State v. OrmsState v. Orms
BROWN, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal by plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio (“state“), from an еntry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, granting a motion for judicial release filed by defendant-appellee, Nathan S. Orms.
{¶ 2} On April 27, 2011, appellee was indictеd on one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, four counts of forgery, 16 counts of receiving stolen property, 16 counts of money laundеring, and 15 counts of theft. On February 3, 2012, appellee entered a guilty plea to one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, a felony of the second degree, and nine counts of money laundering, felonies of the third degree. The trial court entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining cоunts.
{¶ 4} On November 20, 2012, appellee filed a motion for judicial release pursuant to
{¶ 5} On appeal, the state sets forth the following seven assignments of error for this court‘s review:
[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ADDRESS OR MAKE THE FINDINGS TO JUSTIFY THE JUDICIAL RELEASE OF A SECOND-DEGREE FELON.
[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO LIST ALL OF THE FACTORS PRESENTED AT THE HEARING IN DECIDING TO GRANT JUDICIAL RELEASE TO A SECOND-DEGREE FELON.
[III.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING JUDICIAL RELEASE FOR A SECOND-DEGREE FELON BASED ON A REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF ECONOMIC HARM INVOLVED IN DEFENDANT‘S REPEATED MORTGAGE-FRAUD TRANSACTIONS.
[IV.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING JUDICIAL RELEASE FOR A SECOND-DEGREE FELON BASED ON ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN “INAPPROPRIATE” ARGUMENT IN RELYING ON SENTENCES IN OTHER MORTGAGE-FRAUD CASES IN OHIO.
[V.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING JUDICIAL RELEASE FOR A
SECOND-DEGREE FELON BASED ON ITS EMOTIONAL STAKE IN LETTING THE FELON OUT ON JUDICIAL RELEASE AND BASED ON “PRESSURE” TO RELEASE OFFENDERS EARLY. [VI.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING JUDICIAL RELEASE FOR NINE THIRD-DEGREE MONEY LAUNDERING FELONIES WITHOUT MAKING THE NECESSARY FINDINGS AND WITHOUT MAKING THE LIST OF SENTENCING FACTORS.
[VII.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING JUDICIAL RELEASE FOR NINE THIRD-DEGREE MONEY LAUNDERING FELONIES BASED ON ITS REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF FINANCIAL HARM, BASED ON ITS REFUSAL TO CONSIDER OUTCOMES IN OTHER MORTGAGE-FRAUD CASES IN OHIO, BASED ON THE COURT‘S EMOTIONAL STAKE IN LETTING THE FELON OUT ON JUDICIAL RELEASE, AND BASED ON “PRESSURE” TO RELEASE OFFENDERS EARLY.
{¶ 6} The state‘s first, second, and sixth assignments are interrelated and will be considered together. Under the first and second assignments of error, the state argues that the trial court erred in failing to specify on the record requisite findings and to list the sentencing factors presented at the motion hearing in order to justify the release of a second-degree felon. Thе state argues under the sixth assignment of error that the trial court also failed to make the requisite findings and listing of sentencing factors with respect to appеllee‘s third-degree offenses.
{¶ 7}
(1) A court shall not grant a judicial release under this section to an eligible offender who is imprisoned for a felony of the first or sеcond degree, or to an eligible offender who committed an offense under
Chapter 2925. or3719. of the Revised Code and for whom there was a presumption undersection 2929.13 of the Revised Code in favor of a prison term, unless the court, with reference to factors undеrsection 2929.12 of the Revised Code , finds both of the following:
(a) That a sanction other than a prison term would adequately punish the offender and protect the public from future criminal violations by the eligible offеnder because the applicable factors indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism; (b) That a sanction other than a prison term would not demean the seriousness of the offense because factors indicating thаt the eligible offender‘s conduct in committing the offense was less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense outweigh factors indicating that the eligible оffender‘s conduct was more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.
(2) A court that grants a judicial release to an eligible offender under division (J)(1) of this section shall specify on the record both findings required in that division and also shall list all the factors described in that division that were presented at the hearing.
{¶ 8} In accordance with
{¶ 9} In the present case, during the hearing on the motion for judicial release, the trial court noted on the record the fact that the state had not requеsted restitution during the sentencing hearing. The court further commented: “We are not talking about an offense of violence. * * * I don‘t think [appellee] is a threat to anyone‘s safety on the street.” (Tr. 19.) The court also commented that this was “[a]pparently not” the “worst possible offender.” (Tr. 20.)
{¶ 10} As indicated above,
{¶ 11} Upon review, we agree with the state that the trial court did not specify the findings as to the adequacy of the punishment and the seriousness of the offense as required under
{¶ 12} With respect to the state‘s sixth assignment of error, addressing the money laundering counts, the state argues that the sentences for the third-degree felonies were part of the sаme “stated prison term” as the sentence for the second-degree felony count and, therefore, the court‘s failure to comply with the statutory findings and listing of sentencing factors implicates the granting of judicial release as to all of the prison sentences. We agree. See
{¶ 14} Under its third, fourth, fifth, and seventh assignments of error, the state argues that the trial court erred in granting judicial release by (1) refusing to consider the economic harm involved in appellant‘s conduct, (2) concluding that the prosecutor engaged in inappropriate argument during the motion hearing, and (3) basing its deсision to grant judicial release on pressure to release early offenders. In light of our disposition of the first, second, and sixth assignments of error, vacating the trial court‘s grant of judicial release and remanding this matter for the court to comply with the provisions of
{¶ 15} Based upon the foregoing, the state‘s first, second, and sixth assignments of error are sustained, the third, fourth, fifth, and seventh assignments of еrror are rendered moot, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting judicial release is vacated, and this matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with law, consistent with this decision.
Judgment vacated; cause remanded.
SADLER, P.J., and TYACK, J., concur.