits from rifling marks, gun possession in its examining psychiatrist’s and 18-211 weapon. murder could have been report. report that absent some also stated following aggra- The court found the two gun missing cylinder of the had parts, the vating beyond existed a rea- circumstances following before the manually to be rotated (1) doubt: “that the murder was sonable Sullinger A Mr. testi- round could be fired. heinous, cruel, especially atrocious mani- October, 1978, appellant he sold fied that in festing exceptional 19- depravity,” I.C. § He type discovered. noted a revolver of the 2515(f)(5), “that murder and missing part that the a that it was then surrounding the circumstances its commis- hand cylinder be revolved be- had to sion, the defendant exhibited utter disre- a live round would be tween shots before life,” 19-2515(f)(6). gard for human I.C. § positioned. found, only by prepon- The court also but evidence, appointed fol- psychiatrist who was derance lowing “by prior notice of intent to circumstance appellant’s appellant, earlier con- mental disease or rely upon a duct his conduct in commission defense reported murder, propensity defect under has exhibited I.C. history probably anti- constitute appellant court that had commit murder and will

409 continuing Idaho’s, society.” virtually threat 19- statute identical 2515(f)(8). legislature in 18^4004 1977 amended I.C. §§ and 19-2515 and 19-2827 in an added § factors, regard mitigating attempt objec- to meet the Court’s stated: to such tions statutes. Sess.Laws Ch. Court, bur- “This because of the extreme premise p. 390. The basic of Woodson sentencing judge imposed den cases, Georgia, companion Gregg v. and its itself, by the offense has statute 49 L.Ed.2d 859 U.S. S.Ct. consciously all the searched information Florida, (1976); Proffitt v. hoping sincerely to find circum- before it (1976); Jurek v. mitigation which over- stances in would Texas, 428 U.S. aggravation-— come circumstances of (1976); and Roberts v. Louisi- L.Ed.2d however, mitigating such circumstances ana, do not exist.” sentencing authority is that the and: given specific guid- must be and detailed are further there “The Court finds in deciding ance assist them whether to no which out- impose penalty a death in order to assure weigh gravity circum- imposed that the death will not be imposition make stances which would arbitrary capricious in an manner. To unjust.” of the death legislature meet mandate *5 enacted an amended version of I.C. 19- that, § The court then concluded under I.C. providing sentencing hearing for a 19-2515, statutory aggravating “the cir- § which all relevant information could be outweigh mitigating cumstances circum- presented court; to the listing appellant stances” and sentenced to death. the circumstances which must Legal background IV impose be found in order to the sentence of 1977,1 Prior I.C. 18^4004 the to made death; § providing that at least one such mandatory penalty death for those defend- aggravating circumstance be to found exist ants degree convicted doubt; of first murder. beyond a reasonable providing and However, light opinion in the the of of the defendant shall be sentenced to Supreme United Court in States Woodson upon finding death such a unless the miti- Carolina, v. North gating outweigh the found un- Further, held aggravating circumstances. the mandatory legislature provided constitutional a in I.C. 19-28272 § for 19-2515(d), 1. Prior to I.C. section provided required by Code, concerning sentences death or life for first imprisonment and such other matters the sen- degree the murder. amendment By tence imposed as the required by legislature struck the alternative life impris- The Supreme Court. notice shall set forth Laws, onment, 1973 Sess. Ch. p. case, the title docket number of the the and. resulting thus in the mandatory capital punish- name of the defendant and the name and ment pre-Woodson. status address of his attorney, narrative statement judgment, the offense, and punishment 19-2827, 154, § 5, as ch. by added The be in the form of prescribed. report may 390: p. a standard questionnaire prepared sup- “Review death sentences —Preservation Court of Idaho. plied by Supreme (a) the death Whenever (b) records. — The Court of Idaho shall con- Supreme becoming judgment imposed, upon sider as well as errors punishment any final in the trial court, sentence shall enumerated by way appeal. on reviewed the record (c) regard With to the the court sentence Court of Idaho. The clerk trial shall determine: receiving tran- within ten after days (1) Whether was im- sentence of death shall transmit entire record and script, preju- under posed the influence passion, to Court of Idaho and transcript the Supreme dice, or factor, other any arbitrary together general to with a notice attorney (2) Whether evidence supports prepared by report prepared clerk judge’s finding of a cir- setting findings judge forth the the trial supreme preliminary mandatory hearing, court review of all Your Honor. I imposed. Appellant raises death sentences think that there are a number of matters challenges sentence numerous to the might which the Court address itself to in appeal, direct which contentions we con- considering sentencing, ag- as far as sider first. gravating circumstances are concerned.” presented appellant’s appeal V Issues on proceeded Mr. quote length Pincock from parts preliminary various hear- appellant’s A. contention is The first arguments record and made thereon. relying upon that the district court erred transcript preliminary hearing at the Mr. Blake then undertook on behalf of sentencing hearing opposed requiring appellant presented to discuss the facts as testimony of wit- present the state to preliminary hearing record and the open The record below nesses in court. presentence investigation report. aggravation- the court at the discloses that statement, give appellant court allowed hearing initially ap- mitigation offered the inquired and when the court if there was plea pellant opportunity change added, anything further to be Mr. Blake then guilty, which was declined. The court gave a final statement. At no time did stated: object either the state or the defendant mitiga- set this time as a “The Court has proceeding present any in this manner or hearing. tion/aggravation going I’m to witnesses for examination. appel- Blake you, ask Mr. [counsel appellant object Since did any lant], go particularly with forward preliminary hearing use of the record at first, statements, presentence as to the time, use, acquiesced fact in its investigation, and then I’ll hear wit- initially gener must determine whether the mitiga- you have in nesses or statements precludes al rule our review of matters tion.” objected prohibits to below our consid gave appellant the first effect eration of this issue. We conclude that opportunity any material facts or *6 does not. that time in what- information he wished at general applicable appellate This rule to argument by After ever form he wished. necessarily controlling review of error is not Blake, Mr. wherein no witnesses were required where called, statutorily we are to under- proceeded to hear the appellate irrespective take presentation. state’s Mr. Pincock stated for review of the contentions, prosecution: any. defendant’s if Death is clearly punishment Honor, different kind of from chosen, because I “I have Your may may imposed, other that be and good think we do record of have a—a I.C. 19-2827 mandates that we examine transpired preliminary in the hear- what calling today, procedure witnesses to not the sentence but the ing, instead of presented testimony imposing regard- at the followed in that sentence rely on the (1) death; among those enumerated Affirm the sentence of cumstance from or Code, 19-2515, (2) Idaho Set section the sentence aside and remand the resentencing by judge of death exces- case for trial Whether the sentence based argument disproportionate im- on the record and of counsel. sive or cases, (f) considering posed both the similar The sentence review shall be in addition taken, appeal, to direct if crime and the defendant. review (d) appeal the state shall shall be for considera- Both the defendant and consolidated right submit briefs within the tion. have the court, (g) present provided by and to Court shall collect and time preserve argument to the court. the records of all cases in which oral imposed (e) decision a from and in- The court shall include in its year cluding which it took 1975.” reference to those similar cases In addition to its authori- into consideration. Garcia, 108, 110, 100 Idaho 594 P.2d 3. State v. errors, ty regarding correction Watson, 694, 146, (1979); 148 State 99 Idaho v. sentences, regard review of death with 701, 835, (1978). 587 P.2d 842 to: shall be authorized

4H appeal provision imply less of whether an is even taken. While this would seem to ignore may This indicates to us that we testimony, pur- requirement of live absolute Moreover, unchallenged gravity errors. therein, suant to the last sentence it must infrequency of a sentence of death and section, light preceding be read in imposed outweighs any with which it (c) thereof 19-2515. Subsection might proposed justify rationale that be states: objected refusal to consider errors not “(c) penal- the death In all cases in which below. shall, ty may imposed, the court after jurisdictions similarly Other do not allow conviction, investiga- presentence order a appellate preclude technical rules to a com according to such tion to be conducted prehensive cases where a review of those prescribed by law and procedures as are imposed. sentence of death has been See e. shall convene a thereafter 261, g., Brown, (Utah State v. 607 P.2d 265 hearing purpose hearing all 1980); McKenna, v. 476 Pa. Commonwealth arguments relevant evidence and of coun- 428, 174, (1978); 179-80 383 A.2d State aggravation mitigation sel in 413, 1274, Ceja, 115 Ariz. 565 P.2d hearing, offense. At such the state and den., 975, 533, (1977); cert. shall be entitled to defendant (1977); Martin, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 State v. aggravation all relevant evidence in 258, (1952); Iowa 55 N.W.2d mitigation. any party present ag- Should State, Tuggle v. 73 Okl.Cr. 119 P.2d gravating or evidence which (1941). previously recog We have previously has not been disclosed to the by holding nized as much in state shall, opposing party parties, the court error, objection fundamental even absent upon request, adjourn hearing appeal. trial will be reviewed on until White, P.2d desiring the party to do so has had a cert. den. 429 U.S. respond opportunity reasonable to such (1976); Hag State v. evidence. Evidence admitted at trial gard, 94 Idaho 486 P.2d shall be considered and need be re- peated sentencing hearing.' Evi- dence offered at trial but not admitted However, while it is the conclusion may repeated amplified necessary if issue, this court that we consider the (Emphasis preliminary complete hold that the record.” add- use of the hearing transcript sentencing/aggra ed) at the mitigation hearing

vation in this case was speaks The section of the entitlement of the *7 not in error. parties they present whatever evidence Facially, provides: I.C. 19-2516 § aggravation-mitigation desire hear- at the “Inquiry into circumstances —Examina- ing. regarding decision the The ultimate tion of Witnesses. —The circumstances opportunity clearly use to made of that be by presented testimony must be the of party. precise But rests with each the court, open except in witnesses examined question by appellant raised is whether the is so sick or as that when a witness infirm testimony live mandate of I.C. § attend, deposition may to be unable to granted displaces or excludes the discretion by magistrate county, be taken a proceed to the state on how to at the hear- court, upon out of such notice to the e., ing, absolutely i. whether the statute party may the direct. adverse as court requires testimony open live in court at the testimony, representa- No or or affidavit hearing. aggravation-mitigation We decide kind, written, tion of verbal or can be that it does not. by offered to or received or a The last sentence of I.C. 19-2516 makes § thereof, judge aggravation mitiga- in or that we are to treat both sections as clear except provid- punishment, tion of the as together setting procedure forth the to be preceding ed in this and the section.” added) (Emphasis hearings. pro- followed in such statute ing vides previously presented 19-2516, that evidence contemplated by I.C. repeated trial may need be indeed court its reach decision amplified be parties if are by receiving desired. the unsworn formal state- sides, presented “entitled to by together all relevant evi- ments both [other] they dence” presentence argu- desire. The manifest intent is with the report place possible much respective as relevant informa- of ments counsel. provided tion as can before the sentenc- proceeding appellant this did not provide court. This also serves request present any to the trial court for court with as much information and as com- hearing required by formal plete possible a record as appellate for re- participated objec- 19-2516 but without While, admittedly, speaks view. the section type hearing tion in the more informal of trial, prior light evidence from the by sentencing judge. conducted Af- statute, purpose we see no need complained ter the of statements were requirement to read into the statute by prosecutor, appellant’s made coun- considered, previously other infor- relevant responded responded sel to these state- preliminary hearing mation from is to advising appel- ments the court presented be excluded unless again once them, deny lant would and continued testimony. live certainly This is where true arguing that court should consider appellant also relied the informa- appellant’s age.” (Emphasis original) prelimi- tion in the contained record P.2d at nary hearing, as occurred here.4 there, question While the the unsworn counsel, argument statements or presented court was This here, preliminary hearing use Coutts, P.2d 642 testimony, identical, are not we find the argument with provisions a similar that the analogy persuasive. Where the defendant of I.C. 19-2516 were absolute. In that expressly impliedly agrees dispense case, the defendant claimed that certain formality possible with the under stat- prosecutor remarks during the sen ute, e., presentation i. of all statements tencing hearing equivalent were the of un oath, orally and under and instead allows provi sworn evidence in violation of the presentation prior through of facts evi- split noting sions of the statute. After dence, presentence reports, argument of authority among jurisdictions as for counsel, like, prima and the we find no facie mality required hearings, at such this court error due to such use. stated: system recognize “In a viable order maintain We that cases where the death ordinary sentencing hearings, penalty may imposed under cir- are “under cumstances, hearings Indeed, normally ordinary need such circumstances.” our procedur- strong procedural require- all not be with belief that the encumbered requirements provided legislature al attend a resolution ments should care, guilt especially doing of the issue of innocence. The since be followed with opportunity holds in the absence of an therefore so assures this court appellate explicit request meaningful hear- review. Yet formal make *8 appellant’s object aggravating did district While counsel the yond court factors “be- However, preliminary hearing transcript, the use of doubt.” such an reasonable object unnecessary given he suffi- is noted that did indeed the need evaluation is for a Thus, ciency hearing aggravating mitigating the evidence disclosed therein. cir- new on preliminary hearing opinion express record he relied to as to cumstances and we no arguably mitigating show circumstances what the to show. See record shows fails aggra- facially statutory to vating show the absence of It discussion infra. can also be noted that beyond doubt. problem sufficiency factors reasonable arguable with forced to the facts preliminary hearing Were we evaluate disclosed at evidence adduced record, hearing might preliminary we does sentencing stage, extend to use of that record agree appellant certain facts were not with proper. a use we hold here support findings by adequately proved

443 U.C.A., 1953, are faced with a where “It is to be noted that here situation unreasoning adherence to the formal re- specifically eight ag- 76-5-202 sets forth quirements materially would not add to the circumstances, gravating one or more of objectives. We achievement alleged, proved, which must be and found in the court’s find no error consideration Hence, charged by the fact finder. one preliminary hearing along record with capital felony put with a on notice and the other information before it. is made aware of what the State must Next, prove prepare able to his de- and thus appellant’s

B. we consider argument process that he was due denied fense.” 607 P.2d at 822. formally notify

since the state did not him However, Sonnier, 379 So.2d seeking it was the death (La.1979), the court stated: aggravating forewarn him as to which cir capital defendant entitled in a “[A] prove beyond it would seek to cumstances proceeding, sentencing no less than in the sentencing hearing. at the reasonable doubt trial, guilt or to be innocence informed of sentencing While “it is now clear that the nature and cause of the accusation itself, process, as well as the trial must him, against 1, art. LSA-Const. satisfy requirements of the Due Process (1974), right his Fifth Amendment Clause,” Florida, 349, Gardner 430 U.S. ‘[njotice given sufficiently . . . in ad- 358, 1197, 1204, 393, 97 S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d proceedings vance of scheduled court (1977), so process/notice requirements the due opportunity prepare reasonable necessarily are not the same York, afforded, as those at trial. “[setting] Williams v. New will be forth the ’ 241, 248-252, 1079, 1084- alleged with particularly.” misconduct 1085, 93 L.Ed. reh. Gault, In Re U.S. den. 337 U.S. 69 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed. (1967). 459 [sic] Thus, the defendant is entitled to know circumstances which the case, In the under I.C. 18- §§ prosecution 19-2513A, prove sufficiently will seek to upon pleading 19-2513 and guilty charge degree to a of first murder in advance of proceedings court so that appellant was informed that he could be opportunity prepare reasonable will be death, sentenced to or to a determinate or afforded.” 379 at 1356. So.2d imprison- indeterminate sentence of life However, the court in Sonnier then held ment. Not does notify, the statute so standing that the defendant lacked to con- but the record reflects that the court below alleged test the issue because he had not sentencing possibilities made the abundant- either that he was not so informed or that ly appellant clear to during more than once any attempt he had made to obtain the Indeed, proceedings. possibility information. capital punishment point was noted at each agree We position with the taken proceedings plea appel- in the where the Morris, Utah Court in Andrews v. lant was discussed. Whether the state supra. clearly The statute forth sets urge would the maximum or not one of the listed question adequate was immaterial to the possible. must appellant proven beyond doubt, notice to that it was We a reasonable regard. find no error in this outweigh any must circum- shown, prior imposition stances of death. Morris, (Utah Andrews v. P.2d 816 Generally, apparent it is that there will be 1980) cert. den. surprise any given no under the facts of dis- potential aggravating case as to what cir- missed the defendant’s contention that cumstances are involved. Both defense sentencing procedure was unconstitutional *9 prosecution partici- counsel and who have given aggra- in was that no notice as to the pated preliminary vating upon hearing in the earlier and circumstances which the sought. ordinarily appraised was held: trial will Utah court well and conversant with the facts and issues in- “The Court further are finds that there aggravation-mitigation volved in the mitigating no out- hear- circumstances which ing. gravity statute, weigh We of additionally circum- note that imposition in I.C. stances and would make 19-2515(c), provides § that should penalty unjust.” (Emphasis of the death any party present previously evidence not added) disclosed, upon request court shall ad- journ hearing opponent until the has appeal The record on reflects had a opportunity respond. reasonable appellant’s counsel raised below a number Here, the district expressly court informed arguable mitigating such circumstances argu- counsel to disclose the and evidence appellant’s prior as the nature of criminal record, ments to be upon hearing, history relied at the polydrug and his of alcohol and abuse,5 personal the state did so inform the and back appellant. Such familial ground, protections varying interpretations and are sufficient we will and possible surrounding from facts the of superfluous judicial attach thereto re- only fense. Not were these issues raised quirement formally notify that the state they argued, were also in the particular aggravating defendant cir- investigation presentence psychiatric rely. cumstance which it will reports clearly and thus before the district question C. The next us is wheth- before court. failing the trial er court erred in to set 19-2515(d) mandatory I.C. its the mitigating forth it factors considered. court writing terms: “the shall set forth in 19-2515(d) I.C. § states:. any mitigating factors considered.” “(d) Upon the conclusion of evidence reasoning behind similar re- arguments mitigation aggra- quirement specific findings written vation the court shall written find- make explained by the Florida Court: ings setting any statutory aggra- forth step required by “The fourth Fla.Stat. vating Further, circumstance found. 921.141,F.S.A., judge is that the trial writing any coart shall set forth in miti- justifies writing, his sentence of death in gating and, if factors considered provide meaning- opportunity finds that circumstances ful review this Court. Discrimination outweigh gravity any aggravating capriciousness cannot stand where rea- unjust circumstance found so as to make required, important son is and this is an imposition penalty, of the death protection element added for the writing court shall detail in its reasons defendant. Not sen- convicted is the finding.” added) for so (Emphasis open judicial tence then review correction, judge required but the trial previously, As noted the district court stat- issue to view the of life or death within opinion ed its memorandum that it had provided the framework of rules hop- “searched all the information before Dixon, statute.” State 283 So.2d sincerely ing find in miti- (Fla.1973) cert. den. 416 U.S. gation which would the circum- overcome (1974). aggravation however, stances of such mit- — (Em- igating circumstances do not exist.” requirement writ feel the We phasis added.) findings pur The court also made the serves a ten and detailed dual finding pose. Initially of fact: it focuses the attention of (1971); ingestion drugs While or alcohol 487 P.2d 686 State v. appellant Snowden, evening on the offense is not 79 Idaho P.2d (1957). generally, Shepard, sufficient itself to raise defense to the See Liebman and crime, Beyond any arguable Capital Sentencing “Guiding it is our conclusion that Discretion impact proper Mitigat- ‘Boilerplate’: of such is a substance abuse Mental Disorder as a mitigation punishment upon Factor," Georgetown consideration in Law Journal 757 sentencing. appears Such to be the effect Gomez, 18-116. See also *10 921.141(6); Neb.Rev. Fla.Stat.Ann. sentencing § court all the informa- See thorough requires 29-2523(2); Code 76-3-207. § tion before it and Utah Stat. analysis of all relevant factors. Gregg reasoned in v. Supreme noted Geor- Court helps imposition assure that the This 197, 96 gia, supra, objective of death is reasoned and sentence au- 888 that 49 L.Ed.2d at required. constitutionally It also serves as to determine state is asked thority in that purpose, by the Florida as noted Su- any special facts about there are whether Court, preme making process cooper- age, extent of such as the defendant imposing rationally reviewable. On state at the police, or emotional ation with review, 19-2515(d) if the mandates of I.C. § offense, mitigate which would time of the met, we can determine whether are capital punishment. imposition of against ignored any lower overlooked or court concept miti- that the generally We note factors, mitigating raised whether the evi- Mitigating circumstances gation is broad. supports dence factors have been defined as: found, finally whether the court has justification as do not constitute “Such weighed properly all factors. If the find- question, in but or excuse of the offense ings the lower are not set forth court which, mercy, may be fairness exactitude, court with reasonable extenuating reducing the or considered its review on an would be forced make degree culpability.” moral Black’s record, inadequate and could not fulfill the (5th 1979) Dictionary ed. at 903. Law “meaningful appellate function of review” previously discussing mitigat- demanded the decisions of the United the court In Supreme States Court. We hold concept under our sen- legislative requirement mitigating that all tencing provisions, this court stated: factors considered be set forth must be open “It to debate as to whether met.6 19- the ‘circumstances’ mentioned requiring the court to consider and 2515, I.C., particularly to circum- refer factors, specify mitigating pause give surrounding the commission stances guidance on the matter. While the some tending aggravate the crime and legislature provided any sug- has not in- mitigate character of the conduct gestions as to what constitute volved, in- or whether such circumstances factors, statutes from other states delin- do convict, himself, as an indi- clude also possibilities.7 eate The Model Penal Code vidual, include his back- which would among following sets forth the factors oth- environ- ground, age, upbringing and his ers: appropriate any ment or other matter “(a) significant The defendant has no his- culpabil- degree a determination of tory prior (b) activity, criminal that the statute should ity. We think murder committed while the defend- interpretation, particu- given the broader ant was under the extreme influence of Owen, larly capital in a case.” State (g) mental or emotional disturbance.... 253 P.2d 73 Idaho murder, capacity At time of grounds, overruled on other appreciate of the defendant the crimi- Shepherd, 94 Idaho 486 P.2d 82 nality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to requirements conform conduct to the feeling. is still our Such impaired of the law was as a result of Thus, that there was error in we conclude mental disease or defect or tion____” intoxica- writing 1962). specify 210.6(4) (Tent.Draft the court’s failure “suggestions,” Though course, 7. Of such unavailable be- the district judicial, original sentencing, are not exclusive as the United low at the time of I.C.R. significant guidance States made in Lockett v. 33.1 and 33.2 clear provide mitiga- regard infra, Ohio, where a policy to such matters. unlimited tion was mandated. *11 mitigating it factors considered. Yet the Conse- lative authorization. inclusion of quently, resentencing. we remand finding light be in here must viewed such a finding of the court’s statements that this Appellant argues

D. next that the stat- upon statutory aggra- as a was relied is not ute unconstitutional because it fails to specify generally mitigating argument vating This circumstance. While the factors. Ohio, disposed was of in Lockett finding v. U.S. of such a would be ill-ad- inclusion 57 L.Ed.2d 973 impact proc- the possible vised due to its on (1978), Supreme wherein the Court held it balancing aggravating ess of the circum- legislature was unconstitutional for the beyond stances found a reasonable doubt sentencing body’s limit the consideration of raised, and the circumstances mitigating factors to a those enumerated in here, express due exclusion Mata, statute. See also State v. 125 Ariz. by finding we find no 609 P.2d cert. den. 449 error. S.Ct. U.S. Appellant argues next F. due Appellant E. next assigns as error the process statutory denied under finding “by preponderance court’s a penalty may scheme since death be ar evidence” propensi- that he has a exhibited mitigat rived at unless the court finds the ty to commit murder probably which would aggravat ing outweigh constitute continuing a to society. threat ing Appellant circumstance con found. response district court observed in impermissible tends an that this constitutes argument upon appellant’s motion for proof shifting of the de burden correction or reduction of sentence: Mullaney fendant cites the cases of v. requires aggravating “Sec. 19-2515 Wilbur, 421 beyond circumstances must be found a L.Ed.2d 508 and Woodson North reasonable doubt and since the Court Carolina, supra, support proposi of this finding by preponderance made such Mullaney, Supreme tion. Court was beyond doubt, rather than a reasonable it a statutory faced with state scheme which obvious that Court did consider placed upon the burden a defendant finding aggravating such an as circum- prove aby preponderance of the evidence stance in making relied its passion he acted the heat of order sentencing. Perhaps ultimate such find- charge manslaughter. to reduce a murder ing, by since preponderance it was a Court held this to be unconsti beyond evidence rather than a reason- process re tutional since the due clause doubt, able should have been inserted reasona quired prove beyond state However, stated, a finding. as above passion of heat of ble doubt absence the Court was cautious to note that provocation when that issue sudden finding preponderance was made 701-4, 95 properly presented. 421 U.S. at and was not considered the Court aas 1891-92, 520-22. 44 L.Ed.2d at S.Ct. at statutory aggravating circumstance be- essentially was that decided What the cause it beyond was not found a reasona- proving all the burden the state had ble doubt.” offense, including establish elements 19-2515(f) states that legiti intent when a criminal sufficient least one of cir question on of intent was mate issue beyond cumstances must found to exist that in some situa The Court noted raised. reasonable before doubt the sentence of defendant bears the burden of tions imposed. finding A death of an e., introducing i. some evi production, preponder circumstance issue, prosecution but the an to raise feel, dence evidence, ance of the should not persuasion beyond burden of statutorily required retains into the enter evalua process express legis- tive in the absence of doubt. Id. reasonable initially Mullaney unpersuasive penalty cases was set forth in authority We find Georgia, supra, appellant’s Gregg contention.8 Here we are of an proof not concerned with element of wherein engaged but rather are that a offense Justice Stewart noted inquiry all facts and circum- vague into relevant “could standards so scheme have *12 weigh might upon propri- adequately stances which they would fail to channel the ety punishment. weighing capital of The sentencing patterns juries decision of with a process, opinion our does not involve pattern of arbitrary capri- that a and result persuasion but is shifting the burden of sentencing like that cious found unconstitu- presentation of instead with concerned in Furman could 428 tional occur.” U.S. relevant information to the sentencer 46, 2935, 195, at n. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d at deci- order that reasoned and considered Gregg, petitioner argued 887. that bur- sion defendant’s can be reached. The language Georgia death merely raise, aggravation- den is in the authorizing imposition statute of death might mitigation hearing, any factors which “outrageously if the offense was or wanton- possibly mitigate culpability his for tend vile, horrible, ly or inhuman in that it in- opportunity full the offense. He has torture, mind, depravity volved of or an argue those factors. The aggravated battery to the was im- victim” below then evaluates those factors under permissibly vague The and overbroad. Su- guidelines set forth the statute. His Court, however, preme held this lan- that decision, including reasoning, set is then guage was not unconstitutional on its face: forth in detail and this court reviews the is, course, arguable any “It of murder possible speak process. entire While it is depravity involves of aggrava- mind or an persuasion of a “burden” on the defend- battery. ted language But this need not be why ant to he should le- establish receive way, construed this and there is no reason that, niency, sentencing we feel under our Supreme to assume that the Court Geor- process, speak facts themselves once gia adopt open-ended will such construc- presented. completeness of the evalua- 201, 2938, tion.” 428 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. at process mandatory tive below re- at 890. Subsequently, Godfrey L.Ed.2d feel, view this withstands con- Georgia, 420, v. 446 U.S. State, scrutiny. stitutional Tichnell v. (1980), the Supreme L.Ed.2d 398 Court held (1980); Md. 415 A.2d 848-50 statutory provisions where concerning Watson, 120 Ariz. 586 P.2d aggravating circumstances such as these cert. den. applied any murder, be limiting could 59 L.Ed.2d 478 indispensable construction is if the state is its Appellant argues obligation

G. next that lan- to meet constitutional “to tai- guage apply law statutory found lor and its in a circumstances manner beyond arbitrary capricious a reasonable doubt the district avoids inflic- unconstitutionally vague. penalty.” court9 is We tion statutory language conclude that this with- 64 L.Ed.2d at 406. scrutiny. stands constitutional Gregg, apparent it is the lan- Under 19-2515(f)(5) guide guage The need for clear standards to contained in I.C. §§ However, body (6) facially discretion in death is constitutional. in- upon by appellant, 8. The other case relied Carolina, supra, provides (5) heinous, especially Woodson North no The murder was support proposition cruel, manifesting exceptional for the advanced. atrocious or depravity. murder, (6) 19-2515. By sur- circumstances commission, rounding its the defendant ex- (f) statutory disregard following utter life.” are hibited human circumstances, at least one of which must beyond a be found to exist reasonable doubt imposed: can before sentence of death person fairly asmuch as a reasonable could L.Ed.2d 322 the Nebraska “especially characterize murder as hei- considered the nous, cruel, manifesting excep- atrocious circumstance that murder “manifested exhibiting depravity” tional and as an “ut- exceptional depravity ordinary standards life,” disregard ter equally for human is morality intelligence,” and stated: apparent Godfrey under this court interpreting portion “In stat- place must limiting construction ute, key ‘exceptional.’ It word statutory aggravating these might argued every murder in- possibility so appli- avoid the their depravity. The volves use of the word cation in an unconstitutional manner. however, ‘exceptional,’ confines it jurisdictions Other opportu have had an appar- depravity those situations where nity to statutory language construe similar obviously ent to such an extent as to *13 in I.C. 19-2515(f)(5). contained § In all of morality offend standards and in- Dixon, (Fla.1973), 283 1 So.2d cert. telligence.” den., 943, 1951, 416 94 U.S. S.Ct. agree We with the definition of 295 the defendant attacked the con “heinous, cruel” forth by atrocious and set stitutionality the aggravating Dixon, Supreme the Florida Court in capital circumstance that felony was “[t]he “exceptional with depravi the definition of heinous, especially or atrocious cruel.” The ty” forth Supreme set Nebraska Supreme interpreted Florida Court this lan Court in Simants. With these construc guage as follows: tions, e., i. that the murder must be accom meaning feel “[W]e such panied by setting apart acts it from the terms is a matter of common knowledge, norm of murders that its commission so that ordinary an man would not have such depravity manifests as to offend all guess at what was intended. It is our of morality intelligence, standards interpretation that heinous means ex- aggravating circumstance contained I.C. evil; tremely shockingly or wicked 19-2515(f)(5) sufficiently § definite and atrocious outrageously means wicked and guide vile; limited and, court’s dis designed that cruel means imposing penalty. cretion high degree inflict a the death pain with utter to, enjoyment of, indifference or even limiting A similar construction suffering of others. isWhat intended to placed must be aggravating cir capital be are included those crimes 19-2515(f)(6), cumstances I.C. § where the actual capi- commission murder, “[b]y the or the circumstances sur felony accompanied by tal was such addi- commission, rounding its the defendant ex apart tional to set acts as the crime from disregard hibited utter life.” human To capital the norm of felonies—the con- circumstance, properly define pitiless this is im scienceless or crime which is un- portant aggravating note necessarily the other cir torturous to the victim.” Id. added) (Emphasis provision at 9. with this over cumstances which laps. aggravating The second circum Florida, Subsequently, in Profitt v. 428 U.S. stance, 19-2515(f)(2), I.C. that the defend § 242, 255-56, 2968, 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d ant committed another murder time at the 925 Supreme United States committed, obviously this murder could approved construction, of this observ life, show utter disregard for human as ing that say cannot provi that the “[w]e circumstance, sion, could the third construed, provides so inadequate 19-2515(f)(3), I.C. guidance § defendant charged to those with the duty of knowingly great created a risk of death to recommending imposing sentences in capital many persons. The can said Simants, cases.” In same State v. 197 circumstance, Neb. 250 N.W.2d 891 fourth I.C. cert. den., 19-2515(f)(4), that the murder was com L.Ed.2d den., reh. mitted for will not remuneration. Since we delegated presume legislative that the intent was to dard and said Director duplicate any already carry enumerated circum power details so as to to determine stance, 19-2515(f)(6) making thus legislative purpose out which the (See, g., Dept. surplusage mere e. Norton v. Legislature practically cannot or effi- Employment, 94 Idaho P.2d ciently perform The statute is suf- itself. (1972)), phrase we hold that the “utter dis ficiently complete accomplish regu- regard” must be viewed in reference to acts particular falling lation of the matters those set forth in I.C. 19- §§ other than Legislature’s jurisdiction.” within the 2515(f)(2),(3), and We conclude instead at 514-5. S.W.2d phrase that the is meant to reflective of agree analysis; We with this we will not surrounding acts the crime department assume that the director of the utmost, highest, cal exhibit will than rea- of corrections act other life, e., disregard lous for human i. sonable manner. cold-blooded,pitiless slayer. With such an interpretation, it is our conclusion VI Conclusion aggravating circumstance meets the consti discussion, light preceding requirements tutional set forth the Unit Additionally, sentence of death is reversed. remand, Upon ed States Court. being required under I. C. 19-2827 to *14 should, the district court in accordance with appellate independent undertake an review opinion provisions and the of I.C.R. 33.1 any alleged appeal, errors raised on (enacted subsequent original and 33.2 review, although note our awareness of that case), specifically in this set it is clear the actual review in reasoning forth the underlying facts and regard to the case awaits resentenc- finding, any, statutory aggra if that a ing possibility and the that the vating circumstance exists. again imposed. death is Finally, appellant argues H. Sentence reversed and case remanded for legislature improperly delegated resentencing in accordance with opin- power to inflict the death ion. pro Board of Corrections. I.C. vides: BAKES, J., DONALDSON, J., C. punishment “The of death must be in- concur. injection flicted the intravenous of a quan- substance or substances in a lethal SHEPARD, J., opinion. dissents without

tity sufficient to cause until the BISTLINE, Justice, separately concur- defendant is dead. The director of the ring resentencing. in reversal for department of corrections shall determine guilty pled charge the substance or Osborn to a of first substances to be used degree procedures appeals murder. He now and the to be used in from the imposed upon sentence of death which was execution.” having place, him. No trial taken the fol- argument disposed parte This was of in Ex lowing transcript facts from are taken Granviel, (Tex.Cr.App.1978): S.W.2d preliminary hearing. existence of an area for exercise “[T]he of discretion an administrative officer delegation authority

under does not I. delegation render unlawful where stan- victim, Osborn and the murder Charlotte guidance dards formulated for and limit- Carl, employed Christine were both at a discretion, though general, capable ed are They together cafe in were seen Pocatello. application of reasonable .... Holiday in a room Inn at the on October 31st, evening, The next Osborn appears Legislature It that the de- stopped by police driving has officer for policy primary clared a and fixed stan- in an inattentive manner. Osborn was not sufficiently arrested, intoxicated to be but Sullinger Martin testified that in October the officer did ask Osborn’s passenger, 1978 he had sold Osborn a revolver of the Chris, whom Osborn called type to drive. agreed discovered. He with the FBI report weapon’s as to the mechanical attrib- night, Later that Christine body, Carl’s utes. clothed, partially was found the road. being After bound over to district She had head, been shot three times in the filing and after of an information once in the shoulder once in the abdo- charging him with murder in the first de- men. Her face showed tremendous contu- gree, Osborn notified the court of an intent side, right sions on the bruising some on the rely on a defense of mental disease or side, left and a fractured nose. pathol- provisions defect under the of I.C. 18-209. ogist performed who autopsy felt psychiatrist found that he was not the bullet wound behind the ear was a close protection within 18-211, of I.C. § wound, contact while those wounds in the indicated that Osborn claimed history temple probably distance, were fired at a polydrug abuse, and that Osborn claimed to although he conceded that such could have drugs have been on the time of the been incurred at a distance of less than crime. As to Osborn’s claim that he re- eighteen pathologist inches. The stated nothing crime, membered psychi- that the amount of blood indicated her nose opinion atrist stated his that such claim of had prior been being broken to her shot. genuine. amnesia was not He also stated that in this the beat- opinion subsequently pled Osborn guilty. The prior occurred shooting, but he court, following district hearing, the suffi- then merely conjecture stated that this was ciency of which challenged, is not accepted as bruising the same would have occurred plea. After presen- submission of a had beating immediately occurred report, tence an aggravation/mitigation she was shot to death. hearing was held. hearing, At that *15 neither About night 10:30 that Osborn arrived at side called prosecutor witnesses. The ad- home, Lucy driving Baker’s Christine Carl’s vised the court that “because I think we do pistol car. He had possession in his and good have a—a record transpired of what in vest, Osborn, blood on his chest and boots. the preliminary hearing, instead calling appeared “weird,” who acting to be but who today, witnesses rely to on the [I choose] drunk, appear did not to be stated that he testimony presented preliminary the had shot Christine Carl. He first stated he ” hearing . . .. The trial court therefore mountains; body had buried her in the then sentencing had purposes argu- the oral put he said he had it on some railroad counsel, ments of an by oral statement Os- tracks. He also stated that she had called born, presentence the report, transcript the cops the on him and why that was he had and preliminary exhibits from the hearing, had to shoot her. report the FBI psychiatric and the 18-211 § house, occupants Two of Baker’s at Os- evaluation. request, They born’s hid the car. observed following court found the aggra- two blood passenger on the front seat and door. vating beyond circumstances a reasonable police prem- later searched (1) the Baker doubt: “the especially murder was ises heinous, cruel, and found a .22 cal. nine-shot revolver. atrocious or manifesting ex- This revolver was at the FBI lab in ceptional Wash- depravity”; and “that ington preliminary at the time of the hear- murder and the surrounding circumstances ing, only pictures commission, so of it were introduced in its the defendant exhibited ut- report evidence. The FBI stated that disregard ter for human life.” The court gun weapon, found, could have been the murder also only by preponderance but cylinder gun evidence, and that the of the had to be circumstance manually Osborn, rotated before each round could by prior conduct and be murder, fired. conduct in the “has exhibited a 19-2515, propensity prob- obviously an apparent to commit murder and will done in at objections meet ably continuing tempt socie- to the Su constitute a threat preme premise The basic of Wood- Court. ty.” cases, companion Gregg v. son and its Geor circumstances, As to court gia, U.S. succinctly none found there were Texas, (1976), Jurek U.S. outweighed gravity aggra of the (1976), 49 L.Ed.2d 929 and Prof vating I.C. circumstances. Pursuant Florida, fitt 96 S.Ct. 19-2515, imposed pen the death is that L.Ed.2d * alty. We now have the case before us body given “specific be and detailed must ordinary appeal, both as an and also on guidance deciding to assist them in whether mandatory review the death sentence as impose penalty” a death in order “to required 19-2827.1 under I.C. § penalty will not assure that the death be capricious arbitrary or imposed in man II. 252-53, ner.” 428 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. Prior to 18-4004 made legislature, this To meet mandate penalty mandatory death for those defend- 19-2515, enacting provided for a sentenc degree ants first convicted of murder. hearing at which all relevant informa However, light opinion court, presented tion the trial could Supreme United States Woodson listed the Carolina, v. North impose must be found in order to a sentence which held a death, provided aggra that at least one mandatory penalty virtually statute vating beyond circumstance found must be unconstitutional, identical doubt, Idaho’s provided reasonable legislature amended I.C. shall be §§ defendant sentenced death un- evident, usage “(1) * As is of the word “we” Whether the sentence death was throughout opinion literary passion, imposed udice, prej- is a matter of under the influence doing factor, license. The plained by arbitrary reason for so will be ex other opinion. “(2) supports addendum this Whether the evidence judge’s finding statutory aggravating of a cir- provides among 1. I.C. § 19-2827 cumstance from enumerated follows: those 19-2515, Code, section “(a) Whenever the death is im- “(3) Whether the of death is sentence ex- posed, judgment becoming final disproportionate cessive posed im- in the trial sentence shall re- cases, considering in similar both the *16 viewed on the record the and the crime defendant. court, of Idaho. The clerk of the within trial “(d) Both the the defendant and state shall (10) days receiving transcript, ten after the right have the briefs within submit the shall transmit the entire record tran- and court, by provided present time the and to script Supreme to the Court of Idaho and to argument oral to the court. attorney general together the prepared by with notice “(e) The court shall its include decision report prepared clerk the and a reference those cases which setting findings similar judge the trial forth the required by Code, took into consideration. authority court, In 19-2515(d), addition to its section errors, regarding of correction the concerning and such other tence sen- matters regard imposed may with of required to review death sen- as be tences, Supreme shall be authorized to: The Court. notice shall set forth “(1) death; case, Affirm the of the title sentence and docket number “(2) Set the name of the sentence aside and remand the defendant and the and name attorney, resentencing by judge case for trial address of his based narrative statement offense, argument judgment, punishment on record of the prescribed. of counsel. “(f) report may The sentence shall The of review be in addi- in the form taken, appeal, questionnaire prepared sup- tion to direct if and the standard review plied by appeal Supreme shall be for Court of Idaho. consolidated consider- “(b) Supreme shall ation. Court of Idaho punishment any “(g) consider the er- as well as Court shall collect and by way appeal. preserve rors enumerated the records of all cases which the “(c) regard imposed With sentence the death was from and in- year cluding shall determine: 1975." outweigh less the mandates not that we imposed, pro- examine the sentence but the gravity circumstanc- sentence, imposing cedure followed in Further, legisla- 19-2827 the es. in I.C. § regardless appeal of whether an is even mandatory Supreme provided ture for death, gravity taken. The a sentence of Court review of all sentences. Os- infrequency and the with which it is im- appeal born on his raises numerous chal- outweigh posed, any administrative conve- lenges sentencing procedure both to the fol- might by refusing nience that be achieved constitutionality lowed below and to the unchallenged errors. to consider § 19-2515. jurisdictions similarly

Other do not allow appellate preclude rules to technical a com- III. prehensive review of those cases where a A. The issue raised is his first Osborn imposed. has been sentence of death rely- trial court erred in contention that the McKenna, Com. v. 476 Pa. 383 A.2d 174 ing preliminary hearing transcript on the instance, defendant, who had sentencing hearing, opposed re- death, appeal alleged on been sentenced to quiring testimony the state to various at his trial but did not chal- errors open of witnesses in court. Since Osborn lenge constitutionality or the sentence object preliminary the use of the did not sen- of the statute under which he was hearing transcript, acquiesced in and in fact Nonetheless, tenced. after not- use, initially its we must determine whether object to a the rule that failure to precludes general rule which our review appellate sentence at forecloses to, Garcia, objected of matters not State v. sentence, apply review of that refused to P.2d 146 100 Idaho that rule: Watson, P.2d 99 Idaho course, recognize, “We that the doc- (1978), precludes our consideration of this is, adversary sys- trine of waiver in our general applicable ap- issue. The rule indispensable litigation, tem of to the or- peals necessarily controlling is not where judicial process. derly functioning of the review, we are mandated to conduct a irre- are, however, rare There occasional situa- contentions, spective of the defendant’s if appellate tions where an court must con- any, legis- simple being reason that the society sider the as a whole in interests of providing mandatory review lature in done, justice regard- seeing to it that surely aware of that which Justice might less of what otherwise be the nor- Powell wrote: procedure. such situation is mal One the Court have now members of “[F]ive surely imposition capital punish- recognized that death is a dif- expressly unique penalty That this is a re- ment. punishment from oth- ferent kind of jurisprudential quiring special treatment imposed er which this coun- concept is a now embodied in a try. point . .. of view of the From law of this Commonwealth. Thus section defendant, different in both its sev- it is 1311(g) expressly pro- Code Crimes point erity finality. its From the vides that sentence of death shall be ‘[a] *17 .society, view action of the sover- of subject by review to automatic Su- eign taking life of one of its citi- in preme Pennsylvania . . . .’ Court of See any dramatically from zens also differs Pennsylvania also Rule 1941 of the Rules legitimate action. It is of other state Appellate This is illustra- of Procedure. importance to the defendant and to general proposition vital while a tive of a that to im- community any that decision may normally make an in- defendant be, appear rights pose voluntary the death sentence and waiver of formed and be, caprice himself, personal than or to do so based on reason rather his freedom Florida, public give way 430 v. must where a substantial emotion.” Gardner involved; ap- 357-58, policy a case an 349, 51 is in such 97 peals fully in may court feel warranted L.Ed.2d 393

423 this seeking to reach an We have any issue. no to examine the record doubt this is such a case. Because errors affecting rights that the substantial imposition accused, of the death is irrevo- though even made not a finality, imperative ground Clair, appeal.”); cable in its is that State v. St. 3 230, 323, (1955) which sentence Utah 2d 282 327 standards P.2d beyond (“[wjhile constitutionally ordinarily ques- fixed be re- we will not raise proach.” (foot- Id. 383 A.2d tions of on our own ... at error motion omitted). capital justice *18 hearing admitted shall and argu- at trial be considered need all and relevant evidence repeated sentencing hearing. aggravation mitiga- be at the ments of and counsel hearing, tion Evidence at trial admitted of the offense. At such offered but not may repeated amplified necessary be state and the shall entitled or if defendant aggravation complete all relevant evidence the record." tencing preliminary court reads a cold record instead of hearing is to determine wheth- hearing witnesses, seeing live but er a crime has been committed and whether regard probable also must have due for I.C. 19- there is § cause to believe that 2516: crime was by committed the accused. State Ruddell, v. 97 Idaho 546 P.2d 391 “The presented by must be (1976); Haggard, State v. 94 Idaho the testimony of witnesses examined in P.2d 260 preliminary hearing At a court,

open except that when a witness is prosecutor neither nor the defense so sick or as to infirm be unable to at- any counsel has incentive go great tend, deposition his may be taken case, lengths presenting or in cross- magistrate county, court, out of examining the other side’s witnesses. The upon such party notice to the adverse preliminary hearing usually held at an may the court direct. No affidavit or early stage in proceedings so that testimony, representation kind, any or pre- defense counsel has had little time to written, verbal or can be offered to or pare, having prepared, or sees no reason to thereof, judge received or a or, display, his in some situations hand — aggravation mitigation pun- may examining magis- well realize that the ishment, provided except as in this and testimony trate is not any inclined to hear preceding (Emphasis section.” add- merely questions raises of fact. A ed.) magistrate pass upon guilt, does not Coutts, In State 101 Idaho 609 there seems to be some view in the state P.2d this Court held that ought that issues passed upon of fact not be district court did not have to follow the fact, State, either. in Freeman v. requirements formal 19-2516 in the 392 P.2d 542 the Court absence of an explicit request therefor. put wholly the matter at rest: This decision was said to be based on the “ preliminary ‘A examination before a belief requirement other would committing magistrate is in no sense a impose a formality useless on the trial purpose trial. The judg- is to obtain the courts requiring swearing of wit- magistrate ment of a effect that a nesses for even perfunctory the most committed, crime has has been facts and on the provisions belief that if committed that there is reasonable presentence reports had relaxed the re- ground person to believe accused quirements of 19-2516. The pro- Court guilty committing the crime. It is ceeded to hold that order to maintain a “[i]n expected, required, not to be nor is it system sentencing viable hearings, under formality precision the same must circumstances, ordinary hearings such nor- preliminary obtain in a examination as is mally need not be encumbered with all the Bilboa, required upon the trial.’ procedural requirements which attend a P. 33 Idaho 248.” 87 Idaho at guilt resolution of the issue of or inno- (emphasis added). 392 P.2d at 546 cence.” 101 Idaho at 609 P.2d at 645 opinion quoted in the the Court Later (emphasis added). today We hold of Minnesota for an almost those cases in penalty may which the death preliminary statement as to a identical be imposed represent “ordinary do not cir- trial, hearing being in no sense a also de- gravity infrequency cumstances.” The being merely process scribing it as where- of a sentence of death are such that it is under the state determine if it wants necessary procedural all formalities proceed against the further accused. 87 followed with the utmost care. Such a Idaho at 392 P.2d at 547. proposition need not be belabored. reasoning applies to the The same case at by our Our is buttressed deci- conclusion of death can be bar. Before a sentence regard preliminary use of 19-2515(f) requires sions with imposed, I.C. regard, In that hearing testimony trial. must be least one circumstance pre- function proven beyond we have noted that of a doubt. A a reasonable

425 liminary hearing simply designed informed of the nature is nor and cause of the him, produce establishing against evidence accusation intended to LSA-Const. Art. doubt; 1, beyond a 13§ facts reasonable defend- and to his Fifth Amend- right ‘[njotice pleads guilty, given ant who and hence has no ment to .. . suffi- trial, searching ciently procedure pro- to a as in advance of entitled scheduled ceedings it opportunity as a trial before is deter- so that reasonable reliable afforded, put prepare he to death. “[setting] mined that should be to will be alleged partic- forth the misconduct with argu- B. we will Next consider Osborn’s ’ Gault, ularity.” re U.S. process ment that was due in that he denied 1446, 1428, 527, S.Ct. 459 [sic] formally notify him it the state did not (1967). Thus, the defendant is entitled to or seeking was the death forewarn aggravating know the circumstances it specific aggravating which circumstances prosecution will prove which the seek to sentencing hearing would at seek to sufficiently proceed- in advance of court prove beyond “it a reasonable doubt. While ings opportunity so that reasonable to process, sentencing is now as clear prepare bewill afforded.” itself, satisfy as well the trial must However, the court then held the Clause,” defendant requirements of the Due Process standing lacked to contest issue because 349, Florida, 358, Gardner v. 430 U.S. alleged he had not either that he was not so L.Ed.2d 393 informed or he made attempt had process requirements due at trial are not to obtain that information. sentencing. necessarily same as those at People, Williams v. case, In the under § 18— 93 L.Ed. 1337 upon pleading guilty charge to a of first degree murder Osborn was informed that Morris, (Utah v. In Andrews 607 P.2d 816 death, he could be sentenced to to 1980) den. cert. determinate or indeterminate life term. L.Ed.2d the court dis- missed the defendant’s contention that to give As whether the state must notice sentencing procedure was unconstitutional of which circumstances it will given aggra- that no notice was as prove seek to beyond doubt, a reasonable vating which death agree reasoning with the set forth in sought as follows: Sonnier, supra, insofar states U.C.A., 1953, “It noted that the defendant must be notified of ag- specifically eight 76-5-202 sets forth which circumstances the state circumstances, gravating one more will beyond seek to establish a reasonable proved, be alleged, must and found doubt. The execution of a impos- sentence Hence, charged the fact final, finder. one death is a non-correctable event. capital put with a felony is on notice and A defendant put should not be to the bur- is made aware of what the State must preparing den of disprove all ten aggra- prove prepare and thus vating able de- circumstances, and the burden fense.” Id. placed on the state requiring notification is minimal at most. However, Sonnier, in State 379 So.2d (Da.1979), the court stated the However, present case, in the ag- following: gravation/mitigation hearing Osborn’s at-

“Unquestionably, torney the need for reliabili- stated that he had discussed with the ty prosecutor the determination of whether subjects that he would “raise impose adversary penalty by aggravation respect with imposi- ” proceedings tion of demands that an accused sentence . . . . proce- The latter rights of dure process. afforded full due Ac- would be to set them writing out in so cordingly, they defendant is entitled in review, are see, available for g., e. Md.Code, capital proceeding, no less Ann. Art. 27 § and since this guilt trial, pose than be will in the or innocence no state, hardship on the we hold *20 426 provide weigh the state must the defendant the gravity aggravating circum- aggravat-

in with a list of capital stances, case the Moreover, but found none. the it will seek circumstances which finding of quoted imply- fact can be read as prove. we must Since remand this case for ing that mitigating there were some cir- resentencing, state can supply the Osborn cumstances, they simply but that did not prior any with such notice future sen- outweigh aggravating circumstances. tencing hearing. Mata, See State v. 125 Ariz. 609 P.2d (1980) cert. den. 449 U.S. question The next before us is wheth- C. (1980) (where failing er erred in the trial court to set mitigating specific factors it trial court apparently forth the considered. made 19-2515(d) is as I.C. follows: finding mitigating circumstances were absent). conclusion of “Upon the the evidence mitigation arguments aggra- in §, 19-2515(d) mandatory is in its court shall make vation the written find- terms; must set trial court forth in any ings setting statutory aggra- forth writing mitigating any factors considered. Further, vating found. circumstance The reasoning a Florida behind in writing any set forth miti- court shall provision judge must justify the trial and, considered gating factors if the writing in sentence of death was ex- mitigating finds that circumstances court Dixon, plained 283 So.2d State outweigh gravity aggravating (Fla.1973) cert. den. unjust so as to circumstance found make L.Ed.2d follows: penalty, of the imposition death step required by “The fourth Fla.Stat. writing court shall detail its reasons 921.141, F.S.A., is that the trial judge finding.” (Emphasis added.) for so justifies of death in writing, his sentence opinion,

In its memorandum the trial court provide opportunity meaning- following: stated the ful by review this Court. Discrimination because extreme bur- “This capriciousness stand cannot where rea- sentencing judge imposed upon den important son is required, and this is itself, by the statute and offense has protection element for the added consciously all the information searched only Not is convicted defendant. the sen- sincerely hoping to find circum- before judicial open tence review then mitigation which would over- stances in correction, judge is required the trial but aggravation the circumstance come view the issue of life or within —however, mitigating such circumstanc- provided by framework of rules added.) (Emphasis exist.” es do not statute.” following finding made The court then in Dixon : by As added the court of fact: “It emphasized proce- finds must be Court further that there are “The circumstances, mitigating by judges which out- dure to the trial no be followed weigh gravity circum- counting process ... is of X not a mere imposition would make stances and which number unjust.” (Emphasis

of the death mitigating and Y number of circumstanc- added.) es, judgment but as to rather a reasoned require impo- what factual situations way to now maintains the sition of can be death and which satisfied finding court interpret the trial this light of the life total- imprisonment mitigating no circum- concluded there were ity present. of the circumstances Review agree. state- cannot These stances. We guarantees that the reasons ments the trial indicate will reach similar transcript in one case the written court examined might out- result to under similar cir- mitigating circumstances which that reached factor, cumstanees another case.” 382 So.2d statutes from sug- other states do gest at 10.3 instance, certain factors. For Model 210.6(4) Penal Code (Proposed Official requirement that the fac- 1962), appears Draft to have been merely tors set considered be forth *21 states, suggests in influential other fol- the procedural formality imposed by legisla- the factors, lowing among others: Rather, ture aas burden on trial courts. being compliance we see therewith as neces- “(a) significant The defendant no has sary to insure Court can make the history prior activity, (b) criminal thorough proper any review of sentence murder was committed the while defend- legislature of death the which in turn re- ant was under the influence of extreme quires statutory procedure pro- of us. The or mental emotional disturbance .... vides that in the first instance the trial (g) murder, At time the capaci- the the mitigating court must set down all the fac- ty appreciate of the defendant the aggravating tors it considers and the cir- criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct mitigating cumstances it finds. If the fac- or to conform his the require- conduct to outweigh tors aggravating the circumstanc- impaired ments of law was as a result of es, the court tois detail its reasons for so mental disease defect or or intoxication.” finding. By requiring findings, these the 921.141(5); See § Fla.Stat.Ann. Neb.Rev. legislature procedure provided has where 29-2523; Stat. Utah § Code 76-3-207. § on review obligation we can fulfill our Moreover, the Supreme United States determine whether ig- first the trial court Court, discussing in the need focus factors, any mitigating nored overlooked sentencing authority’s spe- attention on the secondly, supports whether the evidence crime, noted, cific circumstances found, aggravating finally factors while upholding Georgia penalty death weighed whether has properly court statute, (the jury au- these factors. Where trial court does thority Georgia) is asked whether “there mitigating set forth the factors has special are facts about this defendant considered, impossible pass it is for us to on against that mitigate imposing capital pun- propriety process weighing of the basic (e. g., youth, ishment his his the extent of undertaken court. trial cooperation police, with emotional having witnesses, heard the is in a far bet- crime.)” state Gregg at the time of position pass ter judgment a first on Georgia, 428 U.S. mitigating aggravating than reasoning is this Court. But if the trial court is not set with forth reasona- argues D. Defendant also that the stat- exactitude, ble this Court would be forced ute is unconstitutional because it fails to to make its inadequate review on an record. specify mitigating argument factors. This legislative We hold that the mandate found Ohio, disposed of in Lockett v. 19-2515(d), mitigating I.C. that all L.Ed.2d forth, factors considered must set must wherein United States be met. held it legisla- was unconstitutional for the viewed, sentencing body’s ture to speculate limit consider-

So we need not wheth- mitigating er ation of finding question might the trial factors to those enumer- Mata, have been ated in a statute. intended to be understood as a See State (1980) (holding conclusion that there no Ariz. mitigating were P.2d regard mitigation policy factors. In this note that a of unlimited ex- that al- is though legislature pressly has not deline- mandated United States Su- Court). ated that a mitigating preme which constitutes 19-2827, imposed. 3. is This with I.C. where the consistent mandates a review this Court of all cases E. We next consider whether the trial are proved beyond based be a reasonable making finding, by doubt, court erred in and so construe it.” evidence, preponderance of the that Osborn Dixon, Similarly, supra, in State v. “by prior conduct or conduct the commis- court held that circum- “[t]he hand, sion the murder at has exhibited a actually stances . . . defined those crimes propensity to commit murder which will ... applicable which the death continuing probably constitute a threat in the absence of circumstances. society.” argues finding The state that this such, they proved beyond As must be is irrelevant because" there were two other being reasonable doubt before considered beyond circumstances found by judge jury.” So.2d While it reasonable doubt. is true there is 19-2515(f) states that least “[a]t no indication that the trial court relied on *22 [aggravating one . . . must circumstance] finding imposing this the sentence of beyond found exist a reasonable doubt death, requirement aggravating that imposed.” before a sentence of death can be mitigating against factors be balanced language capable being This under- important each other is so that error imply aggravating stood to that other cir- might that affect that balance cannot be cumstances can be found to a stan- exist we reverse tolerated. Since on other doubt,” dard “beyond less than a reasonable grounds, we need not decide whether the only aggravating that one circumstance supports finding; evidence or that it “beyond need be found a reasonable doubt.” should have been made at all. But for This would aggravating mean that other guidance, pause future to consider the prepon- circumstances could be found a proposition. evidence, they derance of and that could Simants, v. Neb. balancing be used in against any test N.W.2d cert. den. 434 U.S. mitigating factors considered. S.Ct. We do not believe that this is what the court stated: legislature 19-2515(b) intended. Section 29-2522, “Section R.R.S. now re- states that the court shall sentence the de- quires hearing a determination after statutory fendant to death where it finds a aggravating sufficient circumstances ex- circumstance, aggravating mitigat- unless justify, imposition ist to of a death ing outweigh gravity circumstances penalty. As the United States any aggravating circumstance found. Sim- Court noted in Woodson North Caroli- 19-2515(d) ilarly, states that “if the court na, L.Ed.2d finds that circumstances out- ‘death, (1976): finality, in its differs weigh gravity any aggravating cir- imprisonment more life than a 100- from unjust cumstance found so as to make im- year prison only term differs from one of position penalty, of the death court qualita- year a or two. Because writing shall detail its for reasons so difference, corresponding a tive there is finding.” In neither of these sections does reliability in the need for difference legislature mention the standard of ap- the determination that death is the proof finding aggravating an circum- propriate punishment specific in a case.’ gravity stance. Due to the of the death the obvious intent of the “We believe penalty, legislature we believe intended aggravat- statute is that the enumerated apply proof the same standard require strong circumstances should aggravating circumstances as for the ele- proof. Aggravating circumstances are crime, e., beyond ments of a i. a reasonable mandatory now a element to be con- language doubt. The that at least one such capital sidered in cases. The sentence beyond circumstance be found to aggra- must exist depends upon proof of some it a reasonable doubt before a sentence of vating circumstance. We believe is the imposed only if require the facts death can be means intent of the act found, single . . . even a such circumstance is aggravating which the circumstances out, including imposed. It are carried the burden of sentence death cannot be producing does not mean that where one such circum- burden of evidence doubt, beyond persuasion,’ stance is found a reasonable and its decision in re- may per- subject gard proscription follows other circumstances un- n missibly by preponderance. Any be found der the Due unless ‘it Process Clause interpretation conceivably other could allow principle justice so offends some aggravating outweigh con- deeply rooted in the traditions and mitigating circumstances in cases where to be people science of our ranked as one circumstance was omitted)” (citations fundamental.’ doubt, many beyond found a reasonable but York, Patterson New by preponderance. A were found factual 201-02, 97 ” finding preponderance arrived at (1977).’ the evidence is insufficient to be entered case, In that then held balancing process into the in the absence of negate every mitigat- state did not have to explicit legislative directive to that ef- ing circumstance. fect. punishment Maryland capital Under the Next, argues process F. Osborn that due statute, sentencing authority where the is denied scheme where the beyond finds a reasonable doubt the exist- penalty may be arrived on the factors, ence of one or more *23 finding statutory aggravating aof circum- whether, pre- it aby then must determine stance mitigat- unless the court finds that ponderance evidence, any of the one of the ing outweigh aggravating If, mitigating prepon- exist. factors a circumstances, that proof the burden of evidence, derance the the placed improperly is on the defendant. To body mitigating finds the circumstanc- support argument Osborn cites Mulla- circumstances, outweigh aggravating es the ney Wilbur, 684, 1881, v. 421 U.S. 95 S.Ct. imprisonment a life then sentence of is im- (1975), 44 L.Ed.2d 508 v. Woodson posed. mitigating If the circumstances do Carolina, 280, 2978, North 96 S.Ct. aggravating outweigh not the circumstanc- (1976). However, 944 Mullaney 49 L.Ed.2d evidence, by preponderance es a of the how- only proving dealt with the elements of a ever, then a sentence of death must be crime, while only Woodson held that it was imposed. 413(h). Md.Code Ann.Art. 27 § impose mandatory unconstitutional upheld constitutionality The court the penalty. death State, provisions these in Tichnell 287 Watson, The court in State v. 120 695, 830, Ariz. (1980), Md. 415 as fol- A.2d 848 441, 1253, 1259(1978) 586 P.2d cert. den. 440 lows: 1254, 924, U.S. mandatory “That not it is death (1979), following: stated the it statute is clear. Because allows for a the guilt “When issue of is settled and circum- broad consideration only remains, question punishment the stances, plainly scrutiny it withstands un- process due by requiring is offended Carolina, supra der North Woodson v. already guilty the carry defendant to the S.Ct. U.S. 96 [428 showing burden of he why should receive (1976)], 19 Cr.L. 3287 Roberts v. leniency. contrary This to the due Louisiana, supra U.S. [431 process requirement the State has L.Ed.2d Cr.L. 3076 proof guilt burden of as to (1976)]. Furthermore, it is clear discussing defendant. In affirmative de- complies general with statute the three sanity question, fenses when was a guiding methods of vested discretion United States Court stated: sentencing authority Gregg, in the under ‘Among things, “normally Proffitt, other it is provides Jurek. The statute power within the regu- procedure, ‘State bifurcated trial the im- procedures late under which its laws position of death limited to pattern sentencing authority arbitrary cases in which the capricious aggravating finds at one least circum- sentencing like found unconstitution- sentencing authority stance. The is re- U.S., al in Furman occur.’ could quired to consider the of miti- S.Ct., existence (Foot- n.46 [96 n.46].” gating circumstances. A sentence omitted.) *24 as follows: heinous, especially was atrocious or murder cruel, capital exceptional manifesting depravity.” State wishes to authorize

“[I]f punishment respon Godfrey supra, Georgia, it has constitutional In v. the United sibility apply Supreme in tailor its law a Court reversed a States sentence manner arbitrary solely finding that avoids and ca death based that of pricious wantonly penalty. “outrageously or infliction death the offense was vile, Georgia Part in responsibility of a this horrible and inhuman.” Code State’s regard 27-2534.1(b)(7)provides per- which that a is to define crimes for Ann. § may way death sentence that of murder be sentenced be the in a son convicted beyond [sentencing] obviates discre if it is found a reasonable ‘standardless to death U.S., Georgia, or Gregg supra, outrageously tion.’ 428 that the offense “was v. doubt 196, S.Ct., vile, n.47, 2936, or wantonly at at horrible inhuman in that 96 n.47. See mind, Florida, 242, torture, an depravity of or also Proffitt 428 96 it involved v. U.S. 913; 2960, v. Tex the victim.” This aggravated battery S.Ct. Jurek as, 262, 2950, 428 96 L.Ed.2d had been upheld U.S. S.Ct. 49 circumstance Gregg 929. It on its face must channel the sentencer’s dis as not unconstitutional 153, objective Georgia, cretion 96 49 ‘clear standards’ v. 428 U.S. S.Ct. provide guid that ‘specific and 859 wherein the Court noted detailed L.Ed.2d ance,’ although arguable any ‘make it that mur- rationally and that reviewa that process imposing depravity aggra- ble mind or an a sentence of der involves of Gregg, battery, no reason to assume death.’ As was made clear in “there is vated ‘system Supreme Georgia will could have stan Court that open-ended such vague they adopt dards so would fail ade an construction.” quately to channel the deci 96 2938. Subse- S.Ct. Supreme adopt- patterns juries Georgia sion with Court quently, the result

431 limiting ed a construction What suffering offense others. is intended to “torture, depravity had to capital demonstrate be included are those crimes mind, or aggravated battery capi- to the vic- where the actual commission of the tim.” 100 S.Ct. at 1766. felony accompanied tal was such addi- apart as crime from tional acts to set the however, in Godfrey, evidence capital felonies —the eon- norm showed defendant did torture pitiless or unnec- sciousless crime aggravated battery upon or commit an essarily tortuous 283 victim.” Supreme victims. The Court therefore held 9. So.2d at validity of the death sentence upheld The United States on Georgia Supreme turned whether provision, holding say this cannot supplied Court had “[w]e constitutional con- construed, provision, provides that the as so phrase “outrageously struction to the or inadequate guidance those vile, charged with wantonly horrible or inhuman in that duty recommending imposing sen- . . [they] involved . depravity of mind ” Florida, capital tences in cases.” Proffitt v. . . .. Id. at court found that 242, 255-56, 428 49 U.S. 96 “crimes cannot defendant’s be said to have L.Ed.2d also State v. Wat- See materially reflected a consciousness more son, 1259; supra, 586 v. P.2d at State ‘depraved’ any person guilty than that Knapp, 114 Ariz. 562 P.2d 704 princi- murder.” Id. there “no Since was cert. den. 435 way case, U.S. pled distinguish this in which Sonnier, (1978); L.Ed.2d State imposed, the death from the (La.1979). So.2d 1336 not,” id., many cases in which was judgment upholding court reversed the Simants, Neb. sentence of death. (Neb.1977) N.W.2d cert. den. Godfrey, Under the the simple decision court that the Nebraska noted phrase “the especially heinous, murder was language “. . also includes . or manifested atrocious cruel” must be limited so as to exceptional depravity by ordinary standards constitutional, and the addition of the of morality intelligence.” The Nebras- phrase “manifesting exceptional depravity” ka interpreted language then 19-2515(f)(5) does not alter that follows: result, “exceptional depravity” ap- can

ply murder “In interpreting portion same manner as of the stat- *25 “especially heinous, ute, atrocious key or cruel.” ‘exceptional.’ word is It might argued every that in- murder Dixon, (Fla.1973) So.2d depravity. volves The use of the word cert. den. U.S. however, ‘exceptional’, confines it to L.Ed.2d 295 the defendant attacked appar- those depravity situations where the constitutionality aggravating cir- ent obviously to such an extent to capital felony espe- was “[t]he cumstance — morality offend all standards of and in- heinous, cially atrocious or cruel.” The telligence.” interpreted Florida court these terms as State, In Blake v. 239 Ga. 236 S.E.2d follows: (1977) cert. den. 434 U.S. 98 S.Ct. meaning feel that of such “[W]e 54 L.Ed.2d 320 the court stated terms is a knowledge, matter common depravity contemplat- that “the of the mind ordinary so that an man would not have by ed the statute is that which results guess was what It is intended. our aggravated battery torture or to the vic- interpretation that heinous means ex- tim.” 236 at 643. S.E.2d tremely evil; wicked or shockingly atrocious means outrageously legislature enacting wicked and 19-2515 in- vile; and, that cruel designed comply requirements means tended to with the set high degree Court, inflict pain by with utter forth and therefore to, of, indifference or even intended to limit the death enjoyment aggravated against committing murder, most “espe- of eases. While the but nonetheless heinous, cially language” atrocious or cruel sadistically or with does not do so torture. pain refers to the by amount suffered interpretation, aggravat- With such an this victim, exceptional depravity lan- ing circumstance meets the constitutional guage refers to the state of mind of the requirements by set forth the United States State, defendant. Harris See 237 Ga. Supreme Court. cert. den. 431 S.E.2d Finally, argues legis- H. Osborn that the delegated power improperly lature agree heinous, We with the definition of penalty of inflict the the Board of by atrocious and cruel set forth the Florida provides 19-2716 Corrections. I.C. as fol- Dixon, court in and with the definition lows: exceptional depravity set forth the Ne- punishment “The of death must be in- braska court in Simants. With this con- struction, injection flicted intravenous of a accompa- that the sub- crime must setting apart nied acts from the norm stance or in a quality substances lethal murders, aggravating circumstance sufficient to cause death until the defend- sufficiently guide definite the sentenc- depart- ant is dead. The director of the ing body’s discretion. ment of corrections shall determine to be substance or substances used limiting A similar instruction must be procedures be used in execu- (f)(6), placed upon “[b]y subsection tion.” murder, surrounding or the circumstances commission, the defendant exhibited ut- its disposed parte Ex argument This was of in disregard properly ter for human life.” To Granviel, (Tex.Cr. 561 S.W.2d circumstance, important to define this it is App.1978),as follows: aggravating circumstances note the other existence of an area for exercise “[T]he provision overlaps. The with which this by an administrative officer of discretion circumstance, subsec- second delegation authority does under committed (f)(2), that the defendant tion delegation render unlawful where stan- at the time this murder another murder guidance formulated for dards limit- committed, obviously show an could discretion, though general, capable ed are life, disregard utter human as could the application of reasonable .... circumstance, third subsection (f)(3), knowingly cre- defendant “[t]he appears Legislature “It has great many persons.” ated á risk of death to policy primary declared a and fixed a aggra- The same can be said for the fourth circumstance, (f)(4), delegated the said Di- vating standard and subsection as to power to determine details so murder was committed for remuner- rector “[t]he mind, legislative purpose will carry ation.” With this in since we out presume legislature intended to practically or effi- Legislature cannot duplicate any already enumerated circum- is suf- ciently perform itself. The statute *26 stances, (f)(6) making thus subsection mere accomplish regu- complete to ficiently see, surplusage, g., Department Norton v. e. falling particular matters lation of the Employment, 94 Idaho 500 P.2d 825 jurisdiction.” Legislature’s within the (1972), we hold that the term “utter disre- analysis; we will not agree with this We gard” acts other than those set refers to Department director of assume that the (f)(2), (3) (4);& forth in subsections arbitrary in an and of Corrections will act high- refers to those acts which exhibit the capricious manner. est, utmost, disregard callous human killer, life, namely cold-blooded,pitiless IV. randomly with- such as the killer who acts discussed, pursuant to conscience, who Due to out motive or the errors the killer this case for possess we remand does not I.C. restraints normal

433 19-2827(e)(2)4 pro- resentencing. explicit While statement that it was not con- resentencing by judge vides that trial circum- a sidered as upon shall argu- be “based record my does the rest of Such not alter stance. counsel,” inadequate ment of where an E, under III however. analysis improper grounds one record is of the reverse,

error which the defend- II. hearing entirely ant’s shall de novo. opinions— Supreme Two recent Court resentencing. Reversed and remanded for Raddatz, United States ADDENDUM (1980), and Es- foregoing Since the was written cir- Smith, telle v. 451 U.S.

culated to the members of other be added —-must year major- proposed in October of last as a in III A. to the discussion ity opinion,1 regard research done in to oth- brought my er cases has attention to the A. applicability of two recent States United Raddatz, a case wherein there was far Supreme to Court decisions III A. us, than in the now less at stake case before Supreme Court stated:

I. guarantees process “The of due call for discussing Before cases, however, those E, ‘hearing appropriate a to the nature of regard with to III further review has Central Hanover case.’ Mullane v. convinced me there is merit in the Co., & Bank Trust Court’s view finding trial court’s preponderance 652, 657, evidence L.Ed. us, therefore, Osborn “has exhibited propensity com- issue before whether mit murder will probably presented constitute a nature of the and the issues continuing society” threat was implicated not error sup- interests in a motion to in this case because the court’s later press require evidence the district 19-2827(e)(2) provides processes. 4. example coming readily this Court One may: and, any likewise, adoption mind is case < “Set the sentence aside and remand the child termination case. resentencing by judge case for the trial based Generally preferen- such cases have received argument on the record and of counsel." treatment, anyone tial and I think that do not complain place. opinion purposefully would That that such takes Death out laid parts, thereof, cases, subparts juvenile proceedings, and in order make like waiver expeditious State, it convenient and for the other Jus- see Dillard v. 623 P.2d Idaho they agreed tices type declare wherein unique lengthy are of where they disagreed. Correctly surmising wherein delays judicial process in the cannot tolerat- grounds that sufficient existed to necessitate a ed, prejudice and can lead to claims or of hearing, second I was not so naive punishment, especially cruel and inhuman anticipate as to that all members of the Court kept dangling where row are defendants would concur across the board on those indefinitely processes appellate grounds reversal, required which I felt and a knowing eventually they whether will or will sentencing hearing. type second of format judge performed not be executed. The district Wagenius, used the author of State v. required alacrity, the function with of him not- 581 P.2d 319 and often withstanding absolutely guide- no case law major used in decisions States United interpretation lines available were as to the appropriate. Court seemed The Chief meaning legislative it became enactment Justice, however, apparently disagreed and in Court, however, open duty apply. This January assigned writing of the Court's unduly long where time criticism will opinion Justice, already to another who was And, elapsed sentencing. have between as Jus- opinions burdened with sufficient to write in out, mandatory points tice same McFadden *27 significant My other is not cases. concern here again review remains to be done once after merely only pride authorship, but resentencing place, taken and after has types there are certain come cases which done, penalty briefing is if the is reim- death before this Court where there com- are obvious posed. pelling pri- according a reasons for those cases ority decision-making in our deliberative and judge court actually must hear safeguards, the chal- value of added weighs also lenged testimony. The respon- core of heavily requiring a sentencing favor challenge dent’s to the statute is" that court to hear rather than to read the testi- one who decides must mony hear.’ Mor- upon ‘[t]he will base its which it determina- States, gan 468, 481, v. United Although 56 tion. it could be said that 906, 912, 80 L.Ed. 1288 preliminary transcript particular in this Here, contends, he magistrate might case well have been sufficient ‘hears,’ but the permitted district court is particular capable experienced trial reviewing ‘decide’ the record com- judge, the function of this Court is to follow piled magistrate before the making unambiguous a clear and directives of the final determination. legislature. judges, believe, Most so I prefer solely would to act

“In not on a cold Eldridge, Mathews v. produced preliminary hearing record at a was, all, which as are conducted for an emphasized that three factors different, entirely special, pur- and limited should be in determining considered pose. concepts whether the proc- flexible of due (a) ess have private been satisfied: factor, public The third that of the inter- implicated; (b) interests the risk of an requiring est and administrative burden in erroneous determination reason of the hearing, an additional is rather inconse-

process probable accorded and the value quential, perhaps, pales but for certain procedural of added safeguards; (c) significance against when measured public interest and administrative other producing two factors. The cost of burdens, including costs that the addi- witnesses, probably some but not all of the procedures tional would involve.” 100 prelimi- same witnesses who testified at the S.Ct. at 2413. nary hearing, surely greater would be no Considering order, bring those than what it would have cost to three factors in them first it pleaded guilty is at once obvious and to trial unneedful had Osborn —the private further discussion that doing saving of which Osborn effected a interest implicated unquestionably Idaho, here State of kindness on his e., highest degree, i. part weigh whether the in his defendant should favor in consider- shall live or shall die. This consideration whether witnesses should have testified weighs heavily alone sentencing so that the other judge two live before —as require against saving considerations but little comment in of a few dollars. passing. legislature it The short of is that the did factor, The second that of the risk anticipate might of an that a defendant enter murder; erroneous probable plea guilty degree determination and the a to first Martin, plea guilty following In State v. 94 Wash.2d 614 P.2d of not and a trial but not “[c]Iearly plea guilty. court noted that Washington legislative legislature anticipate possibility did not contemplate scheme did might plead guilty charge that an accused to a authority, jury guilt, there the which decided Thus, degree simply of first murder. failed to having heard the evidence which established provide eventuality.” for that Id. 614 P.2d at guilt, would determine the sentence. With a Washington statutory 167. Since the scheme pleading guilty, jury there was no defendant provided jury that the same which determined pondered upon the evi- which had heard guilt shall be reconvened to determine whether dence. penalty imposed, the death shall be and since legislature rather obvious that the Idaho It is jury the same trial cannot be “reconvened” on 19-2515(c) similarly simply enacting I.C. plea murder, guilty degree to first the court possibility anticipate the that a defend- did not plea guilty degree held that to first guilty degree plead first murder. ant would murder a defendant could not be sentenced to part 19-2515(c) provides in all “[i]n Washington death. The court reaffirmed Mar- be im- Frampton, cases in which posed, tin in State v. 95 Wash.2d shall, conviction, after order a (1981), going P.2d 922 on to hold investigation presentence ad- .... Evidence statute was unconstitutional since it allowed imposed following be considered and need not the death to be shall mitted at trial *28 long the legislature right it is that defendant he the that had the to remain silent and that what he told the today now decide itself if the Court him, psychiatrist against used could be correctly interprets legislative the omission sentencing phase capital the of a case vio- pleading guilty allow defendants to that lated both the Fifth and Amend- Sixth charge to have their lives terminated Grigson In that case Dr. ments. examined government person judge action in the of a he defendant to determine whether countenances, who has not viewed man- competent Subsequently, to stand trial. af- nerisms, and voice inflections those who murder, ter defendant was convicted of particulars recount the of the crime. One Grigson state used Dr. as a witness to es- might ponder upon also likeli- extreme probability that was a tablish there that trial, sentencing hood at a unlike the acts of defendant “would commit criminal hearing, preliminary impeaching usual evi- continuing violence that constitute a would might dence also be submitted. society.” Supreme threat I Finally, only procedure add that a cho- held as follows: prosecuting sen attorney, even distinguish “We can no basis discern though might not be held error because phases guilt penalty between the public acquiescence defender’s there- respondent’s capital murder so far trial as in, thereof, acceptance and the trial court’s protection the Fifth Amendment ipso does statutory facto meet the re- privilege is gravity concerned. Given the quirement, the be exact fulfillment of is the decision to made at the which phase, is placed State relieved necessarily before five-member obligation to observe fundamental consti- compliance. tribunal for review as to Al- guarantees tutional .... effort Any though plainly it is be seen that I.C. compel respondent testify the State to 19-2515(c) provide does the sentenc- against sentencing hearing his will at the ing court is to receive “all relevant evidence clearly would contravene the Fifth aggravation ... mitigation” (which attempt Amendment. Yet State’s I submit would be the case even absent respondent’s dangerous- establish future phrase), nothing approaches dig- therein by relying ness state- on unwarned nity impliedly negating the clear man- Grigson similarly ments he Dr. made to date sentencing of I.C. 19-2516 that the infringes Fifth Amendment values. hear circumstances of the crime open from “witnesses examined in Grigson’sprognosis “Dr. as to future dan- than, court” other as under 19- I.C. § gerousness respon- on statements rested 2515(c), sentencing where judge al- has made, omitted, dent and remarks he ready testimony heard the at trial. reciting the details of the crime. The therefore, privilege, Fifth Amendment B. directly here involved because Smith, supra, Estelle the United against respondent used evidence States Court held psy- that use of during substance of his disclosures testimony, chiatric obtained without warn- pretrial psychiatric examination. repeated sentencing hearing.” tencing authority testimony These hear provisions contemplate body produced same would have been at trial had there trial, clearly heard the awry evidence trial decide goes shall been the Court imposed; whether the death failing shall require compliance absolute in what presented evidence peated at trial need not be re- generally accepted as a matter of some seri- because the as the ousness. body, already has heard that Al- evidence. It should be noted in with this connection though, Washington, unnecessary unlike in it is unique problem plea some states refuse statutory to invalidate the Idaho be- scheme See, guilty capital g., in a case. e. La.Code failing, cause of this it does further substantiate 557; Crim.Pro.Ann. art. N.J.Stat.Ann. my view that it was error for the trial court to (repealed along 2A: § penalty); with the death rely preliminary hearing transcript; on the 220.10(5)(e). N.Y.Crim.Proc. scheme mandates that the sen- *29 tempts any psychiatric to introduce evi- dence, may compelled respond not be Grigson interview with Dr. cannot “[T]he psychiatrist to a if his statements can be competency be characterized as a routine against capital sentencing used him at a ensuring examination restricted to If, proceeding upon being .... ade- respondent charges understood warned, respondent quately had indicated against capable assisting him and was Grigson’s that he would answer Dr. not Indeed, application in his defense. if the questions, validly competency ordered Grigson’s findings of Dr. had been con- pro- examination nevertheless could have function, serving fined to no Fifth ceeded the condition that the results Amendment issue would have arisen. solely applied purpose would be for that “Respondent psychi- . . . no introduced that, must conclude when faced “[W]e evidence, atric nor had he indicated that custody while with a court-ordered Instead, might he do so. the State of- psychiatric inquiry, respondent’s state- fered information obtained from the Grigson ‘given ments to were Dr. competency court-ordered examination as freely voluntarily without com- persuade jury affirmative evidence and, such, pelling influences’ could be to return a of death .... sentence To penalty phase used as the State did at burden, respon- meet its used respondent apprised if had been statements, unwittingly rights knowingly dent’s own made his and had decided to safeguards waive them .... These without an awareness that he was assist- privilege the Fifth were Amendment ing the State’s efforts to obtain the death and, thus, respondent afforded his death circumstances, penalty. In these distinct sentence cannot stand. Appeals correctly the Court of concluded respondent “When was examined privilege Fifth Amendment was Grigson, already Dr. he had been indicted implicated. attorney appointed and an had been represent .... him had a Sixth [H]e calling “The consideration for the ac- right Amendment to the assistance of prior cused to be warned to custodial submitting pretrial counsel before interrogation apply with [under Miranda] psychiatric interview .... pretrial psychiatric no force less at .... examination issue here When “Therefore, in addition to Fifth Grigson beyond simply report- Dr. went considerations, Amendment the death compe- to the court on the issue of improperly imposed was on re- prosecution tence and testified for at spondent psychiatric because the exami- penalty phase on the crucial issue of Grigson nation on which Dr. testified at respondent’s dangerousness, future phase proceeded in violation changed role essentially and became like respondent’s right Sixth Amendment agent recounting of an of the State to the assistance of counsel.” 451 U.S. at post-ar- unwarned statements made in a 471,101 at 1873-1877. 454— setting rest custodial .... Yet [Estelle] case, In the the trial court its given compul- no indication that “[p]rior stated evalu- memorandum decision sory gather examination would be used to by Dr. Reichman ations and the evaluation whether, necessary evidence to decide if has an anti-so- indicate the defendant convicted, he should be sentenced to personality.” cial Thus the trial court did that, death. He was not informed ac- evaluation in sen- psychiatric utilize this cordingly, he right had a constitutional Although tencing phase of Osborn’s trial. not to questions put answer the to him. voluntarily underwent this exami- Osborn nation, purposes only for the he did so defendant, “A criminal who neither ini- determining competency to stand trial psychiatric competency tiates a time of the act evaluation nor at- charged. warned At no time was Osborn might at his hear- the state

ing make statements made use of examination,

psychiatric Osborn nor did *30 use

consent to such of his own statements.

Furthermore, Osborn withdrew claim his precluding responsibility

of mental defect plea guilty.

when he of not It withdrew psychiatric

would seem to follow that

report point from that on be could not voluntarily given and available

classified as purposes, especially purpose

for all

sentencing.

The question then is whether evidence

gained as a of this was result examination

improperly establish an used

circumstance, light viewed excerpted

statements from Estelle. Since remanding resentencing,

we are for it is

perhaps unnecessary that now point question,

decide this and I raise the may give so that the district court possibility excluding

consideration to

evidence, may the admission of which neces- resentencing.

sitate a second remand for regard should also be noted that in Es- Court’s considerations apply presen-

telle could also to the use of reports presentence

tence where investi-

gator incorporate own defendant’s conduct, written statement criminal report

or a of a defendant’s oral statements

thereof, proper without observance Fifth rights. Sixth Amendment Brammer, pro

Werner se. 631 P.2d 219 Hamlett, County William C. Latah Pros. BRAMMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Werner Moscow, Atty., defendants-respondents. LATAH COUNTY Latah ASSESSOR and SHEPARD, Justice. County Equalization, Board of appeal judgment This is an from a Defendants-Respondents. rejected plaintiff-appel- district court which No. 13431. challenge lant Brammer’s method Supreme Court of Idaho. property reappraised which his real purposes. reassessed ad valorem tax

July We affirm. requires county assessor carry continuing pro-

to conduct and out a notes cases when interests so require proceeding the entire should be re- Brown, Similarly, in v. 607 P.2d 261 State viewed to determine whether errors oc- (Utah 1980), objection there was no consequence curred the ac- as a which trial court’s failure to in its voir include dire trial, though a cused did not have fair even jury question of the panel a on their beliefs assigned argued.”); not v. Rus- State penalty, on there nor was a re- death sell, 116, 1003, 106 145 P.2d 1007 Utah quest inquiry. for such The court stated case, (1944) (“[t]his being capital a it is the “[njevertheless, capital case, as this is duty of to consider manifest and this court we considered the defendant’s contention prejudicial though assigned even not error appeal.” on Id. at 265. v. And State Stenback, argued.”); nor State v. 78 Utah 413, Ceja, 115 Ariz. 565 P.2d 1274 1050, 350, (1931) (“[t]his P.2d ruling 975, 533, cert. den. 434 U.S. 98 S.Ct. assigned the trial is not as court error (1977), the independently L.Ed.2d 467 court argued, yet and is capi- not in a reviewed the record to insure defend- this, tal case may such as and should sua trial, ant spite was accorded fair sponte prejudicial consider manifest and er- fact allege any the defendant not did rors which neither assigned are nor ar- Martin, error in the trial. See v. also State gued”). White, generally See v. State 1323, (1952) 243 Iowa (“[n]o N.W.2d 258 708, (1976) Idaho 551 P.2d 1344 cert. den. judicial human life should be taken order every requirement until law (1976) (court review will fundamental error justice with”); complied has been Tug- trial); objection even if no is made at State gle State, v. Okl.Cr. P.2d Haggard, 486 P.2d 260 (1941) (in capital “it prac- case is the (1971) (court may consider error even tice of thoroughly this court to examine the though to). objected not record, any may and consider errors be presented, which are fatal to the accused’s We hold that trial court erred in rights, though even such errors were allowing preliminary hearing the use challenged preserved objections, True, transcript. 19-2515(c)2 ex- I.C. § does ceptions assignments error”); provide or State v. “[ejvidence admitted trial Taylor, 213 S.C. 49 S.E.2d 289 shall not be re- considered need on grounds peated overruled other sentencing hearing,” at the but no Jones, 268 S.C. provision applies 233 S.E.2d 289 such to evidence received (1977) (“it well settled that where hearing. a preliminary Not do we involved, penalty is duty perceive death it is the a vast difference where sen- 19-2515(c) provides mitigation. party as follows: Should evidence has “(c) In all cases in which the previously opposing been disclosed to shall, imposed, the court after convic- shall, party parties, re- tion, presentence investigation order a to be quest, adjourn hearing party until according procedures conducted to such desiring oppor- so has prescribed by do had a reasonable are shall law and thereafter tunity respond to such Evidence purpose evidence. hearing convene for the

Notes

notes imposed mitigat- if the court, case us the district before outweigh circumstances do not using only statutory language, wrote Al- circumstances. heinous, especially “the murder was though sentencing authority still has cruel, manifesting exceptional atrocious statute, guided discretion under it is depravity,” “by the and that murder and objective clear and standards.” surrounding the circumstances its commis- scheme, Under the Idaho sion, the defendant exhibited utter disre- guided. trial court’s is properly discretion gard for human life.” district court nothing mandatory There is which is made apparently compelled explain did not feel the statutory provisions; without resort to reasoning findings beyond behind these a full opportunity defendant has Nothing his narration of the facts. such, mitigating factors. As hold, require more. statute seemed to We scrutiny. withstands constitutional however, phrases, that these without a lim- definition, iting are unconstitutional. Be- Next, argues aggra- G. that the Osborn resentencing, we do cause remand for vating beyond circumstances found a rea- ponder not need to the effect of sonable the trial doubt place any limiting trial court’s failure to 19-2515(f)(5) §§ & are unconstitutional- phrases. definition on these ly vague. The need clear standards body the sentencing to follow set forth will deal first with constitutional- We Godfrey Georgia, 19-2515(f)(5), ity of I.C. which sets forth 1764-65, L.Ed.2d 398 “the circumstance that

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Osborn
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 9, 1981
Citation: 631 P.2d 187
Docket Number: 13400
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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