24 Iowa 102 | Iowa | 1867
In support of the ruling below, counsel rely upon two cases. The first is Payne v. The People (6 Johns. 103), in which it was shown that the prisoner was given a letter to read at his request, and which contained information respecting one J. B. O., who was suspected of the crime of murder. He went off with it, and, being pursued, it was talcen from him. The charge was for stealing a letter, as “ a piece of paper on which a certain letter of information was written of the nature, etc.” It was held
Now, if the instrument described in the case before us was “ neither a bill of exchange nor order for the payment of money, or if it was a mere “ letter of information ” not importing any property in the person of the employer, these cases would be in point. But if it was money or property then it falls within the language of the statute, and is the subject of embezzlement.
Concede that, as the bank had not accepted, it was not liable to pay, and that no action could have been maintained against the government for non-acceptance or nonpayment, it would still be true that it would be the evidence of a debt against the government, which was of value to the State. The indorsement by the governor
Nor again is it the case of a promissory note not used, never issued nor delivered. So long as such a note remained undelivered, and especially if no amount was mentioned in it, it would not be property. Says Little-ton, J., in Rex v. Hart (supra), the stealing of blank acceptances in a dwelling-house would not support the charge of larceny, for .such acceptances are of no value, because not uttered. But it would be very different in the case of the draft before us, which was filled up, alleged to be of the value, etc., and in fact issued and delivered to the defendant in trust, etc.
The abrogation by statute, as has been done in most of the States, of the common law rule, that larceny could not be committed by taking, and carrying away a bond, promissory note, or other mere evidence of indebtedness, tends most strongly to show the incorrectness of appellee’s theory, and the inapplicability of the cases to which counsel refer. Our statute makes the stealing of a bond, bank note, bill of exchange, or other bill, order, or certificate, larceny (§ 4237). And the language of section 4244, upon which this indictment is founded, sufficiently shows, that embezzlement is but a similar statutory crime, consisting of the misappropriation of money or property
Or, if defendant had taken and carried away this instrument from the possession of the holder, there could be no question that it would be “ property,” and the subject of larceny. Whatever would be property under the one statute would be under the other.
The statute defining the word “ property ” removes all doubt, and all common law authorities as to the meaning of “goods,” “chattels,” “request,” “order,” and like terms, are really of but little force or pertinency. Like the act of 7 and 8 Geo. IV. (ch. 29,,§ 51), which made the stealing of any indenture, deed, bond, note, warrant, order or other security for money, etc., usually termed dioses or things in action, a felony, our law includes all, these in the words “money and property.” The fact that the amount of such draft could not be recovered by action at law against the government makes it none the less an evidence of debt or thing in action. The government cannot be sued it is true, but the draft had nevertheless a value, a value in no manner dependent, so far as relates to the present inquiry, upon this right of action. If it did, and the argument is worth any thing, it would be equally valid if the draft had been embezzeled after its indorsement. For, as a subsisting valid evidence of indebtedness, it was worth as much against the government, represented as much, and was as much property when converted as charged in this indictment, as though the governor had duly indorsed the same prior to that time.
Reversed.