*1
Court 23, 1987. Nov. *4 (J. Curran, Jr., Joseph
Ann Gen. Singleton, Atty. E. Asst. brief), Baltimore, Gen., appellant. on Atty. filed by appellee.
No or brief argument C.J., ELDRIDGE, MURPHY, and Argued before COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS, and BLACKWELL, JJ.
ADKINS, Judge. (1982 Art. Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.),
Md.Code § illegal controlled property, including deals with forfeiture of or dangerous (CDS), property and used intended substances manufacture, delivery, the to be used connection with Motor transportation those substances. packaging, among property the kinds of (conveyances) vehicles are 297(a)(4)(iii) But as to them encompassed by statute. the § provides: provisions
No forfeited conveyance shall be under any of the section to the extent interest this neither nor should conveyance of the knew have who to be used in known that the was used or was conveyance subtitle____ violation of this a question conveyance by The us is owned before whether by subject and entirety husband wife tenants one well spouse forfeiture under 297 when aware transport and to distribute the vehicle was used to CDS paraphernalia, and related but other—the innocent 297(a)(4)(iii) spouse—was pro- not. Our is that answer (or spouse tects his or her interest in the the innocent vehicle) in these circumstances. Because of nature of tenancy Toyota Truck entirety, the involved subject the case is not to forfeiture. and Craig
The facts be may quickly sketched. Debra Kessler, wife, Toyota husband and owned a 1984 truck. It is not that it as tenants disputed was owned them entirety. police On 15 June 1985 a officer observed the truck, in it, cocaine and suspected saw substance occupants, Craig Lindsey. arrested the Kessler and Edward quanti- officer searched the truck and found substantial cocaine, ties of some marijuana, paraphernalia. CDS opinion of cocaine found quantity type officer’s Craig indicated an intent to Kessler was found distribute. guilty violating the and in due course the CDS laws State sought to obtain forfeiture truck. *5 hearing City,
At a the Circuit Court for Baltimore Kesslers) (the and the that all of the parties stipulated State of motor requirements relating to forfeiture procedural relating met. The facts to the vehicle and vehicles had been Craig pres- its contents on 15 June 1985 and to Kessler’s agreed all to. Kessler ence on that occasion were Debra testimony ample testified. On the basis with record, B. found as a support Judge Steinberg in the Marvin Kessler an owner of the truck and had fact that Mrs. was vehicle____” found, “a real interest in this He also record, in the ample support knew, convey- that the she neither nor should have known used, used in violation of the ance was ... was I find that as a fact. Subtitle.
Later, comprehensive opinion, Judge in a careful and Stein- findings, reiterated those factual concluded that Mrs. berg 297(a)(4)(iii)’s“innocent Kessler entitled to owner” § defense, of the nature of a tenan- and decided that because could not be forfeited. He so cy by entirety, vehicle affirmed in a Special Appeals ordered. The well- Court Gilbert, Judge reasoned Chief State v. One opinion Truck, Md.App. We Toyota Special certiorari and now affirm the Court of granted Appeals. question Judge Steinberg’s does not
Before us the State Instead, of statu- fact-finding. argues that as matter 297(a)(4)(iii) “owner” in tory interpretation, word “lienholder,” that the “innocent owner” should be read commer- defense is not to a vehicle owner where a available involved; that even if the “innocent cial transaction is available, defense is the forfeiture statute contem- owner” owners, knowl- plates multiple guilty the case others; to all the and that edge imputed of one must be imputed knowledge argument rejected, even if the from entirety exempt held should not be conveyance require forfeiture. These contentions us to construe 297(a)(4)(iii)and to the nature and status of tenan- review *6 to a first proceed in We entirety Maryland. cy by the of 297. pertinent aspects of discussion § 27, History 297 Legislative of Art. I. § 1970, as 403, Acts of by was enacted Ch. Section 297 Act Dangerous Substances Uniform Controlled part on the Act). The modelled (the Maryland Act was Maryland Act) (the prom Act Uniform Substances Uniform Controlled in Laws on Uniform State the Commissioners ulgated by designed Act The Uniform U.L.A. 187 1970. 9 the among subject state on uniformity laws to achieve law, the Federal particularly them and federal between Act of and Control Drug Abuse Prevention Comprehensive 91-513, 1236 Act), 84 No. Stat. (the Federal Pub.L. (1982)).1 at 21 801-966 (codified as amended U.S.C. §§ forfeiture, as Act 505 of the Uniform deals Section 505(a)(4),corre Act. Section Maryland does the § 297(a)(4), conveyances, to concerns forfeiture sponding § four The Uniform Act includes including motor vehicles. conveyances provisions. to One exceptions defenses defense, 505(a)(4)(i), appears carrier” is the “common Maryland Act. Sec. form in the in identical almost 297(a)(4)(a). A second is a version of an “innocent owner” 505(a)(4)(h) subject a vehicle otherwise defense. Under § act offending if or omission forfeiture would be Mary or consent. knowledge without the owner’s occurred Act than of this the Federal rather land’s version tracked if act or Act, protected only Uniform possession in occurred while the vehicle was omission of a violation other than the owner reason some person car). 297(a)(4)(b) (e.g., law a Compare of criminal stolen 881(a)(4)(B). Maryland Act with 21 The U.S.C. § provision Act contained a looked to Uniform also convey interest in a protection security of the holder Act, uniformity, Maryland Despite 1. the stated interest in variations, and addi- adopted in "contains numerous omissions compared cannot Act] matter to the Uniform which [when tional clearly by statutory indicated notes.” 9 U.L.A. at 191. 505(a)(4)(iv). Act, like the Federal Maryland Sec. The anee. Act, provision.2 omitted such
Thus, Act, so Maryland pertained in 1970 the far as vehicles, the Uniform Act motor differed from and no ex no “innocent owner” defense former contained lienholders, while the latter did.3 press protection for extensively Act was amended Ch. Orth, changes Judge noted of 1972. Those are Acts Van, v. One 1983 Chevrolet Court, State this also see 327, 330-331, (1987); Judge A.2d 52-53 State opinion Special Appeals for the Court of Moylan’s Plymouth, 318-325, 507 Md.App. *7 present purposes, enough say For it is to 637-640 looking added to the changes provisions protec- that these in vehicles. security of of interests forfeited tion holders 297(f)-(u). Thus, in they subject addressed covered Sec. the Act. Maryland omitted from 1970 the Uniform Act but addition, guidelines for provided police In extensive they (g)-(i)) 297 as (§ 297(f)) Attorneys (§ State’s officers In (§ (j)-(o)). 297 procedural provisions well as detailed addition, specific added some di- 1972 amendments proceeding (§ to the a forfeiture 297 handling rections court so, brought Maryland in into motor (p)-(q)), doing they concept in the forfeiture law another embodied vehicle security problem, 2. the federal treatment interest see For 881(d), 171.13(b). § U.S.C. and 19 C.F.R. § U.S.C. “conveyance" provisions, 3. While the Federal Act’s like those of the defense, Act, Maryland no owner” the Federal Act contained "innocent portion dealing provide for such a defense in the forfeiture did money Property this sort under and the like. was forfeitable appropriate "except property that no shall be circumstances forfeited owner, by paragraph, to the of the interest of an under this extent any omission established that owner to have been reason act or knowledge consent that or omitted without or committed 881(a)(6). comparable provision in 21 U.S.C. the 1970 owner.” 297(a)(6), Maryland without "innocent owner” Act was but comparable provision language. the Uniform Act. There- is no “inno Act—the in the 1970 Act but not Uniform owner” defense.4 cent that Assembly instructed 297(p) the General new § ... may owner hearing, any [judicial] the scheduled
[a]t vehicle was that the motor competent evidence show or that he used of this subtitle fact in violation known the motor nor should have neither knew was to be so used. vehicle was being, Upon the used, motor was not so determination that the vehicle released to the order the motor vehicle be court shall [Emphasis supplied.] owner. 297(q)), hand (§
On the other
If
decides that the vehicle
hearing
after a full
court
subtitle or that
owner
this
used in violation of
known that the motor vehicle was
knew or should have
used,
being, or was
be so
the court shall order that the
plied.]
motor
[5]
vehicle
be forfeited
the State.
[Emphasis sup
concerned,
far
matters
thus until
So
as we are now
stood
year
549 of that
made further
extensive
Chapter
1984.
changes.
Judge
explained
Orth
part,
For
most
unlikely
portion
legislation
4.
It is not
this
of the 1972
was in
Greer,
response
direct
to decisions of this Court. In State v.
263 Md.
(1971),
George’s
284 A.2d
and in Pr.
Co. v. Blue Bird
Cab,
(1971),
we held that
*8
was not a
under
act. In
innocence
defense
forfeiture
the 1970
Blue
law,
pointed
pre-1970
Bird Cab we also
out that
owner inno-
under
State,
Corp.
cence had been a defense. See Commercial Credit
258
748,
(1970).
265 A.2d
provision
5. The
Act also
an "innocent
inserted
owner”
into
297(f),
(f)(2)
guidelines
police
provided
officers. Subsection
(and
provides)
still
[a] motor vehicle used in
of this
shall not be
violation
subtitle
seized and
shall hot be
to the
forfeiture
recommended
State’s
Attorney when:
See also §
another and
lia to be
owner.
such
(ii)
person
An innocent
297(f)(2)(i).
brought
causes
latter or someone invited into the motor vehicle
[******]
into the vehicle without the
controlled
registered
dangerous
owner lends his motor vehicle to
substances or
knowledge
parapherna-
of the
331-333, 524 A.2d at
Van,
No be any the interest of owner of to the extent of this section neither knew nor should have known conveyance who in used or used conveyance was be violation of this subtitle. looked when Judge Steinberg is this to which language
It
along
findings.
language,
It is this
he made his factual
entirety, upon
tenancy by
law about
with
Toyota
he decided the
truck should
which he relied when
factors
deemed decisive
forfeited. The same
were
be
Special Appeals.
Court
297(a)(4)(iii)
II. Construction
of §
out
by pointing
The
attacks those results
State
1984,
Acts of
was the
purpose
that the chief
of Ch.
the legislative
of lienholders. Since that was
protection
297(a)(4)(iii)
asserts,
should be construed
goal, it
new §
read
it,
in so
“owner” should
light
doing,
word
goal.
in order to
consistent with that
“lienholder”
legislative goals
objectives ordinarily
notion that
State’s
sound.
interpreting
a statute is
should be considered
513-515,
Baltimore,
309 Md.
City
Kaczorowski v.
as to the
632-633
So is its view
legislation.
of the 1984
One 1983
primary purpose
Van,
purpose
noted that the
of Ch.
Judge Orth
Chevrolet
“
dealerships
on
hardship
549 was
'to alleviate the
worked
a secured interest in a motor vehicle which has been
”
arrests.’
drug
seized and forfeited
connection with
flatly:
Legisla
Md. at
To Kaczo of the statute.” at the words aim, or we look policy 632. Sometimes 513, 525 A.2d at rowski, Md. at not import in and clear its in will be so question language full effect give will result that we any absurd productive at 633. word 525 A.2d Id. at meaning. to its include “lienholder” enough to certainly broad “owner” (see 297(g)), defined former 549 was so prior and to Ch. § it give only one would ordinary parlance in but Moreover, it is suggested by the State. meaning restrictive Assembly Ch. the General that when it wrote apparent lienholder, distinguish a and how to describe a knew how to to do it intended general, in when from an owner lienholder the chief law (“requiring See, the title Ch. e.g., so. any and se the owner officer to determine enforcement sale 297(a)(8) (“holder of an installment party”); cured § and 297(f)(3)(determination of “the names agreement”); § parties”); and secured registered of all owners addresses interest (various dealing security provisions 297(j) § party). and a secured 297(a)(4)(iii)was not some point, more to the
But even § of Ch. 549 purpose the chief novel notion inconsistent with mistake. As legislative some through inserted therein defense seen, “innocent owner” concept of an we have in the had embodied forfeiture cases been in motor vehicle All 549 did was restate Act since 1972. Ch. in 297. place a different and move it to provision slightly (1984). In the form out as 549 started S.B. Ch. Senate, the most accomplished, it passed which generated that had protection purposes lienholder part, the more, 297(p) (q) repealed It also it. It did however. the “innocent owner” had set forth which combination lien- protect the measure was to purpose defense. The holders, suggests nothing legislative history its but owners.” Per- designed penalize also “innocent it was *10 haps this, recognizing the House Judiciary pro- Committee posed 297(a)(4)(iii), amendment that became its lan- § guage taken partly from former (p) (q) subsections and respects in other reminiscent of the federal “innocent own- er” expressed 881(a)(6); defense in 21 U.S.C. n. see § Thus, supra. concepts the new of Ch. 549 were adopted provisions while consistent of former law were retained repealed. rather than
Like the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and the Court of
Special Appeals,
297(a)(4)(iii)
we read “owner” in
as at the
§
least including the actual
a motor vehicle.
next argues
State
the “innocent owner”
defense should be restricted to circumstances that do not
in
trafficking
drugs—that is,
involve
might
what
charac
be
simple possession cases,
terized as
opposed
to possession
with intent to
In
distribute cases.
ultimate analysis this
argument is based on
language
some
in 1982
Plymouth,
Md.App.
case,
507 A.2d
In
633.
police seized an
automobile and recommended forfeiture pursuant
297(f). The trial judge found that no sale
drugs
had
§
occurred and that none of the other
specified
criteria
297(f)(1)was present. These criteria focus
on
strongly
§
commercial drug transactions in attempting to explain to an
officer the
circumstances which forfeiture must be rec
ommended. The judge further concluded that a vehicle
forfeited,
could not
judicially
be
unless “at least one of the
satisfied____”
criteria
Subsection F
at
Md.App.
[is]
314,
under
297 is
67 Md.App. at
A.2d at 637. The court
on
went
to hold that
(f)
subsection
does not contain an additional set of preconditions for
forfeiture, but merely guidelines for
police—guidelines
the implementation of which are not
reviewable
a court
in a forfeiture proceeding.
at
Id.
III. Owner’s (as if urge next is that even position State’s to is available held) we the “innocent owner” defense have indicated, is drug transaction where commercial imputed must to all other knowledge guilty owner disagree. owners. We (perhaps argument,
At the outset of this the State an to the trial fact-find- judge’s effort undercut unassailable herring by suggesting red ings) treats us to a whiff of erroneously placed on the burden of Judge Steinberg Br. of an State’s at proving owner. non-innocence Judge Steinberg 21-22. This nonsense. said that is “[sec- to (a)(4)(iii) tion 297 is an affirmative defense [motor vehicle] proceedings” that Mrs. Kessler had forfeiture estab- goal, adoption 6. in the context of the initial 1972 of the "innocent That holdings provision, may have been override our owner” well to Act, defense, owner was not a under 1970 innocence 4, pre-1970 contrary. supra. to restore law to the See n. Both note, Cab, George’s State v. Greer and Pr. Co. v. Blue Bird cited in that sales involved of CDS. 184
lished that defense. State’s App. at 47-48. He correct. was Ford, 147, See State v. One 72 App. 527 A.2d (1987)(once shown, illicit use vehicle vehicle is presumptively subject to forfeiture and burden is on to owner show exemption). entitlement to start,
After this false the State cites a number of which, it, according cases to support notion that this knowledge case Mr. Kessler’s imputed should have been holds, his wife. None of the cases so suggests. even so start We with United States One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette, (E.D.Pa.1975). F.Supp. In that case a owned by vehicle husband and wife as tenants was entirety seized because it used by the husband in illicit activities of which the wife was unaware. The court however, ordered forfeiture. It said nothing, imputa- about tion knowledge husband’s wife. In discussing doctrine, the “innocent owner” the court cited Calero-Tole- Co., do v. Pearson Yacht Leasing U.S.
S.Ct. (1974), 40 L.Ed.2d which noted statutes, that under federal forfeiture “the innocence of the of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniform- ly rejected been as a defense.” The Supreme went Court *12 explain, on to dicta, way problems that constitutional if an might arise owner’s property subject to forfeiture had taken from (by been him a wrongdoer) without his privity or
consent.
the same
“Similarly,
might be said
anof
proved
who
not
that he
only
was uninvolved in and unaware
wrongful
activity,
the
but also that he had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent
proscribed
the
for,
use
his
in
property;
circumstance,
it would be
difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate pur-
poses and was not unduly oppressive.”
at
689-
U.S.
2094-2095,
In that context—the federal constitutional “innocent own-
er” concept—the United States District Court considered
whether the wife had “done all that reasonably could be
property”—
use of
prevent
proscribed
to
expected
[her]
that her own
entirety—and
concluded
the car owned
history precluded
criminal
past
knowledge of her husband’s
de-
constitutional
possible
reliance on this
her successful
course,
stat-
F.Supp. at 348. Of
fense. 393
do “all
that an “innocent owner”
require
not
ute does
use
prevent
proscribed
to
reasonably
expected
could be
it
she
an owner
requires only that
property;”
of [her]
neither knew
in the vehicle and “who
who has “an interest”
used or
conveyance
that the
was
nor should have known
in
Sec.
of this subtitle.”
was to be used
violation
297(a)(4)(iii).
(Del.Su
Electra,
State One
2325:
then
Del.C.
involved what was
per.Ct.1973),
not
to
forfeiture shall
subchapter
respect
“This
...
has
or
the owner of
vehicle who
apply
against
in
in, or
vehicle to be used
knowingly
permitted
used or
A
with,
felony____”
of a
vehicle
connection
the commission
wife. The hus
joint
titled
names of husband and
was
The court
felony.
it in the commission of a
band used
treating
this result by
ordered it forfeited.
It reached
law. Under
ownership
joint
and several under Delaware
or wife as
theory
could treat either husband
husband; thus, the
lack of
owner. It so treated the
wife’s
line
was
186 use her State, husband. Amrani-Khaldi v. 575 S.W.2d 667, (Tex.Civ.App.1978).7 668
None
these
remotely suggests
cases even
knowledge
a guilty
tenant
must or
entirety
may
imputed
even
to the other in the context of an
“innocent
defense.
It
just
owner”
would seem
reason
to hold
able
“innocent”
non-knowledge
tenant’s
be imputed
guilty
should
to the
one.
In any
Mary
event
(in
area)
land cases hold
the entireties
that one spouse is
not,
alone,
by that
agent
other,
fact
an
for the
Arbesman v.
Winer,
282,
298
(1983);
Md.
Molloy,
291 Md.
IV.
and §
string
The last
to the
if
State’s bow
“[e]ven
knowledge of a
is not
guilty
imputed
to other owners
297(a)(4)(iii),
under
conveyances held in
by the
tenancy
entireties are not exempt from forfeiture under
297.”
State’s Br. at
supporting
29. The
argument proposes that
statutory
divorce,
forfeiture
regarded
should be
like
as a
inway which a tenancy by the entirety can be severed.
In
alternative,
it is asserted that forfeiture should be
treated like
equitable remedy
partition,
or that the
7. These
probably
longer
Arizona and Texas
are
good
cases
no
law in
statutory changes favoring
view
the innocent owner defense. See
Van,
Dodge
(App.1986);
re
Ariz.
P.2d 683
and 1972
State,
Pickup
rev'd,
Chevrolet
Truck v.
(Tex.App.1985),
187 done.” wrong has been “where terminated should be estate in reviewed must be These contentions Br. at 38. State’s law the common adherence to staunch Maryland’s of light 309 Md. Dyer, Bruce v. entirety. by tenancy view states 777, (1987) (“Although some 426, 780 421, 524 A.2d the estate altered significantly either abolished have in estate retains the Maryland the entireties ... tenancy by form”). traditional its character restated the recently have so
Because we
Bruce,
Arbesman
supra,
entirety,
tenancy
istics
Beall,
(1983), Beall v.
Winer, 298 Md.
282,
Of there which Absolute may parties. severed without consent of both But occurs example. divorce is an obvious result relation an divorce terminates the marital because absolute A divorce ship upon tenancy depends. limited which not Bruce, does have that effect. 309 Md. 428 n. at at 781 n. 1. Forfeiture does mar- not terminate the and so riage tenancy does terminate the the manner divorce does. operate
Nor does forfeiture
like eminent do
domain,
main.
the case of eminent
taken
property is
*15
from its
by public authority
public pur
owners
for some
See,
Ill,
40;
pose.
Md. Const. Art.
City
Stevens v.
of
775,
(1965);
240 Md.
214
Salisbury,
A.2d
778
Phila.,
Co.,
336, 339-40,
v.
B.
Riden
& W. R.R.
182 Md.
35
99,
101
Neither owner need act
bring
to
Moreover,
eminent
into play.
domain
it is not necessarily
taking
true that a
by eminent domain
or
severs
terminates a
tenancy
by
entirety. North
Highway
Carolina State
258,
(1967)
Comm’n v.
270
Myers,
N.C.
The State cites One 1971 Chevrolet
supra,
to the
holding
contrary, but it does not.
is true
It
that the case
out
points
that forfeiture
anis
in rem action
vehicle,
against the
and not primarily concerned with title or
ownership.
F.Supp.
at 347. But in that case there was
no “innocent
to apply.
owner” statute
In this case we are
concerned
or ownership
with title
because the
says
statute
we should
Abe.
vehicle cannot be forfeited “to the extent
owner____”
interest
any
Sec.
[innocent]
entirety,
ownership
is
297(a)(4)(iii). Where
vehicle, and
one
in the
where
interest
extent is the whole
“innocent,”
may not be
is
the vehicle
entirety
tenant
itself does
a forfeiture action
The institution of
forfeited.
297(a)(4)(iii).
purposes
tenancy
not sever the
this
argument change
partition
State’s
Nor does the
Masterman,
It
on
result.
relies Masterman
(1916),
That case dealt
inapposite.
A.
but the case
Acts
a
affected
Property
the Married Women’s
with how
profits
for entireties
to deal with rents
right
husband’s
wrongful withholding of
and with a husband’s
property
for the
proceeds
property,
needed to maintain the
insurance
equity might
That a court of
of both tenants.
benefit
does not
cope
problem surely
with this
appoint
receiver
proceed-
of a forfeiture
compel
bringing
that the
us
hold
entirety.
ing
“partitions”
tenancy
somehow
involving
cases
no
with its other
The State fares
better
Shields,
In
224 Kan.
re
“wrongdoing.”
Estate of
husband,
(1978), a wife murdered her
These the problem potential cases all deal with of enrich ment of a wrongdoing entirety tenant when tenancy has of wrong been severed because his her own case, severed, ful act. But in this not tenancy has been and Mrs. Kessler is of no guilty wrongdoing. The problem the “slayer’s implicated.8 rule” is not
The State avers that our affirmance Court will Special Appeals produce efforts avoid undesirable through titling forfeiture use of entire- conveyances by the and that is ty, this inconsistent with the harsh application See, the forfeiture law that have many we noted in cases. Cab, Greer, and Blue Bird e.g., Mustang, One 1967 Ford supra, all and Pr. Co. George’s Opel, v. One 1969 267 Md. surely A.2d 168 But are not we to assume the legislature was unaware of the existence tenan- by the entirety adopted cies when it the “innocent owner” defense. And the “harsh in the law” statements cases cited point perception all to a that the legislature intended harsh- short, ness. we read harshly the law as as the General it; Assembly the “innocent writes owner” defense obvi- ously mitigate intended to supra. harshness. nn. 4 See & Since that defense factually legally was both applicable here, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. TO BE BY COSTS PAID APPELLANT.
McAULIFFE, Judge, dissenting: holds majority Legislature that the must have intend- to protect ed interest of property drug peddler addition to that his spouse innocent , because it did expressly provide the termination of the estate of tenan- *17 by the I cy entirety. respectfully disagree. The legislative history traced the by majority demonstrates that the Gener- Maryland dealing generally wrongdoer
8. For
law
with a
who should
act,
Ford,
by
not benefit
or
his
her own
see Ford v.
(1986) (discusses
"slayer’s rule”).
A.2d 389
the
in its
of
has been strict
use
Assembly
al
against drug merchants.
weapon in the war
as a
forfeiture
specific pro-
include
declined to
Legislature originally
The
inter-
security
or
holders
for innocent co-owners
tections
the common law
ests,
consistent with
entirely
an approach
punishment
not an additional
forfeiture is
concept that
individual,
against the
an in
action
an
but
rem
against
v.
Fin., Pr. Geo’s Co.
offending article. See Director of
(1983).
607, 618-19,
When owner, carefully. it did so It forfeiture prohibited innocent of a common case of an innocent owner entirely the an hire, the case of unlawful or vehicle carrier Md.Code conveyance. of an innocent owner’s possession Yol., Art. (1957, Repl. Cum.Supp.) 297(a)(4)(i) (ii). As other innocent owner situa- & to all however, “to the extent tions, prohibited only forfeiture 297(a)(4)(iii). Art. The the interest” of that owner. respect an innocent co-own- Legislature intent of the prohibited, is not conveyance is clear. er Forfeiture of protected. co-owner must be the interest of innocent but interpreted to persuaded may I am that the statute intent, notwithstanding the legislative full effect to give parties in this as by the vehicle case was owned out that an entirety. majority points The tenants not or terminat- ordinarily may entireties estate be severed spouse during the unilateral act of either coverture. ed mean, however, not Legislature may does That property for loss of the termination of provide spouse, omissions one tenancy a result acts or Legislature accomplished by is has precisely what certain property forfeiture of under circum- providing for stances. is an key point to be made here that when order entered, tenancy destroyed
forfeiture is because title *18 passes to the immediately appropriate governmental author- ity. Certainly that was the case when innocent owner exist, defense did not and a culpable spouse could defeat the tenancy by subjected acts that vehicle forfeiture. It is no less the case when forfeiture continues to permit- be ted, but interest of an innocent protected. co-owner is co-owner,
Where there is an innocent
the vehicle should
be sold and the interest of
protected
that owner
an
by
appropriate
of the proceeds.
distribution
Where there is an
lienholder,
innocent
the sale will be accomplished by that
party. Although tenants
entirety are seised of the
equal portions,
whole and not of
recognized
we have
presumption
upon
that each owns half
termination of the
tenancy.1
Assn.,
Meyers
v. Loan & Sav.
139 Md.
(1922).
Gunter,
The consequences of the majority holding may not great significance economic in this case. The motor vehicle lien, is subject a and the interest of the culpable spouse However, may be substantial. the principle established is today equally applicable to the seizure of a jet aircraft used for the smuggling drugs. If such an aircraft is owned husband wife as tenants the entirety, and if spouse of the smuggler can demonstrate his or innocence, her nothing could be forfeited—not the aircraft —not even the smuggler’s interest in the aircraft.
I would reverse. MURPHY, C.J., RODOWSKY, J., have authorized me to say they join in this dissenting opinion. presumption apply
1. The
property
being
does not
when
is
character-
purpose
ized as nonmarital or
granting monetary
marital for the
Rather,
award.
acquire
property
source of the funds used to
Zich,
256, 271-72,
considered. Grant v.
300 Md.