STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Donald OPPERMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 11440.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Nov. 12, 1976.
673
Lee M. McCahren, Vermillion, for defendant and appellant.
WINANS, Justice.
On April 15, 1975, this court reversed a judgment against petitioner because we found that the contraband used to convict petitioner had been seized pursuant to an inventory search which was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Opperman, 1975, S.D., 228 N.W.2d 152. On November 3, 1975, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari; in a 5-4 decision it reversed the judgment of this court and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. South Dakota v. Opperman, 1976, U.S., 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000. On August 26, 1976, this court granted a rehearing to ascertain whether the inventory search of petitioner‘s automobile was in violation of his rights under
We are mindful that the United States Supreme Court found that the inventory procedure followed in this case did not amount to an “unreasonable search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, supra. That decision is binding on this court as a matter of federal constitutional law. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 65 S.Ct. 459, 89 L.Ed. 789. “However, manifestly the question remains for us to decide whether it offends any of the provisions of our own constitution and we are under no compulsion to follow the United States Supreme Court in that regard.” House of Seagram v. Assam Drug Co., 1970, 85 S.D. 27, 32, 176 N.W.2d 491, 494.
There can be no doubt that this court has the power to provide an individual with greater protection under the state constitution than does the United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 1975, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570.2 This court is the final authority on interpretation and enforcement of the South Dakota Constitution.3 We have always assumed the independent nature of our state constitution regardless of any similarity between the language of that document and the federal constitution. Admittedly the language of
with what we conceive to be its plain mean-
We also find persuasive the reasoning in Lawson that for an inventory search to be reasonable, absent a warrant or circumstances constituting an exception to the warrant requirement, there must be a “minimal interference” with an individual‘s protected rights. 487 F.2d at 475. We now conclude that as a matter of protection under
Respondent argues that because petitioner failed to brief or argue the applicability of the state constitution before this court on the first appeal, this issue should be deemed abandoned.5 See Schumacher v. R-B Freight Lines, Inc., 1950, 73 S.D. 535, 45 N.W.2d 458. Admittedly petitioner did not contend that our state provision should be interpreted as giving greater individual protection than does the federal constitution; this court, however, granted a rehearing to consider that question and afforded both sides the opportunity to brief and argue that point. We find that this matter is properly before the court.6 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as a matter of state constitutional law.
DUNN, C. J., and COLER and ZASTROW, JJ., concur.
WOLLMAN, J., dissents.
WOLLMAN, Justice (dissenting).
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion issued when this case was first before us, State v. Opperman, S.D., 228 N.W.2d 152, 159, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the inventory of defendant‘s automobile did not constitute an unreasonable search within the meaning of
