State v. OnusicState v. Onusic
Decided: July 20, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Charles E. Couslon, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
John P. Laczko, John P. Laczko, LLC, City Centre One, Suite 975, 100 East Federal Street, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jacob Onusic (Onusic) appeals from the judgment оf the Lake County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without a hearing. Onusic further appeals from the underlying judgment convicting him of two counts of robbery, felonies of the third degree, two counts of kidnapping, felonies of the second degree, and one count of theft, a felony of the fifth degree.1
{¶3} Upon review, we conclude that the trial court was not required to hold a hearing on Onusic’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas as the record belies his allegations, and Onusic has not provided sufficient operative facts to warrant such a hearing. Additionally, counsel’s failurе to request a change in venue is not subject to appellate review under an ineffective assistance of counsel theory. State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 152, citing State v. Bryan, 2004-Ohio-971, ¶ 156. Finally, the trial court was not biased against Onusic. Rather, the trial court’s sentence and commentary were based upon the permissible and required considerations for felony sentencing pursuant
{¶4} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶5} On March 7, 2025, a Lake County Grand Jury indicted Onusic, by secret indictment, on ten counts: burglary, a second-degree felony, in violation of
{¶6} Onusic entered a written plea of not guilty to the indicted charges. However, on June 5, 2025, a change of plea hearing was held where Onusic entered guilty pleas to Counts 2, 4, 5, 8, and 9.2 Following an oral plea colloquy, the trial court accepted Onusic’s writtеn plea of guilty. A nolle prosequi was entered on the remaining charges.
{¶7} According to the State’s recitation of the facts at the plea colloquy, on March 7, 2022, Onusic entered a Richland County Check and Go location wearing all black clothing, a black hat, and two face masks. Onusic began shouting at the employees to put their hands up before making thеm open their cash drawers. Onusic fled out the backdoor with approximately $1,600.
{¶8} On April 25, 2022, Onusic entered an Advance America location in Medina County. Onusic followed the employee behind the cash counter demanding the employee get on his knees or [Onusic] would blow his brains out. Onusic kept his hand in his pocket to cause the employee to believe he wаs armed. Onusic requested access to a safe, which has a fifteen-minute delayed time lock. Onusic forced the employee to remain
{¶9} On May 6, 2022, Onusic entered another Advance America location in Lake County wearing a mаsk. An employee immediately recognized Onusic as the male who robbed the Medina County location. The employee pretended the computer systems were down. Onusic told the employee to put her hands up and not make any moves or he would shoot her in the face. Onusic kept a hand in his hoodie as if he had a gun. Onusic told the employee she had tеn seconds to put money in his bag and began counting down and said not to look at him or he would kill her. Onusic fled with approximately $1,879.
{¶10} Onusic was identified as the robber through collaboration between Mentor police and the FBI using CCTV from neighboring businesses, cell tower mapping, and social media records.
{¶11} Following the recitation of facts, the trial court inquired directly of Onusic and the following exchange ensued:
THE COURT: Mr. Onusic, did you hear what [the prosecutor] said that the facts would show if this case went to a trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And are those facts true?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
{¶12} Following its order for a presentence investigation and request for victim-impact statements, the trial court held a sentencing hearing on June 17, 2025. The court imposed the following terms: 12 months on Count 2; 36 months on Count 4; a definite term of 3 years on Count 5; 36 months on Count 8; and an indefinite term of 6 to 9 years on Count 9. The court ordered the terms on Count 5 and Count 9 to be served
The Appeal
{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Onusic argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Onusic’s post-sentence motion to withdraw guilty pleas because the allegations contained in the motion, if established as true, would amount to a manifest injustice. We disagree.
{¶14}
[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.
{¶15} This court has previously articulated that a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a plea should be freely and liberally granted. State v. Strmac, 2024-Ohio-2405, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). Thus, when a defendant pleads guilty to one or more crimes and later wants to withdraw that plea before he has beеn sentenced, the trial court should permit him to withdraw his plea. This is the presumption from which all other considerations must start. Strmac, quoting State v. Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486, ¶ 21.
{¶16} However, Onusic seeks to withdraw his guilty pleas post-sentence. A post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be granted to correct manifest injustice.
{¶17} In general, upon a defendant’s
{¶19} In this case, Onusic’s motion made allegations that his trial attorney lied to him regarding the delay between the underlying robberies and his prosecution, that his trial attorney promised him concurrent sentences upon a guilty plea, that this trial attorney told him he would be punished with consecutive sentences if he went to trial, and that counsel instructed him to say yes to everything even if he disagreed.5 Onusic also claims that his trial attorney improperly called his prior robberies armed robberies.
{¶20} First, the record belies the majority of Onusic’s allegations. The trial court engaged directly with Onusic during the plea colloquy and the following dialogue was exchanged:
THE COURT: Now I could give you a consecutive sentence that means one sentence after another for these separate offenses. If I did that then the maximum definite term would
be 23 years and indefinite maximum 27 years; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
. . .
THE COURT: Now, has anybody promised you that I would be lenient on you because you‘re pleading guilty today?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Has anybody promised you what I will sentence you to in this case?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
. . .
THE COURT: Have you been threatened or coerced in any way to plead guilty today?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Are you freely, knowingly and voluntarily entering your guilty plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand at the time of sentencing I do not have to follow the recommendation of either the prosecutor or your lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
{¶21} Based on this dialogue, we find Onusic was aware of the possibility of receiving consecutive sentences. Moreover, Onusic represented to the trial court that he had not been promised leniency, and the trial court explicitly warned Onusic that thе trial court was not bound by any sentencing recommendations made by his counsel or by the prosecutor.
{¶22} Second, no affidavits or other evidentiary materials were submitted to support Onusic’s claims. See State v. Tate, 2011-Ohio-3293, ¶ 41 (11th Dist.). The
{¶23} A defendant bears the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injusticе. State v. Romero, 2019-Ohio-1839, ¶ 13, citing Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. As such, the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing because Onusic has failed to establish sufficient operative facts to demonstrate that the guilty plea was coerced or induced by false promises. State v. Fabian, 2004-Ohio-6692, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), citing Kapper, 5 Ohio St.3d 36 at 38.
{¶24} Onusic’s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶25} In his second assignment of error, Onusic argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not challenge whether Lake County qualified as a proper venue for the underlying charges. We disagree.
{¶26} To obtain a reversal of a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonablenеss, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding. State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984).
{¶28} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that the failure to make objections is not alone enough to sustain a сlaim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 103. Further, debatable trial tactics do not constitute ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at ¶ 111. A licensed attorney is presumed competent, and judicial scrutiny of his performance must be highly deferential. Strickland at 689.
{¶29} We find that Onusic has failed to demonstrate his counsel’s performance was deficient. Even if counsel’s performance had been deficient by failing to request a change in venue, Onusic cannot show prejudice. Venue was proper in this case pursuant to
{¶30} Generally, a criminal defendant must be tried in the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.
When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits offenses in differеnt jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of those offenses in any jurisdiction in which
one of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses occurred.
{¶31} Here, Onusic was charged with a course of criminal conduct—the robbery of multiple Advance America locations. Pursuant to
{¶32} Onusic’s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶33} In his third assignment of error, Onusic argues that the trial court was biased against him, evidenced by comments made by the judge. We disagree.
{¶34} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court inquired why there was a delay between the robberies and the present prosecution. The State informed the court that the federal gоvernment declined to prosecute the case. Onusic takes issue with the trial court’s response to that answer:
THE COURT: So the, so if the feds didn‘t want to, you don‘t have to agree or disagree with me but the feds failed to do their job most likely because they didn‘t want to put in the work to do their job.
. . .
It seems to me from my knowledge of how the feds work that had they taken these cases then your 137 months would have shot up dramatically but they didn‘t in part because they weren‘t very confident in their job or very diligent in their job during that time frame.6
{¶36} Here, the trial court’s remarks do not demonstrate bias. Rather, they reflect the court’s consideration of the seriousness of the offense and the need to impose a sentence that adequately punishes the offender and protects the public—factors the court is required to weigh under
{¶37}
{¶38} To the extent the court’s language was critical, it was directed at the perceived handling of the matter by federal authorities, nоt at Onusic personally. Onusic makes no argument in his brief how he was prejudiced by this commentary. Instead, he merely asserts that the preceding statements from the trial court judge clearly indicate that he was not satisfied the ‘feds’ adequately punished [Onusic.] We disagree. We fail to see how the trial court’s commentary, critical of federal authorities, was biased agаinst Onusic or prejudicial to him in any way.
{¶39} Assuming arguendo the commentary could be construed negatively against Onusic, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. State v. Dean, 2010-Ohio-5070, ¶ 49, quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Here, thе commentary reveals no such favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Id.
{¶40} Onusic’s third assignment of error is without merit.
Conclusion
{¶41} For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
concur.
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error are without merit. It is the judgment of this court that the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.