58 Vt. 140 | Vt. | 1885
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The first and most important question presented by these cases is, whether or not the intoxicating liquors in. question were (in the first two cases) in contemplation of law sold, or furnished, by the respondent in the County of Rutland and State of Vermont; or (in the last two cases) held and kept for the purpose of sale, furnishing, or distribution contrary to the statute, within said county and State. The answer depends upon whether the National Express Company, by which some of said, liquors were delivered to the consignees thereof, and in whose possession the remainder were found and seized before delivery, was
The liquors were ordered by residents of Vermont from dealers doing business in the State of New York, who selected from their stock such quantities and kinds of goods as they thought proper in compliance with the terms of the orders, put them up in packages, directed them to the consignees, and delivered them to the express company as a common carrier of goods for transportation, accompanied with a bill, or invoice, for collection. The shipment was in each instance, which it is necessary here to consider, “ C. O. D. ”; and the cases show that the effect of the transaction was a direction by the shipper t'o the express company not to deliver the goods to the consignees except upon payment of the amount specified in the C. O. D. bills, together with the charges for the transportation of the packages and for the return of the money paid. This direction was understood by the express company, which received the shipments coupled therewith.
Whether or not, and when, the legal title in property sold passes from the vendor to the vendee, is always a question . of the intention of the parties, which is to be gathered from their acts, and all the facts and circumstances of the case taken together. In order that the title may pass, as was said by Morton, J., in Mason v. Thompson, 18 Pick. 305: “ The owner must intend to part with his property, and the
In the cases under consideration the vendors of the liquors shipped them in accordance with the terms of the orders received, and the mode of shipment was as above stated. They delivered the packages of liquors, properly addressed to the several persons ordering the same, to the express company, to be transported by that company and delivered by it to the consignees upon fulfillment by them of a specified condition precedent, namely; payment of the purchase price and transportation charges, and not otherwise. Attached to the very body of the contract, and to the act of delivery to the carrier, was the condition of payment before delivery of possession to the consignee. With this condition unfulfilled and not waived, it would be impossible to say that a delivery to the carrier was intended by the consignor as a delivery to the consignee, or as a surrender of the legal title. The goods were intrusted to the carrier to transport to the place of destination named, there to present them for acceptance to the consignee, and if he accepted them and paid the accompanying invoice and the transportation charges, to deliver them to him; otherwise, to notify the consignor and hold them subject to his order. It is difficult to see how a seller could more positively and une
The authorities upon the above points and principles are so numerous, and are so fully collated in the brief of the leanied counsel for the State, and in the text and notes of 2 Benj. Sales (4 Am. ed.), that we refrain from specific references in support of the conclusions at which we have arrived. These are fully supported by the decision of the U. S. District Court in Illinois in People v. Shriver, 31 Alb. L. J. 163, a case involving precisely the same question. Tkbat, J., says in the opinion: “In the case of liquor shipped by the defendant to Fairfield by express, C. O. D., the liquor is received by the express company at Shawneetown as the agent of the seller, and not as the agent of the buyer, and on its reaching Fairfield it is there held by the company, as the agent of the seller, until the consignee comes and pays the money, and then the company, as the agent of the seller, delivers the liquor to the purchaser. In such case the possession of the express com
II. It is insisted on the part of the claimant in the case of the State v. 68 Jugs, &c., that sec. 2 of No. 43 of the Acts of 1882, under which the liquors in that case were seized, is unconstitutional. Conceding the points contended for by
This section gives the officer the power to seize without warrant liquor found “under circumstances warranting the belief that it is intended for sale or distribution ” contrary to the provisions of chap. 169 R. L. It does not purport to confer the power of search; nor does anything appear to show that the officer assumed to exercise such power in this case. It simply provides for the seizure, without warrant previously issued, .of something which the law. has declared subject to seizure and condemnation, under the police power delegated by the Constitution, as an instrument intended by the owner or possessor for a use unlawful by express statute, and dangerous to the peace, health, and good morals of the community. That the article in itself may be innocuous, may be the subject of lawful ownership, or may even be susceptible of beneficial use, can no more affect the question than could the fact, that certain tools were susceptible of lawful and beneficial use in
The scope and application of Art. 5, Part 1, of the Constitution have been defined by this court in the cases above referred to, and in In re Powers, 25 Vt. 265, which has ever since been regarded as conclusive against such application of that section of the bill of rights as is here contended for by the claimant. See Gill v. Parker, 31 Vt. 610; State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 504; State v. Intox. Lig. 55 Vt. 82. In Massachusetts a statute practically identical with the one in question has been held not to contravene a similar constitutional provision. Jones v. Root, 6 Gray, 435; Mason v. Lothrop, 7 Gray, 354. The decisions in Maine are to the same effect. State v. McCann, 59 Me. 383; State v. Howley, 65 Me. 100.
III. Concerning the claim that sec. 8 of the Federal Constitution, conferring upon Congress the exclusive right to regulate commerce among the states, has application, it is sufficient to say that no regulation of or interference with interstate commerce is attempted. If an express company, or any other carrier or person, natural or corporate, has in possession within this State an article in itself dangerous to
IV. Proof of the former conviction in the cases of State v. O'Neil was properly admitted, notwithstanding the conviction appeared to have been more than three years before the trial. No provision of' the statute requires that the former conviction must have been within three years, and we have no authority to add such a provision to the law, as it is plainly and unambiguously framed by the legislature. The reason for the limitation of prosecutions for the offenses charged in these cases to a period within three years from the time of commission, as for all similar limitations, is that a person should not be called upon to answer to a legal accusation after such a long time has elapsed as would, in the estimation of the law, make it difficult or im
Y. The constitutional inhibition of cruel and unusual punishments, or excessive fines or bail, has no application. The punishment imposed by statute for the offense with which the respondent, O’Neil, is charged, cannot be said to be excessive or oppressive. If he has subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because he has committed a great many such offenses. It would scarcely be competent for a person to assail the constitutionality of the statute prescribing a punishment for burglary, on the ground that he had committed so many burglaries that, if punishment for each were inflicted on him, he might be kept in prison for life. The mere fact that cumulative punishments may be imposed for distinct offenses in the same prosecution is not material upon this question. If the penalty were unreasonably severe for a single offense, the constitutional question might be urged; but here the unreasonableness is only in the number of offenses which the respondent has committed.
The inevitable deduction from what has been said under the first point is, that the respondent, O’Neil, by what he did in respect of the transactions in question, made the express company his agent; and as what was done by such agent in the execution of the authority and instructions directly given by him committed offenses against the statute, O’Neil must be held responsible. That he was innocent of any purpose or intent to break the law, and was unaware that what he did was contrary to law, cannot avail him in defence. State v. Comings, 28 Vt. 508.